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PREFACE 
This book is the revised version of my doctoral dissertation (Doctor of 
Philosophy in Religious Studies) that was submitted at the University of 
Stellenbosch in 2000 under the title, The Churches and the Development Debate: 
The promise of a fourth generation approach. The decision to publish the 
dissertation five years after the initial submission stems from my conviction that 
its essential argument of a fourth generation approach to strategic development 
involvement remains as valid and important as before. As the recalling of the 
ecumenical interest in the issue of development in this book clearly testifies, 
Christian theology and the community of churches that it aspires to serve can by 
no means be regarded as mere newcomers to the debate on and practical 
concern with development. Although perhaps often sidelined by the mainstream 
(secular) actors in the development enterprise, the contribution of this sector to 
the advancement of a people-centred development discourse and practice – 
which is nothing less that an overt agenda for greater justice, sustainability and 
inclusiveness in our contemporary society – cannot be underestimated. 
I for one remain convinced about the contribution that the Christian theological 
and church sector could make to the ideal of meaningful development. Whereas 
this statement can be taken as a reference to society in general, I specifically also 
have in view here my own South African context in which a concern with 
development has today, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, become 
a noticeable issue of concern in academic theological and religious reflection. 
Indeed, I would like to go so far as to claim that in the context of South Africa 
this newly found interest in the issue of development could be seen as an 
integral and significant part of the post-apartheid quest for new constructive 
social discourse, a discourse that in short may contribute meaningfully to the 
challenge of social reconstruction and positive societal change. 
The argument for an investment in fourth generation modes of thinking about 
and participation in development in this book – an understanding of strategic 
development involvement that has been formulated first in the work of well-
known alternative social thinker David Korten but which also underlies the 
thinking in a larger corpus of social sciences literature – I believe challenges the 
Christian theological and church sector in South Africa and elsewhere in a 
radical way. My underlying thesis in this book is that it captures a new mode of 
authentic participation for the churches in development, yet it is at the same 
time a mode of participation that challenges the very nature of conventional 
theological and ecclesiastical thinking and practice. In a nutshell, what is at stake 
here is nothing less than a new mode of inclusive, participatory and supportive 
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thinking and action with others in the development sphere, a new mode of 
solidarity with the agendas of others that is demanded by a new societal epoch.  
The publication of this book coincides with and is the direct outcome of the 
new opportunity I have had in the last three years to work in the Unit for 
Religion and Development Research at the University of Stellenbosch. This has 
been made possible by a number of people, whom I sincerely want to thank: 
Prof. Walter Claassen, vice-rector of research at the University of Stellenbosch, 
who continues to support my academic career in a considerable way; Prof. 
Jurgens Hendriks, head of the Dept. of Practical Theology and Missiology at 
Stellenbosch University, who has been instrumental in my appointment at 
Stellenbosch; and Drr. Khotso Mokhele and Prins Nevhutalu, respectively 
President of the National Research Foundation (NRF) and Executive Director: 
Institutional Capacity Development at the same institution, who have enabled 
substantial financial support for my appointment at Stellenbosch. 
Finally, a number of other people also need to be thanked for their contribution 
towards this publication: Prof. Edwin Hees, who has proof-read and improved 
the text in a meticulous way; Mr. Wikus van Zyl, who patiently took 
responsibility for this publication at AFRICAN SUN MeDIA; and Me. Elize 
Julius, who assisted competently in aspects of the publication.  
 
Ignatius Swart 
Stellenbosch 2006 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any development work of the churches must be seen in the 
theological and organizational setting of the ecumenical movement, 
even when not directly connected with that movement. The 
ecumenical movement has opened new dimensions of awareness to 
the fundamental issues of the developing world. It has brought into 
the discussion of Christian responsibility people with radically 
different perspectives. It has thrown social issues into a new 
context and given inescapable immediacy and urgency to the plight 
of the poorer nations. It has brought vitality, and also confusion into 
the theological and philosophical debates on a Christian 
understanding of man, society and history. It has also required the 
forging of new conceptions of the Church and churches’ 
participation in society. Richard Dickinson (1968:47)  
For more reasons than one, the contemporary theological and ecclesiastical 
concern with the issue of development leads us back to what can be called the 
ecumenical theological debate on development. We may begin by putting this 
statement into the following historical perspective: 
Firstly, the theological and ecclesiastical concern with development originated 
within the very realm of what is popularly referred to in Christian theological 
and church circles as the ‘ecumenical movement’. As indicated in ecumenical 
literature itself, it is a concern and debate that especially took off after the 
World Council of Churches’ (WCC’s) World Conference on Church and 
Society at Geneva in 1966.1 Consequently, this event marked the beginning of a 
                                                          
1 Whereas development as an officially launched nation-state project is generally recognised to have started 
after World War II - which is well indicated by the United Nations’ partitioning of this official period into 
a succession of ‘development decades’ (see, for instance, how this historical determination is indicated in 
essays by Wolfgang Sachs (1993:1-5; 1993a:102-115) and Gustavo Esteva (1993:6-25) in The Development 
Dictionary) - it is commonly recognised by writers from the ecumenical movement that the church and 
theological sector itself only started to engage seriously with the issue of development after the above-
mentioned conference at Geneva (see e.g. Dickinson 1991:269; Itty 1974:6-7; 1967:352). This recognition of 
the churches’/ecumenical movement’s relatively late entry into the worldwide concern for development 
(when compared with development’s earlier beginnings as an official nation-state project of world-wide 
proportions) is, for instance, well captured by Ans van der Bent in her book on vital ecumenical concerns: 
“Hardly any theme and concern has been so inadequately handled in official ecumenical statements during 
the period 1948-1965 than that of economic and integral development. A naïve and romantic conviction 
prevailed that once poor peoples in the Third World obtain a minimum of technology and are profiting 
from “the benefits of more-machine-production”, the process of development will move in the right 
direction and the living standards of a large part of the population will be raised ... Only in 1966 did the 
Geneva World Conference on Church and Society make a serious attempt on the part of the WCC to 
understand the revolutionary realities which shape the modern world. It made the issue of world 
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strikingly fruitful period of reflections and writings on the theme of 
development within the theological and organisational setting of the WCC, but 
also other related branches of the ecumenical movement, such as in southeast 
Asia in particular.2 Having made this observation, it is necessary to add here that 
contributions from other representations of Christian theology and the churches 
only followed at a relatively later stage.3  
Secondly, the ecumenical movement, through the formations referred to above, 
presents us with the bulk of theological literature on the theme of development, 
at least up to a particular point in time.4 Following from the later entry of other 
groups into the development debate, we encounter a longer, substantial period 
of serious grappling with the issue of development only in the case of the above-
mentioned movement. What is referred to here is a confined and clearly 
demarcated core of literature that first of all emerged in the theological and 
organisational setting of the WCC over the last three to four decades and that in 
actual fact only encompasses a relatively small group of writers leading the 
ecumenical debate on development. It is a debate that can be traced back to 
                                                                                                                                              
economic development a major concern of the churches and stressed that large contributions from the rich 
nations are needed and deep changes in world economic and political structures are required if global 
economic growth is to be achieved.” (1986:282-283) 
2 In the construction of the ecumenical theological debate in the first three chapters of this study, writings 
and perspectives from the latter branch will accordingly constitute an important complement to those 
coming from the direct circle of the WCC (see also the next paragraph in the main discussion above for 
the names of those southeast Asian journals that constitute part of our frame of reference). Having said 
this, it will be necessary to acknowledge here the prominent place taken by scholars of southeast Asian 
descent in the conceptualisation over the years of the official WCC perspective on development itself - 
persons such as Samuel Parmar, C I Itty, C T Kurien, M M Thomas and Gnana Robinson. 
3 (1) It is in fact only in the 1980s that more serious reflections on the specific theme of development 
within what may broadly be defined as the evangelical movement in Christianity are encountered. Here 
the two publications especially worth mentioning are a series of conference and consultation papers 
published respectively in Sider, R J (ed.) 1981. Evangelicals and Development: Toward a Theology of Social 
Change. Exeter: The Paternoster Press, and Samuel, V and Sudgen, C (eds.) 1987. The Church in Response 
to Human Need. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. See particularly in these publications the respective 
introductory contributions by Ronald Sider (1981:9-12) and Vinay Samuel and Chris Sugden (1987:viii-xii) 
for overviews of the unfolding of a development concern in evangelical circles. 
 (2) Taking the present author’s own particular South African theological and church context as a further 
case in point, it can be noted that a more explicit reflection on the theme of development followed at an 
even later stage. The first notable initiative here came from a group of researchers (theologians and non-
theologians) predominantly from Afrikaner and Dutch Reformed descent, who under the leadership of J J 
Kritzinger engaged in an extensive research project on the role of religion in development from 1987-1990. 
While it can be noted that the latter project resulted in a substantial number of articles published on the 
subject of religion/church and development in the years 1989-1991 (see Kritzinger 1991:10-11), it has, 
however, been a series of studies and reports emanating from the conferences on “Church and 
Development” held annually by the Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa (EFSA) Institute from 
1992-1997 that have come to present researchers with the bulk of literature on the theme of 
religion/church and development in the South African context. (See in this case the following 
publications that have to date been published by the EFSA Institute: Church and Development: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (1992); Transition and Transformation: A Challenge to the Church (1994); The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP): The Role of the Church, Civil Society and NGOs 
(1995).) 
4 See the previous footnote. 
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articles published in The Ecumenical Review as far back as 1967,5 but also to a 
series of monographs, collective studies emanating from conferences and 
consultations on development, and essays in larger works.6 With regard to the 
observation of other related ecumenical branches or settings over a similar 
period, this debate also finds a significant extension in southeast Asian journals 
such as Religion and Society and Bangalore Theological Forum,7 and more recently 
Al-Mushir and East Asian Pastoral Review.8 
Having stated the historical perspective, there may, however, also be a more 
explicit social theological reason for postulating the ecumenical debate on 
development as point of orientation. The reason for this is that this debate, from 
the point of view of a particular ecumenical self-awareness and self-appreciation, 
anticipates the progressive and innovative stream of thought on development 
within the broad theological-ecclesiastical sector. As discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Two of this study, within the ecumenical theological debate on 
development one encounters what can be called the ‘pretence of a critical 
challenge’ posed both to a traditional theological and church sector and a 
mainstream secular development discourse. Hence, this debate (more than any 
other account of the development theme in Christianity) anticipates and spells 
out a new radical worldly engagement9 by the Christian theological and church 
sector, a new radical social praxis10 and comprehensive social language that 
surpasses the traditional confined engagement and language set by the latter 
sector’s traditional self-containment vis-à-vis the non-ecclesiastical and non-
theological world. Accordingly, it is also the radical worldly basis and 
commitment of that debate that anticipate and spell out a critical disposition by 
Christian theology and the churches towards the mainstream secular realm, as 
their entering into the worldly realm and adaptation of new modes of learning 
                                                          
5 See especially Vol. 19, No. 4 of The Ecumenical Review in which a whole series of articles on development 
that followed on the 1966 Conference on Church and Society in Geneva can be found. See, for instance, 
the introductory article by C I Itty (1967:249-352). 
6 Ans van der Bent’s critical chapter on development in her book Vital Ecumenical Concerns (1986) and 
Richard Dickinson’s entry on development in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement (1991) constitute the 
important examples of this third category. 
7  See the point made in footnote 2 above about the close association of scholars of southeast Asian descent 
with the debate on development associated more directly with the WCC. Thus we could recognise 
amongst the names mentioned in the latter footnote persons such as Samuel Parmar, C T Kurien and M M 
Thomas, who also figure prominently in these two journals. 
8 These two journals may be added to the list as the perspective on development propagated in articles in 
them articulates the same line of thinking as the corpus of ecumenical literature already mentioned. 
9 In his two important essays on the theological foundation of the churches’ participation in development, 
Trutz Rendtorff stated significantly that the development process had to be seen in its entirety as “a new 
form of Christian unity in the world” (1971:95; 1969:210). 
10 In one of his later writings Richard Dickinson, one of the ecumenical movement’s most prominent 
spokespersons on development over the last three to four decades, writes that for the ecumenical churches 
the germane issue in development was no longer whether they should be in solidarity with the poor, but 
how (1983:71). 
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and cooperation with other worldly actors enable them to engage in such a 
critical way. 
On the basis of its own ecumenical inclination, this study finds its critical point 
of departure in the ecumenical development debate demarcated above. More 
specifically, it takes as a central concept the notion of charity, which in the 
ecumenical development debate came to conceptualise a mode of ecclesiastical 
understanding and involvement that once again problematises the church sector’s 
meaningful engagement with the problems of poverty and socio-economic 
deprivation. It is indicated how within this debate the notion of charity came to 
denote a particular historical mode of ecclesiastical social engagement and 
understanding that the ecumenical sector aspired to have surpassed in a later, 
new (development) era. From this historical point of departure the discussion 
will then focus on the actual (progressive) contents of the ecumenical 
theological debate on development. It will analyse the extent in which this 
debate poses a critical challenge to a historical and traditional theological and 
ecclesiastical social involvement and understanding, but also a challenge to a 
mainstream secular development discourse. 
Besides setting out the above charity-development juxtaposition in the 
framework of a particular ecumenical historical consciousness, the intention of 
the discussion is also to show how a development involvement by the churches 
would once again be problematised in the ecumenical development debate by 
what has been termed the pragmatic debate. In fact, in the discussion on this 
particular debate it will be pointed out how a culmination point has been 
reached in the whole ecumenical development debate, as it is once again 
brought back to a consideration of the very basics of the theological-
ecclesiastical debate on development against the background of the already 
identified charity-development juxtaposition. It will be argued and illustrated 
how the pragmatic debate, in a most meaningful and critical way, brings us back 
to a consideration of the actual praxis of the churches that has occurred in the 
name of development. This includes (i) questions about the actual contents of 
the churches’ development work, (ii) questions about whether the churches’ 
involvement in the area of poverty alleviation could in fact be accounted for as 
development, (iii) questions about whether the development work undertaken 
by the churches did in fact articulate the radical worldly engagement and 
progressive development discourse set forth by the ecumenical position, and 
ultimately (iv) questions about whether the churches’ apparent involvement in 
development did in fact reflect something new, more critical and profound than 
its former engagement with the poor and deprived through the historical mode 
of charity work. 
Following from the above exposition it can be said that this study is primarily 
concerned with the question of development strategy, development praxis and the 
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modes of authentic development engagement by the Christian churches in 
particular. It undertakes such an exercise in an abstract and generalising manner 
by not engaging in specific case studies as such, but by applying particular critical 
aspects of the ecumenical development debate to reflect on the churches’ 
meaningful participation in development. However, in this study’s endeavour to 
think critically and anew about the churches’ participation in development, such 
an application of the ecumenical development debate only represents a first 
stage. In compliance with its ecumenical and interdisciplinary intentions,11 this 
study’s aim is to reflect in a further deepening sense on the participation of the 
churches in development from the point of view of a broader NGO and related 
people-centred development debate in contemporary development theory, 
particularly from what has been conceptualised as the third and fourth generation 
approaches or strategies in this theoretical framework. 
Pointing out in further discussion how a charity-development juxtaposition 
similar to that in the ecumenical development debate can be traced in a broader 
NGO development debate, this study proceeds to find a further deepening and 
innovative perspective that was first formulated in the work of David Korten.12 
It indicates how Korten, a foremost exponent of an emerging ‘people-centred 
development’ theoretical corpus, would himself come to problematise NGO 
development work in terms of what he identified as first generation strategies of 
relief and welfare activity and second generation strategies of (local) community 
development involvement. From this basic point of departure, the study indicates 
how, in Korten’s case, this identification has come to form part of a particular 
stratified and historical scheme that in the NGO development debate not merely 
reflects the initial line of problematisation (that is, the problem of a charity-
development juxtaposition). The study in an innovative way also comes to 
conceptualise a mode of authentic NGO development activity that goes beyond 
such an initial problematisation to articulate so-called third generation strategies 
of sustainable systems development activity. 
In a first round of argumentation this study wants to put forward Korten’s 
framework of three generations of NGO development strategies as also 
particularly significant for the theological-ecclesiastical development debate. It is 
argued here, firstly, that Korten’s perspective could be taken as representative of 
                                                          
11 Here the notions of ecumenicity and interdisciplinarity closely follow the position in earlier ecumenical 
development debates that state that a meaningful ecclesiastical and theological understanding and 
engagement could only come from this sector’s cooperation and integration with the other (non-theological) 
actors or disciplines in the development field. It asks of theology to take on a supra-ecclesiastical identity, 
which in fact means taking on a non-identifiable character at a certain moment in the whole process, a 
position of learning in order to come to a higher level of understanding and theorising (see Rendtorff 
1971:95, 102; 1969:210, 214-215; see also the discussion in 2.2 of this study). 
12 We find the deepening and innovative perspective more specifically and especially in Korten’s, Getting to 
the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (1990), which represents the culminating point 
in his strategic thinking on development. 
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a larger NGO debate that, like the ecumenical development debate, has been 
grappling with the problem of charity. It is argued that NGOs, like churches, 
belong to a civil society or voluntary sector that has traditionally been trapped in 
welfare work and that has only slowly and painfully started to negotiate and 
define its rightful existence as a political and development actor vis-à-vis the 
state, government and business sectors. Secondly, and directly related to the first 
argument, it is argued that we could, in the case of Korten’s perspective, find an 
attempt at the conceptualisation of a mode of strategic development 
engagement that deliberately aims to surpass first and second generations of 
relief and project development work (that is, those in which churches have also 
remained stuck). 
In the light of the above-mentioned correspondence this study wants to argue 
that Korten’s formulation of a third generation development strategy challenges 
in an appropriate and meaningful way the theological and church sectors to 
move towards a level of theoretical and strategic innovation beyond its past and 
present understanding of, and engagement in, development (as this study 
concludes with regard to a third generation perspective). Consequently, this 
study wants to propose that the notion of third generation development 
strategies challenges the churches to adapt to a far more critical public role, to 
come to the realisation that their current efforts in development through works 
of charity and community projects remain unrefined and insufficient. In the 
positive, strategic sense, it proposes that the churches should realise that they 
could only play a meaningful structural and transformative role in development 
if they themselves were to adapt to a third generation mode of engagement 
through which they would manage, in one way or another, to become part of 
the policy-making processes at various levels of society (micro, meso and macro). 
The discussion will then go on to indicate how Korten’s perspective underwent 
a further deepening that introduced the NGO development debate to the 
concept of a fourth generation approach or strategy. Departing from his initial 
identification of three generations of NGO development strategies,13 it will be 
pointed out how Korten, in a further development of his own thinking, came to 
regard the third generation strategy or approach as still having definite 
shortcomings in terms of an overall theory and strategy of (global) 
transformation. While attending to the critical problem of institutional and 
policy constraints in development, the third generation strategy, in Korten’s own 
critical assessment of it, not only required countless interventions in the 
institutional and policy processes at macro level (similar to that of the second 
                                                          
13 The original restriction to a third generation perspective in Korten’s thinking is clearly evident from an 
article written by him that dates back to 1987 (thus only three years before the work mentioned in the 
previous footnote in which the fourth generation perspective is put forward); the article was entitled, 
“Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-centred Development” (in World Development, Vol. 
15, Supplement, pp. 145-159).  
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generation strategy at micro and community levels), but it also had to do so 
within a basically hostile political and institutional environment. This 
necessitated a complementary fourth generation strategy that would be able to 
go beyond the focused initiatives of a third generation strategy and energise a 
critical mass of independent, coalescing and decentralised initiatives in support 
of a global social vision for transformation. It points to a strategy or approach – a 
fourth generation strategy or approach – that ought to make the contemporary 
social movements the primary subjects of its development action and theory: 
Social movements have a special quality. They are driven not by 
budgets or organizational structures, but rather by ideas, by a vision 
of a better world. They move on social energy more than on 
money. The vision mobilizes independent action by countless 
individuals and organizations across national boundaries, all 
supporting a shared ideal. Participants in successful movements 
collaborate in continuously shifting networks and coalitions. They 
may quarrel over ideological issues and tactics. But where they have 
been successful, their efforts have generated a reinforcing synergy. 
(Korten 1990:124)  
As indicated by its subtitle, the ultimate aim of this study is to present the 
perspective of a fourth generation strategy or approach as the mode of 
development engagement that holds the greatest prospect for authentic 
participation by the Christian churches in development. Development, as 
suggested in the above quote from Korten’s book, now more than anything else 
– and in a still more radical way than in a third generation strategy – has come to 
be viewed in terms of a ‘politics of ideas’, as a condition of change to be brought 
about by the power of ideas, values, (transformed) relationships and 
communication.14 And it is to this sphere of expertise, this unlimited space of 
social life that one may argue the churches (and religion in general) also belong. 
While the notions of ‘idea’ and ‘value institutions’ cannot define them 
completely (as they are from a sociological and theological point of view also 
many other things), the churches can (at their best) be defined as institutions 
that are educated in their own distinctive way in a ‘politics of ideas’, and which 
perceive their primary task to be the changing of minds, conscience and 
behaviour of human beings and (other) institutions (e.g. the state and 
government). 
At this point it should be pointed out how the notions of ‘limited space’ versus 
‘unlimited space’ are especially important to the argument, as they indicate the 
                                                          
14 Here the order (very much in correspondence with the position of churches and religion in general) of 
‘structures’ before ‘attitudes’ is actually reversed: the power of ideas/values becomes the precondition for 
structural change more than the other way around. 
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significance of a fourth generation strategy as opposed to the third generation 
strategy for the churches even more than for the NGO and civil society sector in 
general. While maintaining particular significance as a progressive mode of 
development engagement, it follows that a third generation strategy still 
represents a strategy of a limited space, especially for the churches. In this mode 
of involvement the churches in particular would not only be confronted with a 
secular, public and organised space that does not readily welcome them as 
meaningful participants, but at the same time also with a specialised terrain for 
which they themselves have traditionally displayed few skills and little 
appreciation and experience. It can be added that it indeed represents a terrain 
of public activity that for the churches (as in the case of a broader NGO sector) 
cannot be the beginning and end of a strategy of large-scale transformation, 
which (a la Korten) has to go beyond such a strategy. 
More appropriate for the churches in particular would be the unlimited space of 
the fourth generation strategy. For here they do not have to be restricted and 
marginalised by the institutional processes of policy-making. Here they could 
participate in a larger (transnational) civil society space, in an ‘idea politics’, a 
‘movement politics’ in the most radical sense of the word that does not let itself 
be confined to set places, spaces and institutions.15 In this sphere they would also 
find much in common with the new social movements and their supporting 
actors (e.g. NGOs), who are driven by similar ideals, ideas and values on the 
issues of peace, human rights, women, environment, democracy, people-centred 
development, and so on. In this unlimited space they would be able to perform 
what they in fact can do best, namely appeal to and change the attitudes and 
consciousness of people across boundaries and cultures. In this space their 
general, but sometimes also specific, ethical teachings would appeal to a 
considerable civil society audience that overlaps with their own constituency. 
And lastly, as also pointed out in this study, in this sphere they would 
experience an emerging new appraisal of the contribution of religion to 
development: not only by someone like David Korten, but in fact by what can 
be called a broader ‘alternative’ intellectual movement in the field of development 
and the social sciences, which this study will put forward as a further 
complementary articulation of the fourth generation strategy and vision. According 
to this study, in this broader ‘alternative dynamics’ religion (and by implication 
                                                          
15 The definition of ‘unlimited space’ at this point correlates well with the notion of ‘transnational civil 
society space’ that Susanne Hoeber Rudolph discusses in an article on “Transnational Religions and Fading 
States”. Following the political theorist, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, transnational civil society has, for Hoeber 
Rudolph, come to denote those emerging and actual “self-conscious constructions of networks of 
knowledge and action, by decentred, local actors that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they 
were not there” (1996:317). Importantly, it denotes an emerging and actual transnational activity (of which 
religion has very much become a part) that is today constantly negotiating its own autonomous position 
vis-à-vis the state. It is an autonomous position that can be defined as “a space for self-conscious, organized 
actors to assert themselves for and against state policies, actions, and processes” (ibid).  
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the churches) is increasingly being recognised as a significant, if not 
indispensable, actor in promoting (but also resisting) the implementation of 
particular values (e.g. peace and reconciliation) viewed as the precondition and 
foundation for meaningful development.16 In this ‘alternative dynamics’ there is 
an increasing appreciation of religion’s role in providing the spiritual energy and 
vision (at least in part) for the collective action and social transformation 
advocated by the new social movement politics. 
Having spelled out in brief what is propagated in this study as the prospects of a 
fourth generation and, to a lesser extent, third generation development approach 
for the meaningful participation of the Christian churches in contemporary 
development, a more concrete framework for the churches’ participation in 
fourth and third generation strategic development action will finally be 
proposed. This framework will be presented in the form of a concluding chapter 
in which it is argued that the ecumenical development debate explored in this 
study represents a remaining incentive for the churches’ progression to third and 
fourth generation strategic development activity. The discussion will then 
propose a number of broad beacons that, beyond a historical and contemporary 
ecumenical development perspective, may guide the churches to new levels of 
meaningful participation in fourth and third generation development strategies. 
Based on our exploration of third and fourth generation strategic development in 
this study, these ‘beacons’ will be: (i) the new social movements, (ii) the new 
communication solidarities, (iii) alternative development policy, and (iv) ‘soft 
culture’.  
By means of this exercise in the concluding chapter the study embarks on a 
conscious attempt to adopt the idea- and value-centred language of the fourth 
generation and to a certain extent third generation strategies. As such the study 
aims to broaden and fill in the basic perspectives and language gained from the 
exploration of the third and fourth generation approaches to development by 
drawing on a wider, complementary, interdisciplinary and normative social 
scientific field. It will offer a wider corpus that still includes complementary 
perspectives from the field of development theory but, as the above proposed 
modes or roles might suggest, also includes further political, sociological, 
communication and cultural specific perspectives. 
Whilst these reflections in the final chapter could be taken as a further 
manifestation of the underlying motive in this study to go beyond a critical 
theological-ecclesiastical perspective and to find a deepening and innovative 
perspective in a broader social-scientific debate on development and 
transformation, it should be stated how this particular discussion comes full 
circle by the way in which it will once again draw selectively on perspectives 
                                                          
16 See, for instance, how this perspective or position on the role of religion in development is clearly found in 
Korten’s argument (1990:188-191). 
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from the discipline of theology to construct an own perspective. In particular, 
the intention here is to draw from progressive theological perspectives or 
discourses located outside of the direct theological/ecumenical development 
debate (such as Ulrich Duchrow’s discussion on alternatives to global capitalism 
from a social theological point of view, the World Parliament of Religion’s 
‘Declaration toward a Global Ethic’, perspectives from the WCC debate on civil 
society, debates on public theology/religion, feminist theological perspectives, 
Jürgen Moltmann’s perspective on a theological expression of joy) that may 
contribute to a fourth and third generation language - especially as the mode of 
development engagement that this language anticipates would now involve the 
meaningful participation of the Christian churches. Stated differently, through 
drawing on this theological and religious input, this study emphasises its ideal of 
true integration, which eventually aims to develop a mode of interdisciplinarity 
through which the perspectives drawn from the broad social-scientific base 
envisaged might be integrated into a unified, complementary and normative 
framework or discourse-praxis - one in which theology, religion and indeed the 
churches would also interactively and constructively participate, often in an 
implicit and anonymous manner, but at times also explicitly.17 
                                                          
17 Here this study closely relates to the position in contemporary public theological debates that determines 
that theological discourse ought to become anonymous or secular in order to participate effectively and 
meaningfully in the public domain (see Lategan 1995:226-228). Yet, while this can be stated as the basic 
mode of discourse adopted in this study, it at the same time does not want to exclude theology and the 
churches from speaking at particular moments in the public discourse and context with a more explicit, 
discernible theological and religious language serving and complementing this very discourse. This in turn 
thus also implies that the theological and religious disciplines will, in so far as the academic debate 
involves the public involvement of the churches/religious institutions, draw on perspectives formulated 
within their own discipline and presented in their own more distinctive language. This, it is proposed, is 
admitted by a conceptual framework in which the principle of plurality is not forsaken as the expression 
of a particular reflexive unity, and in which no one actor and its specific language or discourse is allowed to 
dominate over the other actors. 
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Chapter One 
THE ECUMENICAL DEVELOPMENT 
DISCOURSE: CHARITY 
1.1 Introduction 
The contemporary theological and ecclesiastical concern with the issue of 
development cannot be studied in a historical vacuum. Having indicated in the 
introductory section how the official concern with the idea of development as 
well as the churches’ own concern with the idea constitute a fairly recent 
phenomenon,1 a closer investigation of the churches’ prior engagement with the 
contemporary problems of poverty and socio-economic deprivation is therefore 
necessarily called for. It would be through such an investigation that we could 
come to a fuller determination of the meaning of development, a concept that 
apparently came to denote the progression in the churches’ understanding and 
engagement with contemporary social predicaments vis-à-vis earlier modes of 
understanding and engagement. 
It will be shown in this chapter that, in the broader corpus of ecumenical 
literature on development referred to in the introduction, a definition of the 
churches’ socio-economic engagement in contemporary history prior to the ‘era 
of development’ is explored in a most critical and particular way in the book, 
Separation without Hope? Essays on the Relation between the Church and the Poor 
during the Industrial Revolution and the Western Colonial Expansion. Initiated by 
the World Council of Churches’ Commission on the Churches’ Participation in 
Development (CCPD) and published at the beginning of the 1980s,2 it is in this 
study that the CCPD had put before the ecumenical movement and the 
churches in general a particular historical perspective to guide their understanding 
of contemporary socio-economic realities and their own engagement with those 
realities in comparison with past modes of engagement. As the title indicates, 
the book presents a historical perspective that for the CCPD and its authors had 
to be traced back to the industrial revolution and the period of Western colonial 
expansion during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1800-1914). In 
the explanatory words of Julio de Santa Ana in the editorial preface:  
                                                          
1 The World Council of Churches’ (WCC’s) World Conference on Church and Society at Geneva in 1966 
has been indicated as the landmark in theological and ecclesiastical concern with development. 
2 Published for the first time by the World Council of Churches in 1978, a second edition was published in 
1980 by Orbis Books. In this chapter the latter edition is used as source. 
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Before embarking on a discussion of present-day relations between 
the poor and the Church, we feel it is essential to take time to 
reflect on what these relations were during the industrial revolution 
and the period of western colonial expansion (1800-1914), when 
the attitudes directly affecting the nature of the problems as we 
face them today, first developed. (1980a:vii) 
It would be impossible to do justice to the full range of perspectives and rich 
layer of case studies3 emanating from this book. The aim here will nevertheless 
be to show how one major assumption might be extracted from the study as a 
whole by which a meaningful synthesis can be made of the various perspectives 
on the churches’ response to the social problems in industrial and colonial 
societies during the demarcated period. This assumption (which can be found 
explicitly in a number of the essays and implicitly in the others) is that in those 
instances where the churches did in fact respond to the plight of the poor and 
the social problems that erupted in the wake of the social changes brought about 
by the industrial revolution and subsequent colonial expansion, the response in 
general merely involved a mode of social engagement that could be defined by the 
notion of charity.4 
Having stipulated above that the dissection of the deeper meaning of charity is 
the central aim of this chapter, it will first of all be indicated how such a 
meaning of the churches’ socio-economic engagement is informed by a particular 
socio-ethical evaluation of the far-reaching social changes caused by the 
industrial revolution. Against this background it will be shown how, for the 
particular authors, the notion of charity denotes much more than merely an 
innocent and pious social involvement by the churches and the Christian élite in 
the newly industrialised and colonialised societies. It will be indicated how, 
against the background of the above-mentioned socio-ethical evaluation, the 
notion of charity, in fact, defines a whole mental attitude and ideological 
presupposition or bias amongst the churches by which they showed themselves 
to be implicit and explicit agents of the status quo rather than actors seriously 
concerned with the sufferings and interest of the poor majority. In all, it will be 
indicated how the notion of charity embodied a mode of social engagement that, 
for the authors of the book, summarises the beginning and end of ecclesiastical 
social involvement in the period of industrial and colonial expansion, an 
involvement that had little impact on alleviating the actual causes of social 
suffering.  
                                                          
3 Ten authors (excluding Julio de Santa Ana’s editorial conclusion) contributed to this book, writing 
respectively on the nineteenth-century societies of Western Europe, Britain, Germany, North America, 
Russia, the Arab Orthodox world, Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
4 See in this regard, for instance, the editorial conclusion by Julio de Santa Ana at the end of the study in 
which such general assumptions on the specific notion of charity are clearly indicated (1980b:174-177). 
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1.2 Socio-ethical evaluation 
The first essay in the WCC study, written by André Biéler, “Gradual Awareness 
of Social, Economic Problems (1750-1900)”, presents a profound socio-ethical 
evaluation of the social changes brought about by the industrial revolution.5 
Foremost in this author’s evaluation would be the postulation that humanity in 
general and the churches in particular had come to deal with a phenomenon of 
social change that, up to that time, had only been partly perceived and mastered. 
According to him, this indicates “the astonishing fact of runaway development 
… with roots reaching back into Greco-Roman antiquity, that only began to 
produce its innumerable, galloping and all-transforming effects in the 19th 
century” (1980:4). 
It must be admitted, then, that viewed in a long-term perspective 
of human history, the scientific and industrial revolution, as a 
phenomenon with radically subversive consequences for all 
societies, has never yet been completely analysed and understood. 
To a great extent it is still mysterious. It is not all the case that 
science, of which we are so proud, has succeeded in identifying all 
its elements, discovering all its factors, working out all its 
mechanisms… Since the process has only been partially 
understood, it has only been partially possible to master it. Its 
future course is therefore completely unknown. No human group 
at the present time, in east or west, north or south, whatever its 
ideology, can claim to have succeeded in mastering it. That is why 
the havoc it caused in the past, and even more the damage which 
its exponential growth … is actually doing to the human and 
planetary ecosystem, disconcerts and baffles even those who are 
contributing to its explosion. (Ibid.) 
From the point of view of social progress, Biéler conceded that it is particularly 
unjust to deny the good that the industrial revolution has done. The balance 
sheet includes both debit and credit entries. Yet, and this brings him to the 
essence of his argument, from the point of view of Christian faith, attention 
must be directed primarily to the factor of human suffering inherent to the 
process (1980:9). This suffering was and remains a feature of modern society that 
debars Christians “from any pretension to objective, morally and ideologically 
neutral observation” (1980:5). To them the question has to be raised whether 
they, in the light of such suffering and the profound social eruptions brought 
                                                          
5 Whereas a profound general socio-ethical evaluation of the social changes brought about by the industrial 
revolution can be found in the essay by Biéler, but to a certain extent also in the concluding essay by Julio 
de Santa Ana, it can be said that the other essays in Separation without Hope? deal more exclusively with 
the strategic response of the Christian churches to the above-mentioned social changes. In these essays the 
general evaluation explicitly found in the essays of Biéler and De Santa is implicitly sustained.  
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about, have come to show any growth of understanding and commitment toward 
addressing this common feature: 
Can we really speak at the present time of a historical process of 
growth of understanding on the part of the Christian churches and 
sects in the West of the social and economic problems created by 
the industrial revolution, when in fact the extent, complexity and 
speed of the upheavals that mark the spread of technological 
civilization appear increasingly to escape the notice of our 
contemporaries? (Biéler 1980:3) 
For Biéler, as for the other writers of the study, the outstanding and most 
destructive feature of the industrial revolution was the ever-increasing and 
ongoing pauperisation of the majority of the world’s peoples (1980:9). As 
strikingly summarised by Julio De Santa Ana at the beginning of his concluding 
essay, it is this recognition that in fact constitutes the common denominator of 
the study as a whole: “...in all the situations dealt with in these essays, we 
encounter the fact of poverty, the presence of the poor... We have here a 
universal phenomenon.” (1980b:171) 
Informed by Biéler’s more detailed evaluation, pauperisation in the identified 
period indicates a phenomenon characterised by the common sight of “immense 
human groups crowding in search of work into zones of industrial concentration 
ill-prepared to receive them” (1980:9). More specifically, it denotes a 
phenomenon that particularly involved the working classes. They were the 
people who executed some sort of labour, but under conditions of permanent 
impoverishment (that is, declining wages and deteriorating working conditions) 
as they would come to experience the subversive competition from machines 
and the growth of the population. They are the people who, as a result, have to 
this day suffered extreme forms of exploitation and whose exploited cheap 
labour stands in stark contrast to the improved living standards of a relatively 
small minority of the working classes, specifically those in the industrial 
countries of the West and East (ibid.).  
Biéler referred to this process as the phenomenon of “[i]ndustrial serfdom in the 
new urban centres” of the world and pointed out that it took place 
simultaneously and side by side with the exploitation of those living in the 
colonies of the new industrialised countries. This was a concurrent process as it 
necessitated the conquest of people and resources in the new colonies to sustain 
the initial accumulation of profits and also to bear the consequent cost of the 
infrastructure needed for industrial expansion (ibid.). It likewise entailed the 
impoverishment of the large majority of people in the latter societies6 and the 
                                                          
6 De Santa Ana points out in his editorial conclusion that the factors of the uprooting, exploitation and 
pauperisation of the broad masses in the colonised societies are clearly brought out in the contributions by 
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enrichment of a relatively small proportion of the remaining population 
(1980:5).7  
Biéler, and in a complementary way De Santa Ana, came to define the deeper 
meaning of the pauperisation in industrial and colonial society as involving a 
number of characteristic features or consequences.8 Drawing upon a definition 
of pauperisation by Max Pietsch, Biéler pointed out that this phenomenon 
involved:  
(i) a distinct sociological and anthropological factor whereby the human person 
is bereft of property, life-sustaining resources, family and neighbourhood 
ties. It points to a situation in which he/she falls into a state of economic 
dependence, is torn from his/her roots, militarised in his/her work, 
estranged from nature and mechanised in his/her daily activities. It points 
to a situation, in short, which causes a serious state of human devitalisation 
and depersonalisation (1980:10); 
(ii) a powerful factor of demoralisation9 of the formally employed person for 
whom ‘work’, instead of being a positive gain or source of creativity, 
becomes nothing more than a servile means to an end, directly contributing 
to the vicious circle of reckless and unfulfilled living:  
The more conscious the workers become of the inner emptiness of 
their work, the more they seek compensation by squandering their 
wages, only too often in amusements and pleasures that are no less 
mechanical and empty than their work. (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                              
Julio Barreiro, C I Itty and Sam Kobia (1980b:182) (that is, by those authors representing the various 
societies or regions exploited by colonisation: Barreiro (Latin America), Itty (Asia), Kobia (Africa)). 
7 This statement could be further qualified by noting that the enrichment of people in the colonised 
societies was, and still is, far less in comparison to the enrichment of people in the industrialised countries 
(particularly as such contrasts unfolded in the later periods of nation-state formation and political 
independence). Julio Barreiro, in the final section of his essay, describes the multinational companies (who 
represent a very small section of local and foreign economically privileged groups) as “the new 
conquistadores” vis-à-vis the exploited and impoverished indigenous communities (the large majority of 
people) in Latin America. In contemporary Latin American society, Barreiro argues, the trucks, planes and 
rifles of the multinational companies have merely replaced the horses, armour and swords of the Spaniards 
and Portuguese. They have become the new conquerors and exploiters of the great mineral and ecological 
wealth of the region at the cost of the local and indigenous peoples who, as a direct result, have suffered 
genocide on a large scale and who, away from their natural habitat, have been compelled to do manual 
labour of a deadly kind (such as in the mines) (1980:134). Referring to the factor of forced migration, 
Barreiro further describes the common sight identified by Biéler and mentioned in the main discussion: 
“Equally dramatic is ... the vast legion of men, women and children of indigenous origin who each year 
swell the ranks of the migrants; because of the lack of work and poor health conditions in their natural 
environment, they are obliged to move to the huge, crowded, absurd cities of Latin America, ending up in 
the “barrios de emergencia” (shanty towns), with no security of employment, an easy prey to sickness, 
malnutrition, economic exploitation, prostitution, and so on.” (Ibid.) 
8 These are characteristic features that inform the current limited understanding mentioned in the first 
quote in 1.2. 
9 A factor that for us is closely related to the factors mentioned in (i) as it likewise pertains to the notion of 
the total alienation of the human person (that is, a form of alienation that covers all spheres of human 
life). See how the notion of alienation is also used by De Santa Ana (1980b: 182). 
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 Having pointed to the closer analysis of Biéler (and consequently of Max 
Pietsch) as basic to the understanding of the phenomenon of pauperisation 
caused by the above-mentioned events, De Santa Ana also emphasised that 
such a phenomenon can furthermore to be seen as: 
(iii) the unequivocal result or consequence of social injustice of a structural kind. 
The existence of the poor and the social fact of poverty (that is, the factors 
mentioned in (i) and (ii)) in the period in question are not to be attributed 
merely to natural causes or to personal conduct, but to structural causes 
producing injustice, inequality, dependence and destitution. Poverty, as 
such, was the result of economic growth of the kind that brought large 
profits to some, while offering barely even mere subsistence to others. In 
sum, it was the result of the exploitation of human beings by other human 
beings10 (1980b:182). 
It was important to present this brief exposition of the critical socio-ethical 
evaluation of industrial and colonial society. Through this exposition we came to 
see how this evaluation postulates that we are in actual fact dealing here with a 
phenomenon that in general has been poorly understood and has generated a 
state of pauperisation on an unprecedented scale. This evaluation also constitutes 
the basis for a series of interrelated questions asked in the WCC book, 
particularly with regard to the churches’ response to the social eruptions caused 
by the industrial revolution and subsequent colonial expansion. On the basis of 
this evaluation, questions were specifically asked about the extent to which 
Christians and the Christian churches showed an understanding of the above-
mentioned developments or features. As these are fundamentally related to 
questions of actual social praxis, the question was not only in what ways 
Christians and the churches reacted and dealt with those developments or 
features in practice (Biéler 1980:10), but also what was the nature of the 
relationship between the churches and the poor, the exploited and non-
beneficiaries, in the new system (see De Santa Ana 1980a:vii). 
Furthermore, as these questions relate to an inescapable theological imperative, 
they are also questions that spring from the very heart of the Gospel message 
and affirm the poor as the heirs of the Kingdom of God. At the deepest level 
such interrogation therefore asks to what extent the churches have been faithful 
to the Gospel message that demands a distinct participation in changing the 
social conditions of the poor. It is an ecumenical reading of the Gospel message 
that, to quote De Santa Ana, takes a fundamental structural approach (not less 
radical than a critical social-ethical interrogation) to the social problems at hand:  
                                                          
10  For De Santa Ana the way in which women and children were compelled to work during the last years of 
the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century could be taken as a foremost example of such 
exploitation (1980b:182). 
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The proclamation of the good news must be rooted in practical 
action to secure a transformation of the structures which 
presuppose the existence of poverty and indeed tend inevitably to 
create poverty. The proclamation of the message of Jesus requires 
the Church to engage in action to promote justice at the social level 
(both institutional and structural) and not simply at the level of the 
individual. (1980b:182) 
1.3 Charity: three meanings of an ecclesiastical response 
We have referred to the central place that the concept of charity takes in the 
book under discussion, as it conceptualises what its authors in general concluded 
to be the churches’ inadequate and limited response to the social eruptions 
caused by the industrial revolution and colonial expansion. We may now look in 
greater detail at the actual meaning and implications of the kind of social action 
denoted by the concept. Taking into account the above-mentioned critical 
evaluation of the period in question (1.2), the following synthesis of the meaning 
of charity is extracted from the study as a whole: 
1.3.1 A first meaning: works of charity denote a first stage, but only first, in 
the growth of awareness amongst the Christian churches of the social 
and economic problems that arose with the industrial revolution and 
colonial expansion. 
This perspective, first of all, recognises that Christians and the Christian 
churches in part, were not apathetic about the sufferings of the poor. Biéler 
noted that it was a human condition to which the churches and individual 
Christians responded actively from the very dawn of the industrial revolution by 
doing works of charity (1980:10). As further appraised by this author, it was a 
kind of engagement that, “when undertaken seriously with faith, mobilized a 
great deal of effort, energy, time and money of an active minority” (1980:13). De 
Santa Ana also concluded that it comprised at best a relationship with the poor 
that went deeper than “a paternalism inspired by pity”11 (1980b:175). It was, at 
times, a genuine and sincere engagement, as implied by the example Sam Kobia 
gives of the early mission stations in Africa that served as the homes of ex-slaves 
and social outcasts.12 It rendered some sort of identity and safeguard to such 
people:  
They gave refuge and a sense of belonging to those who otherwise 
could have lived a very hopeless and miserable life. The social 
                                                          
11 See the subsection on paternalism in 1.3.3 below. 
12 This is the example, incidentally, with which De Santa Ana also substantiates his point of appraisal (see 
1980b:175). 
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outcasts could not help but embrace an institution which 
recognized him or her as a person worthy of respect. (1980:162)  
Charity, or social service, as C I Itty indicated in his systematic exposition of the 
churches’ involvement in Asian society, comprised a substantial range of 
categories: education,13 health services,14 social welfare15 and some sort of 
economic development16 (see 1980:143-146). It (charity, aid to the poor) was a 
mode of involvement, as pointed out by Nicolai Zabolotsky in his discussion of 
the relation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the poor in the period 
in question, which in a few cases also took another direction, namely to promote 
social, economic and political reforms (1980:74). Lastly, according to André 
Biéler, it was those Christians most devoted to reaching out to the poor through 
charitable work who, in countries such as England and France, gave their active 
support to the anti-slave movement and protested against the oppressive lot of 
the very poor (1980:11-12).  
However, it is with such a range of activities that the contribution of the 
churches stopped. To start with, the considerable effort by Christians to engage 
with the plight of the poor in industrial and colonial society through what has 
been described as works of charity was recognised by a number of authors in the 
study. In the best of those efforts, these authors recognised a noticeable sincerity 
and sensitivity (at least by a minority) to the sufferings of the poverty-stricken. 
But, and this constitutes the common ground amongst the various authors, 
despite all the good that these activities intended and entailed, the churches’ 
involvement made little contribution towards changing society for good. 
According to Biéler, this denotes a first stage, but only first (!), in the growth of 
awareness amongst the Christian churches of the social and economic problems 
that arose with the industrial revolution and colonial expansion (see Biéler 
1980:10-13). There was little scope for, and understanding of, the structural and 
ideological factors underlying the problem. In the words of De Santa Ana, the 
                                                          
13 According to Itty, this is the sphere of service to which the missions and churches had given the greatest 
attention. Summarising the Christian involvement in this sphere, he notes: “Christian missions pioneered in 
introducing modern school systems in almost every Asian country. In a number of countries, university 
level education was also initiated by the Christian churches. Their involvement in education is far more 
than the proportionate strength of the Christian population in the nation.” (1980:143-144) 
14 According to Itty, this was another important sphere of involvement by the missions and churches. It was 
this sector that was mainly responsible for introducing the modern system of medical services based on 
Western medicine and dispersed through clinics, hospitals, sanatoria, etc. into Asian countries (1980:144-
145).  
15 This sphere included the Christian churches’ and missions’ often pioneering work in fields such as 
orphanages, schools for the blind, deaf and dumb, mental hospitals, houses for widows and unwed 
mothers. It also pertains to the major relief programmes that this sector launched in times of famine, such 
as in India and China during the years between 1877 and 1900 (Itty 1980:145). 
16 This constitutes the area of least imaginative involvement by the churches and missions, according to Itty. 
Taking a marginal place over and against the first three spheres of involvement mentioned above, it 
nevertheless refers to a limited scale of programmes initiated to improve the living standards of the new 
converts, such as handicrafts, leather work, brick and tile making, rural projects to improve agricultural 
production, and the organisation of co-operatives and credit unions (1980:145-146).  
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net result of all the churches’ efforts was that the poor were indeed served, “but 
the social reality of poverty and its underlying causes went practically 
unchanged” (1980b:174, italics added). As Biéler added, the charity work done by 
the churches in the end turned out to be nothing more than “a sort of 
compensation for the increasingly harmful effects of the capitalist and colonialist 
expansion of Europe” (1980:12). It was only a minority amongst the minority of 
socially concerned Christians who also engaged in what he calls the second and 
third stages in the growth of social awareness.17 For the majority of Christians 
sensitive to the sufferings of the time, works of charity continued to be the 
principal remedy for the ongoing pauperisation of the masses in the industrial 
centres. They lacked the conceptual tools to explore “the origins of the social 
evil whose ravages they perceived, or the means of correcting it” (1980:13). 
As elaborated in the discussion on paternalism below (1.3.3), it follows from the 
latter observation that the Christians and churches who engaged in charity work 
were by and large trapped in an ideological frame of mind that made it 
impossible for them to progress to other stages of growth in social awareness. 
They, the Christians doing charity work, were from the middle classes of society 
who, as Biéler indicated, unconsciously attributed “a sacred character to the 
ideologies and existing structures of their social or national environment” 
(1980:5-6, italics added). As this could, in the context of the overall argument, 
be explained in terms of the notion of power, it follows, if only on the 
subconscious level, that an involvement by means of charity work conveniently 
did not critically challenge the position of power of the Christian middle classes 
themselves (social, political and economic) and by implication the societal and 
mental structures that safeguarded that position of power. It did not challenge 
the psychological comfort that they (the middle-class Christians) derived from 
being the actual benefactors and directors of the social process that supposedly 
was to benefit the poor in society. 
This exposition of the first meaning of charity will close with a perspective and 
quote from John Kent’s essay on the relationship between the churches and the 
trade union movement in Britain in the 19th century; the factor of power, 
according to this author, accounted for the irreconcilable separation between the 
churches and the trade union movement (see Kent 1980:36-37), and, for that 
matter, the churches’ categorical resistance against any idea of revolution.18 The 
                                                          
17 In his discussion Biéler defines four stages in growth of awareness. Having identified charitable work as a 
first stage of awareness (see 1980:10-13), the farthest a very small minority of Christians would progress, 
according to Biéler, on the way of critical social awareness and involvement, were second and third stages, 
namely the recognition of the need for state legislative intervention (second stage; see 1980:13-15), and 
studies, publications, inquiries and associations for social progress (third stage; see 1980:15-19). According 
to Biéler, and as especially also reflected in our exposition of a third meaning of charity in 1.3.3 below, 
Christians and the churches were hardly involved in a fourth stage, something he calls the emancipation of 
the working classes and the class war (see 1980:19-24). 
18 The idea of revolution is also meaningfully set out by De Santa Ana. Referring to the churches’ a priori 
anti-revolutionary position in industrial and colonial history, he points out how a revolutionary activity or 
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activities of the latter movement - vis-à-vis works of charity - brought the 
churches and their members from the middle-classes face to face with the 
inescapable issue of the redistribution of power - substantial redistribution of 
power that they were unwilling to sacrifice: 
Unionism was concerned with, and rose out of, the directed classes. 
And what was always implicit, and finally explicit, in both the 
revolutionary tradition (from 1776) and the distinct socialist 
tradition (from a slightly later period), was the proposal that some 
power, even great power, would have to be given (not ought to be, 
but would have to be given) to large numbers of people who in the 
traditional western society had been the directed, the subjects of 
the powers of others. Because unionism always meant some degree 
of redistribution of economic power, it inevitably threatened the 
redistribution of all power. (1980:33) 
1.3.2 A second meaning: a social involvement merely through charity 
denotes a church sector by and large lacking the capacity for a critical, 
social theoretical understanding that could have enabled that sector to 
go beyond such a confined mode of thinking and activity. 
Charity, as the discussion above has made clear, involved much more than mere 
innocent (neutral) and pious social engagement by the churches. Far from it; 
charity was part of a distinct world-view or ideological presupposition that 
rendered a ‘sacred’ meaning to the existing societal order, which accepted this 
order as an absolute given, as ‘essentially good’. Moreover, as an activity 
performed by the middle classes and privileged members of society, it sustained 
the psychological comfort of that social grouping. It provided them with little, if 
any, critical input whereby the ideologies and structures that sustained such 
comfort would be questioned and whereby other modes of social involvement 
would be explored. 
Charity, by denoting the beginning and end of the churches’ involvement with 
the social problems of the day, indicates the lack of any sufficient social scientific 
knowledge-base or insight into the churches’ formal theological make-up with 
which to understand the wider political, economic and social regulations of 
society (in this case, a most complex modernist society). It presumes a 
theological discourse that fails to challenge the very ideological presuppositions 
                                                                                                                                              
line of thinking stands against what the churches at best would embrace, namely a charitable and more or 
less reformist frame of mind. To explain this further in terms of the notion of power applied in the main 
discussion above: in the case of charity and reform, the status quo (the middle-classes, the churches) 
remained the directors and determiners of the process (not at their own cost). In the case of revolution, 
however, a process of social change is implied in favour of the poor, the working classes, or whom De 
Santa Ana calls “the victims of the conditions which generate poverty”, who should have become the 
actual subjects or directors of the process (see 1980b:183-184). 
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or world-view underlying such regulations. It presumes a theological 
consciousness incapable of exposing the historical temporariness and biased 
nature of such regulations, and as such, of stressing the possibility of forming 
alternative regulations. It points to a theological awareness that does nothing 
more than serve such regulations by explaining or formalising them. 
It follows that a relationship of mutual enforcement could be identified between 
the social activity of charity (‘praxis’) and the prevailing theological discourse 
(‘theory’) of the churches. Charity, as an activity that brought the churches into 
the realm of social praxis, for reasons of its own nature, had posed no critical 
challenge to a theological discourse devoid of meaningful social insight or 
understanding. It points to a theological discourse that, at the same time, appears 
impotent in converting that very ongoing charitable activity into other modes of 
critical social involvement. 
Charity, as implied in Nicolai Zabolotsky’s discussion of the churches in Russia, 
was an activity that, in the ecclesiastical consciousness, found its very point of 
orientation in the above-mentioned a-social theological discourse. It is an activity 
that, according to this mode of consciousness, could only be successful if 
executed within a theological determination in which the place of worship 
represents the fundamental starting-point for service to the poor, for the clergy 
as guides and directors of the charitable efforts, and for the wider society (of 
which the members of the churches were a part) as executors of works of 
charity (1980:74). It is a framework in which a centrifugal order of things is 
clearly stipulated, a framework in which theological criteria take precedence 
over the social. It determines that: 
Only if welfare work springs from the place of worship and is 
guided towards its aims by the church hierarchy can it be stable, 
free from the influence of the pride of the do-gooder ... But if it 
issues from the Church as a central point, and is directed to a 
definite goal by members of the hierarchy, charitable work can be 
successfully carried out with the greatest possible active 
participation of society itself. (A. Vertelovsky, quoted in 
Zabolotsky, ibid.) 
For Zabolotsky, however, such determination by and large remained “merely a 
pious wish” (ibid.). While he did not go on to elaborate on this statement, a 
further explanation could well be derived from the larger context of his 
discussion according to which charity work done by the churches in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century did not achieve the ideal where “Russia 
would no longer have any hungry, destitute, sick, forsaken people. The Church 
was not in a position to solve the problem of the poor and this constituted the 
tragedy of its encounter with the world of those in need” (1980:62). Contrary to 
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the mobilisation of Russian society at large by the inner dynamics of the church 
(as anticipated in the quote above), which supposedly would ultimately bring 
about a complete eradication of the problem of poverty, the church was, as he 
pointed out, confronted rather by a society (that is, Russia of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century) of growing contradictions in all spheres of life19 (ibid.). 
But, in the end, this also did not matter so much to the churches. For as 
Zabolotsky indicated towards the end of his essay, they had a different 
understanding of their primary task, which was one of a particular spiritual kind:  
But the Church, let us repeat, did not possess its own explicitly 
formulated programme of political and socio-economic 
reconstruction of life in Russia; above all, it refrained from that 
kind of activity, not without reason, believing that precisely as 
Church it has a much more important field of responsibility. 
First and foremost, the Church’s responsibility consisted (in the 
actually existing conditions of relations with the state) of 
maintaining its own proper identity as an institute of salvation in 
the proclamation of the Gospel, that is, in its internal and external 
mission, in the moral education of the faithful, in the celebration of 
the liturgy, the sacraments and rites of the Church, in pastoral care 
of souls. (1980:81)  
If, with the preceding discussion, a most important existential clarification has 
been given that accounts for what at most can be stipulated as a limited 
involvement in charity by the churches (since a theological paradigm was at 
work here that absolutised its own peculiar self-understanding and self-concern 
of the churches vis-à-vis the larger social world20), it is to the perspective of 
                                                          
19 It was this situation (of overt contradictions), according to Zabolotsky, which gave way to the radical 
assessment of values and far-reaching changes that ultimately led to the 1917 socialist revolution (1980:62), 
a historical event and process that ostracised and radically opposed the churches.  
20 It can be noted here, in anticipation of the discussion in the next chapter (2.2) and with reference to the 
comments already made in the introduction, that this particular problematisation of mainstream Christian 
theology was also taken up as a crucial aspect in the earlier ecumenical debate on development. For 
instance, in an important series of working papers on “a theology of development” launched by Sodepax 
(The Committee on Society, Development and Peace constituted jointly in 1968 by the Holy See and the 
WCC) at the end of the 1960s, this particular problematisation is explicit in a paper by the South 
American theologian, Gustavo Gutierrez Merino, in terms of a church versus the world dichotomy. For this 
author this distinction, which according to him prevailed in what he called “the New Christianity” (a 
phenomenon dating from the 16th century onwards), captures the basic problem of a contemporary 
engagement by the churches in development. Capturing the basic rationale of this way of thinking and its 
untenability in a contemporary social context, he stated: “The world was presented much more clearly 
than in the past as existing in its own right, distinct from the Church, and having its own aims and 
purposes ... The Church as an institution should not interfere in temporal matters except (following the 
oldest traditions) ethically, which meant in practice through the conscience of the individual Christian. 
Thus the building of the earthly city acquired its own “consistencia” ... As a result, the Church’s mission in 
the world becomes clearer. The Church (it will be said) has two missions: evangelism and animation of the 
secular ... The task of building the world does not concern the Church ... This consideration, in fact, makes 
Christianity appear to be an ideology for building up the world. Thus the two fields are clearly 
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André Biéler that this discussion should turn. The latter provided a further 
explanation of the constraints that were (and that for him still are) at stake in 
the theological and social make-up of the churches. Closely related to the central 
point already made above about the churches’ lack of a critical social theoretical 
base, pertinent mental, cultural and ideological factors were, for Biéler, at work 
that explain the constraints of the churches when it comes to, as he calls it, their 
“growth of awareness” of social and economic problems (1980:6). 
According to Biéler, an explanation of the churches’ limited growth of awareness 
and actual social involvement (that is, charity) during the industrial revolution 
goes much deeper than a merely conscious restriction or delimitation of their 
relation to the social sphere. What has to be scrutinised is the very mental and 
cultural structure upon which the churches operated, which by and large still 
reflected a pre-industrial frame of mind. This state of affairs was sustained, firstly, 
by the power of a (pre-industrial) theological and religious tradition that had a 
firm hold on the churches, and secondly, complicated by the fact that the 
cultural framework of the Bible, that foremost authority to which the Christian 
religion appeals, is itself rural, artisanal and pre-industrial. Yet, as summed up by 
Biéler, from the churches and their theological faculties came little, if any, 
systematic effort to overcome the above-mentioned constraints that could have 
enabled them to creatively reinterpret the Christian message and principles in 
the new context of industrial and technological society. This is because they 
lacked knowledge of the political, economic and social mechanisms with which 
they could execute such an interpretation and go beyond the framework of 
private life and personal relationships that constituted the hallmark of their 
prevailing ethical application (1980:7). They, the churches and their theologians, 
made no serious effort to acquaint themselves with those mechanisms by 
integrating them into their theological apparatus. They, in Biéler’s words, 
remained “passive in regard to the development of technological society without 
overmuch concern about the human dramas to which it gives rise” (1980:6). 
In the light of the subsequent analysis of Biéler, it would be wrong to deduce 
from the above that the churches operated in a social vacuum. This brings us 
back, once again, to the pertinent ideological factor already referred to earlier, as 
it could be said that the indifference by the churches towards the new social 
context in which they found themselves exposed their very schizophrenic nature. 
While pretending to be purely ‘spiritual’ in matters of faith and church life - 
which at best extended to doing some neutral charity work - the whole life style 
and mental attitude of the churches and their members, or what can be called 
                                                                                                                                              
differentiated. Unity will be given by the Kingdom of God. The Church and the world contribute, each in 
its way, to the building of that Kingdom ... Both from the level of concrete commitment by Christians in 
the world of today, and from the level of contemporary theological thinking, the two planes are seen to be 
inadequate ... If, at a given moment, this theology motivated and supported the presence of Christians in 
the task of building the world, it appears now to be obsolete and ineffective vis-à-vis the new problems 
which confront us today.” (1969:128-129, 133) 
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their ‘social existence’, rendered tacit support to the dominant interests 
(political, economic and social) and mode of development in industrial society. 
As expressed by Biéler himself:  
These Christians and these theologians were unaware, and 
sometimes still pretend to be unaware, that they have actively 
contributed, both by their own individual daily political, economic 
and commercial activities and by their ignorance of the collective 
effects of these activities, in promoting more and more intensely an 
ill-considered and irresponsible development under cover of the 
alleged neutrality of their spiritual and church life ... Now in the 
light of present-day social sciences, it appears increasingly evident 
that this unawareness by Christians of their real participation in the 
process of development is a defence mechanism designed to hide 
the important action they exert on society by reason of their faith 
and of the ideology which they often combine with it. It is not true 
that, apart from the so-called Christian social circles, the Christian 
churches and sects are economically, socially and politically neutral, 
and do not take an active part in economic expansion, in the choice 
of its structures with their multiple good and bad effects. 
(1980:6, 8) 
1.3.3 A third meaning: charity work represents a form of paternalism of 
which the net result has been the historical, almost complete 
estrangement between the Christian churches, on the one hand, and the 
working classes and the poor, on the other. 
It follows, finally, that charity work denotes an act of overt paternalism. As 
already indicated in the discussion, charity denotes an activity in which the 
middle classes direct the process. It assumes, as pointed out by De Santa Ana, “a 
certain distance between the giver and receiver of aid” (1980b:174, italics added). 
It presumes a relationship of marked inequality:  
There is no question of a relation of equals. However much love 
and compassion there may have been on the part of the churches in 
this relationship, therefore, it must have been an uncomfortable 
one for those on the receiving end, provoking responses which the 
would-be helpers of the poor simply could not understand. (Ibid.) 
De Santa Ana’s observation on incomprehension on the part of the initiators and 
benefactors of charity - the churches, the middle classes - would also correlate 
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well with the idea expressed above of charity assisting the psychological21 
comfort of the benefactors or well-doers. In terms of this observation, it can be 
said that the complacency of the benefactor or well-doer in the whole charity 
enterprise, regarding his/her inability to close the distance that De Santa Ana is 
speaking of and also regarding his/her inability to show a comprehension and 
sensitivity that would have made the poor and beneficiaries the actual subjects 
and (at least) co-determiners of the social processes, expresses nothing less than 
an almost complete self-centredness on the part of the former. In that sense, 
charity work ultimately has to do with his/her (that is, the benefactor’s, well-
doer’s) satisfaction to (at all cost) direct and determine the social processes, if 
only at the subconscious level. This would, not to a lesser extent, apply to those 
charitable activities that were appreciated in more positive terms earlier in the 
discussion, as at least denoting a genuine and sincere engagement22 on the part of 
a Christian minority. These latter cases, which De Santa Ana called 
“compassionate charity” (1980b:175), can also not escape the ultimate verdict 
that applies to all charitable efforts in the history of the churches, in particular 
those charity efforts with the best emancipatory intentions. It remains an 
“emancipation from above”, as indicated by Nicolai Zabolotsky (1980:75), 
initiated and directed by those in positions of relative and absolute power. 
This brings us to the overarching theme in the study under discussion. The 
writers of the study hold that it was the very paternalistic attitude towards, and 
way of dealing with, the poor that resulted in an insurmountable and permanent 
estrangement between the Christian churches, on the one hand, and the poor and 
working classes, on the other. In the words of De Santa Ana, it is a “gulf between 
the Church and the poor ... [that] is still there today and ... [that] goes deep”. It is 
an alienation that is also not to be modified by any counter-argument of a 
substantial Christian presence amongst the world’s poor today. While such 
presence may be of some extensive proportions, it is still far outweighed by the 
larger majority of poor and working class people estranged from and hostile 
toward the churches: 
There are poor people in the churches, it is true; but the 
proportion is far fewer than in society as whole. There are attempts 
to present the Gospel to the poor, to establish a Christian presence 
amongst the workers (for example, worker priests, or Christians 
who live in the slums of great cities or devote their lives to the 
cause of justice and human liberation). But these efforts do not 
represent a major current in the churches. The Pentecostal churches 
in certain parts of Latin America or Africa are described as 
“churches of the poor”, but, as Christian Lalive d’Epinay’s study of 
                                                          
21 Cf. also De Santa Ana’s own observation of the predominant psychological character of the paternalistic 
attitude that accompanies the activities of charity (1980b:174). 
22 See again the first paragraph of 1.3.1 and the quote that directly succeeds it. 
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the Pentecostals in Chile makes very clear, these groups, although 
made up of poor people, do not really represent a “popular” 
mentality23 ... In view of all this, we are safe in saying, without 
claiming absolute validity for the statement, that the 
underprivileged sections of society have on the whole found no 
place in the churches and that these have not seriously tried to 
welcome them ... The ultimate outcome is a vast, solid, structural 
separation between the poor and the churches. (1980b:180)  
It follows that the paternalistic charitable approach with which the churches 
persisted in their dealings with the poor during the industrial revolution and 
colonial expansion left that class of society (that is, the poor) with a mental 
attitude of deep mistrust and antagonism towards religion and the churches. A 
point had been reached in history, as De Santa Ana points out, when this section 
of society could feel that they had reached maturity (1980b:175). And in this 
discovery they experienced a religious or church sector that was little prepared 
(for reasons already set out earlier) to fight the social structures that the poor 
themselves had come to recognise as being at the root of their sufferings. At 
most that sector persisted with its charitable programmes geared to individual 
rather than mass poverty, which appeared rather ineffective and insensitive 
towards the ongoing sufferings and exploitation of the poor (ibid.).  
But there is also a further perspective to the long-term experience of the poor of 
the charitable works of the churches, as indicated by C I Itty in his review of 
that approach to poverty in Asian history. They, the poor, were in reality not the 
main beneficiaries of those areas in the enterprise of charity that could be 
regarded as most long-term in quality. Their experience of first-hand assistance, 
in actual fact, did not go much further than those services of a predominantly 
short-term nature, such as famine relief, orphanages, institutions for the 
handicapped, etc. On the contrary, they were rather by-passed in such areas as 
education and health as in actual practice the rich and middle classes made 
better and more use of these services than the poor. They, the new middle class 
and rich, were in the end the actual beneficiaries as the poorest people often 
lacked an awareness of the value of these services and had the minimum 
economic means to make use of them. And where the poor did benefit to some 
extent, these services were restricted to the new converts rather than rendered 
to the poor in general (1980:146). 
The end result of this whole experience was a counter-revolution by the poor of 
the world that rejected religion and the churches as ally in their struggle for 
emancipation and justice. It was a form of resistance, as evident from the study 
                                                          
23 In the study under discussion this statement is well supported by Sam Kobia and Julio Barreiro in their 
essays dealing with the relation between the churches and the poor in Latin America (see Barreiro 
1980:127-136) and Africa (see Kobia 1980:155-170) respectively. 
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under discussion, which most actively and vigorously came from those poor 
living in industrial societies. These poor, as indicated by John Kent in his essay 
on the relationship between the churches and the trade union movement in 
England, developed their own sub-culture, which remained foreign to even the 
best formations of solidarity that the churches could offer (see 1980:34-36).24 As 
Kent notes, Christian socialism was an expression of Christianity that came 
closest to making common cause with the poor. But it remained, in accordance 
with the notion of an ‘emancipation from above’ mentioned earlier, “a middle-
class affair, an attitude recommended to the working class, but never very 
popular in the working class” (1980:31).  
To conclude with André Biéler’s perspective of an apparent fourth stage25 in the 
growth of awareness amongst the Christian churches of the social and economic 
problems that arose with the advent of the industrial revolution and colonial 
expansion, the following can be stated. Referring to this stage as “the 
emancipation of the working classes and the class war” (see 1980:19-24), Biéler’s 
description of this stage leads us to identify the underlying irony of this stage. 
While assuming a particular Christian participation in this stage, the mode of 
involvement in this stage, in terms of Biéler’s own description, came to present 
the working classes and the poor’s ascendancy to take control of their own 
situation, to become the subjects in their own struggle (ibid.). And as such, it 
very much points to the latter group as an autonomous force liberating itself 
from any religious patriarchy through its own struggle. 
Assuming the solidarity of a small minority of truly committed Christians (see 
Biéler 1980:24-26), there was in reality little scope for Christian participation. 
The poor and exploited workers had found in the institutionalised labour 
movement of the nineteenth and twentieth century their direct ally for 
emancipation, a movement that was (and is) per se anticlerical and anti-Christian 
(Biéler 1980:26). As pointed out by Biéler, there was in actual fact “nothing left 
for Christians who wanted to act in solidarity with the proletariat except to 
create denominational trade unions” (1980:25). For the working classes, as this 
author finally concludes, it was already too late. They had discovered in the 
ideology of atheism and in the hope rendered by the revolutionary doctrine of 
Karl Marx, a substitute for the indifferent and often hostile views held by the 
Christian majority.  
In sum, having espoused, tacitly or expressly, the interests of capitalism and the 
ruling classes (of which Christian charity appeared to be a mere extension), the 
poor and working classes, from their perspective and actual experience, could 
find no allies in the churches and religion. And, for more than one reason as the 
                                                          
24 Kent (ibid.) at this point refers to the example of the so-called Christian “Chapel communities”, which as 
“alternative” communities of faith achieved little lasting contact with working class people, as it was 
ultimately a case of two different cultures that could not be reconciled.  
25 See footnote 17 of this chapter.  
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foregoing discussion has made clear, a critical and committed Christian minority 
could not turn the tide (see Biéler 1980:27-29).  
1.4 Ecumenical renewal 
It was not until the ecumenical renewal of the first half of the 
following century that a different aspect of Christianity would 
reappear, more faithful to its original tradition and capable of 
responding anew to the divine inspiration of nations seeking social 
solidarity and supranational fraternity… Consequently, it needs to 
be stated emphatically how great is the merit of those few people 
who, following in the footsteps of the pioneers of the minority 
social Christian movements, originated the ecumenical movement 
of the last few decades; they have alerted the churches, their 
authorities and theologians, and have courageously brought them 
face to face with the complex realities of the contemporary world. 
They have only partly succeeded, for that matter, and not without 
difficulty, not without meeting with fierce resistance, and often 
with caustic and unjust criticism. (Biéler 1980:28, 7) 
We may close this chapter with the above extract from André Biéler’s essay, 
which provides us with an appropriate transition point to the discussion in the 
next chapter. Having seen in the foregoing discussion how the notion of charity 
has been central to a most critical historical perspective by a number of critical 
authors linked to and writing for the contemporary ecumenical movement, it is 
the latter extract that requalifies that critical perspective to some extent. While 
not further elaborated upon in Biéler’s essay or anywhere else in the study under 
discussion, we are presented here with what we may call an ecumenical self-
appreciation, a statement of appreciation within the ecumenical movement itself 
that points out the different route that this representation of the Christian 
churches has apparently taken versus the larger majority. To interpret this 
further in terms of the critical perspective on charity defined in this discussion, 
it is suggested in the above statement of appreciation that (i) the representation 
in contemporary Christianity that has come to be known as the contemporary 
ecumenical movement had gone beyond a charitable mentality and mode of 
social involvement; (ii) that the individuals and groups that represent this 
movement have engaged in and have pressed for a mode or modes of social 
involvement pursuant of the critical structural and ideological understanding 
called for by the above-mentioned authors in their study; and (iii) that these 
efforts have likewise resulted in the same kind of fierce opposition on the part 
of the Christian majority as experienced by a critical and committed minority in 
the nineteenth century, but with the one exception, namely that this time this 
minority had positioned itself better in terms of its own organisational setting 
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(with reference to the World Council of Churches and its affiliations world-
wide).  
In the next two chapters of this study the above-mentioned suggestion of a new 
direction in Christian social thought and praxis by the contemporary ecumenical 
movement will be subjected to closer scrutiny. This will be done by taking a 
closer look at what was indicated at the start of this study as the ‘ecumenical 
development debate’. Having come to denote the apparently new conceptual 
framework (that is, ‘development’) by which the contemporary ecumenical 
movement or churches in particular would express their engagement and 
solidarity with the poor of the world,26 such further exploration will enable us 
to draw the historical comparison mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
(that is, charity versus development). Through such an exploration we will now 
not so much be presented by the historical counterpoint, that is, the perspective 
(as in this chapter) on a mode of historical socio-economic engagement by the 
Christian churches that precedes a development mode of engagement by that 
sector, but rather with the articulation of an actual progressive discourse and 
praxis in a more recent, new era of ecclesiastical socio-economic engagement. 
                                                          
26 C I Itty, an important representative of the ecumenical movement in the 1960s and 1970s, wrote the 
following appreciation in the introduction to the special issue in The Ecumenical Review that followed the 
1966 WCC Conference on Church and Society in 1966: “Development is the most crucial human concern 
of our time ... Development is also a matter of deep moral concern ... To Christians this moral challenge 
and human cause have deep spiritual implications. The care for the poor and the needy is part of our 
divine obligation. To love one’s neighbour is a Christian imperative. In today’s world, the concept of 
neighbour includes men in need everywhere and not only those in the immediate neighbourhood and the 
concept of love includes international economic justice. To be concerned about the development of the 
“Third World” is the most active expression of the Christian imperative for love and justice in our time.” 
(1967:249-351) 
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Chapter Two 
THE ECUMENICAL DEVELOPMENT 
DISCOURSE: CRITICAL CHALLENGE 
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of development has become a major preoccupation of 
the churches, but the churches have not been uncritical participants 
in the broader debate about the goals and methods for promoting 
development. They have challenged fundamental assumptions and 
conceptions, and they have called into question many existing 
patterns for trying to achieve development at both the macro- and 
micro-levels. Not least significant, they have continuously explored 
the possible implications of these new insights for their own 
theories and actions. Richard Dickinson (1991:273-274) 
We started this study with a positive statement of the ecumenical movement’s 
contribution to the churches’ thinking on development from one of Richard 
Dickinson’s earliest works.1 In that quote the same kind of ecumenical self-
appreciation may be observed as indicated in the final section of the previous 
chapter. There is one difference, though. While the statement once again came 
from a key thinker2 in the ecumenical movement, the difference is that this time 
the focus of appreciation had shifted more specifically to the notion of 
development. It upholds the view that the ecumenical movement had come to 
show the way to the rest of the Christian sector or churches towards a new 
progressive engagement in the contemporary socio-economic problematic of 
poverty and underdevelopment through its concern with development.  
In the same sense the quotation at the beginning of this chapter can be taken as 
an important continuation of Dickinson’s earlier statement. As this quotation 
represents a more recent statement by the same author (in his entry on 
‘development’ in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement3), it not only confirms 
Dickinson’s earlier positive pronouncement (which dates back to the beginning 
                                                          
1 See p. 1. 
2 Dickinson is the person responsible for the entry on ‘development’ in Dictionary of the Ecumenical 
Movement (see also the next footnote and the next paragraph in the main discussion above). Appreciation 
for Dickinson’s central contribution to the ecumenical movement’s thinking on development, is also 
clearly expressed by the various representatives of this movement writing the respective forewords or 
introductions to this author’s publications through the years on the ecumenical churches’ participation in 
development. See De Santa Ana (1983:vii-viii); Itty (1975:vii-viii); Lacey (1968:7). 
3 Published in 1991 by Eerdmans and edited by Nicholas Lossky et al. 
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of the ecumenical movement’s involvement with development4), but it also 
claims a positive progression in the ecumenical movement’s whole engagement 
with development during the past few decades. Whereas Dickinson’s earlier 
statement could be taken as a declaration of the ecumenical movement’s 
participation in development as such (which distinguishes this group from the 
rest of the church sector), this more recent statement assumes more overtly a 
distinct critical engagement by the ecumenical churches in the whole 
development enterprise. 
For Dickinson the ecumenical movement’s involvement with development did 
not merely represent an activity of a particular factual or quantitative status, that 
is, of an ecumenical church sector that has unconditionally or uncritically made 
development one of its major preoccupations.5 He suggests that such an 
involvement by the churches presumes a progressive status on two levels. It 
firstly presumes that such an involvement challenges mainstream secular 
development discourse and praxis in a distinct way. It secondly presumes that 
this critical engagement also finds a particular application in terms of the 
churches’ own theories and actions as it challenges the thinking and activities of 
the church sector in general. 
This chapter intends to explore more closely the nature of the ecumenical 
development discourse along the lines of Dickinson’s twofold presumption. In 
this statement a clear example of what may be called the ‘pretence of a 
progressive discourse’ on development maintained in the ecumenical self-
consciousness can be found. The discussion will now elaborate on this author’s 
claim of the ecumenical discourse’s respective challenge to the church sector in 
general and to mainstream secular development discourse by drawing on a larger 
corpus of writings in the ecumenical debate. Starting off with the second part of 
Dickinson’s claim, which is directed to the churches, the discussion will in 
particular concentrate on the critical challenge that the ecumenical discourse 
would gradually come to pose to mainstream secular development discourse 
(that is, the first part of Dickinson’s claim). It will be shown how, in this 
framework of critical reflection, the ecumenical concept of development would 
in particular be formed through the three interrelated concepts of ecumenical 
growth, social justice and self-reliance.  
2.2 Challenging the church sector 
In a wider application of ecumenical writings on development the challenge to 
the churches can be recognised in particular in the contributions of those 
                                                          
4 See our demarcation of an ecumenical concern with development in the introduction and particularly in 
footnote 1. 
5 See again the statement by C I Itty in footnote 26 of the previous chapter that makes ‘development’ the 
cardinal concept in the whole ecumenical socio-economic debate. 
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writers6 who, in the earlier phase of the ecumenical development debate, had 
come to problematise a prevailing church versus the world dichotomy in 
mainstream theological and ecclesiastical thinking and praxis.7 These writers 
proclaimed that, in contrast to mainstream theology and ecclesiastical praxis, the 
contemporary ecumenical concern for development represented the most 
significant expression of the new movement in Christianity working towards the 
overcoming of the church versus the world dichotomy. It reflects, in the words of 
Gustavo Gutierrez Merrino, “the advance in theological thinking” that leaves 
behind the outmoded concept of this distinction (1969:133).  
As this appreciation could first of all be found in the meaning of development 
itself, the contemporary question of development represented the most 
comprehensive viewpoint for a theological reorientation (Rendtorff 1971:89; 
1969:206).8 Development, accordingly, includes “consideration of the 
interdependence and the participation of all productive forces” (Rendtorff 
1971:91; 1969:208). It cannot be restricted to “the problems of economic, 
technological, and scientific development”, as its complexity extends beyond the 
latter to embrace “all spheres of life”. Not only does it include an indispensable 
‘cultural dimension’, but it also constitutes a vital connection with the problem 
of peace that, through the ethical and institutional aspects that it entails, 
expresses “the most striking example of the complexity of the problem of 
development” (Rendtorff 1971:95-96; 1969:210). 
                                                          
6 The contributions by Trutz Rendtorff (1969; 1971) and Gustavo Gutierrez Merino (1969) are in particular 
recognised as most explicitly and most specifically touching upon the theme envisaged in this subsection 
(see also footnotes 9 and 11 of the introduction and footnote 20 of Chapter One).  
7 In close connection with the previous footnote, it should be noted that this particular problematic has 
already been touched upon in footnote 20 of Chapter One. Whereas the discussion in this footnote points 
to the nature or contents of a theological expression or ecclesiastical praxis in which the above-mentioned 
dichotomy is sustained in a negative sense, the discussion in the main section (2.2) here concentrates on the 
actual positive overcoming of such a (negative) dichotomy in an ecumenical theology and ecclesiastical 
praxis - or, at least, the movement towards overcoming that problem. (See also as a further expression of 
the positive aspect of the church versus world theme, the comments made in the introduction of this 
study.)  
8 At this point the discussion may also refer to Rendtorff’s juxtaposition of the concepts of ‘development’, 
on the one hand, and ‘evolution’ and ‘revolution’, on the other. Debated within the context of his 
interrogation of a prospective ‘theology of development’, Rendtorff argued that the notion of development 
provided a prevailing ‘theology of revolution’ (which still occupied the foreground at the WCC’s Geneva 
Conference in 1966) with a potentially broadened meaning. This, for a start, is captured by the concept of 
development itself, or for Rendtorff rather the German term ‘Entwicklung’, which may “be regarded as an 
alternative to the opposition between revolution and evolution”. In contrast to both the latter two 
concepts, the notion of development indicates something “more rational and more comprehensive”. It 
implies a well-considered and constructive human activity of a kind unmatched by the other two 
concepts. It implies “the impetus to projection, to planning, and to positive reflection and consciously 
ratified change” that the other two concepts do not reflect in the same manner (Rendtorff 1971:91). And in 
this very sense, it also poses a most meaningful challenge to the theological and church sector: it is the rich 
and comprehensive enterprise of development with its imposition of a complex array of economic, 
cultural and institutional issues on the contemporary world-wide project of social change that presents a 
most viable and concrete frame of reference for a new Christian orientation of worldly involvement 
(1971:87). 
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Viewed from the perspective of the churches and Christian theology, the 
development problem in all its complexity constitutes the motivation for a 
process of profound renewal, a breakthrough of a (traditional) static ontology - in 
the structural sense (see Rendtorff 1971:94-100; 1969:209-213). Formative here is 
not only the very nature of the development process in which the churches 
engage, but also the kind of involvement to which the process of development 
compels the churches and Christian theology. For them such an involvement 
constitutes “a new form of Christian unity in the world” (1971:95; 1969:210). Its 
most immediate consequence is the reality “that the frontiers between faith and 
earthly tasks, Church and world, [are] becoming blurred” (Gutierrez Merrino 
1969:133). It denotes “a new, world-wide experience of unqualified Christian 
involvement in the vital problems of the contemporary world”, which clearly 
differs “from traditional forms of church action and theological thought” 
(Rendtorff 1969:204; cf. 1971:86) and which necessitates “the transcending of 
hitherto accepted theological formulations and churchly self-concepts” 
(Rendtorff 1971:86; cf. 1969:204). Rendtorff explained this in the context of 
what he saw to be the reality of the ecumenical churches’ involvement in 
development: 
The dominant themes of the general Christian awareness are no 
longer specifically churchly in the sense that the special identity of 
the Christian church is the first consideration. The main interest is 
directed rather to world development in all its aspects. More and 
more the churches are seeing themselves as part of a Christian 
process which thematically and institutionally leads far beyond the 
boundaries of the established churches and the theological 
overtures they have hitherto made toward mutual understanding. 
(1971:87; see also 1969:205) 
At this point in the discussion a first basic distinction could be drawn between a 
‘development’ involvement by the churches and a ‘charity’ involvement as set 
out in the previous chapter. In so far as the preceding determination relates to 
what Rendtorff claimed to be “the real, factual, established, and growing 
engagement of the Christian churches in the whole development field” (1971:94; 
see also 1969:209), it denotes the definite theological and ideological separation 
of a certain part of the church sector (broadly defined as the ecumenical 
movement) from the rest, which, at most, is still engaged in charity work and 
determined by a charitable mentality. In terms of Rendtorff’s vital distinction, a 
development involvement points to a new mode of co-operation and integration9 
in the worldly sphere (see 1971:102-103; 214-215). It presumes, contrary to the 
self-contained identity and its own peculiar (theological/ecclesiastical) response 
                                                          
9 See the initial introduction of these two concepts in footnote 11 of the introduction. 
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to worldly problems sustained by a charitable involvement and mentality,10 a 
new openness and willingness (on the part of Christian theology and the 
churches) to engage in and identify with non-traditional, worldly spheres and 
identities.11 
This new development mode of engagement has to be determined by an 
awareness of a limited competence and a sense of dependence on the part of the 
churches and theology. According to Rendtorff, this sector’s concern for 
development ought to be governed by the recognition that “[t]he complex, 
diverse, and far-reaching problems of development” are far beyond their 
competence to solve. Their experience in development, based on their new 
worldly engagement, has to bring them to acknowledge that any development 
work undertaken exclusively on their own would be “either arrogant or naïve” 
and that they themselves can “play only a modest part” in the development task 
as a whole. 
Here if anywhere, the need is for cooperation with all social, 
national, and international bodies engaged in development work… 
The cooperation factor means that we cannot construct a theology 
of development from existing church dogmatics and doctrines 
alone. This factor imposes on us a new concept of theology, one 
which is, as it were, supra-ecclesiastical. (1969:210, italics added; see 
also 1971:95) 
2.3 Challenging mainstream secular development discourse 
2.3.1 Gradual critical awareness 
As can clearly be seen from a wider range of ecumenical writings on 
development, the recognition of the need for co-operation and integration in the 
earlier stage of the ecumenical development debate pointed out above did not 
prevent representatives from that section of Christian theology and the churches 
from simultaneously criticising mainstream development thinking in a very 
                                                          
10 This meaning or definition has been emphasised particularly under the second aspect of a charity mode of 
involvement discussed in Chapter One (see 1.3.2). 
11 Here, in anticipation of the more detailed discussion in Chapter Six of this study, reference can be made to 
the present author’s MA Research Paper, Towards a New Solidarity Praxis: Critical Reflection’s on the 
Churches’ Participation in World Transformation, in which the idea of a new openness and willingness to 
engage and identify with non-traditional entities has been developed under the specific denominator of a 
‘new solidarity praxis’. Hence the idea stressed in this research paper, with reference to, but also 
supplementary to, a contemporary ecumenical consciousness (see Swart 1997:36-60; 88-89), that a 
meaningful contribution by the Christian churches to (world) social transformation (and by implication 
development) can only be realised by that sector’s adoption of such a praxis. It would most radically entail 
adaptation to “a new universalism, a new worldview, a new commitment to be in solidarity with ‘strangers’ 
and erstwhile ‘enemies’” (1997:88-89), in the political, disciplinary (epistemological), ideological and 
strategic sense (cf. e.g. 1997:1-6; 7-9; 61-62). 
THE CHURCHES AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
 36
definite way. It entailed, beyond what a theological and church sector was 
capable of within traditional parameters, speaking a proper, critical discourse of 
development that would not accept the reigning (secular) point of view and 
practice of development out of hand (cf. Rendtorff 1971:102-103; 1969:214-215). 
In the ecumenical development debate it is pointed out how the ecumenical 
movement soon adopted a rather critical stand vis-à-vis the dominant secular 
position. They started from a position of initial compliance with the mainstream 
notion of development through conforming to the Rostowian model12 of 
development (see Dickinson 1991:268-269), their support to mainstream 
institutions of development (governments, UN agencies, international 
development organisations) (Itty 1974:6-7; Dickinson 1975:70), and their 
preoccupation with economic categories13 in their own discussions and writings 
(see Itty 1974:7). Gradually, the prevailing and growing contradictions in the 
economies of particularly the so-called developing countries14 led individuals and 
institutions in this movement (e.g. the WCC) to adopt a more critical position 
                                                          
12 Referring to the ideas and theories captured in the 1960 development economics classic by Walter 
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, this model dominated 
understanding of development during the earlier stages of official, secular development thinking. It 
emphasises, in simple terms, the necessity of a particular ‘take-off’ stage for traditional (undeveloped) 
societies to develop to a state of economic and social ‘maturity’ (see further e.g. Hettne 1995:52-53; Oman 
and Wignaraja 1991:10-13). Whereas the realisation of this ‘take-off’ stage requires a sufficient level of 
technical skills, financial support and economic organisation to be made available in the newly developing 
societies, it also explains the churches’ understanding of their own task in development in the initial 
conformist stage mentioned above: to generate financial and other material resources to give to 
governments, secular agencies of development and technical specialists, whom they willingly entrust with 
the further task to put into operation the actual development process (see Dickinson 1991:269; 1975:70). 
(See furthermore the discussion of the ‘Pragmatic Debate’ in the ecumenical development debate in 
Chapter Three.)  
13 This point is made by C I Itty in his 1974 article in The Ecumenical Review. For this author economic 
categories clearly dominated the debate and the ensuing statements and reports emanating from 
ecumenical conferences and assemblies during the mid and late 1960s: the Church and Society Conference 
in Geneva (1966), the SODEPAX Conference at Beirut (1968), the WCC Fourth Assembly at Uppsala 
(1968). As pointed out by Itty, particularly with reference to the assembly at Uppsala, at this occasion the 
debate would in a rather confined way be concerned with economic growth amongst the poor people and 
nations of the world, which had to be achieved by far-reaching structural changes in the international 
economy and the responsibility of rich nations to provide better terms of trade, investment and 
appropriate technology (1974:7). (See also, for instance, how, as a direct consequence of the Uppsala 
Assembly, the theme of ‘Rich and Poor Nations’ dominated in the Vol. 20, No. 4 issue of The Ecumenical 
Review (1968).) 
14 In his 1974 article in The Ecumenical Review, “The Limits-to-Growth Debate in Asian Perspective”, Samuel 
Parmar listed the following contradictions within the economic growth paradigm: 
(1) An increase in the extent and intensity of poverty despite the increase in national and per capita 
incomes; 
(2) A shortage of foodgrains, rising prices of agricultural produce and greater inequality in rural areas 
concomitant with social discontent and unrest despite a successful green revolution; 
(3) An increase in industrial unrest, unemployment and under-employment, prices of manufactured 
goods, unused capacity, power shortages and monopoly tendencies amidst impressive industrial 
progress; 
(4) Continuing balance-of-payments deficits and debt-servicing despite a more than doubling in the value 
of annual exports; 
(5) An increase in illiterate persons (70% of the Indian population, for instance) despite educational 
expansion and a doubling in literacy (1974:35-36). 
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towards the dominant paradigm. They had, in a relatively short period of 
intensive reflection on the theme of development, become quite critical of the 
whole equation of development with economic development and specifically with 
the economic growth paradigm upheld in mainstream circles. In the words of C 
I Itty, who wrote the following about the ecumenical churches’ growing 
discontentment with the economic growth paradigm towards the end of the 
1960s: 
The GNP-biased view of economic growth was criticized as it need 
not reflect any improvement in the standard of life of the poor 
masses. In fact, the experience of many countries in the Third 
World showed that, in spite of certain increases in GNP during the 
first development decade, the lot of the vast majority of the poor, 
instead of improving, was actually worsening. The increase in GNP 
largely benefited the already rich and the middle class in those 
countries, resulting in increased social inequalities and economic 
exploitation. (Ibid.)  
While ecumenical scholars did not want to forsake the macro and structural 
aspect of development, a new emphasis was now placed on the human 
dimension in the ecumenical reconsideration of development. Constituting the 
guiding principle in many of the ecumenical writings on development since the 
early 1970s,15 this critical perspective wanted to challenge the anthropological 
and ideological basis of the mainstream secular paradigm that confines the 
meaning of human existence to economic categories.16 It emphasised that 
                                                          
15 Highlighted in a number of publications directly associated with the institutional framework of the WCC, 
it should here be noted how the theme of human development would take central stage in writings from 
the southeast Asian representation of the ecumenical movement (see the discussion in the introduction of 
this study). In the former case, see Robinson 1994:316-318; Mulholland 1988:1-8, 18-30; De Santa Ana 
1985:103-104; Itty 1974:6-11; Elliot 1971:59-69; Land 1971:2-35; Fernandes 1970:228-239. (While writing here 
in The Ecumenical Review, Robinson also comes from a southeast Asian context.) In the latter case, see 
Moghal 1993:42-56; Thomas 1991:35-39; Fernandes 1991:300-305; Das 1987:195-211; Jathanna 1987:218-234; 
Kurien 1987:137-142; 1970:9-15; Amalorpavadass 1972:4-9, 19-21.  
16 (1) Constituting the focus of critique in those writings mentioned in the previous footnote, the following 
additional reference list can be noted here of ecumenical writings on development in which a critical 
disposition towards economic biased and economic growth theories runs as a basic theme through the 
discussion. As in the case of the reference list in footnote 15, once again note the substantial number of 
authors of southeast Asian origin indicated in all cases with an asterisk: Dickinson 1991:270-271; *Kurien 
1987:135-142; 1981:29-45; Dickinson 1983:48, 57-59; *Upadhyay 1980:5-20; *Athreya 1980:21-32; Dickinson 
1975:2-13, 68-71, 117; Linnenbrink 1975:270-272; Pronk 1975:16-23; *Parmar 1975:8-15; *Parmar 1975a:166-185; 
*1974:33-52; Grant 1974:22-29; *Song 1972:55-62; *Kurien 1972:15-24; *Thomas 1972:36-41; *Parmar 1970:16-
33. 
 (2) At this point in the discussion it can also be noted (if only in a footnote) how ecumenical thinking 
shows a significant parallel with what is later identified in this study as the ‘alternative movement’ in 
development. As is well illustrated in the recent work of Raff Carmen, central to the alternative 
representation of development’s critique of the mainstream development enterprise is the latter’s own 
particular reduplication of the Western value construct captured by the notion of homo oeconomicus 
(economic man). Development (or developmentalism) in this sense became the Third World parallel of 
Western economism, which in tandem with the latter “attempted to steer the course of a complex human 
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development has to be understood in a holistic sense. It determined that an 
authentic development process has not only to consider all aspects of human 
well-being, but it also has to counter the factor of exclusion sustained by the 
economic growth paradigm (that is, exclusion of the larger majority of people 
and nature). To quote in this regard Gnana Robinson’s more recent formulation 
of ecumenical theology’s critical position vis-à-vis the economic growth 
paradigm: 
Development theories which are based merely on economic growth 
have to be subjected to criticism by Christian theology, which is ... 
concerned for the holistic development of the whole human 
community. We are here concerned with the development of all 
people, all ethnic communities - black, white, brown and yellow, 
high-caste and low-caste, male and female. Holistic development 
focuses on the material, physical, psychological, emotional and 
spiritual needs of every person in the community, not only the 
present generation but also future generations. Stewardship of the 
resources of nature therefore becomes very important. Waste has to 
be avoided; and nothing should be done that will disturb the 
ecological balance of nature. (1994:318) 
However, in critical ecumenical thinking, the debate on development would not 
lose its economic angle. Important in this regard are those voices that at an early 
stage in the new period of critical thinking warned against defining development 
too broadly as the total or integral liberation of the human person (see Itty 
1974:10; Thomas 1972:36; Kurien 1972:16; Elliot 1970:21). While these voices,17 on 
the one hand, did not want to forsake the principles of a human development 
perspective, which naturally has to define the ultimate objective or outcome of 
an authentic development process, on the other hand, Elliot stressed that such a 
broad term of reference also robbed the word of any specificity and workable 
meaning (ibid.). The cutting edge of any liberating development process, as was 
determined in this counter-perspective, has to remain the economic entry point 
of development. Development is specifically about “the conscious struggle 
against mass poverty” (Thomas 1972:36). It is the lack of a minimum of 
economic goods and services that holds people captive in a state of poverty, 
                                                                                                                                              
organism, human society ... by the sole macro-economic indicator of growthmanship” (1996:194). (Also 
note here the formulation of the subtitle of Carmen’s book, Autonomous Development. Humanizing the 
Landscape: An Excursion into Radical Thinking and Practice, which, as in the case of ecumenical 
theological thinking, emphasises the human aspect of development as the counterpoint to the merely 
economic notion of development. See in this regard Carmen (1996:193-210).) 
17 Once again the formative influence of southeast Asian scholars, like C T Kurien and M M Thomas, can be 
noted. At first the emphasis was on their own Asian context (see Kurien 1972:16; Thomas 1972:36), but 
someone like C I Itty (at the time director of CCPD), in his important 1974 article in The Ecumenical 
Review, used a speech by Thomas as a major source to set out the general ecumenical position that gave 
pre-eminence to the economic entry point of development (see 1974:10).  
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causes their spiritual and human enslavement, and remains the decisive link with 
the other dimensions of human well-being that are fundamental in the 
ecumenical concern with development. In the words of M M Thomas, a 
prominent ecumenical scholar of Indian descent: 
In defining Development too broadly as the total spiritual or 
integral liberation of man. This is no doubt the ultimate objective 
of every human activity. But Development service should 
emphasise specifically the spiritual and human enslavement which 
want of a minimum of economic goods and services (food, clothing 
and shelter, work, health and literacy) brings to men, women and 
children and it should emphasise the distinctive contribution 
liberation from such wants makes to the larger integral human 
liberation. No doubt, material poverty is closely linked with 
traditional religious ethos, value-systems, traditional social 
institutions and power-structures, and therefore cannot be fought in 
isolation from them ... But the distinctiveness of Development 
service is that the conscious struggle against mass poverty, i.e. 
economic liberation, is the point of entry and should remain the 
conscious connecting link for our concern with these other aspects 
of human existence. Otherwise, everything which the Church has 
been doing and wants to do will be defined as Development 
service, and the cutting edge of our economic objective of 
development, viz. the elimination of mass poverty, will be lost. 
(Ibid.)18  
2.3.2 Three interrelated concepts 
In the discussion so far we have come to see how the critical ecumenical debate 
on development of the late 1960s and early 1970s has left us with the image of a 
debate that fluctuated between the two poles of economic versus human 
development (Itty 1974:10). From this point onwards we can now proceed by 
pointing out how this debate would further refine itself around the three 
interrelated concepts of economic growth, social justice and self-reliance. Finding 
wider acceptance and first entering the ecumenical conceptual framework at the 
ecumenical consultation at Montreux in 1970,19 these three concepts gave a 
clearer structure and direction to ecumenical reflections and statements on 
                                                          
18 It is the economic aspect of development, as Thomas meaningfully stated in a previous point in this 
article, through which development work has to be distinguished from the churches’ charitable diakonia. 
Contrary to the latter involvement, ‘development’ means change in the pattern of economic and social 
living that causes the poor to be poor (Thomas 1972:35-36). 
19 In the continuing ecumenical development debate people would also come to refer to the latter three 
concepts as the ‘Montreux triangle’ (see e.g. Kurien 1974:201). 
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development in the years to come20 (Itty 1974:8; see also De Santa Ana 
1991:316).  
Through the influential thinking of Samuel Parmar,21 an Indian professor of 
economics and a prominent member of CCPD in the 1970s, it was argued that 
economic growth remains fundamental to the idea of development. At the same 
time, this did not imply an acceptance of the idea of economic growth per se. It 
was stressed that the notions of social justice and self-reliance have to radically 
redefine the meaning of development.22 These two concepts not only have to 
render a qualitative meaning to economic growth, but have to bring to the fore 
the human, political and structural dimensions of an authentic development 
process. What follows is a synthesis that would now, from the starting point of 
Parmar’s formative thinking, constitute the basic framework of a progressive 
ecumenical definition of development. 
2.3.2.1 Economic growth 
In the critical ecumenical definition of development the principle of economic 
growth retained central importance. While this position had to be meaningfully 
informed by the ‘limits-to-growth’ debate, which challenges the living patterns 
and policies of the industrial or ‘developed’ nations (see Parmar 1974:43), it 
rejected the prescription of a zero rate of growth for developing societies. This 
was stated by Parmar, with specific reference to the countries of Asia (and thus 
by implication also to the rest of the developing world), as follows:  
From this angle, prescriptions of zero rate of growth and global 
equilibrium as made by the advocates of limits to growth are not an 
option for Asia. Even on the assumption that rich nations will 
impose cuts on their consumption and transfer surpluses to poor 
nations, a zero rate of growth is unacceptable to us. Short of a one-
world government built on international economic justice, such 
transfers would institutionalize charity and dispossess our countries 
of their dignity and integrity. On the other hand, if a policy of zero 
rate of growth is accepted under existing politico-economic 
conditions, it would only perpetuate the status quo, leaving 
developing nations and deprived groups in developed nations to 
their miserable lot. In that case, even if industrial nations succeeded 
in overcoming their problems of pollution, ecological imbalance, 
                                                          
20 A reliance on these concepts is clearly still evident in the 1990s, as reflected in one of the more recent 
publications on development in The Ecumenical Review by Gnana Robinson (see 1994:318-320). 
21 The formative influence of Parmar is generally acknowledged in ecumenical literature on development 
(see e.g. Itty 1974:8; Dickinson 1991:270; 1975:69; De Santa Ana 1991:316). 
22 Or, as otherwise stipulated in an ecumenical understanding, economic growth has to become one of the 
means for promoting social justice and self-reliance (see De Santa Ana 1991:316). 
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etc., the environmental problem of poverty in developing nations 
could only become worse. (1974:42) 
Implicit in the above statement by Parmar is the perception that the problem of 
environmental degradation in Third World societies was, contrary to its causes 
in the developed world, not caused by over-development or excessive growth, 
but by a lack of sufficient growth. In these societies the cause is poverty, the lack 
of goods and services that are basic to decent human living (see Parmar 1974:41-
42). It consequently called for development strategies focusing on the eradication 
of absolute poverty. This, however, could not be enough as people would still 
be living at a subsistence level. Authentic strategies of development ultimately 
need to operate with the yardstick of a ‘desirable minimum’ (Parmar 1975a:14-
15), which clearly calls for some kind of growth (see Parmar 1974:42).23 
It can be said that the aspect of economic growth would, in the ecumenical 
definition, be best described by the juxtaposition of qualitative versus 
quantitative growth. According to this, the conventional view of development is 
seen as reducing and limiting the enterprise of development to a quantitative 
approach to growth. Here the ecumenical point of view did not neglect the 
value of the important indices of development such as increases in GNP, per 
capita income, quantum of resources, size of investment and expansion of 
education and welfare facilities. It regarded these indices as meaningful indicators 
of general socio-economic improvement, but only up to a certain point. It 
maintained that they could still be misleading, for the reason that an approach 
inclined towards aggregates and averages often conceals the real situation 
(Parmar 1975a:8-9). 
As the critical ecumenical position could be taken a step further, it maintained 
that the quantitative approach gives no real explanation for situations of gross 
absolute poverty prevailing in developing societies despite the realisation of 
growth. As such, this approach in actual fact contradicts (see Parmar 1974:35-
36)24 the very meaning and goal of development: 
Development is a process by which poverty should be overcome. 
Therefore, if the fruits of growth reach the poor then it can be 
affirmed that development has taken place; otherwise not. 
(Parmar 1975a:9) 
Related to the above-mentioned critique is the fallacy of this approach in 
describing a whole country as ‘poor’ on the basis of per capita income. This 
                                                          
23 Following Mahatma Gandhi, Parmar also refers to the spiritual dimension of ‘bread’ and ‘work’. Growth is 
accordingly to be seen as the positive realisation of the divine calling to eradicate poverty, inequality and 
exploitation, and hence, as a key element in the process of humanisation (see 1974:42). 
24 See, at this point, footnote 14 in which Parmar’s list of contradictions within the economic growth 
paradigm of development is specifically mentioned. 
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constitutes a generalisation that neglects the existence of “small pockets of 
affluence” within poor countries that actually control the economic and political 
processes and accordingly appropriate the major share of production (ibid.). 
These recognitions expose the great weakness and limitations of the quantitative 
approach. It is a non-institutional approach that neglects fundamental 
institutional and structural indicators. It does not take into account the factor of 
institutional and structural changes that have to be implemented in favour of the 
poor. It omits the fundamental political factor that has to bring a policy-making 
process into place that can break through the power structures that sustain the 
negation and exploitation of the poor - despite the actual realisation of growth as 
measured by GNP. As argued in the following comment on a rectification of the 
quantitative approach, which anticipates much of the essence of the second and 
third principles of ‘social justice’ and ‘self-reliance’ in the ecumenical triangle of 
development discussed in this chapter: 
Policies of development should bring about structural change. The 
development process should not be seen merely as a techno-
economic exercise for accumulation and deployment of resources. 
It should aim at fundamental changes in the overall social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions. 
Structural change calls for a change in values and institutions. 
Experiences of a number of developing countries show that, under 
the influence of the quantitative approach, development efforts 
have become adjuncts and allies of the status quo, both nationally 
and internationally. It is commonplace for spokesmen of developing 
countries to condemn neo-colonialism and the unjust structures of 
international economic and political relations that promote it. But it 
should not be forgotten that external influences are able to enter 
and permeate our economies through the connivance and 
cooperation of unjust internal structures. A quantitative approach 
bypasses these fundamental issues of development. (Parmar 
1975a:9-10) 
However, the ecumenical critique of the quantitative approach to economic 
growth does not end here. Closely related to the third principle of ‘self-reliance’ 
discussed later in this chapter, the conventional economic growth paradigm of 
development would be criticised for its imitation of the paradigm applied to 
developed countries, rather than taking the socio-economic realities of the 
developing world seriously. Concerning the impact of a consumerist, scientific 
and technological drive upon developing societies similar to what is taken as the 
norm in the developed societies (see Parmar 1975a:12), the ecumenical position 
pointed out the fallacy of conventional thinking in claiming that it was possible 
for poor nations to ‘catch up’ with the rich. This notion of ‘catching up’ with the 
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rich nations captured the essence of the conventional way of thinking that 
emphasises that developing countries might be able to narrow the gap between 
them and the developed world, if not reaching the same standard of living as the 
latter, with a high enough growth rate (see Parmar 1974:38). Yet, in the 
ecumenical consciousness, this would be regarded as an impossibility that does 
not take into account the reality of limited resources and a comprehensive 
notion of human well-being. Parmar summarised this as follows: 
The fallacy of the “catching-up” concern in development has 
become apparent. The gap between rich and poor nations has 
widened. Preoccupation with keeping up with developed nations 
has made us neglect the more important question of reducing 
domestic inequalities. Development means to be like the developed 
nations. In terms of the resource availability in the world today this 
is not possible; moreover, human welfare has not been furthered by 
the path that the industrial nations have followed. Hence, both on 
grounds of feasibility and desirability, developing economies would 
be wise to charter a different course. (1975a:13) 
This critique of the possibility of poor nations ‘catching up’ with the rich, more 
specifically introduces the ‘alternative’ concept of ‘qualitative growth’. Growth, 
as pointed out earlier, was seen as vital to development (Parmar 1975a:10) and as 
a means to overcome poverty. Yet, the rejection of a zero rate growth did not 
imply that developing societies should pursue the same patterns and policies as 
those of the industrial countries. The quantitative aspects of development, such 
as concern about GNP, had to be subordinated to qualitative goals (Parmar 
1974:42). 
As the focus of development strategies would now be on those below the poverty 
line (Parmar 1975a:14), it held that the contents of production ought to become 
more important than its quantum (Parmar 1975a:10). Determined further by the 
regulation of a ‘permissible maximum’ (as counterpoint to the already 
mentioned principle of a ‘desirable minimum’ and as laid down by a still very 
relevant ‘limits-to-growth’ debate) and the impediment of a limited resource 
base in developing societies (see Parmar 1975a:15; 1974:44-45), this perspective on 
production would be articulated by the determination that an available resource 
base has to “be applied to the production of essentials and withdrawn from the 
less essential” (Parmar 1975a:14, italics added). In terms of a concrete policy 
framework this implies: (i) that slum clearance and low-cost housing will take 
priority over high-cost housing, (ii) coarse and medium cloth over fine textiles 
or synthetic materials, (iii) an increase in production of essential commodities 
over the expansion of a luxury goods sector, (iv) small irrigation schemes that 
reach the low-income groups over huge multipurpose projects, (v) training for 
basic rural health services over the concentration of medical facilities in urban 
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areas, (vi) the increase in health and educational facilities over, for example, 
night clubs, and (vii) small viable projects over prestige projects (Parmar 1974:37; 
1975:14). 
From another angle, it can be said that the concept of qualitative growth views 
cost-benefit relations in social rather than in sectional terms. It determines that 
development has taken place in cases where social benefit exceeds social cost, 
where net economic welfare increases and the wellbeing of the poor has been 
enhanced. As such, it counters the generally narrow, micro view of cost and 
benefit in conventional growth strategies, where a project is regarded as 
beneficial if the value of output exceeds the cost of input. It determines that 
such strategies do not as a rule take into account the cost to society (as a 
qualitative approach does). It does not make an assessment of negative 
consequences such as industrial pollution, the spread of slums, the evils of 
urbanisation and industrial expansion (crime, alienation, the sub-culture of 
poverty, unemployment) and the export of exhaustible resources (Parmar 
1975a:11).  
Contrary to the quantitative approach to growth, it could be pointed out that 
the most significant feature of qualitative growth is the fact that it brings into 
account cultural, human and social factors as fundamental co-determinants of 
welfare and development. This means a new consideration for the place of 
values as the ultimate factor in development, that is, values that through the 
attitudes of people, socio-cultural norms and ethical consciousness determine 
the nature of social institutions and structures (ibid.). Expressed in the positive 
sense by a qualitative approach’s emphasis on the essentiality of modest or 
simple consumption patterns in order to bring about an institutional and 
structural arrangement through which the poor might become the co-
stakeholders of the limited resource base in developing countries (see Parmar 
1974:44-45; also 1975:14-15), the institutional and structural aspect is, in the 
negative sense, indicated by a quantitative approach’s undermining of the values 
that development stands for. Far from being a merely narrow-focused, a-
structural and a-institutional strategy of development, the quantitative approach 
enhances a structural and institutional arrangement upheld by the values of 
excessive consumerism, profit seeking and personal advantage at all cost, also 
including exploitation and aggrandisement (see Parmar 1975a:10), as described in 
the following quote: 
Many developing countries are facing an unprecedented upsurge of 
corruption, hoarding, profiteering, and illegal domestic and foreign 
transactions, which are eating at the very vitals of society. These 
reprehensible forces have found sustenance in the process of 
quantitative growth. While basic needs remain unfulfilled, the 
quest for luxuries gains momentum. There is a steady erosion of 
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social commitment and responsibility. Such tendencies create 
values and social attitudes that jeopardize development. We have, 
therefore, to discard the narrow idea of a high rate of growth in 
favour of a value-oriented qualitative approach under which the 
struggle against poverty will from the outset be based on social 
justice and people’s participation. (Parmar 1975a:11-12) 
2.3.2.2 Social justice 
The ecumenical definition of development would, as an important corollary of 
what has been spelled out under the first principle of qualitative ‘economic 
growth’, determine that the application of social justice has to “precede growth 
and be considered a necessary precondition for growth” (Parmar 1974:43). In this 
sense, it involves the question of value change as much as of institutional 
transformation, which go hand in hand as is evident from the final section on 
‘economic growth’ above (see Parmar 1975a:11). It is governed by the realisation 
that achievements of growth coincide with increased economic inequalities 
rather than vice versa. Increase in GNP is accordingly to be regarded as a 
delusive indicator as this ensures no automatic ‘trickle-down’ of the benefits of 
increased production to the poor25 - an outcome clearly not brought about by a 
mere market mechanism, as the latter rather favours the higher-income groups 
of society possessing adequate purchasing power (Parmar 1975a:10; 1974:39). 
On the basis of the above critical assessment of existing institutional and policy 
regulation (predominantly against the interests and well-being of society’s poor), 
a social justice framework in ecumenical development thinking emphasised the 
necessity of an alternative system of regulation. In this system the notion of 
distribution ought to be the governing principle. Based upon “the acceptance of 
egalitarian values which … [are to] be realised in institutions relating to 
property, power and opportunity” (ibid.), this denotes a system of institutional 
and policy regulation that has to work not only towards an increase in 
production to specifically meet the needs of those below the poverty line (thus 
giving expression to the priority placed on the production of essentials within 
the imposed parameters of a national maximum in consumption patterns), but 
also to draw this social group into the mainstream processes of production and 
give them a stake in growth (Parmar 1974:40, 41). 
In the ecumenical definition of development, this principle of equitable 
distribution also rejected the traditional view of welfare in which distribution is 
seen as a consequence of growth and, consequently, in which production takes 
precedence over distribution (as the inverse would rather be a case of 
‘distributing poverty’) (see Parmar 1974:43). In this sense the ecumenical position 
rejected the mainstream rationale that policies of social justice would act as a 
                                                          
25 See also footnote 14 again and the first quote in 2.3.1 in which the ecumenical movement’s critical position 
towards the GNP-biased view of economic growth is formulated. 
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disincentive to capital and enterprise. Here the counter-argument would be that 
it is rather the “stoppages and disruption of production caused by lack of 
people’s participation [that] damage the interests of these factors more than a 
decrease in their immediate share” (1974:41). It takes the stance that policies of 
social justice, of a more egalitarian pattern of distribution, will in the longer term 
become a promotive factor of growth rather than the opposite:26 
Most Asian economies have a small saving class and a large non-
saving class. This results from maldistribution of income and is an 
obstacle to growth. Measures of social justice should, by drawing 
the non-saving class into the mainstream of production, redress the 
pattern of distribution, increase the productive capacity of the 
people and transform them into a saving class. Such measures 
should be looked upon as investment to make our human resources 
more efficient. That is how social justice can become a promoter of 
growth. (Ibid.) 
In the preceding two paragraphs the notion of participation has been touched on 
as another fundamental determinant in the ecumenical understanding of 
development. More than indicating an important factor of production and 
growth (Parmar 1974:40), the concept of participation became the crucial ethical 
and political indicator in the ecumenical concern for social justice (see Dickinson 
1991:271; 1983:56; also Parmar 1975a:15). It denotes the “visible element in the 
vision of an emergent society” (ibid; see also Arce Martinez 1978:268). As the 
prevailing mainstream development reality is associated with the lack of the 
popular sector’s participation in the decision-making processes of development, 
‘participation’ denotes the distinct repoliticisation of the development agenda vis-
à-vis an exclusively economic and technocratic approach (Dickinson 1975:70; 
Parmar 1975b:170-171, 175-176; De Santa Ana 1975:143-147). In the most 
profound sense, this meaning of participation introduces the leitmotif of 
‘solidarity with the poor’, which makes the churches’ assistance of the poor in 
                                                          
26 At this point a meaningful parallel can be drawn between ecumenical development thinking and South 
Africa’s own Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It is also stipulated in the RDP 
document that the integrated development process inherent to this programme opposes the conventional 
approach that holds growth and development, or growth and redistribution, as processes that contradict 
each other. Similar to ecumenical thinking, it also goes on to proclaim a strategy of redistribution that 
should be regarded as basic to a process of inclusive growth and development for society at large: “Growth 
- the measurable increase in the output of the modern industrial economy - is commonly seen as the 
priority that must precede development. Development is portrayed as a marginal effort of redistribution 
to areas of urban and rural poverty. In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The RDP 
breaks decisively with this approach. If growth is defined as an increase in output, then it is of course a 
basic goal. However, where that growth occurs, how sustainable it is, how it is distributed, the degree to 
which it contributes to building long-term productive capacity and human resource development, and 
what impact it has on the environment, are the crucial questions when considering reconstruction and 
development. The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified 
programme.” (ANC 1994:6) 
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their own struggle for participation and liberation the most concrete and 
conscious expression of their (the churches’) involvement in development (see 
Linnenbrink 1975:271).27 This view was expressed by C I Itty, one of the 
prominent formulators of the ecumenical understanding of development, as 
follows: 
Development is essentially a people’s struggle in which the poor 
and oppressed should be the main protagonists, the active agents 
and immediate beneficiaries. Therefore, the development process 
must be seen from the point of view of the poor and oppressed 
masses who are the subjects and not the objects of development. 
The role of the churches and Christian communities everywhere 
should be essentially supportive. (Itty quoted in Dickinson 
1991:272) 
At this point, as far as the churches’ solidarity with the poor is concerned, the 
ecumenical understanding of development most clearly converges with the 
message of the theology of liberation. It was explicitly stipulated at the 
ecumenical consultation at Montreux in 197428 that ‘liberation’ represented a 
new word for ‘development’ (Linnenbrink 1975:271). This word most powerfully 
expresses the ultimate goal of the alternative ecumenical understanding of 
development, and exposes the inherently biased nature of mainstream capitalist 
development, serving the status quo and sustaining the subservient position of 
dominance and dependence in which the poor find themselves. However, this is 
an understanding of development that does not simply denote the adoption of 
Marxist doctrine:29 “it was more basically a result of the effort to reread the 
                                                          
27 In his book entitled Poor, Yet Making Many Rich: The Poor as Agents of Creative Justice, Richard Dickinson 
indicates how the following five modes of being in solidarity with the poor could be identified in the work 
of the WCC: 
(1) Helping the poor to meet their immediate needs through relief and modified project assistance 
(1983:73; Chapter 4). 
(2) Development education or “consciousness-raising for global justice” (1983:73; Chapter 5). 
(3) Systemic (structural) analyses of basic social systems (1983:73; Chapter 6). 
(4) Theological and ethical reflection on major cultural values and myths that govern societies, especially 
influential societies (1983:73; Chapter 7). 
(5) Working alongside groups of the poor on local levels who are working towards their own 
emancipation (1983:74; Chapter 8). 
28 This was the second ecumenical consultation at Montreux, which significantly shaped the ecumenical 
understanding of development. It followed upon the first important consultation at Montreux already 
referred to earlier in the discussion. 
29 In their opposition to the reigning capitalist system ecumenical writers on development would come to 
express clear socialist sentiments. “There is an expressed conviction”, Richard Dickinson wrote in his entry 
on ‘poverty’ in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, “that some form of socialism ... is the system most 
likely to overcome poverty”. (See Sergio Arce Martinez’s explicit equation of development with socialism 
in his 1978 article in The Ecumenical Review (Vol. 30, No. 3)). Yet, as Dickinson suggests, in the larger 
corpus of ecumenical literature a position more sophisticated than a mere identification with socialism is 
to be encountered. Pointing out “the failure of both capitalism and communism”, it is a position that rather 
adopts the fuller and more sophisticated language of what might be called “(a)n alternative ‘third way’” - a 
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biblical materials and to see Christian theology with new eyes, from the angle of 
vision of the poor and oppressed, ‘from the underside of history’”30 (Dickinson 
1983:59). In terms of an authentic development praxis, it assumes that the poor 
will take “control of the process of development” (Linnenbrink 1975:271). In this 
sense it also requalifies the merely supportive role of the churches as indicated 
previously. In cases where the poor accept their lot of poverty and misery in 
passive resignation, the churches have the clear task of conscientisation.31 In the 
words of Itty, they have the task of assisting “the masses to recognize the roots of 
their plight, to acquire a new awareness of themselves and the possibilities for 
changing their situation” (Itty quoted in Dickinson 1991:272). 
For the churches, this identification with the poor, in their struggle for 
development, at the same time implies an unequivocal self-critique. It implies 
the conscious and deliberate action of the churches to free themselves from the 
structures of wealth and power in which they might find themselves entangled 
(see Linnenbrink 1975:272). It assumes the extension of an authentic ecumenical 
development involvement to direct its role of conscientisation to the churches 
and Christians living in the rich industrial states (Linnenbrink 1975:273) (but, one 
may add, not omitting their counterparts in developing countries). This means 
bringing rich Christians and churches to the point of critically self-examining 
their own power base and ideological self-interests from which they render 
development aid (see Linnenbrink 1975:273-274). 
In conclusion, this task of conscientisation has to be seen as the “constitutive 
factor for the unity of the Church” (Linnenbrink 1975:274). It should be stressed 
that, in the ecumenical consciousness, development was only authentic where it 
unifies rich and poor around the single denominator of a “Church of the poor, a 
poor Church” (see Linnenbrink 1975:272; italics in original); where it rules out any 
“neutral, arbitrator’s rôle ... from both oppressed and oppressors” and where it 
involves “taking an unequivocal stand on the side of the oppressed and the 
                                                                                                                                              
concept or theme that would at an earlier stage be informed by the ecumenical notion of “a responsible 
society” (which emphasises political and economic freedom and responsibility), but later also by the still 
fuller ecumenical description of a “just, participatory and sustainable society” (which highlights material 
well-being, political participation and ecological sanity) (1991:808).  
30 In a southeast Asian context this theological underpinning of development would significantly come to be 
known as ‘A Theology of the People’ or minjung theology, meaning theology of alienated or marginalised 
people (Das 1987:211-216; see also the numerous references to such theological expression in footnotes 25-
32 in this section of the discussion by Das). In this theological expression, another writer from India 
meaningfully wrote that theology is not the main subject of people’s struggle for liberation, but justice is. 
It involves “the struggle of the people, especially the struggle of the poor, for their life”. It is therefore not 
the task of theologians to theologise this struggle, but their task could, at most, be a supportive one: “It is 
not we who should theologise this struggle. God himself has chosen sides. He has chosen to liberate the 
poor by delivering them from their misery and marginality, and to liberate the rich by bringing them down 
from their thrones. We are invited to take the side of the poor, to claim solidarity with them in their 
struggle.” (Mar Polouse 1983:88) 
31 Cf. the concurrence between this perspective on conscientisation, as defined in the following two 
paragraphs below, and the perspectives on conscientisation in Chapter Three of this study, that is, at the 
end of 3.2.2 and especially in 3.3.2. 
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disinherited whenever they are denied the social, economic and political 
conditions necessary for effective participation in the social processes of 
development and decision-making” (Linnenbrink 1975:274). 
2.3.2.3 Self-reliance 
In the ecumenical consciousness, the structural and policy-making element of an 
authentic development process is most clearly described by the third 
determinant concept of self-reliance. Here the deficiency of mainstream 
dominant strategies to bring about a process of authentic development was 
pointed out. It was stressed that such strategies do not take the distinctive and 
peculiar situation of developing countries into account and that they remain 
structural and policy frameworks that are imposed upon these societies from 
outside. As this is most clearly to be recognised in the problem of modern 
technology as a strategy for developing societies, such a technological 
arrangement conforms to the pattern of supply in industrial nations. It is capital-
intensive and labour-saving, while economic conditions in developing societies 
are very different. In these societies the situation is one of a scarcity of capital 
and a relative abundance of labour. Consequently, the influx of capital-intensive 
technology causes the distortion of the patterns of utilisation in these societies. It 
uses more of what these societies lack and less of what they actually possess, 
especially labour (Parmar 1974:45-46). 
In the ecumenical perspective, the most suitable technological arrangement 
could (to adopt Parmar’s perspective) best be described as an intermediate 
technology. Here the prevalent quest has to be for a labour-using technology 
(contrary to a labour-saving one) that takes into account the distinctive socio-
economic realities and conditions of developing countries. In spite of the fact 
that the system of modern technology by and large represents the opposite of 
such a (labour-using) technological arrangement, this perspective would not be 
inimical to the adoption of a modern technological arrangement. In practice, it 
proposes the implementation of “a politico-economic system that would allow 
for the co-existence of two basically divergent technologies”. It proposes the co-
existence of a capital-intensive system of technology utilised by a smaller sector 
of society,32 while the rest of the economy is geared towards intermediate 
technology. As the essence of such structural and policy regulation was 
furthermore described by Parmar: 
We need not shy away from the dualism inherent in a two-
technologies social system. Economic dualism has been a 
                                                          
32 In this perspective the defence sector and part of the industrial sector are identified as utilisers of capital-
intensive technology. Yet this statement can be regarded as a contradiction in terms, particularly with 
regard to the former sector, as it is acknowledged that the real solution to the problem of development 
entails the issues of peace and disarmament. As the notion of intermediate technology highlights the 
violent impact of modern technology upon human beings and nature, it points to disarmament and anti-
militarism as integral parts of an authentic development strategy (see Parmar 1974:48). 
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characteristic of many Asian countries. It still continues. A small 
organized sector exists alongside a large traditional sector. Of 
course, in the past the former has exploited the latter and 
contributed to underdevelopment and inequality. An important 
aim of developmental efforts is thus to end this kind of dualism. 
Technological dualism could also present similar dangers, with the 
modern sector dominating the one which uses intermediate 
technology. To safeguard against such possibilities it would be 
necessary to undergird any experiments in two-tier technology by 
appropriate political and ideological supports. (1974:47-48) 
In the above description the predominant orientation of an intermediate 
technological arrangement for traditional or indigenous societies is clearly spelled 
out, but also its definite political determination,33 that is, that this kind of society 
and arrangement has to be safe-guarded from exploitation and domination by 
the dominant modern sector through a system of clear structural and policy 
regulation. This does not only entail a fundamental perspective on employment 
and labour (that is the aspect already pointed out), but it also considers the 
environmental and limits-to-growth factor. While the ecumenical perspective on 
development emphasised the need for a particular measure of qualitative 
economic growth as indicated earlier, it simultaneously took full consideration of 
the limits-to-growth debate and ultimately the necessity for a zero rate of growth 
in the economic arrangement as this is the only safeguard against environmental 
and, for that matter, human destruction. Demanding the device of an 
intermediate technology this perspective furthermore qualified that: 
Intermediate technology can maintain harmony between man and 
nature. In that case it will not exploit nature as advanced 
technology is doing. It could, therefore, be considered non-violent 
in character. Precisely for that reason it can develop and flourish in 
a climate of peace. The limits-to-growth discussion is of great 
significance in this context. It exposes the rapacious nature of 
technology. The suggestion of zero rate of growth and equilibrium, 
if put into practice, would reduce the exploitative attributes of 
technology and divest it of its inherent violence.  
(Parmar 1974:48-49) 
Related to the problem of technology, the ecumenical development perspective 
of self-reliance also extended to the debate on trade. Existing trade arrangements 
between developing and developed nations, which are upheld in this 
perspective, have to be regarded as part and parcel of the problem of 
                                                          
33 Thus, as under the heading of economic justice (see 2.3.2.2), the inherent political dimension or nature of 
an authentic development practice once again becomes evident.  
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mainstream development. These existing arrangements have to be seen in an 
historical light as the preservation of relationships from the time of colonial 
domination by which “capital and technique have moved from the dominant 
nations into the weaker ones to foist on the latter a pattern of specialization and 
trade that would serve the interest of the former” (Parmar 1974:50). As “a double 
movement of factors” is basic to this process leading to the constant draining of 
labour and raw materials out of the so-called developing societies to serve as 
inputs to the dominant countries, it reflects “the prevalent trade policy of export 
promotion and import substitution” in the contemporary context. Its objective is 
aimed at achieving self-reliance in the foreign exchange sector (Parmar 1974:50-
51). In terms of the prevalent predisposition to imitate the dominant countries in 
all aspects and sectors, the rationale is to achieve the desired balance in the 
foreign exchange budget through enough export, to import the capital, goods 
and services necessary for the growth of a distinctive modern, industrialised 
sector without external financial assistance34 (see Parmar 1974:36-37, 51).  
In the ecumenical debate on trade, based on the above critical perspective, 
“change in the existing pattern of international division of labour, terms of trade, 
and trade policies” was, however, demanded (Parmar 1974:51). Development 
would here take on the clear meaning of structural reform. It requires that 
“reforms of the international economic system [are] just as imperative as those 
required within the poor countries and within the developed countries” (Grant 
1974:26, 27). As this once again introduces the notion of justice, “(i)ts expression 
would be social justice in the domestic economy and international economic 
justice in the world economy” (Parmar 1974:52). In terms of existing socio-
economic relations, it implies a global structural and policy regulation in which 
primacy is given to the interests of the weaker sections, a policy according to 
which the industrial nations would “give up their present hold on the world’s 
resources” (ibid.). 
Yet in the ecumenical development debate the perspective on alternative trade 
regulations and structures would undergo further deeper qualification through 
the notion of self-reliance. It would go beyond the mere emphasis on just and 
fair international economic relations. It would propagate the principle of far less 
trade. However, by this the ecumenical perspective did not imply self-
sufficiency, autarchy or delinking (Robinson 1994:320; Das 1987:206; Dickinson 
1983:32). As this concerns the question of trade and the interrelated quest for 
intermediate or appropriate technology, the ecumenical perspective wanted 
rather to apply explicit qualitative consideration of the nature of what is 
exported and imported (Parmar 1974:50). The concern would here be with 
redressing the serious drain of scarce resources induced by a current export 
                                                          
34 In his exposition Parmar called this kind of autonomy a “narrow, functional” self-reliance, as it considers 
the “blind imitation” of the “concepts and policies borrowed from industrial countries” a necessity 
(1974:36). Hence the clear linkage between the debates on technology and trade in the critical ecumenical 
perspective at this point. 
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policy, because this poses the real danger of their depletion in the long term at 
the cost of local people striving for self-reliance (ibid.). 
However, self-reliance was not only to be seen as an economic concept, but had 
to be applied to the whole of a society and culture. It relates to the collective 
cultural psyche of a people and to their liberation from the cultural imperialism 
imposed on them by the political, economic and technological (Western) 
structures and powers of domination (Dickinson 1983:32-33). Consistent with 
the denial of autarchy or self-sufficiency as a viable strategic option, self-reliance 
implies a strategy of development that “would not eliminate all vertical 
dependencies”. It would rather seek to minimise these vertical dependencies as 
far as possible (Dickinson 1983:33). The ecumenical understanding would relate 
here to a meaning expressed in the 1974 Cocoyoc Declaration,35 whereby self-
reliant development means a new affirmation of a people’s self-confidence; of 
reliance primarily on their own resources, human and natural, and on their 
capacity for autonomous goal-setting and decision-making. “It excludes 
dependence on outside influences and powers that can be converted into 
political pressure” (Robinson 1994:320).  
Self-reliance, in the ecumenical understanding, was all about affirming a local 
people’s self-respect and dignity (Das 1987:206). Formulated differently, it can be 
said that a development strategy of self-reliance indicates a fundamental 
reorientation ‘from below’ (see Fernandes 1991:303-304). It denotes the 
structural and policy regulation to ensure the authentic participation of local 
people.36 As this carries an explicit social and cultural meaning, it means that the 
process of development would evolve into an “indigenous movement for 
development” (Das 1987:207). It opts, on the broad socio-economic level, “for 
local grassroots initiative and innovation yielding results compatible with local 
conditions, tastes and culture” (Dickinson 1983:33). 
It is appropriate to conclude here that much of what has been described above, 
particularly under the rubric of self-reliance, captures the essence of a critical 
modernisation perspective in the ecumenical debate on development. Not 
surprisingly, it would be made clear by writers from the Southeast Asian 
representatives of this debate37 that this perspective does not imply an anti-
modernist approach. Congruent with what has been stated above, it does not 
mean a delinking from a modernist world. It wants rather to emphasise that 
modernisation is not a self-evident process that can be equated mechanically 
with Westernisation (Das 1987:207). 
                                                          
35 Adopted by a United Nations symposium in 1974 in Mexico (see Robinson 1994:320). 
36 At this point the interrelatedness of self-reliance with the second fundamental concept of social justice can 
be clearly drawn. As the notion of participation was indicated as inherent to the meaning of social justice 
earlier in our discussion (2.3.2.2), self-reliance here comes to represent an important concept to further 
qualify the meaning of social justice and, for that matter, the notion of participation. 
37 See, for instance, Robinson (1994:317-320), Moghal (1993:48-51), Thomas (1991:31-39), Das (1987:201-211), 
Song (1972:58-64). 
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Self-reliance, in the critical ecumenical perspective, would rather come to be 
associated with what M M Thomas called the “space and support in the global 
processes of modernisation for the Third World’s own experiments” (1991:33). 
Self-reliance, accordingly, comes to stand for a new meaning of modernisation, 
one in which the element of diversification is central. It denotes the means by 
which to bring into the process of development traditional or indigenous 
society’s contribution towards bringing about a new pattern of modernisation 
that needs “to develop not only an ideological alternative to Capitalism and 
Communism but also an alternative technology appropriate to a human mode of 
modernisation” (Thomas 1991:37). If only called ‘traditional society’ for the sake 
of distinguishing it from what can be called Western modernisation, we may 
here conclude with the following appreciation by Thomas of the ideological, 
value, spiritual and social contribution that those sections of humanity have to 
make to a new human mode of modernisation (that is, a general mode of social 
existence applicable to all of humanity): 
It seems to me that all these call for a philosophy of modernisation 
which goes beyond the materialistic worldview and respects the 
organic and spiritual dimensions of human community life. 
Actually all religions and cultural traditions of the Third World are 
quite sensitive to these dimensions through their reverence for 
nature and concern for the primary communities like the family; 
and therefore any emerging new socialism needs to assimilate some 
of the traditional spirit and values in their renewed form. This will 
also help to give modernisation indigenous cultural roots, without 
which it often brings demoralisation. (1991:38) 
2.4 Beyond charity 
In the foregoing discussion the broad parameters of the ecumenical discourse on 
development, as it originated and reached a level of sophistication from a 
particular point in time onwards, has been set out. Having indicated how this 
discourse, from an early stage in its development, pretended to critically 
challenge both the church sector in general and a secular development discourse 
and practice, a point has now been reached where we can reconsider, in a better 
way, the meaning of that discourse in the light of the definitions of charity in the 
previous chapter.38 
It should be concluded that the exercise undertaken in this chapter, that is to 
synthesise the various strands of the ecumenical discourse on development, 
cannot but lead us to extract a positive meaning from that discourse in view of 
                                                          
38 We here refer to the three definitions or statements on charity stipulated in the previous chapter as the 
critical points of reference for evaluating the ecumenical discourse on development. 
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the critical position taken in the previous chapter. If only denoting a particular 
(progressive) discourse, which as the critical perspective in the next chapter will 
aim to make clear, not necessarily implies a corresponding progressive praxis, a 
meaning of theological-ecclesiastical discourse can be extracted here that has 
clearly progressed beyond the first stage in the growth of awareness of 
contemporary social and economic problems (as described in the previous 
chapter). 
A development discourse, as evident in the ecumenical understanding, would 
clearly not take the existing order of things at face value - as occurs in the case 
of a charitable mode of understanding. It exceeds the boundaries of traditional 
theological and ecclesiastical language and adopts a distinctly critical social-
theoretical content. Taking on a far more anonymous identity in this sense - by 
speaking to a far greater extent a development discourse proper and falling back 
far less onto traditional theological and ecclesiastical metaphors - it is 
nonetheless a discourse profoundly normative in nature. In other words, it 
displays a clear ethico-political agenda, articulating through its central concepts of 
(qualitative) economic growth, social justice and self-reliance, a vision of definite 
structural and policy change if the chronic problems of poverty, inequality and 
environmental degradation are to be redressed in a sufficient and satisfactory 
way. 
In the very normative and ethico-political sense just mentioned, the ecumenical 
discourse on development could perhaps be best described as a discourse from 
below, which has made the poor, the environment, but also human (holistic) 
well-being in general its central concern. It has come to regard the latter category 
as a concern or perspective that opposes the imposition from above by the 
dominant ideology of a narrow-minded economic meaning onto human well-
being. It has come to rethink structures and policy - economic, political and 
social - to enable poor and hitherto marginalised societies and people to become 
centres of direct participation, to sustain a new responsible stewardship of nature 
and to foster holistic well-being of human persons in general.  
As a discourse or perspective from below, we have come to see how the 
political term of distribution became central to ecumenical understanding, that 
is, distribution of property, power and opportunity. Thus, as the central concept 
of a politicised ecumenical understanding of development, it is the principle of 
distribution that would, from an ecumenical point of view, give clear guidance 
about the kind of structural and policy changes that ought to take place within 
and amongst nations. 
As a discourse from below, we have come to see how the ecumenical 
perspective also introduced a particular perspective on labour into the 
framework of development, which as indicated in the previous chapter, is absent 
in a charitable mode of understanding. The ecumenical development 
perspective, as such, has taken on a clear social meaning by criticising the salient 
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feature of modern technological devices to exclude a large majority of the 
world’s population - especially those in the so-called Third World - from 
meaningful and creative labour. It has drawn into the semantic constellation of 
development the notion of a labour-using technology, a kind of device that, in an 
alternative political and economic consciousness, puts far greater value on the 
contribution of indigenous culture and knowledge to the problem of labour. As 
an ecological and environmental consideration also figures notably here, it has, 
under the rubric of an intermediate technology, come to emphasise the need for 
the steering of a collective human energy towards a technological device, 
conducive to environmental and human social well-being - meaning in the latter 
case creative and participatory human beings.  
It can be said that an ecumenical development discourse has clearly 
distinguished itself as an exponent of an alternative development corpus. It has 
come to denote an idea movement as much as indicating an actual theory-praxis 
corpus to intervene in existing social, political and economic arrangements to 
enhance human socio-economic well-being. It has come to constitute a value-
centred and normative discourse challenging existing structural and policy 
arrangements. Moreover, it has incorporated an ideological meaning critically 
disposed towards modernist society in terms of structure, policy and worldview. 
As this meaning of development clearly separates itself from the meaning of 
charity, development, as a discourse composed of structural, normative and 
ideological meaning, ought to appeal in the ecumenical understanding to the 
conscience of both the poor and the rich. For the poor, development ought to 
mean liberation from their own passivity and oppression, the ability to recognise 
the nature of their predicament, and the confidence and will to become the 
subjects of their own struggle for emancipation and development. For the rich, in 
turn, it ought to mean the adoption of a critical self-awareness, the ability to 
recognise their own psychological comfort and position of power (to use the 
description applied in the previous chapter) and the moral will to engage 
creatively and constructively on a path of liberation of themselves and their 
poor fellow human beings. 
We should end our positive assessment of the ecumenical development 
discourse at this point by referring to development (in terms of it being an 
intellectual enterprise) as a comprehensive set of normative, ideological and 
socio-critical ideas - an idea movement. In the next chapter we will focus more 
specifically on that particular offshoot of the ecumenical development debate 
that has already been identified in this study as the ‘Pragmatic Debate’. We will 
come to see how this debate juxtaposes a progressive discourse, that is, a set of 
normative, challenging ideas, with the reality of an actual (conservative) 
‘development’ praxis. It will bring us back to what is referred to, at the very 
outset of the next chapter, as the return to a basic consideration, the question of 
how a prevailing social praxis of the churches has responded to the challenge of 
a progressive development discourse, essentially an idea movement.  
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Chapter Three 
THE PRAGMATIC DEBATE 
3.1 Introduction 
Indeed there is not just one spectrum; rather there is a family of 
spectra. For example, there is a range of opinion that stretches from 
the cautious operational agencies whose major focus is still in 
works of a caritative nature, to the analytical, social science trained 
Christian who takes a much more ‘progressive’ view of the nature 
of poverty and the Church’s role in eradicating it. 
 ...we are likely to find a large discontinuity between, let us say, the 
major papers at a World Council of Churches conference on the 
one hand, and the working hypothesis of a Church development 
agency in the US or the UK or Germany on the other ... Put 
concretely, we should not regard WCC statements (and a fortiori 
consultation papers) as descriptive of how Church development 
activists thought - or think. 
 ...it comes as no surprise to find formal declarations and 
publications from the Church - both Protestant and Catholic - 
using a different language and addressing a different problem to that 
of the Church development agencies on the ground. To put it 
crudely, a gap exists between the rhetoric of the Church’s thinking 
bodies and the actions of the Church’s acting bodies. Charles Elliot 
(1987:29-30) 
In the above extract from Charles Elliot’s book, Comfortable Compassion? 
Poverty, Power, and the Church, a significant continuation can be found of what 
this author, at an earlier stage of the ecumenical development debate, came to 
label as “The pragmatic debate”.1 As suggested in this extract, through this 
debate a distinct tension would be introduced in the larger ecumenical 
development debate between theory and praxis, between theological and 
ecclesiastical development discourse as conceptualised in the realm of the World 
Council of Churches (WCC), on the one hand, and what the churches and their 
related bodies were in actual fact doing in the area of development, on the other 
(that is, development work being done on the ground by a wider and diversified 
church sector).  
                                                          
1 This term is the heading of the final chapter of Elliot’s book, The Development Debate, which was 
published in 1971. 
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It can be said that the pragmatic debate indicates the return to a basic 
consideration. It poses the question whether the churches’ so-called development 
activities do in fact articulate something different from the works of charity of 
old. As the churches and church-related development agencies are now (that is, 
in the new dispensation of development) engaged in various kinds of 
development projects, in which they want to emulate the reigning secular views 
and models of development,2 the question is asked in the pragmatic debate 
whether such a ‘development’ engagement does in fact represent a different 
ideological, operational and relational framework from the works of charity in 
which the churches were previously involved.3 Or, to take it a step further, it is 
asked in this debate whether the development praxis of the churches does in 
fact reflect the critical development discourse that has emerged in the 
theoretical reflections of Christian theology and the churches (as we came to 
witness in the previous chapter). 
Apart from institutions for service and charity,4 C T Kurien, another eminent 
Indian economic scholar participating in the ecumenical development debate, 
wrote in his 1974 reflection on the theme of “The Church and Development”,5 
the churches’ response to the challenge of development also involved their 
sponsoring of projects specifically intended to increase productivity, such as in 
agriculture. Numerous schemes to provide assistance to small farmers and to 
encourage farming in drought-ridden areas would be undertaken by church-
related agencies. In the domain of education new emphasis was placed on 
technical and vocational training. In the field of health some Christian hospitals 
were also taking up community health as a matter of high priority. In a general 
socio-economic sense, various forms of village upliftment projects and 
community development schemes became part of the churches’ societal service 
(1974:202-203).  
Having mentioned the above modes of project engagement by the churches, 
Kurien conceded that some of these projects could be regarded as “of a 
pioneering nature and that most of them represented new areas of service for 
the church” (1974:203). Yet this author simultaneously qualified such 
observation by questioning the presupposition that most of the churches’ 
                                                          
2 As will be pointed out in more detail under the sub-heading of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate (3.3) in this 
chapter, this is a point of view highlighted and criticised by Charles Elliot in his book, Comfortable 
Compassion? 
3 While no specific reference is made in the pragmatic debate to the work explored in Chapter One of this 
study, the theme of charity constitutes the clear backdrop in this debate. In anticipation of the discussion 
of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate mentioned in the previous footnote, see how a reference to the charity 
work of the Christian missionaries constitutes the clear point of departure in the discussions of the 
pragmatic debate by Charles Elliot (1987:17-25; 1971:110-113) and C. T. Kurien (1974:201-202). 
4 In the pragmatic debate ‘charity’ not only indicates a historical mode of social engagement by the churches 
(with reference to the previous footnote), but also an ongoing mode of engagement up to the present, 
paralleling and overlapping with a so-called development involvement by this sector. See in this regard the 
first chapter of Charles Elliot’s Comfortable Compassion? (1987:9-16).  
5 This is the topic of the postscript in Kurien’s book, Poverty and Development, which was published in 1974.  
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projects were reflecting the progressive principles that characterise the 
theological-ecclesiastical discourse on development:  
But it is very doubtful whether these [projects] measure up to the 
standards of self-reliance and social justice that the church has 
accepted as new dimensions in development. (Ibid.)  
In substantiating his argument, and by referring particularly to the case of India, 
Kurien pointed to the external factor characterising the development work of 
the churches. This was, according to him, first of all illustrated by the fact that 
this work reflects an outside process in which the initiative comes from donor 
churches abroad and in which the local churches and their agencies are little 
more than local agents and administrators on behalf of “many overseas 
contributing churches and bodies”. Consequently, it would in this sense be 
possible to say that “many ‘development projects’ were initiated solely because 
finances from outside were readily available” (ibid.).  
No less significant is a second meaning. While it could be said that numerous 
individuals and special agencies were involved in the designing and execution of 
the projects (and one presumes here also local Christians), the actual state of 
affairs was that most churches and the majority of their members had no 
ownership of these development activities, as they were neither aware nor 
involved with them. In the words of Kurien: 
Most of the so-called ‘church development projects’ did not have 
any contacts with the churches and had little to do with 
development except the names that they carried. They have also 
created the impression that dependence on foreign resources is the 
easiest way to achieve development. (Ibid.) 
As Kurien ultimately concluded, projects of the above-mentioned kind could 
hardly be regarded as making a positive contribution to the cause of social 
justice. Already suggested by the above-mentioned observations,6 this was in a 
further interrelated way reflected by the nature and impact of the churches’ 
projects. Their impact had to be seen as quantitatively very limited in relation to 
the vast problems of poverty, hunger and unemployment inherent in rural areas. 
By their very nature most of the projects were also incapable of reaching the 
poorest sections of the population, namely, the landless agricultural labourers in 
the rural areas and the destitute in the cities. In all, it could be said that these 
projects, as part of a larger collective effort, had fallen short of bringing about 
                                                          
6 It can be said that the above-mentioned external factor (in the twofold sense mentioned) largely neglected 
the aspects of participation and liberation (of the local people and the poor) that were recognised in critical 
ecumenical development discourse as inherent in the central principle of social justice outlined in 2.3.2.2. 
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the fundamental structural changes that are required to alter the livelihoods of 
the latter social groupings on a long-term basis:  
 ...it is becoming increasingly clear that justice for these sections 
calls for radical changes in our basic socio-economic structure and 
not just a few projects here and there, however thorough and 
adequate they may be as far as projects go. (Kurien 1974:203-204) 
The above perspectives from the writings of Elliot and Kurien introduce us to 
the scope and contents of the pragmatic debate. Also referred to as the ‘project 
debate’, we may recognise through the brief exploration above how it is, in 
particular, through this debate that fundamental questions have been posed with 
regard to the development praxis of the churches in the wake of an apparently 
critical ecumenical development discourse. If only undertaken by a very small 
group of writers in the ecumenical development debate,7 and if already 
conveyed to some degree in this introductory discussion, the aim of the rest of 
this chapter is to explore the meaning of the pragmatic debate. This will be done 
by distinguishing between a moderate and radical account of the pragmatic 
debate. Pointing out how each account has, in its own way, come to call for a 
rethinking and reorientation of the churches’ involvement in development, the 
discussion will conclude by considering the way in which the pragmatic debate 
represents the ambivalent point of both an impasse and renewal in the 
ecumenical development debate.  
3.2 The ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate 
3.2.1 Historical review 
In the few historical accounts at our disposal, it is pointed out that the churches’ 
development involvement through projects faced continual criticism and review 
(Dickinson 1983:77; also Itty 1974:11). In his concise but meaningful overview of 
the earlier period of project involvement, C I Itty, for instance, referred to 
“several new sets of criteria for projects” (ibid.) that had been devised from an 
early period in the realm of the WCC.8 In this regard he specifically referred to 
the contributions that were made at a consultation sponsored by the WCC’s 
Division on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service at Swanwick in 1967 
and the Council’s Fourth Assembly at Uppsala in 1968. Amongst a 
                                                          
7 Amongst this small group of writers and as reflected in our discussion of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate in 
this chapter, Charles Elliot and C T Kurien distinguish themselves as representing the most critical 
position. 
8 Itty (1974:11) pointed out how a special body was established in 1965 within the WCC to assist churches 
to meet the criteria set by the Council and its working bodies. Initially called the Committee on 
Specialised Assistance to Social Projects (SASP), this body later became the Advisory Committee on 
Technical Services (ACTS). 
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comprehensive list of new criteria devised at the latter occasion, the following, 
according to him, deserve special mention: 
× Projects which aim at the ‘root causes’ of underdevelopment rather than 
treating its symptoms; 
× Projects which have a comprehensive character, which attack the diverse and 
relative problems of a community in a coordinated and strategic manner; 
× Projects which arise out of long-range planning; 
× Projects which complement national or governmental planning; 
× Projects which reflect technical viability and competence (Itty 1974:11). 
Itty indicated that it was at the Uppsala Assembly that the new emphasis on 
structures highlighted at the 1966 Church and Society Conference,9 was 
sustained.10 It would uphold the latter conference’s view that structural factors 
are to be seen as the primary cause for underdevelopment in world society. It 
also reflected in its own discussions the ecumenical development debate’s 
increasing juxtaposition of the churches’ development involvement through 
micro projects (also called the ‘project system’) against what was seen as the 
macro structural factor in development (that is, micro projects versus macro 
structures)11 (Itty 1974:11-12). Yet – and this is the central point to be made in 
what we have come to recognise as the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate – in spite of 
the prominent place given to the churches’ participation in structural changes at 
Uppsala, this assembly would nevertheless maintain the value of the project 
approach on the local level.12 Itty quotes from the document, Uppsala 68 Speaks, 
which clearly illustrates the dual position taken at Uppsala (that is, one that 
maintains the value of the churches’ development projects over against the 
problematisation of the project approach):  
The churches are already engaged in mission and service projects 
for economic and social development and some of these resources 
could be used strategically on a priority basis for pioneer or 
demonstrative projects as an important response to the most acute 
needs of specific peoples and areas. (1974:12) 
                                                          
9 See again the beginning of this study (page 1 and footnote 1) where the central place of this conference in 
the ecumenical debate is indicated. 
10 At this point Itty referred to the Uppsala Assembly’s adherence to the pronouncement of Samuel Parmar, 
who declared that development in fact means disorder and revolution, that is, a dynamic process that 
“changes existing social and economic relationships, breaks up old institutions to create new, brings about 
radical alterations in the values and structures of society” (1974:12). 
11 In radical circles in the ecumenical movement in the early 1970s, as Itty pointed out, the criticism of the 
project approach would in fact reach the point of its complete rejection, most notably by Christians in 
Latin America belonging to the ‘structuralist’ school of thought. As source in this regard Itty referred to: “A 
Pastoral Letter from Concerned US Missionaries in Chile”, October 1972, CCPD documents No. 2, 
Churches and Development (see 1974:12, footnote 24). 
12 A position, it may be observed, which clearly distinguished itself from more ‘radical’ positions such as that 
mentioned in the previous footnote. 
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Articulating a central aspect of the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate, it is proclaimed 
in this extract that there is still a meaningful place for the project system besides 
a more overt structural approach to development. It suggests that there is the 
remaining factor of people and local societies’ fundamental needs, which cannot 
be neglected amidst the concentrated participation in programmes for structural 
change. In this light the development projects of the churches are to be 
positively viewed as serving as a meaningful and qualitative effort to meet these 
needs. 
In the 1968 publication by Richard Dickinson, Line and Plummet. The Churches 
and Development, we can find a further elaboration of precisely this line of 
thinking. In this work, which served as an important preparatory document for 
the discussions on development at Uppsala (see Lacey 1968:7), Dickinson 
defended the churches’ project system. Sustaining in his own argumentation the 
tension between the project and structural approaches, or what he in the case of 
the latter also called “preventive work” (see 1968:78-79), Dickinson proclaimed 
that this could be regarded as a most creative tension. From the dynamics of 
such tension new modes of creative action could be developed by the churches: 
But there is a growing uncertainty about the adequacy of traditional 
involvement of churches in development and social service 
projects. Many Christians today ask whether, given the radically 
new environment of the 1960s, a new approach is not demanded. 
We believe that this is a most significant doubt, laden with 
potential creativity as Christians seek new and more effective forms 
of service. (1968:76) 
Dickinson argued that what was required was not the abolishment of projects, 
but rather the need to clarify and re-interpret the development objectives of the 
churches, and especially also to bring an administrative machinery into place that 
expresses and achieves these objectives (ibid.). Most fundamental in this regard 
is the challenge to relate more fully the churches’ service efforts to the Christian 
ethos. Rather than discriminating between different modes of action, it is this 
ethos that in fact upholds the belief that all aspects of human life are potential 
“expressions of God’s redeeming action, and ... important for individual 
fulfilment and the achievement of a fuller koinonia” (1968:77). What matters to 
Christians is all activity that can collectively contribute to the emancipation of 
every human person, be it “from crippling disease, from deprivation and hunger, 
from ignorance, from the prejudices of others which keep one in an inferior 
position, from narrow horizons and parochial visions” (ibid.).  
In the Christian approach to development there could be “no hard and clear line 
of distinction between works of charity and those of justice” (Dickinson 
1968:78). The former engagement could at a particular moment just as much be 
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an expression of the Christian ethos, of Christian love, as of justice (cf. 1968:79-
80). In fact, there is a case to be made for the Christian sector to work “primarily 
on the level of symptoms - to trouble-shoot rather than diagnose and prescribe - 
as they have neither a “Christian” blue-print for society, nor the technical 
competence to make diagnoses and prescriptions for complex social, economic 
and political questions” (1968:79). Moreover, there is the argument that secular 
agencies are already engaged in preventive work and that the churches are most 
needed in curative and remedial work (ibid.). 
It was between recognising the need for a greater structural approach in the 
churches’ development work, on the one hand, and the defence for the churches’ 
project system and participation in works of a more curative and remedial kind, 
on the other, that Dickinson’s argumentation continued to fluctuate. This way of 
reasoning would be characterised by the demand for a renewal and rethinking of 
the churches’ development work. Yet it simultaneously did not want to totally 
disapprove of the churches’ traditional mode of involvement. There was no plea 
for the disposal of a project approach, but for its continued qualitative 
innovation towards work of a more preventive kind:  
Some believe that churches should muster all possible help for the 
present and visible victims of disaster, while others argue for greater 
efforts in race relations, international affairs, economic integration, 
government-sponsored relief programs, etc., to ward off social 
disasters and make advance provision for caring for the victims of 
natural disasters in future. 
These are tortuous and agonizing questions which push us to the 
depths of our spiritual and theological understanding; they require 
decisions as to which groups among the needy will be helped. But 
in the final analysis we believe that churches should give much 
more attention - even if this entails the elimination of some relief 
programs, if that proves necessary to anticipating and preventing 
the eruption of man-made disasters. But we do not make a facile 
distinction between the two types of work because the churches’ 
work among the needy remains and is a witness and sign in and to 
the world, as well as an opportunity for the churches’ own spiritual 
growth. (Dickinson 1968:79) 
This is the line of thinking that continued in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
mainstream ecumenical development debate. In the final section of his already 
mentioned discussion, Itty briefly pointed out that conscious efforts continued in 
the early 1970s to bring the development projects of the churches into line with 
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the fundamental principles of justice, self-reliance and people’s participation13 
(see 1974:13). It is, however, to Richard Dickinson’s later important work, Poor, 
Yet Making Many Rich: The Poor as Agents of Creative Justice,14 that we can turn 
for a more substantial review of the project system within the WCC in the 
period referred to. 
In a chapter in this work entitled “Relief and modified project assistance” 
Dickinson pointed out how, on the basis of recognised shortcomings15 of the 
project system, efforts prevailed to transform the project system in the 1970s 
and 1980s. By way of summary, we can point to the following units and 
initiatives within the WCC that, according to Dickinson, made noticeable 
attempts towards transforming the project system. 
Firstly, there were the efforts of CICARWS (the Commission for Interchurch 
Aid, Refugee and World Service) to devise a new ‘Project List’ that could assist 
the churches in moving away from a predominant preoccupation with material 
sharing to a greater focus on personal and spiritual sharing (which would reverse 
the position of the poor churches from being mere recipients to actors who, 
from the point of view of the rich churches, have much to offer in terms of 
personal and spiritual enrichment). As Dickinson quoted one particular source,16 
the emphasis would increasingly be on the enlargement of the Project List to 
include activities that focus on the development of human resources, make 
much more of ecumenical dialogue on witness and service and establish new 
forms of solidarity not articulated in terms of money, “but in common 
commitment to issues of justice and human fulfilment, communication and 
mutual support” (1983:81-82).  
Aiming through its endeavours to transform the project system in a way that 
would found the churches’ project activities on a much more theologically and 
holistically grounded understanding of the witness and ministry of the churches, 
Dickinson furthermore pointed out how CIRCAWS attached greater 
importance to networking strategies on local and regional levels, a process 
initiated far more ‘from the bottom up’. In such a process there could be an 
expanded role for local, national and regional church groups in the articulation of 
priorities and the selection of projects. It also envisaged that the practice of 
networking would stimulate a deeper and new process of dialogue amongst 
groups as well as new patterns of partnership, not only between the so-called 
recipient groups, but also with funding partners. As a significant extension of 
this, regional and national groups were asked to create relationships also with 
                                                          
13 Itty pointed out how the micro/project approach adopted a people’s movement approach that recognises 
the poor as the subjects and as autonomous, active agents of development (1974:13).  
14 Published in 1983 by the WCC’s Commission on the Churches’ Participation in Development (CCPD). 
15 See the list of shortcomings stipulated by Dickinson (1983: 80, 81). 
16 ‘Project List Review’ drawn up by the Central Committee of CICARWS at their meeting in Dresden in 
1981, p. 3 (Dickinson 1983:91, n. 7). 
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non-institutional groups, such as the base ecclesiastical communities of the poor 
(1983:82). 
Secondly, there were the efforts of CCPD (the Commission on the Churches’ 
Participation in Development), especially through the Ecumenical Development 
Fund (EDF) that was established by this commission after the Montreux I 
conference in 1970. Through this fund CCPD allocated block grants to partner 
groups in selected countries and regions that would go beyond a fragmented 
project approach. The difference was that block grants were now allocated to 
groups rather than individual projects. It made these groups the real subjects who 
could, to a far greater extent, determine the nature and contents of their own 
development processes. It also made more integrated and holistic efforts 
possible, as it allowed for longer-term and sustained processes that would not 
suffer from the uncertainties of year-to-year project funding (Dickinson1983:84). 
One striking example of the block grant initiatives by CCPD was also this unit’s 
so-called ‘motivators training programme’, by which young volunteers were 
selected and trained to live and work in the poorest of villages. A clear 
conscientising strategy was to be followed through which the motivators would 
assist poor villages “to discover and mobilize their own resources for self-
reliance” and “to make themselves less vulnerable to decisions made outside of 
their village” (Dickinson 1983:84). Dickinson concluded about the success and 
impact of the motivators programme as follows:  
It illustrates one effort and approach by a WCC branch to be in 
solidarity with the poor by experimenting with new forms of 
resource transfers and the sharing of power. The evaluation team 
noted that the programme is people-centred and comprehensive. 
“The base is not a methodology of outside capital, but a drawing 
out of the people themselves.” Not least important, of course, is the 
impact of the programme on the motivators themselves. “We have 
seen ex-motivators at work in strategic places - in government 
agricultural schemes, in theological colleges, as village pastors. They 
are all a core of future leadership in church and society.” (1983:87) 
Finally, there were the loans and investment programmes launched through the 
Ecumenical Loan Fund (ECLOF) and the Ecumenical Development Cooperative 
Society (EDCS). Through these initiatives the WCC not only made loans 
available to small-scale operations on a low-interest and long-term repayment 
basis (through ECLOF), but also larger and more comprehensive block loans 
(through EDCS). The aim was to achieve, through this kind of inexpensive, low-
interest loan (contrary to outright loans), a still greater sense of responsibility and 
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ownership by the local people.17 Dickinson quoted a source18 that stipulated the 
outstanding criteria for projects to be funded; foremost had to be the direct and 
radical participation of the poor and powerless in indigenous projects or 
programmes to meet their basic needs. They also had to be allocated direct 
ownership of the projects or programmes, which had to show the potential for 
achieving long-term, self-sustaining activity and growth. In an integrated manner, 
the projects or programmes also had to contribute to the social, economic and 
political advancement, not only of the direct participants, but of the larger 
surrounding community in order to avoid the unsustainable use of non-renewable 
resources and unsustainable impact on ecological systems (1983:87-89). 
To end off this historical review of the project system in the ecumenical 
movement, we have thus been presented with the image of an initiative that 
appeared to be consistently aware of and sensitive to the development 
relationships it sustained. It was an initiative that, through its spokespersons, 
appeared to be concerned about the dominating relationships that it might 
sustain (that is, rich Christians and churches determining the development 
processes of poor people and Christians). It also appeared to signify a conscious 
mutual effort by the rich and poor counterparts to constantly transform and 
enhance the quality of activities; or as Dickinson would phrase it, “to find more 
adequate ways of making the sharing of financial resources more effective, 
efficient, and expressive of true ecumenical sharing” (1983:89).  
As Dickinson went on to indicate, the “commitment to discover new forms of 
sharing within and among the churches” (ibid.) became a trademark within the 
project initiative of the ecumenical movement. This refined initiative was not so 
much characterised by propositions of specific and concrete actions that the 
churches could undertake (that is, beyond the specific projects it financed)19 to 
foster the structural and institutional transformation that could bring about true 
development. But it may be said, however, that this initiative points to a 
progression at least on the ideological level. It indicates the search for new 
relationships of mutual sharing and collective action among rich and poor, which 
no longer constitute a one-way movement from the materially affluent to the 
less affluent, but one in which the latter also have much to offer in terms of 
relationships, information, experience and values. If still countered by the reality 
of the churches’ failure by and large to achieve such relationships of authentic 
mutual sharing, it was nevertheless anticipated that the seeds of such 
                                                          
17 Dickinson also pointed to the excellent repayment record of loans, as well as the steady expansion of the 
loan programme. This was evident in the number and total amount of loans from 1979 to 1980 (89 to 118 
loans, $1.4 to $1.9 million) and the overall growth rate of 33% (1983:88). 
18 Fred Bronkema, “Ecumenical Development Cooperative Society: A Model for Action in Development 
Cooperation”, pp. 3-4 (Dickinson gives no details on the origins and date of this source; 1983:92, n. 19).  
19 For Dickinson this was the frustrating part of WCC documentation dealing with the issue of the sharing of 
resources. While radically challenging existing forms of sharing, it still to a great extent lacked giving more 
concrete suggestions for practical sharing of resources, especially in the context of WCC programmes 
(1983:91). See in particular Dickinson’s reference to the 1980 publication, Empty Hands (1983:89-91). 
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relationships of sharing were already visible in the project system that, through 
its vision for transformation, was moving in this direction (see Dickinson 
1983:89-91). 
3.2.2 Relational perspective 
The above historical review ought to earmark Richard Dickinson as the most 
prominent exponent of the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate.20 Having to a certain 
extent outlined his thinking in this review, it can be noted how this debate 
would still take on a more clear-cut angle through Dickinson’s formulation of a 
relational orientation in church development work. Articulated to some extent 
in his publication, Line and Plummet21 (see 1968:77-78), this writer’s argument 
would be conceptualised in a most focused and well-thought-out manner in an 
article, “Toward a New Focus for Churches’ Development Projects” (published 
in 1970 in The Ecumenical Review). 
In the latter article Dickinson, in another focused reflection, again came to 
review the project system of the churches. At the beginning of this article 
Dickinson suggested that the prevailing points of criticism against the project 
system of the churches had to be taken seriously. These points of criticism were 
that the project system actually serves as a vehicle for a Western mode of 
development and worldview, that it makes Third World people and churches 
dependent on rich Europe and the West, and that it as a whole has little impact 
on large-scale transformation and change (see 1970:210-211). Accordingly, 
Dickinson also rejected the principle of a mere multiplication of church 
development projects to increase their impact. For him a more profound 
deliberation was called for regarding the actual impact and nature of the 
churches’ development projects: 
 ...but the central issue remains, viz., what is the real impact of 
these efforts and what should be the core or focal point in church-
sponsored development projects? It is alarming that, in many of the 
more materially affluent countries, concerted efforts are being made 
to increase the quantum of aid through the churches, without a 
probing of new analysis of how these new resources are to be 
deployed. (1970:211) 
However, in the immediately following discussion Dickinson again clearly 
revealed the position taken in the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate, namely that the 
churches’ development projects remain significant and should continue: 
                                                          
20 See again the identification of Dickinson as a central figure in the ecumenical development debate in 
footnote 2 of the previous chapter. 
21 See our discussion of this book in 3.2.1. 
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To ask what should be the core or focal point in church-sponsored 
projects assumes that there should be church projects at all. I make 
that assumption. Elsewhere I have argued the validity of church 
projects as adding to the total quantum of assistance; as providing 
independent, non-governmental centers of initiative and effort; as 
exploiting the long experience and contacts of the churches in 
social service programs; as of continuing importance for the 
churches’ own progressive self-affirmation, self-discovery, and 
spiritual growth. (1970:212)  
For Dickinson, it was not an abandonment of the project system that was called 
for, but a rethinking, a renewal, a redirection of the churches’ projects. In his 
own words, there was the important need to bring “the diffused and refracted 
church-sponsored projects ... into some coherent strategy” (ibid, italics added). 
Yet, having said this, more was needed. Such a coherent strategy had to be 
created on the basis of a particular philosophy and direction that would take a 
number of factors into account, namely i) the institutional characteristics and 
sociological realities of the churches, ii) the ethos of the Christian community, 
and iii) the social situation in which the churches endeavour to work, each with 
its own unique character (ibid.). 
For Dickinson this could be captured in what he called the “relational element”, 
or in what could be called “relational projects”. The relational element most 
significantly captures the nature and existence of the churches as a social 
institution. It also most appropriately conceptualises the ‘specialised’ terrain of 
the churches and distinguishes them from other actors or institutions in the 
development field. Through such relational orientation more creative and 
effective modes of engagement by the churches are likely to emerge (see 
1970:212-213; also 219, 221). 
What then is meant by the notion of ‘relational projects’? According to 
Dickinson, they are projects that focus on groups rather than on individuals, on 
interaction rather than on an attainment of living and material consumption. 
Here the emphasis is on how “sub-cultures of a national society” can be brought 
into a relationship of creative rather than destructive interaction. As this 
particularly concerns the many dispossessed and powerless groups in socially 
divided societies, the focal point has to be on how such groups can be brought 
into the cultural and political processes of those societies (1970:212). Here the 
focus should not only be on individual groups, but on the possibility of creative 
interrelationships between different groups. As Dickinson, at a number of places 
in the discussion, applied the theologically familiar notion of reconciliation 
(1970:214, 218, 220; also 1968:77), the emphasis should be on how to bring 
estranged groups of a population “into a community of recognized common 
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interests and mutual appreciation” (1968:77;22 also 1970:212-213). Summarising 
the essence of such a development approach, Dickinson stated: 
All societies, and especially vulnerable less materially developed 
ones, are threatened by religious, racial, tribal, class, caste, linguistic, 
ethnic and other rivalries. Relationist projects would promote the 
interpenetration of these sub-cultures in the interests of how 
attitudes and actions of one group militate against the well-being of 
another, of mutual discovery of overarching and common 
aspirations. (1970:213)23 
From this point onwards Dickinson gave further meaning to the idea of a 
relational orientation to church development projects through a discussion of 
the apparent advantages and liabilities of such an approach. The various internal 
frictions mentioned in the latter quote had to be regarded as a serious 
impediment to development. It is also such a recognition of the value of a 
relational orientation that identifies a first point of advantage for the churches. 
As few other agencies conceive of their development function along the lines of 
reconciliation (because, it can be added, they do not have the expertise and 
vision for this on an institutional level), it suggests that the churches could, on 
this level, fulfil a significant and pioneering role in the area of development 
(1970:214; see also 218-219).  
There were also a number of other points of advantage marked by a relational 
approach. A second advantage is that the relational perspective has the potential 
of making the churches important participants in the deepening and broadening 
of the concept of development. Dickinson argued that it was through the aspect 
of conceptualisation, namely their interpretation of the meaning of development 
(in the relational sense) and “their dialogic relationship with governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies in refining and maturing the conception of 
development and humanization”, that the churches could make a more 
significant contribution than through the traditional projects that they were 
sponsoring (1970:214-215; see also 1968:94-97). 
                                                          
22 With reference to the quoted passage, Dickinson’s formulation in his earlier definition of the relational 
orientation in Line and Plummet (see again the first paragraph of 3.2.2) is here preferred as it better 
expresses the interrelational aspect emphasised at this point. 
23 Admitting at this point that the notion of “relationist projects” might still appear to be an abstract concept, 
Dickinson (1970:213) went on to provide a number of examples of already active projects by the Christian 
churches that more concretely illustrate this concept. These were projects such as Target Lengo, a 
newspaper that gave news and views on social developments in Eastern Africa, the studies of Hinduism 
sponsored by the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society in Bangalore, the Paulo Freire 
method of literary education in Brazil and Argentina, the studies and projects on private colleges and 
national development directed by the National Board for Christian Higher Education in India, the 
development of Dom Helder Camara’s co-operatives in northeast Brazil aiming at the political 
conscientisation and active political participation of the participants, the Quaker programmes of 
international residential conferences and seminars and the Latin American Church and Society proposal to 
establish social justice training institutes. 
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Dickinson pointed out a third advantage, namely that a relational approach also 
sharpens the churches’ and the larger constituency’s awareness of the 
psychological and social dynamics of developing countries. This awareness 
introduced into the playing field of development such non-material factors as 
the various sub-cultures in developing societies’ strivings for social justice, 
dignity, personal and cultural identification, and overall emancipation24 
(1970:215). These factors, in turn, could be related to a fourth advantage: It was 
pointed out by Dickinson that a relational approach helps the churches to shift 
from a pre-occupation with individuals alone to a greater concern for the 
structures of community. This gives the churches not only a far better 
understanding of how structures and power groupings in fact constitute the 
formative forces in a given society, but it also brings them to a point where they 
can see as their primary role the task of bringing the disadvantaged and excluded 
individuals of that society into new relationships of participation and interaction 
with the existing power groupings:  
These power groupings cannot be ignored. Part of the task for the 
future is to learn how to relate individuals to them in such a way 
that there is responsible participation, and to relate them to one 
another in creative rather than destructive interaction. (1970:215-
216) 
Dickinson points out as a corollary a fifth advantage of how a relational 
approach can help Christian communities, especially minority communities in 
developing countries, to escape their ghetto mentality and become less self-
centred with regard to preserving their rights, institutions and integrity 
(1970:216). Dickinson also identified two further points that more closely reflect 
the ideological aspect of development. Relational programmes bring forward the 
insight that fewer investments in brick and mortar efforts are required (ibid.). 
Development is, in relational terms, not so much only a question of the 
materially affluent giving to the less affluent. It also involves a non-material, 
relational factor, which is fundamental to its success. 
A relational approach seventhly demonstrates that, in terms of a general concern 
for humanisation, all countries are in fact developing. The fact that so-called 
developed countries are grappling with problems similar to those in the so-called 
‘less developed’ countries (such as divisions of race, class, religion and language) 
suggests that “(q)uestions of international development and humanization apply 
to all nations, and the interrelationships between all countries” (1970:217). This 
calls for the following relational role by the churches:  
                                                          
24 At this point Dickinson pointed to the examples of Third World societies and leaders, such as Nyerere’s 
emphasis on ‘standing-on-one’s-own feet’, Latin America’s rejection of the Yankees, Sukarno’s rejection of 
foreign aid, Frantz Fanon’s plea for Africa’s psychological emancipation from Europe, and the black 
person’s struggle in the USA for dignity and psychological freedom (1970:215). 
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Thus all countries are potential donors, and all countries are 
potential recipients of aid. If churches and church-sponsored 
projects can help us to focus on that reality, avoiding the 
paternalism of the givers of material assistance, and the sense of 
subservience and resentment of material aid, they will have helped 
to de-fuse an explosive situation within the world community, as 
well as within nations. (Ibid.) 
Finally, it could be said that relational-type projects are closely related to the 
ethos of the churches. In emphasising notions such as liberation, justice, 
reconciliation and koinonia, they stand at the heart of the mission of the 
churches. They are a mode of engagement that expresses to the full the 
interrelational, communitarian and social emphasis of the Christian ethos. They 
convey an authentic perspective on humanisation beyond a narrow material and 
economic meaning. They represent an approach to development that aims to 
bring the poor and exploited of society into the centre of the overall processes 
for reconciliation and participation (see Dickinson 1970:217-218).  
Dickinson finally also addressed the criticism that might be directed against a 
relational approach. It could, for instance, be said that this approach constitutes a 
gross neglect of basic economic and physical needs.25 In addition, there is also 
what he called “the psychological problem”, namely that the relational approach 
can be perceived by developing countries as a convenient strategic instrument 
wielded by the developed countries to undermine any competitive economic 
progress that might be achieved by them (that is, the former): 
An emphasis on the relational type project is not without its 
limitations. There is the basic physical problem that many people 
in the two-thirds world desperately need health care and food; it 
would be hollow to speak of human dignity with these basic 
necessities unmet. There is also the psychological problem that 
already people in the less materially developed countries allege that 
the Western countries, and the churches in collusion with these 
Western governments, have not stressed economic material 
development for fear of competition with Western industries. 
(1970:218) 
In his response to such points of critique, Dickinson pointed out that the 
relational approach does not call for the end to all economic-centred engagement 
by the churches. Whereas we may, at this point, recall other pronouncements by 
this author in which he argued for the retention of the social and charity services 
                                                          
25 This is in accordance with the position in the ecumenical debate that wanted to retain the economic entry 
point to development. See 2.3.1. 
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of the churches,26 Dickinson confirmed in a more moderate way in this 
particular formulation that there was a special role for the churches “to stimulate 
among governments a greater sense of their basic responsibility for economic 
development”. Moreover, there is scope for a number of economic development 
projects by the churches with a strong relational component (such as projects 
through which individual farmers might be assisted to relate to the total village 
community) (ibid.).  
Yet, and this expresses Dickinson’s ultimate position, beyond this kind of 
‘economic initiatives’, primacy has to be given to relational kinds of 
development engagement. As it could rather be left to institutions such as 
governments to take responsibility for economic development at large, the 
relational element indicates an area in which the churches specifically can really 
excel. The relational perspective raises for the churches the question whether 
they are not called upon to “work in more pioneering areas, doing what others 
cannot or will not” (1970:218-219). 
Contrary to narrow-minded economic views of development, Dickinson 
maintained that a relational approach does not constitute a mere by-product of 
development (see 1970:220), but stands at the very centre of development. This 
is a conviction driven by the perception that the relational approach is just as 
much a meaningful promoter of material well-being as economic development 
efforts themselves, as it fosters the goals of self-reliance and inter-group 
cooperation (1970:219). 
For Dickinson the case for the churches’ preferential option for relational-type 
projects ultimately brought him to adopt a perspective on conscientisation, 
namely that the need to change people’s attitudes, thinking and values has to be 
seen as fundamental to authentic development. Here the meaning of relational 
projects does not lie in the quantum of their efforts (as in the case of economic-
centred projects), but in their ability to influence the thinking and attitudes of 
people, as the ultimate requirement for a decisive development process:  
It is not the projects in and of themselves which will radically affect 
development; rather it is the influence which projects have upon 
the thinking and attitudes of those connected with them. If this is 
true, then relational projects have a great advantage over many of 
the traditional types of church sponsored activities. The major 
advantage of this re-orientation would be the sensitizing of people 
in both the “recipient” and “donor” countries ... to dynamic social 
realities. Not the least would be the new and renewing 
understanding which the Westerner would get through his 
involvement in the fluid dynamics of a less materially developed 
                                                          
26 See 3.2.1. 
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and politically coherent nation - perceptions of inestimable value 
for him as he reflects on the social forces at work in his own 
society ... Thus, while relational type projects do not have direct 
applicability to international disparities, it is difficult to imagine a 
better means for sensitizing people of less and more materially 
advanced countries to the basic human meanings of development 
and humanization. (1970:220-221) 
3.3 The ‘radical’ pragmatic debate 
3.3.1 Modernisation critique 
In the ecumenical development debate the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate does not 
constitute the sum of the pragmatic debate, but should be, in a most critical 
way, supplemented by what may be called the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate. Taken 
up by one or two critical writers perhaps less affiliated to the centre of the 
mainstream ecumenical debate27 (as opposed to the central figure of Richard 
Dickinson), a fine line at first glance appears to separate this perspective in the 
pragmatic debate from the former. According to the point of view stated in the 
introduction of this chapter, the churches’ development praxis through 
development projects is juxtaposed with the far-reaching principles of social 
justice and self-reliance in critical ecumenical development discourse. Both the 
radical and moderate versions would seem to accentuate such a contradiction. 
Viewed from the point of view of the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate, it can be 
observed how this debate, similar to the radical account, in its own pertinent 
way also pushes for the reform and transformation of the project system to work 
towards and meet the very principles of social justice and self-reliance. In this 
account of the pragmatic debate, the vision is also held that the churches’ 
development projects have to become authentic instruments of social justice, 
self-reliance and people’s participation. 
Where then do the two accounts of the pragmatic debate separate? With a view 
to answering this question this section will focus on the work of Charles Elliot, 
who can be regarded as the main exponent of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate. He 
is the person who has sustained the most critical and substantial discussion of 
the project system of the churches,28 which in this study embodies the ‘radical’ 
pragmatic debate to its full extent. We may here return in more detail to Elliot’s 
                                                          
27 We are speaking here of Charles Elliot and C T Kurien, who have both in their own way been important 
contributors to the ecumenical development debate since its early stages. 
28 Whereas the contribution of C T Kurien, the other exponent of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate’, consists 
only of a number of pages (which have largely been dealt with in the introduction to this chapter), Elliot 
has more fully worked out this debate in a whole chapter and a monograph, as indicated in the main 
discussion above. 
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already mentioned earlier book, The Development Debate,29 in which he 
introduced the concept of the ‘pragmatic’ debate. 
In the chapter entitled “The pragmatic debate”,30 Elliot argued that the so-called 
development efforts of the churches were generated within the same ideological 
setting that sustained and promoted the paternalistic social service activities and 
attitudes of the Christian missionaries (see 1971:110-113).31 Elliot proclaimed that 
it was the earliest so-called ‘development’ efforts of the churches and their 
agencies in the 1950s and early 1960s that “perpetuated both an inadequate 
understanding of development and an inadequate basis for the relationship 
between the wealthy West and the starving millions” (1971:114). It was an 
enthusiasm for development that started with the “starving baby” syndrome and 
in a renewed way strengthened the ideological position of the rich West and the 
Western churches: 
No great theological education was required to see that the parable 
of the Good Samaritan, for instance, applied directly to the starving 
babies of Africa. At a time when traditional missionary enterprises 
and institutions were threatened and discounted by the rise of 
nationalism in Africa and colonial Asia, the churches’ flagging 
interest in the former colonies found a new focus in the brilliantly 
managed publicity campaigns of Oxfam, Freedom from Hunger and 
War on Want. (1971:113-114)  
From this point onwards Elliot also focused on the later refined project system 
of the WCC that was discussed earlier.32 In this further deliberation Elliot 
acknowledged that “some small progress” had been made vis-à-vis the charity 
and missionary modes of engagement of the churches (1971:115-116). Going so 
far as to refer to those projects that aim at manifesting the goals and vision of 
social justice and Richard Dickinson’s concept of ‘relational projects’33 as a media 
via (‘middle way’) between the mission and charity services of the churches (see 
1971:117), Elliot, in the final analysis, doubted whether the project system’s new 
arrangements of sharing and partnership between donor and recipient churches 
could be regarded as authentic expressions of a social justice framework. He 
contended that in the relationship set up in providing aid, all decision-making lay 
in the hands of the donor. Real partnership in decision-making, consequently, 
does not become possible by a mere “token acknowledgment by the donor that 
                                                          
29 See footnote 1 of this chapter. 
30 See again the beginning of this chapter (3.1 and footnote 1). 
31 As concluded at the end of this subsection, we can note how Elliot’s notion of paternalism resembles the 
third meaning of charity formulated in chapter one (1.3.3). 
32 See again 3.2.1. 
33 In footnote 13 of the above-mentioned chapter by Elliot (see 1971:123), he refers in particular to the article 
by Dickinson that also constitutes the focus of the discussion in 3.2.2 (“Towards a new focus for churches’ 
development projects”). 
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the recipient must be allowed a greater share in decision-making”. It can only 
become possible where the donor transfers all decision-making power to the 
recipient and he/she in turn also receives back “a proportion of decision-making 
power from the hands of the recipient” (1971:118). 
In this sense Elliot concluded that the refined project system, with its 
determination of ‘progressive’ arrangements of sharing and partnership, can still 
be regarded as conservative. As this brings us to a sustained assumption in the 
‘radical’ pragmatic debate, it is argued that the project system, albeit in its 
refined form, in essence retains the relationships of power that were characteristic 
of the missionary and charity services of the churches. It is a mode of engagement 
that cannot be transformed to the extent that there is no relationship of 
dependence from the side of the receivers. In essence, it remains a one-way 
activity in which the privileged donor reaches out to the poor recipient:  
Radical as this approach may be - and the evidence at the time of 
writing is that it will prove too radical for the constituency of the 
World Council of Churches - there is an important sense in which 
it is still conservative. Though it aims to transfer power, it does so 
by transferring resources to be used for the social and economic 
development of groups ... in the poor countries. There is still, 
therefore, what we could call without disparagement some 
missionary flavour: the rich are encouraged to give a little to help 
the poor ... However well intentioned and carefully circumscribed 
with non-discriminatory provisions, aid is aid and an agent of the 
maintenance of a dependent relationship. Therefore, the best aid 
that can be given to the poor countries is the means of breaking 
that relationship. And that means starting with the marginados. 
(1971:119)  
Having seen how Elliot, in the last two sentences of the above critique, also 
suggests a different mode of engagement by the churches, a different starting 
point, this is the appropriate point in the discussion to turn to his later work, 
Comfortable Compassion? Poverty, Power, and the Church. Contrary to the 
complacency that has often surfaced in the writings of representatives from the 
ecumenical movement,34 of which the ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate can be taken 
as an example, Elliot in this book calls for a radical reorientation of the 
churches’/ecumenical movement’s actual involvement in development (see 
1987:16). In this continuation of his earlier critical account, Elliot also 
approached such reorientation from the point of critically reviewing the project 
system of the churches. There was one addition, though, that constituted the 
                                                          
34 See here again the pronouncement of Richard Dickinson quoted at the beginning of Chapter Two. 
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crux of Elliot’s argumentation: his review of the project system was now framed 
in terms of a critical modernisation perspective.  
Elliot contended that the project system of the churches had been nothing more 
than an uncritical imitation and embracement of the Western modernisation 
paradigm of development. However, there is far more to this than a mere 
rendering of development services and the creation of development structures 
according to a particular ideologically confined model or paradigm of 
development. The project system of the churches not only signifies an act of 
paternalism through which the recipients or the poor are denied full 
participation and ownership of the development process, as Elliot argued in his 
earlier critique, but is also co-instrument of a larger development enterprise that 
imposes a whole model of society on other societies, a model with its particular 
worldview and thinking, its structuring and regulation of society. It creates a 
state of dependence on the part of the recipients, compelling them to abandon all 
indigenous systems of knowledge and living.  
In his discussion Elliot again (as in his earlier critique) pointed towards the 
churches’ conscious separation of their development activities from their 
missionary and charity activities. By doing so they wanted to shed the colonial 
image that had become attached to the latter services and activities in the now 
politically independent developing countries. Yet, as Elliot indicated, this 
predisposition in actual fact provided the impetus for the churches’ 
embracement of the modernisation paradigm (see 1987:17-23). While the 
churches, through a newly defined ecumenical initiative,35 wanted to escape the 
missionary ways of doing and thinking, they identified themselves with the 
secular paradigm of development. 
We shall not be surprised to find, therefore, that the Church’s 
involvement followed - both chronologically and in many respects 
ideologically - fashions dictated by the secular world. (1987:25) 
Elliot argued that there was a kind of historical inevitability about this 
identification. Sensing the need to produce results (that had to be different from 
those produced by the missionaries and that had to be the concrete 
manifestation of the new ecumenical impetus to be engaged in the 
contemporary socio-economic realities in world society) and starting their work 
with virtually no theoretical background in development, the churches were 
under great pressure to pick up ideas, plans and programmes from wherever 
they could (1987:25). For a number of reasons they conveniently found these in 
                                                          
35 Elliot pointed out how the churches’ involvement in development originated through the ecumenical 
movement/WCC. Elliot argued that this was an ecumenical initiative through which the churches’ new 
involvement in development obtained legitimacy in the eyes of political leaders and governments and 
countered the old denominational rivalries created by the missionary activities of the churches (see 
1987:23-25). This particular point was also made in the introduction to this study. 
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the secular environment of government-driven development operations. They 
perceived such development operations as the appropriate sites to participate in 
a process of democratic development (cf. Elliot 1971:116). Through linking up 
with these operations, they were now also receiving substantial funding that 
legitimated their own position in development (see 1987:25-26, 43). No less 
important, they were, through such engagement, also not required to acquire any 
critical competence in development, but only to channel resources and aid 
through their development projects to developing communities (see 1987:37, 47-
48, 63-70). 
From the point of view of mainstream secular development enterprises, Elliot 
pointed out how this mode of development work gave a central place to the 
notion of economic growth. In such terms development is understood “as 
economic growth plus some improvement in social conditions, e.g. education, 
health, housing and employment” (1987:31). It stipulates that improved living 
conditions require higher income, that higher income can in turn only be 
achieved by improved productivity and that greater productivity, again, requires 
higher investment. 
It is, according to this mode of thinking, the task of international cooperation - 
and thus of development projects - to contribute to such a process of 
development to start the ‘engine of growth’. It is furthermore the perception 
that this ‘engine of growth’ will bring about the required social change, namely 
urbanisation, a new class structure and a new range of tastes and expectations 
(ibid.). Yet – and this brings us to the central point of thinking about 
modernisation – inherent in this way of thinking is the belief that the 
institutions and thought-patterns of people in developing countries are 
unsuitable for achieving the level of economic growth that is required to 
transform them into the kinds of industrialised societies that are idealised. 
Therefore the institutions, perceptions, attitudes and ways in which people 
relate to each other need to be modernised. This would lead to the high rates of 
economic growth required and, ultimately, the levels of consumption similar to 
those in the developed countries (1987:32).36  
According to Elliot, the churches’ thinking was deeply permeated with the 
ideology of modernisation (ibid.). It is a feature that could clearly be recognised 
in their projects of development. It could be recognised in the vocational schools 
that they established to produce ‘modern’ apprentices and partisans. It is also 
illustrated by the model farms that they established to produce ‘modern’ 
agricultural techniques to ‘modernise’ the farming system of peasants. It is evident 
from the ‘modern’ forms of economic organisation, such as cooperatives and 
                                                          
36 At this point Elliot pertinently referred to the book by Gunnar Mydral, Asian Drama (published in 1968), 
which was very influential in framing a mode of development thinking along the lines of the need for 
modernisation.  
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credit unions, which they introduced to bring incentives and discipline to the 
(presumed) backward peasantries (1987:33).  
According to Elliot, projects such as these indicated the implicit racism of the 
modernisation paradigm. It implies that what exists is backward, inferior, in 
conflict with progress and generally lacking all the positive attributes that 
enabled the industrial countries to be successful. It denies the positive dynamics 
that are also at work in the societies targeted for development:  
It ignores, for example, the subtlety of social organisation in an 
Indian village or an African tribe. It ignores the astonishing 
knowledge of many indigenous people of their environment and its 
constraints. It ignores the delicacy of personal relationships and the 
wisdom of rural people in every continent. (Ibid.) 
Modernisation theory, furthermore, is built on the rationale that it is the low-
income societies that need to be changed if living standards are to rise. The 
problem, consequently, is ‘out there’ and change needs to take place ‘out there’. It 
conveniently assumes that the rich, developed countries can only have a 
beneficial impact on the poor, developing societies through their development 
assistance. This brought Elliot to a renewed structural and political perspective: 
modernisation theory denies the fact that through such factors as trade, 
investment and the communication of inappropriate consumption patterns and 
technologies, the rich countries might also be highly destructive of ‘traditional’ 
societies, or otherwise obstructive of the necessary changes. It is a mode of 
thinking and action that is not concerned about process, that is, processes of 
enrichment and impoverishment, participation and exclusion, access and control. 
It abstains from questions that are necessarily political and directs itself 
exclusively to technocratic questions about the implementation of projects. It 
assumes that, given enough successful projects, development will be achieved 
(1987 35-36). 
In conclusion, it can be said that with this perspective of Elliot we have come 
full circle. As his critique of a contemporary development enterprise would be 
applied to the project system of the churches, it very well resembles the critical 
ecumenical perspective that was set out in Chapter One of this study. It closely 
correlates with those three meanings of charity formulated in Chapter One, 
suggesting that the churches’ engagement in development through projects in 
many ways reveals the same ideological, political, structural and social 
theoretical deficiencies as their works of charity did in an earlier historical 
period. Although a different kind of project was presumably being mediated by 
the churches in the new era of development (contrary to the traditional 
charitable activities of the missionaries such as building schools, hospitals, 
orphanages and homes for the elderly) (see Elliot 1987:33), and although the 
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churches’ efforts were now also part of a far greater national and international 
initiative determined by the secular world of power, Elliot’s critical perspective 
presumes that the churches’ development projects were exposing an 
ideologically and socially uncritical engagement similar to the churches’ works of 
charity. 
Thus the first critical meaning of a charitable mode of engagement outlined in 
Chapter One37 is echoed by Elliot when he, in a way somewhat contradictory to 
his whole argument, acknowledges that the churches have over-invested in 
approaches to development that are not necessarily destructive or unnecessary 
(1987:117) and in certain contexts represent an important and appropriate area of 
work (1987:179; also 13). But he immediately qualified this statement by noting 
that they constitute approaches to development that are inadequate by 
themselves and are easily subverted into countersigns. They were activities that 
more often become services for the elite and middle-class (1987:117). As in the 
case of charity, these approaches by and large neglected the factors of structures 
and power inherent in the problem of poverty. Elliot stated this, from the starting 
point of the project approach of the churches, as follows: 
If poverty persists, it is, one supposes, because insufficient projects 
or the wrong bundles of projects have been implemented. The 
remedy is more projects, more money, more professionals, more 
agencies. The fundamental relationships of power and wealth 
extraction are simply never faced. (1987:48) 
The approach of the churches to development through projects also resembles 
the second critical meaning of charity discussed in Chapter One.38 Elliot argued 
that it was structural factors such as the international trading system, the 
international monetary system, foreign investment, the transfer of technology, 
access to information, the role of the military and the creation and maintenance 
of a sub-class of permanently poor that have a far greater impact on the 
developing world and the living standards of poor people than international aid 
(project) efforts. Yet these areas were almost by definition beyond the technical 
competence and sphere of action of the churches and reflected their inability to 
undertake critical social thinking. They are areas which the clergy have not been 
trained to address, while only a very small group of lay people are close to these 
matters to be helpful in any way (1987:63). Such incompetence was 
conveniently disguised and not challenged by the project involvement of the 
churches. 
There is a still more significant point to this neglect, which highlights the 
ideological aspect of the churches’ bondage to the modernisation paradigm. This 
                                                          
37 Cf. the meaning of charity in 1.3.1. 
38 Cf. the meaning of charity in 1.3.2.  
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is the fact that many of the lay Christians who have been involved in 
international trade, technology transfer or banking find it very difficult to subject 
their area of daily concern (which was also the source of their daily bread!) to 
the radical critique of a structural approach. Not only do these Christians tend to 
be politically conservative, but they also tend to perceive capitalism as a morally 
good, even divinely sanctioned, form of organisation that also has to be the 
remedy of the poor. In Elliot’s words:  
Within capitalism, they tend to regard the function of the market, 
whether for capital or technology or manufactured goods or raw 
materials, as the ‘invisible hand’ that guides human society to the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number ... It is asking a very great 
deal ... of such people to make the perceptual leap from the snug 
commercial environment in which they are embedded, to the 
perspective of the Kingdom of God in which the rich and powerful 
are brought under judgement, and the Kingdom is proclaimed to 
the poor and lowly and the meek ... That perspective is so far out 
with the normal mind-set of those who operate the structures that 
it is not hard to understand why most Churches most of the time 
have remained mystified at, confused by, and therefore negligent of 
the central issues involved. (1987:64)  
As suggested by much of the discussion in this subsection, it is also possible to 
equate Elliot’s criticism of the churches’ project system with the third meaning 
of charity offered in Chapter One.39 Elliot held that the development projects of 
the churches naturally presume a movement from the rich to the poor. It is an 
irreversible reality; the project system cannot be otherwise! Projects mean tasks 
to be executed amongst the poor and underprivileged. They represent an act of 
clear paternalism. 
As in the case of his earlier work, Elliot again emphasised the essential one-way 
direction of the churches’ projects.40 They represent a kind of operation that 
cannot be reversed by an emphasis on social justice, such as in the ‘moderate’ 
pragmatic debate. In addition to his earlier criticism, Elliot now also cast this 
particular point of his argument in terms of the critical modernisation 
perspective referred to above. Although the argument has – through the 
emphasis on justice – come to be that the rich and powerful have used their 
wealth and power in a way that makes poverty inevitable and that justice can 
only be implemented by the rich rendering reparation to the poor through a 
transfer of resources, the assumption remains that these resources are used in 
ways consistent with modernisation thinking. It is a case in which the nature of 
                                                          
39 Cf. the meaning of charity in 1.3.3. 
40 We are referring here to the argumentation in his earlier 1971 work discussed in subsection 3.3.1. 
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development, in essence, retains its Western meaning. Only this time it is 
demanded that the rich give to the poor on a far greater scale (see 1987:52-53). 
3.3.2 Conscientisation 
Having pointed out the apparently common ground between the ‘moderate’ and 
‘radical’ accounts of the pragmatic debate at the beginning of 3.3.1, it is important 
to also discern the continuous thread that separates the ‘radical’ pragmatic 
debate from the ‘moderate’ account. It can be said that the ‘radical’ pragmatic 
debate’s critique of the project system (and, for that matter, an apparent 
progressive ‘moderate’ pragmatic debate) is that it sustains the dominant position 
of the rich and powerful. As is observed in the last paragraph of 3.3.1, this is a line 
of assistance (from the dominant to the subordinate) that cannot be reversed. 
The very notion and reality of development projects indicate that this is an 
impossibility. A reversal of direction, with a starting point from the position of 
the poor and subordinate, a radical breakthrough and transformation, therefore, 
demand at least the abandonment of a project vocabulary. It demands, in fact, a 
profound reorientation. 
It may be observed how both the ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ accounts of the 
pragmatic debate emphasise the concept of conscientisation in their respective 
perspectives on strategic reorientation. Having already indicated how the notion 
of conscientisation takes a central place in Richard Dickinson’s formulation of a 
relational reorientation of the churches’ development projects,41 it would here 
for a start be possible to say that both accounts appear to conceptualise the 
development role of the churches along the lines of what has been formulated, 
at a number of points in this study, as an idea- and value-centred approach to 
development. Accordingly, it seems that both accounts have come to define the 
actual role of the churches as one of conscientisation, value transformation, 
sensitisation, and changing the minds, attitudes and behaviour of people. 
Yet at this point it can be indicated how the above determination of a decisive 
separation between the two accounts of the pragmatic debate also indicates the 
fundamental difference between the two perspectives on conscientisation. As 
suggested by Elliot’s critical assessment, the notion of conscientisation in the 
‘moderate’ pragmatic debate rather reinforced the assumption that development 
was a matter for the developing countries. Through the medium of the project 
system, it sees the support of the efforts of the church development agencies in 
the developing countries with money, training and manpower for 
conscientisation work as the prevailing role of the churches in the developed 
countries. This is a case where the paradigms of modernisation and 
conscientisation overlap to a considerable extent. Both situate the most effective 
                                                          
41 See here again the final two paragraphs of 3.2.2. 
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point of engagement for the metropolitan churches in the developing countries 
(1987:117). 
This brings us to the culminating point of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate. 
Through the writing of Elliot this debate has come to propagate a far more 
radical and profound meaning of conscientisation. At the basis of this is the 
perception that processes and programmes of conscientisation are not reducible 
to projects.42 It points to complex, organic and autonomous processes that 
sharply contrast with the traditional top-down, modernising, neatly planned 
projects favoured by donors. 
It is simply not open to the managerial manipulations of Western 
categories of thought. It has to be organic, inevitably slow, 
uncertain, unpredictable, in many senses uncontrollable. Because it 
is essentially about freeing people in a number of dimensions of life 
that are complex, inter-active and hard to get, it is an approach that 
has to be lived experimentally, experientially and always 
provisionally. It is therefore an approach that is always opaque and 
untidy for those outside it. (1987:90) 
Indicating a complete shift from a project to a conscientisation vocabulary, one 
can note how the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate, through Elliot’s perspective, 
highlights a full-fledged idea- and value-centred role for the churches in 
development. This perspective wants to convey that the explicit and distinctive 
role of the churches in development is the creation of an alternative 
consciousness in society at large. It is this mode of involvement that is the 
authentic task of the churches, not the execution of projects. In contrast to the 
‘moderate’ pragmatic debate, the point of departure is radically reversed. It is a 
double entry point in which the rich and powerful are to be brought to an 
alternative consciousness determined by the interests, self-expression and point 
of view of the poor and powerless. Capturing the essence of such a 
conscientisation of the rich, Elliot wrote: 
What is definitive is the level and nature of the consciousness that 
informs the actions of the rich and the powerful in their dealings with 
the relatively poor and relatively powerless ... It is the creation of an 
alternative consciousness, which in the spirit of magnificat and 
beatitude puts the poor and powerless at the centre, that is the true 
task of the Church in development. This alternative consciousness is 
not paternalistic or condescending: it is a consciousness that turns 
upside down the priorities and assumptions of twentieth-century 
                                                          
42 We may here also compare the two other earlier, less elaborate accounts of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate 
referred to in this chapter, namely that by C T Kurien (see 1974:206-209) and in the earlier chapter by 
Elliot (see 1971:119-122), in which a similar radical meaning of conscientisation is propagated.  
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industrialised, secularised acquisitiveness ... and judges relationships, 
structures, and economic ties not by what profit it brings to the 
dominant partner but by how much it enlarges the life chances of 
the subordinate partner. That means the judgements have to be 
made by the subordinate partner - which in turn means that the 
subordination is ended. The interests of the poor and powerless, as 
formulated and expressed by they themselves, thus become 
definitive of the alternative consciousness. The rich and powerful, 
in other words, have to learn to use their wealth and power not for 
their own aggrandisement, but for the goals set by the poor and 
powerless. (1987:117-118, italics added)  
Following from such a basic formulation of what is to be viewed as the 
churches’ actual role in a process of authentic development, it should be pointed 
out how Elliot would ultimately draw on more traditional theological metaphors 
to further deepen this particular understanding of the churches’ development 
role. For Elliot, conscientisation in terms of the above formulation entails a 
‘pedagogy of the oppressed’. This is a meaning that he derives largely from the 
theories of Paulo Freire, the well-known Brazilian Roman Catholic educationist. 
For the churches this means that development has to start with the 
empowerment and critical conscientisation of the poor (see 1987:85-87). As this 
is a process in which poor people take charge of their own empowerment 
(1987:86) and in which the churches from poor societies and countries may 
participate, Elliot argued that the conscientisation of the poor could ultimately 
be seen as meaningless if it does not attend to the wider relationships and 
structures of power (economic and political). Elliot commented that the 
‘subjectification’ of poor people that Freire had been attempting was unlikely to 
mean a great deal unless it was accompanied by the control of productive assets 
(1987:98). This obliges the poor and powerless and those who work with them 
to admit that the category of power is central to the process (1987:101). 
This realisation of the centrality of power (1987:102) brings us to the renewed 
theological understanding of conscientisation that is referred to above. 
Propagated as the central argument of Elliot’s book, the use (or misuse) of power 
is essentially a religious question. It is an issue that includes, but also goes 
beyond, the economic, social and legal aspects of power. The exploitation of the 
weak by the strong is an issue fundamental to human well-being and occupies a 
central position in the Christian message (1987:15). It pertains to the deepest 
“inner or spiritual essence” of human beings, that is, their natural tendency to 
dominate and exploit other fellow human beings, to seek their own self-interest 
(1987:126-127).  
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For Elliot, development, from the perspective of the churches, involves a 
fundamental spiritual dimension.43 It involves what he called the “dialectical 
relationship between the outward, material world and the inner spiritual world” 
(1987:119, italics added), or as he otherwise put it, between the “inner” and the 
“outward journey” (see e.g. 1987:130, Chapter 10). Manifested in the way that 
the conscientised oppressed would deal with their anger, frustration and 
resentment in their confrontation with the rich and powerful (see 1987:88, 95-
99), development also points to a fundamental focus on the rich and powerful 
themselves, that is, people and systems. It follows that the mirror image of a 
‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ is a ‘pedagogy of the rich’.44 Unless the rich and 
powerful are liberated from their need to hang on to their wealth and power in 
an exclusive and defensive way, the process of confrontation is likely to lead to a 
(violent) clash between the rich and the poor as the latter demand a 
reorganisation of the social processes (1987:95).  
The way to authentic development consequently calls for metanoia, conversion, 
directed first and foremost towards the rich and powerful (1987:118). It is 
ultimately also a question of the conversion of the church (1987:174). It points to 
the responsibility of the churches in the richer countries to confront the powers 
of corruption in their own societies, especially the impact of such powers on the 
poor locally and abroad. It likewise calls upon Christians in poorer countries to 
do the same (1987:173). 
Elliot qualified this point by saying that conversion and spiritual renewal should 
not here be seen in the restricted individualistic sense traditionally emphasised 
by the churches (1987:152). It is something totally different. The reality of power 
and the consequent process of spiritual renewal imply three ontological levels: 
individual, collective and cosmic (1987:129). Translated into the terms of the 
dialectical nature of the inward and outward journey, conversion involves a 
concrete level of confrontation and focus. This does not nullify the aspect of 
critical social understanding and knowledge emphasised earlier in this chapter.45 
It determines that the inner psychological/spiritual healing and growth and the 
reconstitution of consciousness ought to manifest itself in new personal life-
styles (less material and simpler, for instance) (1987:132-133). In the dialectical 
sense it also finds expression in the further collective outward journey of a 
concrete confrontation of institutions and structures. 
It follows that systems and institutions also need spiritual renewal and conversion. 
Of fundamental importance are the powers behind the system (1987:135, 153), 
something Elliot calls “its inner wells of motivation and consciousness which 
                                                          
43 We can conclude that it is this spiritual aspect of conscientisation that was still undeveloped in the earlier 
accounts of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate by Elliot and Kurien referred to in the previous footnote. 
44 Elliot pointed out that Paulo Freire had also been working on ‘a pedagogy of the rich’ as a fundamental 
complement to ‘a pedagogy of the oppressed’ (1987:95). 
45 See 3.3.1. 
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make it use its power in a given (egocentric) way” (1987:126). This points to a 
recognition and approach that confront and identify the outer expressions of 
such inner corruption and self-centredness. He insists that “the powers of 
corruption, of moral disintegration, of undisguised evil have to be overcome in 
the essence of our structures if we are to begin to see in our institutions the 
possibility of covenant quality relationships” (1987:152). In concrete terms, this 
approach focuses on the demonic nature of an arrangement such as the 
international monetary system that continues to drain a continent such as Africa, 
for instance, of over thirty percent of the value of its exports to service its debts. 
Elliot sums this up in terms of a perspective on the conversion of the system at 
work, which dialectically ought to involve all three the ontological levels 
mentioned above:  
Certainly one can identify a dozen key actors, but in no sense are 
they free agents, by whose fiat the whole structure could be 
changed. Those individuals and the bureaucracies and power-
systems they represent are trapped, not only in the sense that they 
cannot change the system, but in the deeper sense that they are 
ideologically blinded to the fact that it needs to be changed. For 
they are caught in a web of value systems and explanations that 
‘justify’ the present arrangements by which Africa is systematically 
impoverished - and all for the sake of her own poor! (1987:154)46 
3.4 Impasse and renewal 
We are concluding our discussion of the ecumenical development debate with a 
discussion of the pragmatic debate in this chapter. We started off by setting out 
a most critical perspective on the notion of charity in the ecumenical 
development discourse and, secondly, pointed out how a contemporary 
ecumenical development discourse poses a critical challenge to the meaning and 
ecclesiastical practice of charity. The discussion indicated how the pragmatic 
debate captures a prevailing tension in the whole ecumenical debate on 
development. Indeed, it can be concluded that the pragmatic debate, in both its 
moderate and radical manifestations, has come to indicate the continual struggle 
of the Christian churches in the field of socio-economic and socio-political 
praxis. While the new notion of ‘development’ (we have indicated how 
‘development’ represents a concept only recently applied by the churches) 
promised much with regard to a new mode of social engagement by the 
churches, the pragmatic debate stressed the need for a continued rethinking and 
                                                          
46 In the final chapter of his book Elliot identifies in a most concrete way four examples of collective 
Christian action world-wide that serve as models of how the powers behind institutions and structures 
might be challenged. They are the Witness for Peace in Nicaragua, the peace movement in the United 
Kingdom, the Christian Institute of Southern Africa and Solidarity in Poland (see 1987:157-173). 
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transformation of the churches’ actual involvement in the domain of 
development. 
We could therefore conclude here with the following two somewhat 
contradictory observations, namely that in the context of the wider ecumenical 
development debate the pragmatic debate represents an impasse, but also a 
prospect for renewal in terms of the churches’ participation in development. It 
would first of all be possible to say that the pragmatic debate indicates an 
enduring divide between theory and praxis, between what has been aspired to 
and formulated by a relatively small group of progressive thinkers in theological, 
church and wider social theoretical circles, and what the majority of church 
people and agencies were and are in actual fact doing in the name of 
development. 
We have seen how both accounts of the pragmatic debate, moderate and radical, 
have been calling for a reorientation of the churches’ involvement in 
development. We might even say that there appears to be a considerable overlap 
between these two critical accounts, as both point to a reorientation of the role 
of the churches in development along the lines of values, ideas, relationships and 
conscientisation. Both these accounts seem to represent a theoretical perspective 
through which the gap between development praxis and the critical discourse 
on development that was set out in Chapter Two is substantially closed - 
between what has been put forward as a idea- and value-centred development 
praxis and our own description of the critical development discourse in Chapter 
Two as an ‘idea movement’. 
But – and this is an important distinction – in the case of the ‘radical’ pragmatic 
debate a far more radical, profound and convincing perspective on an idea- and 
value-centred development praxis has been articulated. It is a perspective 
emphasising the impasse of a prevailing project-centred approach by the 
churches, exposing the ideologically limited and biased nature of that approach 
and calling for a profound reorientation, a radical new mode of involvement in 
development.  
At this point it is important to note how the pragmatic debate remains an 
unresolved aspect of the ecumenical development debate. Having come 
particularly through the radical account to represent a most meaningful and 
fruitful problematisation from which new innovative conceptualisations of the 
churches’ strategic involvement in development might emanate, it can be 
observed how this debate coincides with the overall decline of the ecumenical 
development debate. Indeed, Charles Elliot’s Comfortable Compassion? signals 
the last important and substantial publication in that branch of the ecumenical 
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development debate associated with the WCC.47 It would be followed by only a 
small number of scattered writings,48 in contrast to the rich stream of 
publications on the subject of development during the 1960s, 1970s and to a 
lesser extent the earlier part of the 1980s.49 With the exception of a small 
number of articles published in The Ecumenical Review in the late 1980s and the 
1990s,50 we do not encounter any significant attempts51 towards a continuing 
problematisation and rethinking of the churches’ role in development along the 
critical lines of the pragmatic debate. We find no reference particularly to 
Elliot’s above-mentioned book, no indication that this work and the critical 
debate that it represents is taken seriously in the overall theological-ecclesiastical 
debate on development. 
We might go so far as to state that the pragmatic debate, in more ways than one, 
anticipates a fatigue in theological-ecclesiastical thinking on development, an 
inability to move creatively beyond the impasse spelled out by this debate. As 
an overview of the small corpus of ecumenical writings on development over 
the last decade suggests, recent ecumenical reflection on the theme of 
development seems to follow old, familiar tracks. This is, for instance, evident 
from a number of contributions in a 1994 issue of The Ecumenical Review that 
focus rather on the subject of ‘ecumenical diakonia’ (Vol. 46, No. 3). In these 
reflections the issue for representatives of the WCC is still what Elizabeth Ferris 
formulated as the question of how “to relate the emergency phase of assistance 
more closely with longer-term development goals” (1974:274). As also evident 
                                                          
47 See in this regard again our distinction at the beginning of this study between the two branches of the 
ecumenical development debate, namely that branch directly associated with the WCC and a related 
southeast Asian branch.  
48 Taking the publications in The Ecumenical Review as a case study, it can be noted how only three articles 
were published in this periodical throughout the 1980s that deal pertinently with the subject of 
development. In the 1990s the total was only four articles, of which the most recent was published in 
1996. Regarding the latter group of four articles, in fact only the article by Gnana Robinson, “Christian 
Theology and Development” (1994), addresses the subject of development in terms of the nexus of 
religion/theology and development. While referring in one way or another to the concept of development, 
one of the remaining three articles deals mainly with the topic of ecumenical diaconical work and relief 
services (that by E Ferris in 1994), another with an organisation such as the United Nations’ relationship to 
development work (that by J Dias in 1995) and the last one with the subject of development per se, thus 
not in any way reflecting the nexus of religion/theology/church and development (that by J Ramalho in 
1996).  
49 Whereas the 1980s marked the decline of the ecumenical development debate (see next footnote), two 
important exceptions in this period prior to the publication of Comfortable Compassion? are Richard 
Dickinson’s already mentioned book, Poor, Yet Making Many Rich. The Poor as Agents of Creative Justice 
(published in 1983) and Ans J Van der Bent’s already mentioned chapter in her book, Vital Ecumenical 
Concerns (published in 1986).  
50 As we are taking the WCC branch of the ecumenical development debate as our case study, it should be 
mentioned that it is still possible to trace a steady stream of articles on the subject of development during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in those southeast Asian journals mentioned in the introduction. Yet this 
group of writings is scattered over various journals rather than concentrated in a particular journal or two 
in this period, which shows a marked decline in publication in comparison to the rich stream of articles 
and other publications on the subject of development in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. 
51 The exception is Richard Dickinson’s entry on ‘development’ in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement 
(Geneva: WCC) that was published in 1991. 
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from an article by Martin Robra in the same series of reflections, the issue of 
WCC diakonia service at the beginning of the 1990s still involved a serious 
grappling with the question of a just sharing of resources, or what he calls an 
“ongoing discussion of sharing in solidarity” (an issue very similar to what has 
been a central point of critique and reflection from an early stage in the 
ecumenical development debate/pragmatic debate) (see 1994:283-285; cf. also 
279-283).  
However, it should be acknowledged that the broad ecumenical debate in this 
period of decline of the ecumenical development debate still allowed important 
scope for reflections on themes such as ‘civil society’ and ‘sustainable society’,52 
themes that can in an important way be related to the subject of development 
and consequently make an important contribution to a deepening and renewal of 
the theological-ecclesiastical debate on development.53 Having made this 
observation, it should at the same time be noted that the subject of 
development in no way explicitly figures in the discussions of the latter 
themes.54 Whereas such connections have been made in the formal (secular) 
field of development studies in the 1980s and 1990s,55 no real attempt has been 
made to also creatively and innovatively reconsider the theological and church 
sector’s own understanding of, and engagement in, development through the 
above-mentioned themes. In sum, it remains that case that ecumenical thinking 
on development has been restricted to the few scattered contributions already 
referred to.56 
It should be said that, in the final instance, the pragmatic debate does not only 
present us with the problematisation of, and impasse in, a current theological-
ecclesiastical development debate and praxis. As already concluded in this 
chapter, particularly under the headings of ‘Relational perspective’ (3.2.2) and 
‘Conscientisation’ (3.3.2), both moderate and radical accounts of the pragmatic 
debate have in their own respective ways also begun to embark on a constructive 
road of renewal. This perspective on renewal is closely related to our own 
perspective on strategic renewal that is spelled out in the introduction of this 
study and it emphasises an authentic role for the churches in development along 
                                                          
52 These themes constitute the focus of reflection in two issues of The Ecumenical Review in the 1990s, 
respectively in Vol. 46/1 (1994) and Vol. 48/3 (1996). 
53 It should be obvious that the theme of civil society would be especially important to the alternative 
perspective of the pragmatic debate, as it could give crucial political, normative and strategic momentum 
to the value-centred, idea-centred and relational orientation of this debate. 
54 The exception here is J Ramalho’s article in the issue focusing on sustainable development. However, see 
our evaluation of this article in footnote 48. 
55 In this period the concept of ‘sustainable development’ articulated a growing environmental and ecological 
concern in development thinking. Especially important in this period, however, is also the concept of ‘civil 
society’, which has increasingly come to articulate the conceptual and strategic essence of a new stream of 
people-centred theories on development, a movement in development thinking characterised by a 
juxtaposition of state- and government-centred versus civil society-centred strategies of development (see 
e.g. Korten (1990:28-29)). 
56 See footnote 48. 
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the lines of values, ideas, conscientisation, human behaviour and relationships – 
in short, what we have come to call a ‘politics of ideas’. 
Stated differently, it can be said that the pragmatic debate (in which the radical 
account represents the chronological progression as opposed to the moderate 
account) presents us with the historical culmination of a movement in the 
ecumenical development debate that has constantly pressed for a reorientation 
of the churches’ role in development similar to our own expectation. This 
movement of thought presents us with the critical conceptual, strategic and 
ideological basis from which to develop our own basic argument. From this basis 
we will, in the next few chapters of this study, develop our argument, in 
accordance with the wider interdisciplinary and solidarity framework set out in 
the introduction. Exploring the perspectives of a broader NGO and alternative 
development debate in this further discussion, we will come to see how this 
debate, in a similar way to the ecumenical development debate, comes full circle 
by starting off with the problem of charity and progressing to a more 
sophisticated strategic perspective that advocates a value- and idea-centred 
approach to development. It is a perspective that in a significant sense also 
identifies religion and its institutions as an important (if not crucial) actor in 
development.  
 91
Chapter Four 
CHARITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE NGO 
DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
4.1 Introduction 
A striking feature of the ecumenical development debate focused on in the first 
three chapters of this study is its general neglect of a concurrent NGO debate on 
development.1 Yet it can simultaneously be noted how, from the point of view of 
the NGO development debate, a number of perspectives have emanated that call 
for a closer identification and comparison with the ecumenical development 
debate presented in the first three chapters of this study. The perspectives that 
reflect a charity-development juxtaposition, similar to that in the ecumenical 
development debate are: 
Firstly, the historical perspective in the NGO development debate that relates the 
origins of development-oriented NGOs from both the North and the South, 
                                                          
1 (1) By the NGO development debate is meant a growing and substantial corpus of literature in the broad 
field of development that today has come to focus on the contemporary phenomenon of development-
oriented NGOs or what might otherwise be called non-governmental development organisations 
(NGDOs). While the concepts ‘NGOs’, ‘development-oriented NGOs’ and ‘developmental NGOs’ are 
more commonly used in this debate (see e.g. OECD 1987:4-8), the critical point has also been made (in 
this debate) that, given the broad and diversified range of institutions/associations that are covered by the 
term non-governmental organisation (NGO), the “concept NGO is wrongly used to denominate non-
governmental development organizations (NGDOs): namely one form of NGO devoted specifically to the 
design, study and/or execution of development programs and projects in Third World countries, with the 
support of international development cooperation institutions and the direct involvement of the popular 
sectors” (Padron 1987:70, italics added). Taking the latter as an important distinction that also informs the 
discussion in this chapter, and acknowledging the usefulness of the concept ‘NGDO’ that is used by some 
writers in the NGO development debate (see e.g. Padron 1987:69-74; also Fowler 1998:136-155; Wils 
1994:1-7; Verhagen 1989:2-6), the more commonly used concepts of ‘NGOs’ and ‘development-oriented 
NGOs’ will nevertheless still be applied in this study. 
 (2) This statement echoes recent critical voices in the ecumenical movement that have recognised 
Christian theology’s general neglect of the theme of civil society to date, in contrast to the social sciences 
(see e.g. Batista 1995:246). In an important article in the already mentioned Vol. 46/1 of The Ecumenical 
Review (see footnote 52 of the previous chapter) Konrad Raiser put this critical observation into 
perspective when he argued that, contrary to a civil society model or paradigm, the basic models for the 
structure of the church have historically rather mirrored developments in the organisation of the state and 
today increasingly also those in business corporations (1994:42). See also the articles by De Santa Ana 
(1994:3-11), Batista (1994:12-18), Duchrow (1994:21-27) and Ichiyo (1994:28-37) in the same issue, which 
together with Raiser’s contribution, mark the beginning of a more explicit and systematic civil society 
orientation and awareness in the ecumenical movement/WCC. 
 (3) Thus the argument here, in accordance with the observations in point (2), is that a civil society 
orientation or paradigm should necessarily have brought a theological and ecclesiastical debate on 
development to at least some kind of identification with the NGO debate on development and the (civil 
society!) organisations (that is, development-oriented NGOs) on which this latter debate has come to 
focus. See in addition to this argument our connection of the notion of ‘development’ to that of ‘civil 
society’ at the end of the previous chapter (see in addition to the main discussion footnotes 52, 53 and 55). 
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developed and developing worlds, to a definite welfare or relief2 approach. 
Development-oriented NGOs are a post-World War I and II phenomenon, and 
this perspective points to the gradual progression of development-oriented 
NGOs from their initial starting-point of a relief-oriented involvement. It 
portrays development-oriented NGOs as a special category that, from a 
historical point of view, did not start as development agencies, but were drawn 
to development by first providing relief in emergency situations, after which 
they started to recognise that, in developing countries, relief was not enough.3 
Particularly significant in this perspective is its recognition of the NGO sector’s 
close proximity to the Christian churches, both in the North and the South. This 
indicates the clear church and Christian presence in the phenomenon of 
development-oriented NGOs, not only during the initial stages of their 
evolution, but in fact until the present day. It holds that the churches did not 
only substantially contribute to the voluntary and morally committed character 
of the NGO sector through their initial relief and welfare services, but that they 
at later stages also served as the indispensable supporters of NGOs’ political 
activities (e.g. in Latin America4). Not ignoring the fact that the NGO sector 
may have taken on an increasing secular identity, this perspective maintains that 
the phenomenon of development-oriented NGOs cannot be understood apart 
from their religious roots and also maintains that church-related bodies, churches 
and Christian NGOs still make out a substantial part of the contemporary NGO 
movement.5 
Secondly, the perspective in the NGO development debate that sustains or 
reiterates the welfare, relief/development dichotomy in the reflections on 
development-oriented NGOs as a more recent and present-day phenomenon. 
Related to the first perspective, this second perspective concerns itself with the 
question of the ‘scaling-up’ and institutional transformation of development-
oriented NGOs towards more sophisticated modes of development activity that 
would have a more long-term, emancipatory and structural impact on the lives 
of the poor and beneficiaries. Recognising the more ‘complex’ nature of many 
development-oriented NGOs by which other orientations (e.g. advocacy, 
                                                          
2  As is evident from the discussion in this chapter, preference is generally given in the NGO development 
debate to the terms ‘relief’ and ‘welfare’, rather than to the term ‘charity’ commonly applied in this study. 
3 See here in particular OECD (1987:4). 
4 See here especially the article by Leilah Landim, "NGOs in Latin America", which points out how the 
churches represented the fundamental political space through which NGOs could carry out their activities 
during the periods of political authoritarianism in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. It was their close 
proximity to the churches in this period, Landim concluded, that left its mark on the NGO sector until 
the present day (1987:32). 
5 See Landim 1987:31-35; OECD 1987:4-15; also Arruda 1985:12-13; Bhatt 1995:77; Bratton 1989:570-571; 
Brodhead 1987:2-5; De Graaf 1987:277-282; Fernandez 1987:39-43; Howes and Sattar 1992:103-104. Whereas 
the contributions by Arruda, De Graaf and Fernandez do not so much reflect the welfare aspect of this 
first perspective, they nevertheless fit in here as they likewise give evidence of the NGO sector’s close 
historical and ongoing relationship with the Christian churches. 
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development education) might coexist with a welfare approach,6 this 
perspective highlights the distinctive internal organisational and 
ideological/mental constraints within NGO ranks that complicate their 
surrendering of a welfare/relief orientation and character. One author’s 
articulation of the particular difficulties and challenges encountered by NGOs to 
transform themselves from relief- to development-oriented organisations sums 
up this perspective well: 
This presents a particular difficulty and challenge to NGOs whose 
initial entry and activities have been in relief and refugee assistance. 
To move from relief to development means much more than just 
starting development projects in refugee camps, because the basis 
of the interaction and relationship between NGOs and intended 
beneficiaries must change. This has consequences for field staff, 
their selection, values, incentives and training, as well as for the 
structure of the NGO itself and its systems of financing. 
(Fowler 1988:21)7 
Thirdly, the perspective in the NGO development debate that stresses the deficiency 
of the project-centred approach in NGO development activity on the strategic and 
ideological level. As in the case of the second perspective, also concerned with 
the issue of strategic renewal in the NGO sector, this perspective bears close 
resemblance to the critical position in the ecumenical development debate that 
regards the project approach as the inadequate media via between welfare/relief 
and authentic development.8 It denounces the predominantly technocratic and 
linear (‘blueprint’) approach in mainstream development9 that treats 
development as a set of predictable outcomes to be achieved through the 
ordering of predetermined and logical inputs and outputs. It rather portrays 
development as the product of complex and contingent processes that can only 
be partially predicted and controlled. It introduces the notions of empowerment, 
                                                          
6 Identifying, for instance, six categories of ‘orientation’ amongst development-oriented NGOs in her recent 
contribution to the NGO development debate, viz., welfare, development, advocacy, development 
education, networking and research, Anna Vakil furthermore noted that many NGOs are in fact displaying 
more than one orientation and in some cases as many as four or five out of the six today (1997:2063).  
7 See the following authors for insights into this second perspective: Brodhead 1987:2-4; Elliot 1987a:57-60; 
Fowler 1993:329-335; 1988:12-25; Mimica and Stubbs 1996:281-290; Smith 1984:118-122, 154-155. 
8 (1) See again 3.3.1. 
 (2) With this comparison between the NGO and ecumenical development debates the contribution of 
Charles Elliot can again be noted (as in the case of the ecumenical development debate discussed in 
Chapter Three). As the most important exponent of the ‘radical’ pragmatic debate, Elliot delivered a 
similar ‘project critique’ in a paper at the important symposium on NGOs and development in London in 
1987. See the supplementary issue of Vol. 15 (1987) of the journal World Development in which Elliot’s 
paper (1987:57-68) was published with the other symposium papers under the theme, "Development 
Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs". 
9 Here we may note, for instance, how Charles Elliot came to associate the project approach to 
development with a Western-dominated neo-modernisation paradigm in development thinking, a paradigm 
devoid of any critical political meaning and ideological self-critique (see 1987:58-68). 
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democratisation and development education/conscientisation as an ‘alternative’ 
development vocabulary and captures development as a (political) process by 
which the poor and hitherto subordinate/the South/target groups constantly 
negotiate and break through the relationships of dependence and subordination 
to become co-creators and owners of the process. In this sense, it also redirects 
the problem of development to the society of the sender/donor/the North/the 
rich. The following quote presents a powerful articulation of the underlying 
principle of the third perspective, stating that the lack of people’s participation 
in development:  
 ...is not a problem unique to research, education and training. It 
also underlies the dangerous obsession with ‘projects’ that 
characterises the work of most development agencies. The logical 
corollary of a world-view which sees development as a series of 
technical transfers mediated by experts is that, given a sufficient 
number of situations, or projects, in which these transfers can be 
made, ‘development’ will occur. But, as Sithembiso Nyoni has 
pointed out, no country in the world has ever developed itself 
through projects; development results from a long process of 
experiment and innovation through which people build up the 
skills, knowledge and self-confidence necessary to shape their 
environment in ways which foster progress toward goals such as 
economic growth, equity in income distribution, and political 
freedom. At root then, development is about processes of 
enrichment, empowerment and participation, which the 
technocratic, project-oriented view of the world simply cannot 
accommodate. (Edwards 1989:119-120)10 
Fourthly, the perspective in the NGO development debate that overlaps with the 
first three perspectives in its recognition of the imperfection of past and present 
welfare/relief, project, localised and isolated efforts in development, but that, more 
fully than the former three, concentrates on the question of strategic innovation by 
propagating and problematising a broad theory of scaling-up and mainstreaming. 
Reflecting various types of scaling-up11 in its framework, but also many different 
                                                          
10 (1) See furthermore Biggs and Neame 1995:31-33; Chambers 1993:27-39, 76-88; 1989:16-18; Friedmann 
1995:139-143, 158; Fowler 1998:142; 1995:144-155; Gariyo 1995:138; Clark 1991:69-70; Elliot 1987a:58-68; 
Padron 1987:74-75; Verhagen 1987:15-16, 75. 
 (2) While it does not reflect the NGO development debate in a direct way, we may here also refer to the 
book by Robert Cassen (and associates), Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force (1986). 
This work is an important source for writers from the NGO development debate critical of the project 
approach (see e.g. Chambers 1993:76; Fowler 1995:145). The observation in this book of the dominance of 
the economic and technical elements in project design and implementation at the cost of the institutional, 
social and political elements correlates well with the critical view in the NGO development debate (see 
1986:117; also 105-117; 306-313). 
11 In his meaningful synthesis of the different definitions of ‘scaling-up’, Peter Uvin identified four different 
forms or types, viz. quantitative scaling-up, functional scaling-up, political scaling-up and organisational 
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concepts such as development education, advocacy, empowerment, lobbying 
and networking, this perspective finds particular expression in the discourses of 
public policy-making, political democratisation and institutional/organisational 
transformation. Also referred to as the ‘New Policy Agenda’ in NGO 
development discourse, this perspective emphasises the need for 
‘mainstreaming’, that is, for NGOs to become part of the official policy processes 
in order to convert their ‘alternative’ solutions and programmes into the general 
and official policy framework.12 In view of such an ‘agenda’ this perspective also 
problematises and complicates the prospects of NGOs in the policy arena by 
focusing on the internal organisational and external relational elements that 
confront NGOs as prospective political and policy actors. It emphasises the need 
for organisational transformation among NGOs (in terms of ‘accountability’ and 
‘performance’) and the establishment of viable relationships with the other 
actors in the political or policy arena: their own clientele/the poor, local and 
Northern governments/states, donors, other NGOs and aid agencies.13 
We have attempted so far to show how a number of perspectives can be drawn 
from the NGO development debate, which reveals a remarkable parallel with 
the presentation of the ecumenical development debate in this study. We have 
also attempted to show how these perspectives, in terms of the interdisciplinary 
intentions of this study, demarcate the NGO development debate as an 
important source of learning for an ecumenical development debate in search of 
strategic renewal. In this sense, we have attempted to show how these 
perspectives come to suggest that such a mutual comparison and identification 
are more than coincidental and become possible not without good reason. To 
take the above first perspective here as the basic point of departure, these 
perspectives come to suggest that development-oriented NGOs stem from the same 
                                                                                                                                              
scaling-up (1995b:498-499; 1995a:928-929). John Clark made a distinction among three types of scaling-up, 
viz. project replication, building grassroots movements and influencing policy reform (1991:84-85), while 
Michael Edwards and David Hulme identified four possible ways of scaling-up: via working with 
government, operational expansion, lobbying and advocacy, and via supporting local-level initiative 
(1992a:212-213). 
12 For this particular definition of mainstreaming, see Wils (1995:53). 
13 (1) See Annis 1987:129-133; Biggs and Neame 1995:31-40; Bratton 1990:87-116; Chambers 1993:89-105; 
1992:40-47; Clark 1992:191-202; 1991:83-141; Edwards and Hulme 1995:3-15; 1995a:219-228; 1992:13-27; 
1992a:211-216; Friedmann 1995:139-162; Fowler 1998:137-155; 1995:144-155; 1993:325-337; Gariyo 1995:131-
138; Hashemi 1995:103-110; OECD 1986:3-23; Robinson 1992:28-39; Uvin 1995:495-510; 1995a:927-938; 
1993:25-337; Wils 1995:53-62. 
 (2) As evident from the reference list in (1), the fourth perspective represents an exhaustive corpus of 
writings in the NGO development debate. However, this should by no means be regarded as a complete 
reference list on the fourth perspective as it only comprises a relatively small selection of essays from two 
important books, Non-governmental Organisations - Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic 
Bullet (1995) and Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World (1992) (both edited 
by Michael Edwards and David Hulme), as well as a number of important articles, chapters in books and 
study documents. In addition to this list, reference can also be made to the rest of the essays (mostly case 
studies) referred to in the above-mentioned two books and the following selection of articles and study 
documents that in one way or another relate to the fourth perspective: Bratton 1989:569-585; Drabek 
1987:ix-xv; Esman and Uphoff 1984:56-57; Fowler 1991:53-78; Nogueira 1987:169-177; Stremlau 1987:213-
224; Van der Heijden 1987:103-112; Wils et al 1988:30-51; Wils 1988:73-77. 
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vital sphere that also marked the initial attempts of the churches in the realm of 
development. They come to suggest that development-oriented NGOs originate 
from the same voluntary, civil society association as the churches, vis-à-vis and in 
relation to the domains of the state and government, and that they (the NGOs) 
have shared with the churches a similar, if not the same, moral, social and at 
times political commitment towards the problem of world poverty and human 
suffering.14 They come to suggest that, while development-oriented NGOs have, 
since their origins taken on a dynamics of their own and are today also separated 
from the religious and church sector,15 they (the NGOs) have likewise grappled 
and continue to grapple with the basic problem of charity (as the historical 
starting-point of their inquiry) and the consequent question of strategic 
innovation. It is an undertaking, these four perspectives suggest, that has brought 
the NGO development debate to pose similar critical ideological, operational 
and relational questions (e.g. with regard to the project approach in 
development, the relation between North and South in development). In sum, 
these perspectives come to suggest a debate on development that, as in the case of 
our own structuring of the ecumenical development debate in this study, has in the 
historical and strategic sense been necessarily and significantly framed by a similar 
charity-development juxtaposition. This point has to be qualified by stating that a 
stage has been reached in this frame of reference, and perhaps more so in the case of 
the NGO development debate, where the tension has to a greater extent shifted to a 
juxtaposition between ‘less desirable’ and ‘less sufficient’ modes of ‘development’ 
action and what is rather regarded as ‘authentic’ modes of development.  
Against the background of this comparative view of the ecumenical and NGO 
debates on development, this chapter will focus on the perspective provided by 
David Korten. Having already indicated in the introduction how we want to 
develop a deepened perspective along the lines of Korten’s framework of four 
generations of NGO development action, the aim will be to discuss, in terms of 
the quest for theoretical and strategic innovation posed by the charity-
development juxtaposition in the NGO development debate, the significance of 
Korten’s initially identified scheme of three generations of NGO development 
action.16 This will be done by drawing not only on Korten’s own writings, but 
                                                          
14 Ben Turok, a South African scholar and politician, drew the following meaningful parallel between the 
churches and NGO sector under the rubric of civil society at a conference on the role of the churches and 
NGOs in development: “Civil society structures are voluntary and they have a high moral profile. NGOs 
are based on morality, or supposed to be, and the churches are based on morality, or supposed to be.” 
(1995:165) 
15 Here we can speak of the ambivalent character of developmental NGOs today. Having taken on an 
increasingly secular identity, they also still have amongst their ranks a considerable number of organisations 
that in one way or another have a church/religious affiliation. See in this regard Landim 1987:32; OECD 
1987:5, 10. 
16 We are referring here to the framework that Korten initially set out in his article, “Third Generation NGO 
Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development”, in the important supplementary issue of Vol. 15 
(1987) of World Development and again in more elaborate fashion as a first meaningful unit of reflection in 
his book, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (1990).  
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also on a larger corpus of literature that includes other complementary material 
from the people-centred theoretical point of view (that is, the point of view 
from which Korten also proceeds). In this latter category of other 
complementary material will finally also be those writings in the NGO 
development debate that have taken a critical position towards Korten and the 
so-called ‘New Policy Agenda’, that is, an agenda that, similar to Korten’s third 
generation perspective, has allocated an elevated democratising, institutional and 
policy role to development-oriented NGOs. 
4.2 Three generations of NGO development action - David Korten 
My own insights into the strategic choices facing NGOs began to 
take shape in 1985 while I was working with the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (AID). I had been looking primarily to 
the large donor agencies to serve as instruments for the institutional 
changes required to support the community-based management of 
development resources. In 1985 I came to the conclusion that the 
large donors were not the answer to this need ... The need for more 
basic institutional change remained as real as ever. If the large 
donors could not address it, then who would? Colleagues in AID 
who were also struggling to answer this question suggested that we 
should more closely look at the potential of NGOs to assume this 
role. As I began to look at the experience of NGOs in development 
from the perspective of this need, I was struck that there seemed to 
be a definite pattern of evolution within the community away from 
more traditional relief activities and toward greater involvement in 
catalyzing larger institutional and policy changes. 
This pattern seemed to reflect the learning that many of these 
organizations had derived from the critical self-examination of their 
own experience. The pattern seemed to involve three identifiable 
stages or generations of strategic orientation, each moving further 
away from alleviating symptoms toward attacking ever more 
fundamental causes. I decided to identify these stages as generations. 
(Korten 1990:114-115) 
In terms of the above-mentioned four perspectives, Korten’s contribution to the 
NGO development debate can be appreciated for integrating them into a single 
framework. The above introductory words from Getting to the 21st Century: 
Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda orientate us towards this author’s 
particular appreciation of the role of NGOs in development. According to him, 
a definite pattern of evolution in NGO development activity may be recognised 
that in the historical and strategic sense extends across the extreme poles of an 
initial relief involvement, on the one hand, and a later engagement in affecting 
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policy and institutional change, on the other. This indicates a span of progressing 
NGO development activity that can be best defined by various stages or 
generations of strategic orientation. 
4.2.1 Generation one: relief and welfare 
First generation strategies, according to Korten, grew out of a long tradition of 
international voluntary action aimed at providing welfare services to the poor 
and assisting the victims of wars and natural disasters.17 They involve NGOs in 
the direct delivery of services to meet immediate deficiencies that are 
experienced by the beneficiary population, such as needs for food, health care or 
shelter. Their focus is on individuals and families and the benefits delivered 
depend entirely on the resource capacity of the NGOs involved (1990:115; 
1987:148). 
Korten pointed out how, overlapping extensively with the first perspective in 
the NGO development debate stated above, many of the contemporary 
international NGOs, such as Catholic Relief Services, CARE, OXFAM UK, Save 
the Children, World Vision and the Danish Association for International Co-
operation, originated during World Wars I and II to render relief and 
rehabilitation in the war-torn societies of Europe. They were full-fledged 
charitable relief organisations that started with an inward focus on the 
immediate needs of European societies. It was only in the following years, as 
recovery progressed in Europe, that they also directed their attention to new 
emergencies in Southern countries, particularly in assisting refugees from 
political conflicts in China, India, Korea and the Middle East (1990:116; also 
1987:147-148).  
According to Korten, in the case of NGOs indigenous to Southern countries, 
patterns similar to those of NGOs in the North existed. They were oriented 
towards charitable welfare actions, commonly depended on funds and 
commodities from the North, and were often church- or mission-related, such as 
in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, and in Africa throughout the colonial 
era. In Asia (e.g. in Bangladesh) their proliferation could also be largely 
accounted to efforts to respond to the needs of victims of war and national 
disaster (1990:116). 
In evaluating the impact of first generation strategies, Korten conceded that 
relief efforts remained “an essential and appropriate response to emergency 
                                                          
17 In this regard Korten referred to a number of examples, mostly characterised by a significant religious (!) 
affiliation: the initiatives of Irish Protestants in 1647 to send food aid to settlers in North America who 
were victims of wars with the Indians; the assistance provided by private British charities through much of 
the 17th and 18th centuries to America to support missionaries and schools for Indians, Negroes and poor 
whites; the voluntary assistance provided by private groups in the United States in 1793 to refugees who 
fled revolutionary turmoil in Santo Domingo; and the establishment of several international relief and 
missionary societies in the 1800s in Europe and America, including the Red Cross (1990:115). 
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situations that demand immediate and effective humanitarian assistance”. 
Situations such as these are part of human reality and there will always be 
individuals within any community whose circumstances necessarily demand 
some form of welfare assistance. However, as a development strategy, first 
generation strategies of relief and welfare represent a contradiction in terms. 
Such approaches offer little more than a temporary alleviation of the symptoms 
of underdevelopment and should therefore not be confused with development 
assistance (1990:118; 1987:148). 
While first generation approaches can be regarded as appropriate to emergency 
situations that create special temporary needs, they contribute little or nothing 
to the ability of poor people and countries to meet their own needs on a sustained 
basis (1987:148). They presume a kind of NGO that rarely theorises about why 
the assisted people have unmet needs. For this NGO, it merely remains a case of 
responding to the immediate and visible needs of a particular individual or 
group. The NGO in all cases remains the doer and the beneficiary is the passive 
receiver. The management capability required by this NGO also primarily 
remains a capability in logistics management. It contributes little in terms of a 
critical development awareness besides its fundraising appeals to the general 
public: 
They focus on dramatized presentations of starving children 
appealing from magazines and TV screens with sad and longing 
eyes for a kind person to help them by sending money to the 
sponsoring NGO. (1990:116) 
4.2.2 Generation two: small-scale, self-reliant local development 
According to Korten, second generation strategies anticipate a development 
approach conscious of the deficiencies of first generation strategies. While some 
of the NGOs engaging in second generation strategies have done so since their 
founding, a more common pattern has been for NGOs who have worked with 
the poor in Southern countries to start with first generation strategies. Generally 
speaking, their experience leads them only gradually to question the validity of 
relief and welfare activities (1990:118). 
Second generation strategies, in particular, point to the period in the late 1970s 
when NGOs came to see the need for a more developmental approach. This is 
the period in the evolution of development thinking that became dominated by 
the welfare versus development debate.18 The pendulum had now swung to 
what is often referred to as community development strategies. In terms of NGO 
                                                          
18 In this regard Korten (1990:118) referred to the influence of John Sommer’s book, Beyond Charity 
(published in 1977 by The Overseas Development Council), in changing the thinking of many NGOs in 
this period.  
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development activity, these strategies involve village-level self-help actions in 
areas such as preventive health, improved agricultural practices, local 
organisation (e.g. the formation of community councils) and local infrastructure 
(e.g. the digging of wells, the building of feeder roads, etc.) (1990:118; 1987:148). 
Following from the above examples it can be said that Korten’s notion of second 
generation strategies corresponds with the third perspective above on the 
project-centred approach in NGO development activity. As Korten would also 
come to use the notion of “village development projects” to describe the second 
generation development activities of NGOs, this might first of all be understood 
in the more progressive sense of the word. Second generation strategies are, 
according to him, clearly developmental in concept. What distinguishes them 
from first generation relief and welfare approaches is the stress on local self-
reliance, with the intention that benefits will be sustained beyond the period of 
NGO assistance. The notion of empowerment has now become the guiding 
principle whereby the energies of NGOs shift to developing the capacities of 
local peoples to better meet their own needs (1990:118; 1987:148). 
Second generation development strategies, therefore, call on NGOs more and 
more to take on the role of mobilisers rather than that of actual doers. The role 
of NGOs is seen as an intervening one to activate the potential that lies dormant 
in the community and individuals.19 
Second generation strategies involve an implicit theory of village 
development that assumes local inertia is the heart of the problem. 
According to this theory the potential for self-advancement rests 
within the village community, but remains dormant because of the 
inertia of tradition, isolation and a lack of education and proper 
health care. The theory suggests that this inertia can be broken 
through the intervention of an outside change agent who helps the 
community realize its potentials through education, organization, 
consciousness raising, small loans and the introduction of simple 
new technologies. (1990:119) 
With these words Korten ends his assessment of the progressive nature of 
second generation strategies of development. Having hinted in this passage at a 
remaining paternalistic attitude and outside agenda on the part of the NGOs, 
Korten’s further evaluation of second generation development strategies largely 
overlaps with the position in the second perspective in the NGO development 
                                                          
19 At the level of the individual Korten more particularly referred to second generation strategies’ focus on 
human resources development as the central issue. This approach to development, in line with the 
communal perspective highlighted in the quote that follows above, assumes that the problem lies 
exclusively in the individual’s lack of skills and physical strength. It is therefore a matter of developing the 
economic resource value of a person, which will naturally lead to opportunities for gainful employment in 
the economic system (1990:119). 
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debate above. Whereas second generation interventions assume a progressive 
empowerment approach, they, according to Korten, often in practice constitute 
“little more than handouts in a more sophisticated guise”. They bring a long-term 
dependence on the assisting NGO to effect and give little more than lip service 
to the principle of self-reliance (ibid.). 
In essence, the underlying assumptions of second generation strategies often 
remain overly simplistic, even of those of a more political nature that attempt to 
confront local power relations. Whereas NGOs, in this frame of reference, view 
the problem as resulting from a combination of a lack of development of the 
individual and patterns of exploitative power relationships at the local level 
(according to this approach the problem of poverty thus also has a distinct 
political dimension), they neglect the larger picture. Commonly assuming that 
village organisations of the poor can, by their own initiative, mobilise sufficient 
political resources to change the relevant political power structures, these NGOs 
as a rule fail to relate the local power structures of society to the larger institutional 
and policy context. They fail to take into account the factor of larger national and 
international systems through which local structures of power are maintained 
and against which even the strongest village organisations are relatively 
powerless (1990:120; also 1987:148). Their scope of attention remains limited to 
individual villages and neighbourhoods and the specific local groups they come 
to assist (1987:148). 
4.2.3 Generation three: sustainable systems development 
Against the background of a critical view of second generation development 
strategies, third generation strategies can be closely identified with the notions of 
‘scaling-up’ and ‘mainstreaming’ in the fourth perspective in the NGO 
development debate above. Third generation strategies, according to Korten, 
“look beyond the individual community and seek changes in specific policies and 
institutions at local, national and international levels” (1990:120, italics added). 
They represent a strategic orientation that often grows out of NGOs’ frustration 
with the limitations (unsustainability!) of second generation strategies20 and are 
based on a growing realisation that: (i) the benefits generated by its village 
interventions depend on a continued (unsustainable!) NGO presence and 
availability of donor subsidies, and (ii) acting on its own, the latter interventions 
can never hope to benefit more than a few favoured localities. The conclusion 
that can be drawn here is that “(s)elf-reliant village development initiatives are 
likely to be sustained only so long as they are linked into a supportive national 
development system” (1990:120, italics added; also 1987:148-149). 
                                                          
20 As in the case of second generation strategies that more often build on NGOs’ experience in first 
generation strategies (see again the beginning of 4.2.2), third generation strategies are thus also more likely 
to presume NGOs’ experience in second generation strategies. 
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Table 1: Strategies of NGO action in development: Korten’s initial 
identification of three generations (Korten 1990:117; 1987:148): 
Generation 
 First Second Third 
Defining 
features 
relief & welfare community 
development  
sustainable systems 
development 
Problem 
definition 
shortage local inertia institutional and 
policy constraints  
Time frame immediate project life ten to twenty years 
Scope individual or 
family 
neighbourhood or 
village 
region or nation 
Chief actors NGO NGO plus 
community 
all relevant public and 
private institutions 
NGO role doer mobiliser catalyst 
Management 
orientation 
logistics 
management 
project management strategic management 
Development 
education 
starving children community self-help constraining policies 
and institutions 
 
According to Korten, the underlying theory of third generation development 
strategies is thus grounded “in an assumption that local inertia is sustained by 
structures that centralize control of resources, keep essential services from 
reaching the poor, and maintain systems of corruption and exploitation” 
(1990:121). This recognition brought a growing number of NGOs, most notably 
in the mid-1980s (see 1987:150),21 to the realisation that they need “to exert 
greater leadership in addressing dysfunctional aspects of the policy and 
institutional setting of the villages and sectors within which they worked”. It 
means moving to a third generation strategy in which the focus is “on facilitating 
sustainable changes in these settings on a regional or even national basis” 
(1987:149).  
Third generation strategies, therefore, imply less direct involvement at village 
level and greater involvement with a variety of public and private organisations 
that control resources and policies that have a direct impact on local 
development (ibid.). This requires NGOs to work in catalytic, foundation-like 
roles, rather as operational service providers at the local level (1990:121; 
1987:149). Taking on various forms, this may broadly speaking involve NGOs in 
working with major national agencies to assist them in reorientating “their 
policies and work modes in ways to strengthen broadly based local control of 
                                                          
21 Whereas it is possible, according to Korten, to recognise a longer history of NGO activity influencing 
policy and institutional changes (see 1987:150), he more pertinently pointed to the mid-1980s as the 
period that saw a substantial shift of NGOs to third generation modes of involvement (ibid.). See his list 
of NGOs, particularly in the context of Asia, which, according to him, had in this period progressed to 
third generation development strategies (1990:120-121; 1987:150). 
Charity and Development in the NGO Development Debate 
 103
resources”; moreover, it may also involve them in the creation of new institutions 
of meaningful size “to provide essential local services on a sustained, self-
financing basis” (1990:120, italics added). 
Ideally, as it becomes possible for NGOs in third generation strategies to 
influence rather than control the organisations with which they are working 
(1987:149), their success hinges on a number of factors. Firstly, it compels them 
to acquire in-depth knowledge of the system at work. Secondly, it compels them 
to build relationships with the system’s key players and develop the necessary 
technical and strategic competence to establish their credibility with them. In 
this relational sense, it also requires of them (especially those that have 
historically worked independently) to develop skills in working collaboratively 
with both public and private organisations. It challenges them to work in one 
way or another with government, with whom they (that is, NGOs of a more 
critical disposition, particularly in the South) have more often stood in 
relationships of mutual suspicion, if not outright hostility. Thirdly, and 
importantly, it requires of them the skilful management of their limited resource 
base, positioning and repositioning such resources where they may have the best 
prospect of changing system dynamics in the desired direction (1990:121; 
1987:149). 
4.3 Theoretical and strategic innovation 
4.3.1 People-centred development agenda 
Tim Brodhead22 argues that it is impossible to be a true 
development agency without a theory that directs action to the 
underlying causes of underdevelopment. In the absence of a theory, 
the aspiring development agency almost inevitably becomes instead 
merely an assistance agency engaged in relieving the more visible 
symptoms of underdevelopment through relief and welfare 
measures. The assistance agency that acts without a theory also runs 
considerable risk of inadvertently strengthening the very forces 
responsible for the conditions of suffering and injustice that it seeks 
to alleviate through aid ... For the same reasons, an organization 
cannot have a meaningful strategy without a development theory. 
To maintain that an organization has a strategy is to claim that there 
is a well thought out logic behind the way in which it positions its 
resources. This logic must make explicit the organization’s 
assumptions regarding the forces that sustain the problem condition 
it is addressing, and the points of system vulnerability at which an 
                                                          
22 See Korten (1990:128, n. 2). 
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intervention will create a new and more desirable equilibrium of 
forces. (Korten 1990:113-114) 
Korten significantly introduced his outline of three generations of NGO 
development action with the above argument. He proclaimed that NGO 
strategic development action could not be viewed by itself. It necessarily implies 
a particular theory of development or logic that informs the strategic thinking or 
way of intervention. It is the absence of such a theory that results in NGOs’ 
confinement to first generation strategies of relief and welfare interventions, the 
latter being a mode of action that cannot assume the qualification of being 
development action as it is not informed or guided by any critical theoretical 
input on the causes of persisting underdevelopment and poverty in society and 
the systemic and policy changes required to overcome such problems. 
As implied by Korten, the question of critical and appropriate NGO 
development strategy goes much deeper to also assume the question of a critical, 
appropriate and general theory of development (that is, a theoretical framework 
and contents that give the substance of the strategic considerations in the NGO 
development debate). In terms of Korten’s own generational framework, 
whereas no meaningful theory of development can be assumed in the case of 
first generation strategies, it can be only partially assumed in the case of second 
generation strategies. Second generation strategies, in contrast with third 
generation strategies, lack a wider orientation, a critical development theory that 
might orientate the NGOs that are involved in linking their local development 
efforts to larger processes and structures that directly influence such efforts. As 
Korten suggested in one of his most recent writings, second generation strategies 
assume an incomplete and restricted theoretical perspective that fails to move 
the NGOs involved to adopt strategies that are necessarily of a wider policy-
oriented nature: 
Some NGOs have equated ... development with participatory 
village development interventions. Such interventions are 
important, but in themselves are generally inconsequential ... We 
now realize that in one respect the World Bank and the other big 
donors are right. Policies are important ... Without the right 
policies, irrespective of how many village development activities 
NGOs carry out or how many courses they offer with titles such as 
consciousness raising or empowerment, there will be no 
consequential change. (1995a:178) 
Against this background Korten’s thinking about third generation development 
strategies can be identified with a wider corpus of theoretical reflections on 
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development known as people-centred development.23 Restricting ourselves in this 
subsection (4.3.1) largely to the writings of Korten, in which the focus has been 
on the strategic development roles of NGOs from a people-centred 
development perspective24 and on the notion of people-centred development 
per se, this concept of development indicates, according to Korten, “a process by 
which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities 
to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed 
improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations” (1990:67, 
original italics). As evident from this definition, people-centred development can 
be defined as fundamentally value-oriented and includes in its framework the 
principles of justice, sustainability and inclusiveness (1990:67-68; see also Korten 
1995a:173). Its explicit goal is that of “human growth defined in terms of greater 
realization of human potentials” (Korten 1984:300) that demands the authentic 
participation of every human being in the productive activity and decision-
making processes in his/her immediate society (1984:300-301). It is “grounded in 
a world view that perceives earth to be a life-sustaining spaceship with a finite 
store of physical resources” (1990:68). Its dominant logic is one of a “balanced 
human ecology” (1984:300), which determines that the quality of life of the 
earth’s inhabitants “depends on maintaining a proper balance between its solar 
energized regenerative systems, its resource stocks and the demands that its 
inhabitants place on these systems and resources” (1990:68). It pertains to a 
notion of development in which the principles of human participation and self-
reliance, on the one hand, and environmental sustainability, on the other, 
mutually determine each other. This is set out as an ideal by Korten in the 
following way: 
                                                          
23 This is a theory of development that was conceptualised firstly in Korten’s own writings, but that can also 
be applied more widely to a substantial series of other writings on development that (i) in some cases 
assume the concept and idea frame of people-centred development, and (ii) in other cases again directly 
and explicitly relate to this concept and idea frame. In the case of the first category of a wider corpus of 
writings, the important publication is the book, People-Centred Development: Contributions toward Theory 
and Planning Frameworks, edited jointly by David Korten and Rudi Klauss, and published in 1984. Rather 
than constituting a compilation of essays written in view of a specific occasion or publication, this book 
draws on the writings of numerous authors that had already been published as chapters and essays in 
books and articles in journals. As the subtitle of the book might also suggest, these contributions constitute 
writings of note in the field of development studies and related social sciences. Although in most cases not 
explicitly applying the term people-centred development, these writings are taken by the editors of the 
book as making an important contribution to the theoretical and planning framework of people-centred 
development thinking. In the case of the second category, the publication of note is the book, Government-
NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development, edited by Noeleen 
Heyzer et al. in 1995. Consisting of essays by various writers, including Korten, this publication focuses on 
the important theme of government-NGO relations in development work, notably from the point of view 
of a distinct people-centred development agenda. 
24 The two important publications here are Korten’s article, “Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to 
People-centred Development”, and his book, Getting to the 21st Century, which were taken as the initial 
basis of the discussion in this chapter. See, however, also the last part of Korten’s essay, “Steps Toward 
People-Centred Development: Vision and Strategies”, in Heyzer’s book mentioned in the previous 
footnote in which Korten again discussed the NGO sector’s contribution to a people-centred development 
agenda (see 1995:182-189). 
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Our challenge is to create a global system that is biased toward the 
small, the local, the cooperative, the resource-conserving, and the 
long-term - one that empowers people to create a good living in 
balance with nature. (1995b:270)  
According to Korten, people-centred development thus represents an 
“alternative development paradigm” (1984:299; cf. 1987:146). At the very core of 
its understanding, as meaningfully captured in the preceding quote, is what 
Korten and others25 refer to as a territorial perspective.26 It involves a perspective 
that stands directly opposed to what can be called the functional perspective in 
reigning transnational capitalist organisations27 and conventional growth-centred 
development policies, in which the emphasis falls on economies of unlimited 
scale that transcend national interests and commit themselves primarily to the 
search for new profits and market share in the name of economic progress and 
development (Korten 1995a:170; also Korten and Carner 1984:208; Korten 
1984:306).  
Against such functional disposition showing little loyalty to either place or people 
(Korten 1995:171; Korten and Carner:1984:208; see also Korten 1995b:249-257), 
the territorial perspective in the people-centred development theoretical 
framework can be defined as the logic of local self-reliance, that is, “the logic of 
place, people, and resources bound into locally, self-sustaining human ecological 
systems” (Korten 1984:307). In the people-centred framework, this logic presents 
the only solution to what is to be seen as the “threefold crisis” of ongoing and 
escalating poverty, environmental destruction and communal violence/social 
disintegration in contemporary global society (see Korten 1995a:165-167; 
1995b:18-23, 261-262; 1990:13-16).28 The concept of development highlighted 
here, consequently, is that of maximum differentiation and diversity vis-à-vis the 
standardisation and uniformity associated with economic globalisation. Stressing 
                                                          
25 Reference can be made in particular to the essays by George Carner and Korten, John Friedmann, and 
David Morris in Part 6 of People-Centred Development: Contributions Toward Theory and Planning 
Frameworks (see footnote 23): “Planning Frameworks for People-centred Development” (Korten and 
Carner, pp. 201-209); “Agropolitan Development: A Territorial Approach to Meeting Basic Needs” 
(Friedmann, pp. 210-222); “The Self-Reliant City” (Morris, pp. 223-239). Korten and Carner (1984:208-209, 
326, n. 10) base their exposition of the territorial perspective on a book by Friedmann and Clyde Weaver, 
Territory and Function: The Evolution of Regional Planning (published in 1979 by the University of 
California Press). 
26 For an identification of the principle of territorialism specifically with the notion of ‘alternative 
development’ or ‘another development’ (i.e. a notion of development that, as suggested by Korten above, 
presumes the concept of people-centred development), see the references in footnote 34 below. 
27 It is pointed out from a critical people-centred development point of view that in the functional 
perspective the phenomenon of the transnational corporation can be taken as the ultimate expression or 
point of reference (Korten and Carner 1984:208). See in this regard also Korten’s latest book, When 
Corporations Rule the World (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1995), a work that Korten defines as 
representing the culmination point of his own intellectual journey (see “Prologue: A Personal Journey”, pp. 
1-14). 
28 In all the writings of Korten referred to here, the 1980s are indicated as the period of substantial 
intensification of the mentioned threefold crisis. 
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that the former arrangement of development can be the only foundation for true 
human flourishing and developmental (evolutionary) progress, Korten wrote:  
It appears to be a near universal truth that diversity is the 
foundation of developmental progress in complex systems and 
uniformity is the foundation of stagnation and decay.29 
Standardization and uniformity seem to be almost inevitable 
outcomes of a globalized economy dominated by massive globe-
spanning corporations geared to mass production and marketing in 
a culturally homogenized world ... The processes of economic 
globalization are not only spreading mass poverty, environmental 
devastation, and social disintegration, they are also weakening our 
capacity for constructive social and cultural innovation at a time 
when such innovation is needed as never before ... By contrast, 
economic systems composed of locally rooted, self-reliant 
economies create in each locality the political, economic, and 
cultural spaces within which people are able to find their own 
paths to the future that are consistent with their distinctive 
aspirations, history, culture and ecosystems. A global system 
composed of localized economies can accomplish what a single 
globalized economy cannot - encourage the rich and flourishing 
diversity of robust cultures and generate the variety of experience and 
learning that is essential to the enrichment of the whole. (1995b:269, 
italics added)  
However, Korten stresses that people-centred development goes beyond a mere 
decentralisation of economic and political structures (1987:147; 1984:301). Its 
emphasis on local decision-making and control (Korten 1984:301) and the need 
to create conditions of production that would enable people of a particular area 
to meet their own needs by using local resources and local control (Korten 
1984:307; also 1995:179-180) is not to be confused with self-sufficiency, isolation 
or the closing of local borders. Nor does it involve a denial of modern 
technology per se (1984:307; also 1995a:180).  
People-centred development, on the contrary, seeks to build a global system of 
interlinked diversified local economies that will be largely economically and 
ecologically self-reliant in meeting their own basic needs, but that would also 
function as elements of a larger whole. Rather than seeking to optimise impersonal 
economies of scale, the designed system would seek “to optimise the release and 
                                                          
29 For Korten an important source in this regard is Arnold Toynbee’s study of the growth and decline of the 
world’s great civilisations. According to Toynbee’s finding, civilisations in decline have been consistently 
characterised by a “tendency toward standardization and uniformity”, whereas civilisations during stages of 
growth have rather been characterised by “the tendency toward differentiation and diversity” (Korten 
1995a:268-269). 
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application of the creative and social energies of people who work together and 
with a shared sense of community and mutual contribution”. In this arrangement 
the primary role of the links between local self-reliant economies would be to 
facilitate the free flow and sharing of information and beneficial technology 
(Korten 1995a:180). It points to a local-global arrangement that can, according to 
Korten, be very well captured along the following lines of advice that were once 
put forward by John Maynard Keynes, one of the fathers of modern economic 
theory: 
Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these are the things which 
should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun 
whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible; and above all, 
let finance be primarily national.30 (in Korten 1995a:180) 
Seen from a different angle and clear structural and policy perspective, a central 
aim of people-centred development can furthermore be defined to overcome 
the urban bias in world development (see Lipton 1984:152-15631). It points to 
what John Friedmann called agropolitan development: a territorial approach to 
development deliberately aiming to overcome the contradictions between city 
and countryside through the diversification of area economies, the redirection of 
basic infrastructure and resources to the countryside and the development of 
domestic (local and regional) mass markets (1984:215-217). Also appropriately 
defined by Korten as an equity-led sustainable growth strategy (see 1990:72-82), 
the essential logic is here to be found in the “choice of priorities for the 
sequencing of development interventions” (Korten 1990:81). The aim here is to 
radically reverse the sequence followed in conventional export-oriented growth 
strategies. It implies that domestic mass markets are to be created, not by foreign 
demand for the products of low-cost labour, but by increasing agricultural 
productivity and industrial diversification in decentralised locations with an 
emphasis on labour-using and capital-saving technologies (Friedmann 1984:217; 
Korten 1990:76). Involving what Korten called “a broadly based integrative 
approach to rural development that avoids the creation of economic enclaves” 
(ibid.), the following sequential pattern (stages) is to be followed in which urban 
industrialisation and export promotion only represent the last stages in the 
development process on the basis of substantial increases in rural productivity, 
incomes and industry (ibid.):32 
                                                          
30 Quoted originally in the book by Herman Daly and John Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the 
Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (published in 1989 by Beacon 
Press), p. 209. 
31 The reference here is to Michael Lipton’s essay, “Urban Bias in World Development”, in People-Centred 
Development: Contributions toward Theory and Planning Frameworks, which meaningfully complements 
those essays listed in footnote 25 and also published in the latter book. 
32 According to Korten, the economic successes of the three ‘Asian Tigers’ - Taiwan, South Korea and Japan - 
were based on such a model of development (see 1995:181-182; 1990:73-77). The arguments that attribute 
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× Stage I: Preparation for change - the creation of a political and institutional 
context that allows for the successful implementation of the asset reform 
measures to be introduced in Stage II. 
× Stage II: Asset reform and rural infrastructure - giving people access to 
productive resources through the implementation of a redistribution of 
productive assets, especially land reform, massive investments in basic 
education, investment in the basic infrastructure to open up remote rural 
areas and reduce communication costs, strengthening rural communication 
links to reduce rural isolation, etc. (This stage is, according to Korten, to be 
regarded as the heart of the overall strategy of equity-led sustainable growth.)  
× Stage III: Agricultural intensification and diversification - increasing rural 
productivity and incomes, whereby local markets are strengthened for basic 
products that are within the production capacity of small rural industries. 
× Stage IV: Rural industrialisation - the stage in which the rural economy 
moves from a primary reliance on agriculture to a more sophisticated rural 
economy able to capture a large portion of the value-added potential of 
agricultural production. 
× Stage V: Urban industrialisation - the gradual shifting of priorities to 
expanding urban industries that have strong backward and forward linkages 
to the rural agricultural and industrial sectors, the consolidation of a country’s 
technical base and strengthening of its competitive efficiency (that is, the 
production of more sophisticated products by using advanced technologies 
that, by this stage, the domestic economy should be able to command). 
× Stage VI: Export promotion - encouraging the use of residual production 
capacity for export to foreign markets with products that have a high value-
added relative to their content of physical and environmental resources 
(1990:78-81; see also 1995a:182; Friedmann 1984:215-218). 
It is clear from the above that people-centred development is not to be 
conceived in a kind of other-worldly language that cannot be translated in terms 
of conventional development and modernisation discourse. Korten concluded in 
one of his reflections on this notion of development that if people-centred 
development was to emerge, it will be “as an offspring of the production-centred 
industrial era”. It will be “conceived in the knowledge, possibilities, and 
necessities created by that era” (1984:309). Yet, it will redirect and apply these 
                                                                                                                                              
their successes to export-led growth, Korten argued, are based more on misrepresentation to bolster an 
ideological position than on reality (1995:181; also 1990:73). While the experiences of these countries 
provide only a partial model for a people-centred development strategy, as they do not serve as models of 
environmentally sustainable development and democratic political process, they nevertheless provide “a 
useful framework for making growth more broadly-based, integrated, equitable and economically sound” 
(1990:74). Capturing the essence of such a growth strategy, Korten observed: “Well before the ‘Asian 
Tigers’ became successful exporters, each instituted radical land reform, made massive investments in basic 
education, created dense networks of rural organizations, and stabilized their populations with effective 
family planning programmes. These actions integrated their economies and provided the foundation for 
broad-based participation in the benefits of economic growth.” (1995:182) 
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human achievements in an alternative policy and structural framework and in 
terms of alternative ideas, values, social techniques and technologies (see ibid.) to 
bring about what the conventional paradigms of development and modernisation 
have fallen short of: creating truly people-centred, humane, just and sustainable 
societies without forsaking the ideals of a modern world. In the words of John 
Friedmann, an exponent of the people-centred development theoretical 
framework,33 whose following exposition of agropolitan development well 
captures the conceptualisation of an alternative notion of development (in the 
structural and policy sense) within a remaining modernisation paradigm: 
If the countryside is endowed with basic infrastructure - for 
instance, if an internal communications and transport network is 
built up that will connect agropolitan districts and regions with 
each other - large cities will lose their present overwhelming 
advantage. The economy will then turn inward upon itself, discover 
its hidden energies and assets, and, in a “natural” learning 
progression, modernize itself from within. 
Manufacturing industry will be second in a logical sequence of 
steps. The first is the continuous upgrading of agricultural 
productions, starting with overall increases in the physical volume 
of food and basic fibres, followed, in due course, by increases in the 
productivity of farm land and the productivity of workers. 
The development industry will be tied into this sequence, 
beginning with agricultural processing and going on to the 
manufacture of tools and other equipment of use to peasants and 
workers in their daily lives. Dispersed among the villages and fields, 
small industries will provide a source of work and income, in a 
mode of production that is intimately related to the emerging 
agropolitan structure of society in which the contradictions of 
industrial capitalism - between city and countryside, production 
and consumption, work and leisure - are progressively resolved. 
(1984:217-218)34 
                                                          
33 See again the discussion earlier in this section and footnote 25. 
34 While taking a central place in an explicit people-centred development corpus, it can be noted that the 
ideas akin to agropolitan development have in fact been part of a longer and broader intellectual history in 
development and socio-economic thinking. See e.g. Björn Hettne’s identification of the principles of 
territorialism, cultural pluralism and ecological sustainability as the dimensions central to the broader 
intellectual movement of ‘Another Development’ in his book, Development Theory and the Three Worlds 
(see 1995:199-206). As important additions to Hettne’s reference list, see also Trainer (1995:56-73), Kothari 
(1995:128-131) Omo-Fadaka (1975:23-52) and Schumacher (1993:chap. 13). See also a further article by John 
Friedmann, “Modular Cities: Beyond the Rural-Urban Divide”, which was published in the special issue on 
the theme of “Future cities” in the journal Environment and Urbanisation (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996, pp. 129-131) 
in preparation for Habitat II, the second UN conference on Human Settlements in 1996. See in this article, 
furthermore, Friedmann’s reference (notes 1 and 2, p. 130) to a longer history of thinking along the lines of 
an agropolitan development: Kropotkin, P, Fields, Factories and Workshops (1898); Howard, E, Garden 
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4.3.2 Politics of scaling-up and mainstreaming 
Following from the discussion so far, a people-centred development agenda 
clearly anticipates Korten’s notion of third generation development strategies. It 
is an agenda that requires from its development actors, in this case most notably 
NGOs, to scale up and mainstream their development activities in order to make 
a decisive impact on the policy and institutional environment in favour of a 
people-centred development policy and institutional regulation. As formulated 
in one of Korten’s most recent discussions of the people-centred development 
theoretical framework, “(a)n integral part of the policy agenda of people-centred 
development ... [is] to reverse the tendency toward concentrating power in 
impersonal and unaccountable institutions, returning it to people and 
communities and assuring its equitable distribution”. It emphasises local 
organising and aims at advancing the empowerment process through the 
development of “member-accountable institutions and strengthening local 
resource control and ownership” (1995a:178-179). 
Korten furthermore determined that progress toward people-centred 
development at the same time required “fundamental structural reforms at 
national and global levels” (ibid., italics added). At the national level it requires 
“breaking down dualistic economic structures, integrating the modern and 
traditional sectors and melding, redistributing and reallocating the use of their 
assets”. At the global level it means “breaking the unchallenged and 
unaccountable power of transnational capital and bringing transnational 
corporations under a system of controls and incentives that make them useful, 
accountable contributors to the creation of a just, sustainable, and inclusive 
human society” (1995a:179). 
It is significant that the above perspectives on scaling-up and mainstreaming in 
NGO development action come from an essay by Korten35 in the already 
mentioned book, Government-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges 
for People-Centred Development.36 As the title of this book suggests, the prospects 
and challenges for people-centred development have come to be viewed by 
adherents of this theoretical framework in terms of the question of government-
NGO relations. Stated differently, these authors, who have come to favour the 
NGO sector as primary actors in the people-centred development agenda (see 
Heyzer 1995:1, 5; Korten 1995a:182-188; Korten and Quizon 1995:131-132; Riker 
1995a:15-16, 52; 1995b:94, 114, 124-125; 1995c:192), identified government as a 
central actor in the national and international development arena that cannot be 
side-stepped in NGOs’ endeavour towards what may be called third generation 
development strategies. The quest for this mode of involvement inevitably 
                                                                                                                                              
Cities of Tomorrow (1902); Lewis, M, The Culture of Cities (1938); Lloyd Wright, F, When Democracy 
Builds (1945); Friedmann, J, Life Space and Economic Space (1981, 1985). 
35 “Steps toward People-Centred Development: Vision and Strategies”. 
36 See footnote 23. 
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brings NGOs to the challenge of engaging themselves in the harsh world of 
official politics and development policy. He outlines the following perspectives 
in this publication: 
Firstly, a central perspective to emerge from the collective set of essays in this 
book is that government has to be regarded as an actor of crucial importance in 
development, not least in a people-centred development agenda. As various 
authors in this collection have come to a similar conclusion, NGOs cannot be 
considered as “a replacement for government delivery systems” (Bhatt 1995:88); 
government also has an essential role to play in a just, sustainable and inclusive 
society (Korten and Quizon 1995:161); the ideal of people-centred development 
can only be realised in the case of a collective and collaborating effort between 
government and the NGO sector (Heyzer 1995:12; Riker 1995b:121; 1995c:198): 
In order to realize at least a more conducive, if not a potentially 
more enabling policy environment for people-centred 
development, it is imperative that joint action by institutional 
actors from both state and civil society be fully explored. Thus, this 
task requires a fresh look and analysis of the state-of-the art in 
terms of government-NGO relations. (Riker 1995b:95) 
However, this view does not do away with the fact that existing NGO-
government relationships and the current role of government in bringing about 
people-centred development have to be seen as considerably problematic. As 
stated by Korten and Antonio Quizon, while the idea is not to do away with 
government, the purpose of third generation strategies is to reduce government’s 
“pervasive presence and control, gradually absorbing it into new systems of 
relationships consistent with the people-centred vision that assures its 
accountability and responsiveness to the people from which it derives its 
authority” (1995:160). These two authors and other contributors to the present 
volume concluded that the current role of government in development had to 
be seen as being, from a people-centred development perspective, far from ideal. 
Government’s basic impetus has rather been to control, manage and co-opt the 
development process37 (Riker 1995a:19, 34-36; 1995b:105-106; 1995c:196). 
Consequently, although representing a prevailing force in any development 
agenda, it was doubtful whether, in current collaborative arrangements, a 
common vision of development could really be assumed between governments 
and donors and those NGOs that aspire to bring about people-centred 
development. Korten and Quizon well captured this problematic in their essay 
by suggesting that the former (that is, governments and donors) acted rather as 
                                                          
37 See also Korten’s notion of the ‘dominant state’ in Getting to the 21st Century? (1990:50-51, 156-161), which 
correlates well with this description of the general nature of government’s participation in development. 
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proponents of the growth-centred vision of development, as opposed to the 
people-centred development vision:38 
Any effort to improve working relationships between NGOs, 
governments, and donors must eventually come to grips with their 
different perceptions about the nature of development. To what 
extent are NGOs, governments and donors actually working 
toward the same goal? Should NGOs accept official commitments 
to human resource development strategies as a demonstration that 
governments and donors have accepted a people-centred 
philosophy? As NGOs become more dependent on official donors 
and more active in relations with governments, which agenda is 
likely to prevail? How can NGOs broaden official acceptance for 
their alternative agenda? (1995:131-132; see also 141; Korten 
1995a:173; Riker 1995c:203-205) 
Following from Korten and Quizon’s last question, a central strategic concept in 
all the essays in the above-mentioned book is James Riker’s recognition of the 
need for NGOs, people’s organisations and other groups in civil society to create 
political space for independent initiatives vis-à-vis government and the state 
(1995:23). Not discarding the ideal of authentic cooperative NGO-government 
relationships, and the reliance on government itself to bring about the above-
mentioned political space, this concept presumes a development and policy 
environment in which the former group of actors organises and operates freely 
and increases political participation to (successfully) influence and press this 
environment (including government) towards people-centred development (see 
Riker 1995a:23-24, 36-40, 42-48; 1995b:94-95, 123-125, 127-128; 1995c:201-205; 
Korten and Quizon 1995:160-161).  
We may close our exposition of this first perspective by referring to the authors 
of the above-mentioned book’s observation of the NGO sector’s partial success 
in obtaining such actual political space (thus akin to Korten’s conclusion with 
regard to third generation NGO development strategies). Chandra de Fonseka 
and James Riker concluded in their respective essays that the growing 
dissatisfaction of international funding and large donor agencies (notably the 
World Bank but also USAID, CIDA, etc.) with Third World government 
performance and capability, and these agencies’ demand for greater direct 
involvement by NGOs in development in the 1980s and 1990s (vis-à-vis 
governments), were raising significant challenges to expand the social and 
                                                          
38 In accordance with the basic distinction between ‘growth-centred’ and ‘people-centred’ approaches to 
development in people-centred development thinking (as should be evident from the discussion in 4.3.1), 
the notion of growth-centred development also constitutes the counterpoint to the idea of people-centred 
development in the book under discussion here. For more detailed juxtapositions of the two paradigms, 
see besides Korten and Quizon’s essay (1995:134-141) the essays by Heyzer (1995:8-10), Korten (1995:167-
180) and Riker (1995b:203-204). 
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political space for people-centred development (this notwithstanding the fact 
that there are prevailing ideological differences between agents of a people-
centred development vision and governments and donors as mentioned earlier) 
(De Fonseka 1995:64-75; Riker 1995b:94-95; 1995c:194; see also Korten 1995a:165; 
Riker 1995c:204). As Anil Bhatt also concluded in his essay on “Asian NGOs in 
Development”, “if influencing government policies, laws and legislation ... [could 
be] considered a political role, then NGOs particularly in the latter half of the 
1980s ... performed this role too, with some notable success” in Asian countries. 
These included NGOs’ success in influencing government to adapt policies on 
women, forestry and drug prohibition (1995:86). 
Yet, Bhatt expressed a common consensus amongst the authors of the above-
mentioned book. NGOs’ role in influencing development policies remains 
limited and of recent origin. Most organisations in this sector, despite the above-
mentioned progress, are still preoccupied with their grassroots work (that is, 
Korten’s second generation strategies - cf. Heyzer 1995:7) and hardly have “the 
time, resources or inclination to go beyond their projects and micro-level issues”. 
Bhatt continued to list the following criteria that necessarily have to be taken 
into account in the quest for scaling-up and mainstreaming NGO development 
activity: influencing policy requires “careful data collection and analysis, 
expertise in alternative policy formulation, coalition-building with other NGOs, 
campaigning, advocacy skills, and a willingness to confront vested interests and 
the establishment, as well as to withstand the allegations that they are getting 
involved in politics” (Bhatt 1995:86). 
The challenges faced by development-oriented NGOs in scaling-up and 
mainstreaming towards third generation development strategies could therefore 
be considered as vast and by no means a concluding fact. It is in this regard that a 
second perspective can be linked to Korten and Quizon’s self-critical statement 
that the focus of the above-mentioned book on government, NGOs and donors 
is in fact inappropriate, given the inherent nature of people-centred 
development. As this statement can be critically related to the above first 
perspective, the quest for people-centred development calls for a strategic 
orientation focusing on a range of actors wider than the limited triangle of 
government, NGOs and donors: 
Indeed, it might be argued ... that the focus of this book on 
government, NGOs and donors is inappropriate. The primary actors 
are people’s organizations, with the government, business and 
voluntary sectors playing supporting roles. Yet people’s 
organizations are not even mentioned in our agenda, nor are they 
represented here. We have also left out the business sector 
altogether. Donor roles and involvement, which we have chosen to 
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highlight, are decidedly residual and temporary in a people-centred 
development strategy. (Korten and Quizon 1995:157) 
Mentioning two further actors in the development process, namely people’s 
organisations (POs) and business, Korten and Quizon (and other authors in the 
volume) highlight the central place of POs, or what Korten in a subsequent essay 
in the volume called the fourth sector (see Korten 1995a:187-188), as the actual 
primary actors in the development process. These authors emphasised that 
NGOs, along with government, could only be regarded as secondary actors in 
people-centred development. They need “to be accountable to the people, who 
are simultaneously the principal players and beneficiaries of development” 
(Riker 1995c:196). This is defined best by De Fonseka: In people-centred 
development POs constitute the principal actors, and NGOs secondary, 
intermediate, supportive and catalytic entities. It furthermore implies that NGOs 
are dispensable entities and that the role of an authentic NGO is “to work itself 
out of its role by investing its powers, capability and expertise in its wards, the 
primary organizations” (1995:70). It spells out the following twofold role for 
development-oriented NGOs in their relations to POs: (i) They are challenged 
to help prepare and build the POs to which they relate “as small democratic self-
managing units able to emerge from their conditions of semi-marginalization into 
the mainstream market economy” and (ii) they are challenged to bring these 
organisations into the political life of the community where, as part of civil 
society, “they could exercise democratic control and mastery over their leaders 
at local and national levels” (1995:70-71). 
According to Korten and Quizon, the primary importance rendered to people’s 
organisations or the fourth sector in people-centred development ultimately 
requires of NGOs to participate in what can be called movement building. 
Anticipating in this regard Korten’s conceptualisation of fourth generation NGO 
development strategies, which will be the focus of discussion in the next 
chapter,39 it can be said that the idea of development-oriented NGOs’ 
participation in ‘movement building’ is closely related to the notion of third 
generation development strategies in two ways. It firstly calls on such NGOs to 
transcend the concentration on isolated community development projects, 
which have traditionally been highly operational with little concern for or 
awareness of policy issues. Secondly, in so far as a (fourth generation) movement 
politics can be reconciled with the policy emphasis in third generation 
development strategies, it calls on NGOs to actively support, build and 
participate in a transformative people’s movement against what Korten and 
Quizon refer to as the current mainstream “policies defined within a self-
destructive development system” (1995:159-160). Seeing the realisation of such a 
transformative movement as an emerging reality, in which concepts such as 
                                                          
39 See inter alia 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.4. 
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networking, coalition-building, relationships and organising structure now take 
central stage, Korten and Quizon stated: 
They [the NGOs] are beginning to join forces within ever-growing 
and evolving networks and coalitions in what is emerging as a social 
transformation movement. These involvements are pushing the 
more forward-looking NGOs beyond project-oriented, dependency 
creating relationships with individual villages toward the 
development of networking structures that link both NGOs and 
people’s organizations as interdependent, self-reliant partners in 
complex patterns of lateral relationships in pursuit of major 
national and global agendas. The very formation of these networks 
and coalitions is creating a new social reality as NGOs experiment 
with the creation of new organizing structures based on consensus, 
equality and mutual accountability. (1995:160)  
Closely related to the above second perspective, but also to the first perspective, 
a third perspective to emerge from the volume under discussion is the emphasis 
placed on global or transnational strategic orientation for those NGOs adhering to 
a people-centred development agenda. In this perspective, the concept of 
‘nation-building’ is to be seen as “outdated and incomplete as it is conceived 
largely as a state project” (Riker 1995c:197; see also Bhatt 1995:87). Contrary to 
the concentrated focus on merely government and the state, the emphasis has 
now come to be on building community and (national and global) civil society. 
“This new conceptualization means shifting the development and political 
discourse toward civil society and the vital actors (e.g. NGOs, social movements, 
people’s organizations) that shape it.” (Riker 1995c:198) 
Yet it is particularly in terms of the first perspective that the global or 
transnational strategic orientation of the third perspective acquired special 
significance for authors of this volume. As pointed out by Riker, the formation 
of transnational networks by NGOs and other international actors in areas such 
as the environment, human rights and international development policy 
“presented a new mode for international politics” (1995c:199). As a strategy of 
new alliances across national boundaries, it not only serves as an important 
protecting measure for NGOs (Heyzer 1995:12) in their confrontations with 
governments and states, but also enables them to present an efficient force to 
counter mainstream, government-dominated development policy supported by 
major international donor institutions (e.g. the World Bank40). As argued 
                                                          
40 Bhatt and Riker argue in this volume that the effect of transnational or global strategic linkages was 
evident from the success of combined advocacy efforts of NGOs in the developing world with citizen 
groups and NGOs in the West in prompting the World Bank to re-examine and reorientate its own 
development policies and programmes (especially in the area of the environment and its support for dam 
and resettlement projects) and, as a result, in pressurising the Bank not to give funds to national 
governments for particular projects (Bhatt 1995:86-87; Riker 1995b:199). 
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eloquently by Noeleen Heyzer, it has become obligatory for NGOs “to go 
outside the boundaries of the nation state and form alliances with powerful 
actors on the international development scene with a similar vision of people-
centred development and rely on shifts that have occurred in world public 
opinion on these issues”. This has come to constitute the domain where NGOs 
could participate in international inter-governmental forums (e.g. the United 
Nations) and through which they could “lobby, embarrass or dialogue with 
governments on an equal footing” (1995:12). 
4.3.3 Macro- versus micro-policy reform 
An aspect of third generation development strategies that cannot be neglected in 
this chapter is Korten’s distinction between the notions of macro- and micro-
policy reform that he developed in a number of his earlier writings (see Korten 
1986a:309-313; 1986b:1-6) and especially in his article, “Third Generation NGO 
Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development” (see 1987:150-156).  
In these publications Korten argued that macro-policy reform indicated a reform 
action “that can be accomplished through pre-emptive central action - the stroke 
of an authoritative pen - with minimal requirement for the development of new 
institutional capacities as a condition for implementation” (1986b:1). Typically 
involving the many policies relating to pricing decisions, subsidies and trade 
regulations in the official policy arena, it usually points to a fairly clearly defined 
and specific decision. Once formally endorsed by the appropriate political 
authority, its implementation, at least from an administrative point of view, can 
be taken as relatively straightforward (1987:151; 1986a:309; 1986b:1-2).  
Macro-policy reform, according to Korten, is to be directly associated with what 
has come to be called the ‘policy analysis school of planning’. In this approach 
expertise has been concentrated on projecting the consequences of alternative 
policy choices in order to estimate which will produce the most favourable 
outcome (1987:151; 1986a:309; 1986b:2). In contrast, micro-policy reform denotes 
a kind of reform that depends on the accomplishment of often highly complex 
and difficult institutional changes for its implementation. It commonly involves 
the development of significant new institutional capacities and norms, a 
redefinition of institutional roles and relationships, and even changes in deeply 
held personal and professional values. However, the most complex of all are 
likely to be those micro-policy reforms that demand a sharing of power between 
national and local levels, and the creation of self-reliant beneficiary organisations 
(1987:151; 1986a:310; 1986b:2).  
For Korten, while not disregarding the importance of macro-policy reform to 
achieve people-centred development (Korten 1987:152), micro-policy reform 
captures the heart of third generation people-centred development strategies. 
Congruent with the movement presumed by the notions of scaling-up and 
mainstreaming from the grassroots upwards, micro-policy reform indicates a 
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bottom-up process of changing policies, rebuilding institutional structures and 
supporting norms that place control in the hands of communities and develop their 
capacities to manage local resources and reap their benefits (see Korten 1987:152; 
1986a:310; 1986b:3). It points to a kind of reform that cannot merely be achieved 
by political leaders, top administrators and large donors in their position ‘from 
above’ (see Korten 1987:152, 153-154; 1986a:310-311; 1986b:2-3). It requires 
processes of profound value transformation to infiltrate institutions and the 
consciousness of people related to those institutions. It presumes a mutual 
process not only focusing on building the skills and capacities of communities 
‘from below’, but also on bringing people in governing positions to “a reversal of 
existing professional and managerial practice” (Korten 1986:311), implying 
practices that are necessarily supportive of the former communities. 
Micro-policy reform can thus be defined as a process of achieving transformation 
in human and institutional orientation and capacity both on centralised and 
decentralised levels. As a process pertaining to the level of ideas and values (thus 
very much in line with the approach or mode of development involvement 
emphasised in this study!), it belongs to what has come to be called the social 
learning school of planning (Korten 1987:151; 1986a:310; 1986b:2). Korten points 
out that, as this approach emphasises expertise in facilitating the processes by 
which complex institutional changes are achieved, policy analysts now have 
relatively little to offer, at least in their traditional individual and technical 
capacities. Instead, performance in the micro-policy arena now rather depends 
on the exercise of creative initiatives by many individuals on the ground in the 
processes of social learning in which they collectively engage (1987:151-152; see 
also 1986a:311; 1986b:3). 
Korten emphasised that micro-policy reform and the social learning processes 
that it presumes depend on “the involvement of one or more catalyst 
organisations with a sustained commitment to facilitating coalition building and 
institutional learning” (1986a:311, italics added). Favouring the potential of 
NGOs41 to fulfil this type of catalyst role (see 1987:154; 1986b:6), Korten 
pointed out the following two key elements of this role: (i) the formation of a 
coalition of individuals committed to change and who also bring with them the 
resources of a number of relevant institutions, and (ii) the introduction of a 
variety of resources to provide feedback on operational experience as an input 
                                                          
41 While not neglecting the need for serious capacity-building in the NGO sector (see further below in the 
main discussion), organisations able to meet the requirements of institutional catalysts can, according to 
Korten, more likely be found amongst the thousands of development-oriented private voluntary 
organisations/NGOs (both international and domestic) working in Third World countries. Amongst the 
latter a number of organisations are to be found that “have a natural interest in micro-policy reform, view 
development as primarily a people to people process, and lack the inherent structural constraints faced by 
the large donors” (1987:154; 1986:313; 1986a:6). In other words, it could be claimed that NGOs (as 
institutions of civil society) are perhaps the best suited to fulfil the role of development catalysts as they 
are by nature the intermediary institutions between the people (that is, their constituency) and the official 
development institutions such as those of government/the state and donors. 
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to institutional learning (1987:152). Giving some idea of the accumulated process 
envisaged here, based on an actual prototype third generation strategy,42 Korten 
wrote:  
As understanding of the resource management problem increases 
and possible ways of dealing with it using community management 
approaches are identified, one or more pilot projects are established 
under agency auspices to serve as learning laboratories in the 
development of new approaches. The pilot projects may involve 
one or more non-governmental development agencies assisting in 
the training and supervision of agency field staff - plus social 
scientists from one or more in-country institutions who develop 
site assessment methods and document implementation processes. 
The experimental field activities are intensively monitored by the 
working group, so that approaches may be modified and 
implications for the larger organization assessed. Through 
workshops, conferences, and training programs, the experience base 
of and the number of persons engaged in the review of these 
experiences is expanded. Gradually, additional learning laboratories 
are established that build from the experience of earlier efforts. 
(1987:153; also 1986b:4) 
For Korten, however, the anticipated role of NGOs as catalysts for people-
centred development and micro-policy reform can by no means be taken as self-
evident. Striking a note that has been heard a number of times in this chapter,43 
Korten emphasises the need for new types and levels of technical and strategic 
competence among the NGO sector itself. In the same vein he observed that this 
sector seemed to be characterised rather by a disdain for more hardcore 
managerial approaches to development, which many NGOs traditionally viewed 
as lying outside their orientation and approach to development: 
Most NGOs have developed primarily in response to the altruistic 
desires of one or more individuals to contribute toward making a 
better world. They have relied on high moral purpose, good will, 
                                                          
42 In his discussion Korten would hold up as an example the work of the Southeast Asia Office of the Ford 
Foundation in irrigation and social forestry in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. See complementary 
to the quote that follows in the main discussion above, Korten’s systematic exposition of the unfolding 
catalyst role that the latter foundation has been playing in bringing about the kind of micro-policy reform 
spoken about in the present subsection (4.3.3) (see 1987:152-153; 1986:311-312; 1986a:4-5). 
43 See (i) the various observations on the need for greater social competence and organisational 
transformation in the NGO sector in 4.1 (with reference to the fourth perspective in the NGO 
development debate in particular) and 4.2.3 (that is, within a third generation mode), (ii) the point of 
departure of a third generation approach (that is, the need for a critical development theoretical 
framework) spelled out at the beginning of 4.3.1, and (iii) the emphasis on the above-mentioned need 
stipulated at the end of the first perspective on scaling-up and mainstreaming in 4.3.2.  
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hard work, and common sense to make them successful. Until 
recently the application of effective professional management 
techniques, and in some instances even the acquisition of technical 
competence, has not been seen as relevant to their purpose. These 
particular NGOs are best described as being at a pre-bureaucratic 
stage, lacking adequate development of basic management systems 
and procedures. Increased budgets, geographical spread, and growth 
in staff are in themselves forcing many NGOs to come to terms 
with such deficiencies, but often with considerable reluctance ... 
Some NGOs actively espouse an ideological disdain for 
management of any kind, identifying it with the values and practice 
of normal professionalism, and placing it in a class with 
exploitation, oppression, and racism ... Often the distrust of 
management comes from associating it with centralized control-
oriented bureaucratic forms of organization.44 (Korten 1987:155, 
156) 
Thus, Korten’s fundamental point is that NGOs’ aspiration to act as systems 
catalysts to reform micro-policy has to be guided by more than good intentions. 
Scaling up to this mode of engagement means that NGOs are now to enter the 
world of hardcore and skilled professionalism, notwithstanding their possible 
critical disposition to the underlying values of such professionalism. They are to 
recognise that “(s)ome of the most important of the organizations with which 
they work will be large, influential, and staffed by highly credentialed 
professionals” (1987:155). Hence, they need “to obtain the respect of those who 
control the relevant technologies” - doctors, engineers, lawyers, politicians, 
administrators, village leaders - by showing them that “they offer a useful 
technical and political resource” (ibid., italics added). 
Drawing in particular on Robert Chambers’s innovative distinction between 
“normal development professionalism” and a “new development 
professionalism”,45 such a mode of scaling-up does not mean the identification of 
NGOs with the narrow disciplinary specialisation associated with the former 
kind of professionalism. On the contrary, it can be conceptualised in terms of 
the latter kind of professionalism that, according to Chambers, has come to 
denote “the emergence of a new development professionalism based on 
                                                          
44 Following from this particular characterisation of the NGO sector by Korten, we may (complementary to 
our comparative view in the introduction of this chapter) identify the following common characteristic 
between these two sectors: both can be defined as development actors that are strong on moral inclination 
and commitment, but weak on socio-economic skills and social-technical competence. See in this regard 
also footnote 14.  
45 The paper of a distinguished specialist in the field of rural development, Chambers, used here as source by 
Korten, has been published as a discussion document of the Sussex-based Institute of Development 
Studies, “Normal Professionalism, New Paradigms and Development” (1986). This paper represents ideas 
that would be more fully developed in his later books, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (1989) 
(see esp. Chapter 7), and Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development (1993). 
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alternative values46 and offering a variety of alternative technologies, 
organizational forms, and management and research methods appropriate to a 
people-centred development” (ibid.). 
These are not necessary less sophisticated, less effective, or less 
disciplined. To the contrary, in many respects they represent 
advances over normal professionalism based on a more 
sophisticated understanding of the nature of social and 
development processes. They are well suited to the purposes of 
most development-oriented NGOs. (Ibid.)  
Stating the possibility of reconciling NGOs’ moral disposition to development 
with particular managerial and technical emphases, a further profile of the 
organisational forms and management methods to be pursued by NGOs under 
the umbrella of the new development professionalism could, according to 
Korten, be defined as post-bureaucratic or strategic by nature. This points to 
approaches to development that discourage central control and actively support 
self-assessment, self-correction and a well-defined sense of mission in the 
institutional learning process on the basis of rich information flows. Without 
neglecting the complexity and prolonged nature of the process, as it works for 
change in complex and dynamic institutional systems, this aspect of the new 
development professionalism fundamentally demands from NGOs (as catalysts 
of the process) basic skills in social analysis complemented by skills in process 
facilitation and coalition-building (1987:156). Identifying the above-mentioned 
competencies of the new development professionalism as a constant challenge 
(both in terms of capacity building and time investment) for the NGO sector as 
it seeks to implement third generation strategies, Korten concluded: 
(C)onsciously working to achieve a restructuring of social 
institutions is a role that remains unfamiliar to most NGOs. It 
represents a third generation of NGO strategic orientation, and calls 
for serious investment in developing the organizational capacities 
required to be effective in implementing such strategies. Since 
quick results cannot be anticipated, the NGO undertaking a third 
generation strategy must have the staying power to remain at the 
task for 10 or even 20 years if necessary. Capable leaders who 
                                                          
46 That is, values alternative to the values and methods of normal development professionalism that, 
according to Chambers, favour the powerful over the weak, rich over poor, urban over rural, industrial 
over agricultural, things over people, standardisation over diversity, the controlled over the uncontrolled, 
quantitative over qualitative, precise measurement over visual assessment, project blueprints over adaptive 
learning, large scale over small scale, market-oriented producers over subsistence producers, modern 
technology over traditional, laboratory studies over field experience, control-oriented organisations and 
technocratic decision-making over people-centred organisations and decision-making (Korten 1987:155). 
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combine a long-term vision with well developed skills in strategic 
management are essential. (Ibid.)  
4.4 Critics of Korten and the ‘New Policy Agenda’ 
We started this chapter by showing how the charity-development juxtaposition 
that was set out in the first three chapters of this study can significantly also be 
found in what can be called the NGO development debate. From this point we 
progressed by exploring the innovative conceptual meaning of David Korten’s 
notion of third generation development strategies in overcoming the problem of 
charity and what we termed ‘insufficient’ or ‘less desirable’ modes of 
development action47 (that is, in terms of Korten’s notion of third generation 
development strategies, a problem that first of all and directly concerns the 
NGO development debate’s focus on NGOs as actors of development, but that 
we also relate in this study to the ecumenical and general theological debate on 
development theory’s quest for conceptual renewal of ecclesiastical 
development action). 
But the discussion in this chapter remains incomplete unless we finally address 
critical assessments of Korten’s generational perspective (in particular on third 
generation strategies) and the so-called ‘New Policy Agenda’ in the book, Non-
Governmental Organisations - Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic 
Bullet (edited by Michael Edwards and David Hulme, and published in 1995 by 
Earthscan). In this book, as the title suggests, the various authors set out to 
critically assess the performance and accountability of development-oriented 
NGOs in the light of what they call the ‘New Policy Agenda’ in current official 
development politics. This, in short, is an agenda that, as authors Edwards and 
Hulme indicated in their introductory essay, is organised around the two 
reigning ideologies of economic neo-liberalism and political liberal democracy. It 
has increasingly come to view NGOs as preferred channels (vis-à-vis the state48) 
not only for providing welfare services to the poor, but also for promoting 
processes of democratisation that are to be considered as indispensable to the 
ideal of economic growth and development49 (see 1995a:4). 
                                                          
47 See again our highlighted conclusion at the end of 4.1. 
48 See also the reference in 4.3.2 to this turn in current official development policy as a positive factor in 
allowing greater ‘political space’ for NGOs to achieve the people-centred agenda in development.  
49 For a more comprehensive explanation of the rationale at stake here, complementary to the rather 
condensed exposition by Edwards and Hulme, we may refer to Alan Fowler’s important article on “Non-
Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective”. In this article Fowler 
meaningfully indicated how a Western form of democratic representation is in fact implied in current 
mainstream official development policy, which is seen as condition for market capitalism to provide the 
economic growth and division of benefits required for the sustainable alleviation of poverty (1993:326). In 
this rationale, furthermore, the empowerment of people and civil society (that is, the task especially 
entrusted to NGOs!) in relation to the state is seen as fundamental to the regulations of privatisation and 
economic liberalisation. According to Fowler, this is well explained by current World Bank policy (in 
which NGOs have accordingly been favoured as agents of democratisation vis-à-vis the 
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Proceeding with our argument, the latter, second role of democratisation 
allocated to NGOs in the ‘New Policy Agenda’ can be taken as particularly 
relevant to the discussion in this chapter. While the underlying ideological 
differences between Korten and the people-centred development understanding 
and mainstream development policy are not to be ignored here,50 it can be said 
that the role of democratisation in the ‘New Policy Agenda’ in principle 
anticipates Korten’s definition of third generation strategic development action - 
that is, the creation of political space51 for people’s communication and 
participation (see Edwards and Hulme 1995a:4) that assumes the tasks of 
institutional and policy democratisation /transformation/reform. However, and 
this brings us more to the focal point of our argument in this closing section, 
against the background of such an identification of Korten’s notion of third 
generation NGO development strategies with the democratisation role allocated 
to development-oriented NGOs in the ‘New Policy Agenda’, the following 
problematisation of the ‘New Policy Agenda’ (that is, both the above-mentioned 
two roles in this agenda) and a third generation development role (by 
implication but also explicitly) can be found in the book under discussion.  
Firstly, in this book, by means of a general overview of NGOs’ performance and 
accountability in development, the perspective is to be found that effectively 
dismisses the claim of NGOs’ successful adaptation to the modes of 
development involvement anticipated in the ‘New Policy Agenda’. It is claimed 
that NGO development activity has as a general rule not met the expectations 
that are anticipated in the ‘New Policy Agenda’. Whereas they (NGOs) have had 
some success in the area of micro-policy reform and in providing some services 
more cost effectively than government could, it can be confirmed that NGO 
service provision, as a general rule, usually fails to reach the poorest people 
(Edwards and Hulme 1995a:6). Stipulating the moderate success that NGOs 
have had, particularly in the second of the above-mentioned roles (that is, 
democratisation), Edwards and Hulme stated: 
                                                                                                                                              
state/government): “(E)mpowerment … [is seen] as a process by which ‘ordinary people, and especially 
women ... take greater responsibility for improving their lives’ ... In other words, a process that unburdens 
the state and reduces its role and some responsibilities towards citizens. This interpretation must, 
however, be placed within the economic emphasis of the Bank’s report where people as entrepreneurs, 
rather than the state, are regarded as the economic motor of society.” (1993:332, italics added) 
50 It can be said that in the ‘New Policy Agenda’ the notion of democratisation takes on a predominantly 
(neo-liberal) economic meaning, that is, the rolling back of the state, privatisation and economic liberation 
to successfully and efficiently enable export-led economic growth development strategies (see again also 
the previous footnote). In the people-centred development framework, on the other hand, 
democratisation rather takes on a political meaning, that is, the implementation of institutional and 
structural transformation based on the principle of territoriality (see again 4.3.1) to enable the viable 
introduction of alternative economic arrangements and strategies (that is, alternative to the former 
strategies). 
51 In line with the distinction made in the previous footnote, the notion of political space here, however, 
should not obscure the predominant and restricted economic meaning/ideology that the ‘New Policy 
Agenda’ impresses on the democratisation process. See also footnote 49. 
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(T)here is increasing evidence that NGOs and GROs do not 
perform as effectively as had been assumed in terms of poverty-
reach, cost-effectiveness, sustainability, popular participation 
(including gender), flexibility and innovation ... Evidence on the 
performance of NGOs and GROs in democratisation is more 
difficult to come by, except in the area of ‘micro-policy’ reform 
where a growing number of case studies demonstrate that NGOs 
and GROs can influence governments and official agencies, 
especially where they come together to form a united front ... 
However, there is little evidence that NGOs and even GROs are 
managing to engage in the formal political process successfully, 
without becoming embroiled in partisan politics and the distortions 
that accompany the struggle for state power. In both Latin America 
and Africa, evidence shows that NGOs have had little impact on 
political reform, partly because NGOs themselves (as non-
representative organisations) have failed to develop effective 
strategies to promote democratisation. (1995a:6, 7) 
It can be said, if only in an indirect way, that the above assessment also raises 
serious reservations about the actual and successful involvement by NGOs in 
third generation development strategies as conceptualised by Korten. Yet at this 
point we may secondly notice how authors of the above-mentioned book, in the 
context of their critical appraisal of the ‘New Policy Agenda’, in a direct way also 
problematised Korten’s generational perspective (as a particular contribution to 
the conceptual framework assumed by the latter agenda). In their own quest for 
conceptual clarity concerning the authentic role or roles of NGOs in 
development, these authors expressed their concern “about the stages ... [Korten] 
suggested and the linear progression they supposedly represent” (Biggs and 
Neame 1995:35). Stated differently, for these authors the linear view represented 
by Korten’s generational framework poses a false dichotomy that they regard as 
untenable. The set categoric distinctions that it proposes are regarded as 
seriously contradicting a comprehensive approach to development and human 
well-being. 
The latter argument is more specifically cast in terms of the debate on social 
justice in development by authors Edwards and Hulme in their concluding essay 
in the volume. According to them, social justice requires the capacity of people 
to organise themselves to defend their rights. However, it also requires that 
people are liberated from the conditions of material poverty. Given the scale of 
material poverty and the size of the gaps in access to basic services in many 
countries of the world, NGOs are required continue playing a significant role also 
in service provision and welfare. At the same time, according to Edwards and 
Hulme, it remains perfectly possible for NGOs to “innovate, and to retain a 
sense of mission, a high level of independence, and an attachment to values and 
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principles”. Hence the conclusion by them that the goals of social improvement 
are best served by an involvement of diversified and combined stratification, as in 
fact suggested by actual practices:  
There are many NGOs which play a major role in social 
organisation, awareness raising and advocacy; just as there are many 
GROs [grassroots organisations] which aim to support material 
improvements in their members’ lives. Indeed, there are strong 
arguments to suggest that these functions are best combined 
together. (1995b:225)  
From a somewhat different angle, Stephen Biggs and Arthur Neame presented a 
complementary argument in their contribution to the debate. According to 
them, a historical overview suggests that “NGOs have [in fact] sought to change 
institutions for at least a century” (the suffragette movement for the 
emancipation of women and the Anti-Slavery Society in the UK could, 
according to them, be taken as cases in point). On the basis of this historical fact 
they reject Korten’s generational perspective, in which an institutional approach 
to development rather indicates a relatively recent mode of NGO involvement; 
they also point out the counterpoint of the latter historical category of NGOs. 
As an example one could take the case of many NGOs (such as in the 
Philippines) that, while characterised by their long-standing commitment to 
fundamental change, have again moved from concentrating on political 
mobilisation to the provision of welfare and relief (in the Philippines, for 
instance, as a response to militarisation in 1987). This brought Briggs and Neame 
to the crux of their argument, in that the latter shift in emphasis does not again 
indicate a ‘backward’ move on the part of those particular NGOs, as Korten’s 
typology suggests. It simply means performing a humane action that suits the 
needs of the context! (Cf. 1995:35.) 
The above twofold problematisation should necessarily be taken into account in 
our own adherence to Korten’s generational framework. Stated from an 
appreciative point of view, first of all, this problematisation offers important 
qualifications to our appreciation of that conceptual framework. These 
qualifications in an important way reflect the reality of NGOs’ performance in 
development (vis-à-vis the euphoria of a third generation of NGO development 
activities that apparently are accumulating and successfully under way today) 
and should serve as a corrective to a one-sidedness that may become the 
weakness in Korten’s generational framework (or rather a straightforward 
reading of this framework). However, having said this, we want to close this 
chapter by stating the following in defence of Korten’s model and our continuing 
appreciation of it as representing a most useful and appropriate framework for 
defining new, innovative modes of development action for those institutional 
actors on which this study mainly focuses, namely the churches: 
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Firstly, and somewhat contradictory to our appreciation of the above-mentioned 
qualifications, we claim that the authors of the volume under discussion may 
well have presented us with an inaccurate reading of Korten. While we do not 
have any problem with the qualifications presented by the authors of this 
volume per se, it is necessary to ask whether Korten in fact presented a 
perspective or framework so very different from the one they are proposing. 
There in fact appears to be no real difference between these authors’ 
requirement for diversified and combined stratification in NGO development 
activity and Korten’s own emphasis on the necessity for the co-existence of the 
various strategic or generational orientations in contemporary NGO 
development action, not least his recognition that relief efforts remain an 
essential and appropriate response to the emergency situations that human 
societies are continuously faced with today (1990:118, 1987:148). Korten’s 
following statement clearly goes against the linear approach which his critics 
accuse him of adopting:  
These three generations do not represent precisely defined 
categories and are more appropriately applied to individual 
programs than to whole organizations. A given NGO may find that 
one of its programs is characterized by a third generation 
orientation, whereas others may be dominantly first or second 
generation - each responding to different needs ... In any given 
setting it is most likely that the needs addressed by the different 
strategies will be met by different NGOs representing different 
purposes, constituencies, and competencies. NGOs pursuing third 
generation programming strategies will often need to give explicit 
attention to the development of capacities of collaborating NGOs 
to meet essential first and second generation needs as part of their 
larger system development strategy. (1987:149) 
Secondly, we fully adopt the bias that, as Korten acknowledges, ultimately 
defines his own position. He responds to his critics in a note in Getting to the 21st 
Century, and indeed goes along with their view that few NGOs in fact fit purely 
into one generation or another (that is, a mere linear articulation) and that there 
is a need for all three types of programmes. “I have responded by stressing that 
each generation meets an important need and has its important place within the 
NGO family, much as the generations in a human family.” (1990:129, n. 5) Yet, 
despite this acknowledgement, he remains convinced of the validity of the 
generational framework and in particular this framework’s stress on the need for 
third and fourth generation type strategies. Korten argued that it was on these 
strategic modes that development as a long-term and global enterprise ultimately 
depends: 
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I do believe that the future of development, perhaps global society, 
depends on many more VOs engaging boldly and effectively in the 
third and fourth generation type strategies discussed in this chapter 
than is currently the case. (Ibid.) 
This position taken by Korten is also supported by the larger discussion in this 
study. As we have attempted to show with regard to the churches, charity and 
local project and community development work (which correlate well with 
Korten’s notions of first and second generation development strategies) imply 
much more than a merely innocent and committed outreach to the poor. 
Involved here are also critical questions relating to ideology, power and the lack 
of more sophisticated social-theoretical capacities, the need for critical self-
examination and the quest to conceptualise new modes of strategic development 
action that might break through prevailing problematic modes of engagement. 
In addition to the recognition of the prevailing inadequate and problematic 
strategic orientations by development actors (especially in this case civil society 
actors such as the churches and NGOs), we may also state the fact that the 
moderate success of the modern enterprise of development so far provide 
fundamental grounds for the conceptualisation of new strategic development 
orientations. To rephrase the words of one critical development writer not 
directly linked to the people-centred development debate, we are indeed a long 
way from an aid-free society, which is the true barometer of successful 
development and true community control (Dudley 1993:161). Hence the crucial 
challenge to conceptualise and apply modes of strategic development action that 
go beyond relief and unsustainable community development orientations and 
work towards that goal. 
In this study we are emphasising that the role of value- and idea-centred 
approaches to development, ‘a politics of ideas’, is crucial to the task of achieving 
far-reaching development and transformation. It can be concluded that Korten’s 
conceptualising of third generation development strategies has already to a 
substantial degree steered us in that direction. From the basis of this appreciation 
we now take the discussion further to focus on his notion of fourth generation 
development strategies in the next chapter. Although the chapter cannot neglect 
the necessity of third generation strategies and thus assumes their continuing 
application, we propose that a fourth-generation strategic development 
orientation represents the ultimate expression of the value- and idea-centred 
approaches to development mentioned above.  
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Chapter Five 
THE DAWN OF A  
FOURTH GENERATION APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
The critical deficiency of the third generation strategy parallels at 
the macro-level the deficiency that the second generation strategy 
displays at a more micro-level. The second generation strategy’s 
critical flaw is that it requires countless replications in millions of 
communities, all within a basically hostile political and institutional 
context. It is much the same with third generation strategies, only 
at a more macro-level. 
Thus it is not surprising that almost since the first workshop in 
which I articulated the concept of the third generation strategy, 
thoughtful colleagues have suggested that something is missing. 
There had to be a further step, a fourth generation. 
Isagani R. Serrano of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement (PRRM) is among those who have struggled with the 
issue. Arguing that the unequal distribution of power and wealth at 
national and international levels carries major responsibility for the 
multiple crises gripping Southern countries, he wrote a paper 
suggesting that third generation strategies are only a partial answer. 
Where do NGOs go from here (from the third generation)… 
Development theorists and practitioners must think beyond “repair 
work” addressed to the components of interdependent systems 
although they can build up from there. Their efforts at re-
examination should help enable the whole international NGO 
community to effectively promote what the watershed NGO 
conference in London called the Alternative Development 
Paradigm. 
Serrano suggests that this should be the central concern of a fourth 
generation NGO development strategy. (Korten 1990:123-124) 
In Korten’s thinking on strategic NGO development action, the concept of a 
fourth generation strategy or approach would eventually be added to his initial 
framework of three generations of NGO development action.1 Korten referred 
                                                          
1 By way of recapitulation (see footnotes 12 and 13 in the introduction), this is the distinct difference 
between Korten’s discussion in his earlier article, “Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-
Centred Development” (1987), and that in Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global 
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to his own intellectual itinerary in the above extract from Getting to the 21st 
Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda and it is clear that, at an early 
stage in the generation debate, he and other critical exponents of the NGO 
development debate had recognised the need for further conceptual innovation 
beyond the third generation strategy or approach. Whereas the latter remains an 
essential dimension to a development strategy of transformation, the central 
concern was (akin to the case with second generation strategies) that an infinite 
number of interventions are required in the third generation mode to achieve 
the desired object of overall transformation.2 Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether third generation interventions have enough mobilising power to match 
the countervailing forces of dominant national and international institutions that 
operate on the basis of “an invalid development vision” (Korten 1990:123). 
Korten and others therefore argued that the third generation strategy or 
approach needed to be complemented by a fourth generation strategy or 
approach that can compensate for the third generation’s prevailing deficiencies. 
It represents a mode of more sophisticated thinking that articulates what has 
been termed the ‘Alternative Development Paradigm’ in the NGO debate.3 
In this chapter the aim will be to explore the meaning of the fourth generation 
development concept presented in the writings of David Korten.4 As this 
chapter constitutes the culmination point of our exploration into innovative 
strategic development conceptualisation in this study, in accordance with the 
development of Korten’s own argument, its contents must be read as part of a 
cycle that also includes the discussion in the next chapter. Thus, our exploration 
of a fourth generation strategic development meaning will eventually also relate 
to a wider intellectual circle that can be taken as a further complementary 
articulation of a growing fourth generation approach to development and the 
question of overall (global) transformation. Traced as a discernible normative set 
of discourses in the social sciences that, in the historical and conceptual sense, 
goes beyond the work of Korten and the NGO development debate, the discussion 
in the next chapter will draw on discourses of development and transformation 
in which features of the fourth generation approach highlighted by Korten are 
central. In accordance with Korten’s own adherence to the concept of 
                                                                                                                                              
Agenda. As indicated in the above quote, in the latter work Korten added the notion of a fourth 
generation development strategy to his initial framework of three generations. 
2 See in this regard the observations made in the introduction of this study. 
3 Thus, whereas the notion of ‘an alternative development paradigm’ previously defined the concept of 
‘third generation development strategies’ in Korten’s earlier writings (see 4.3.1), this notion has now come 
to define the fourth generation (as evident from Korten’s adherence to Isagani Serrano’s perspective stated 
in the quotation heading this chapter). 
4 In this chapter, as in the previous one, Korten’s discussion in Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action 
and the Global Agenda, will be taken as basic point of departure. In addition, aspects of the meaning of 
fourth generation development will also be derived from a limited selection of Korten’s writings that were 
used as sources in the previous chapter, particularly his essay, “Steps Toward People-Centred 
Development: Vision and Strategies”, in the book edited by Noeleen Heyzer et al., Government-NGO 
Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development.  
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‘alternative development’, it will be possible to connect such further exploration 
of the meaning of a fourth generation strategy to the notions of ‘alternatives’ or 
‘alternative development’. This can be done on the basis of a direct adherence to 
these notions by the debates/perspectives that will be explored, but more 
importantly also the various debates’/perspectives’ affiliation to a ‘transformative 
political’ discourse in which features and actors similar to what can be called the 
counterpoint to mainstream development thinking are highlighted. 
For now, however, the discussion will remain with Korten and the NGO 
development debate. It will be shown how, in Korten’s fourth generation 
strategic framework, the relational orientation and organisational definition of 
development-oriented NGOs are still further refined in relation to the meaning 
of third generation development. Whereas the theoretical and strategic principles 
that were highlighted in the meaning of third generation strategic development 
are fully assumed in the meaning of the fourth generation,5 it can be noted that 
the people-centred development concept is still further radicalised in the fourth 
generation strategic orientation. Here we are entering the terrain of the new 
social movements, whereby individual persons and collectivities of people, 
marginalised by mainstream development but also conscientised and committed 
to the values and ideas represented by the new social movements, shift to the 
forefront and truly become the agents of development. Here the emphasis falls 
on a ‘value’ and ‘idea politics’ that rises above the third generation strategic 
orientation in terms of its natural reach, the areas or elements of social life that are 
prioritised for transformation, the strategic orientation and skills that are required, 
and the kind of actors that are to be involved (such as religious actors). 
It will be shown how, in this mode of development, the phenomenon of NGOs 
is restricted to what Korten has referred to as Voluntary Organisations and 
People’s Organisations. They are organisations that act as service organisations to 
the new people’s or social movements and that realise the radical democratic 
principle of people-centred development by becoming the owned organisational space 
of people and the people’s (grassroots) movements themselves. Moreover, they are 
organisations that do not retreat into isolated spaces, but are politically and 
ethically oriented, committed to what Korten calls a global people’s movement that, 
through networking and interaction among the diversified range of like-minded 
NGOs, movements, individuals and other actors, is mobilising into the synergetic 
force that seeks to bring about people-centred development (in the comprehensive 
sense implied by the participation/interaction of the diverse range of actors referred 
to here) on a global scale. In sum, they are organisations for whom interaction with 
the government and business sectors becomes secondary (which does not mean the 
latter are regarded as unimportant, however), as their primary concern becomes 
promoting what Korten calls people-to-people interaction. 
                                                          
5 See the discussion in 4.3 of the previous chapter. 
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5.2 The fourth generation: a social movements approach 
According to Korten fourth generation strategies look beyond the focused 
initiatives of third generation strategies to change specific policies and 
institutional sub-systems (1990:127). They are motivated by the perception that 
there is “a need to energize decentralized action toward a people-centred 
development vision on a much broader scale than is possible with the more 
focused interventions of either second or third generation strategies” (1990:124, 
italics added). 
It follows that the fourth generation strategic development orientation is 
informed by a theory of action that identifies an inadequate mobilising vision as 
the root cause of contemporary development failure (1990:127). The 
breakthrough of people-centred development to become the dominant, global 
paradigm (see 1990:124) can, according to this recognition, only be achieved 
through processes that might influence the public consciousness towards “an 
alternative vision adequate to mobilise voluntary action on a national or global 
scale” (1990:127). A process of transformation is emphasised that “must be 
achieved primarily through the power of ideas, values and communication links” 
(ibid., italics added). The fourth generation orientation highlights a 
communication strategy in which the modern system of communication is 
utilised as a primary instrument: 
The focus is on the communication of ideas and information 
through the mass media, newsletters, recorded media, school 
curricula, major media events, study groups and social networks of 
all types to energize voluntary action by people both within and 
outside their formal organizations in support of social 
transformation. (Ibid.)  
For Korten such an idea- and value-centred perspective points to a social 
movement approach to development. Development, in so far as it aspires to ideals 
of large-scale transformation, can find in the communicative power of the 
contemporary people’s or social movements the greatest potential for social 
change. In the field of development, however, such an identification constitutes 
a neglected terrain. Despite the success of people’s movements in the last few 
decades in reshaping thought and action on such issues as the environment, 
human rights, women, peace and population (1990:124), development has 
generally not been viewed as a movement6 (1990:127). There is a striking 
                                                          
6 For Korten this does not mean that prototypes of development-oriented people’s movements cannot be 
found in history. According to him, the literacy movement/Mass Education Movement in China in the 
1920s and 1930s, and the world population movement that mobilised itself under the banner of the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) in the early 1950s represent powerful examples of 
national and global achievements in people-centred development (see 1990:124-125). 
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separation between Voluntary Organisations (VOs), or NGOs that work in 
support of the new social movements, and those involved in development. The 
issues still appear very much separated (1990:127-128). 
Table 2: Strategies of NGO action in development: Korten’s addition of the 
fourth generation (Korten 1990:117): 
Generation 
 First Second Third Fourth 
Defining 
features 
relief & 
welfare 
community 
development  
sustainable 
systems 
development 
people’s 
movements 
Problem 
definition 
shortage local inertia institutional and 
policy 
constraints  
inadequate 
mobilising 
vision  
Time frame immediate project life ten to twenty 
years 
indefinite future 
Scope individual or 
family 
neighbour-hood or 
village 
region or nation national or 
global 
Chief actors NGO NGO plus 
community 
all relevant 
public and 
private 
institutions 
loosely defined 
networks of 
people and 
organisations 
NGO role doer mobiliser catalyst activist/ 
educator 
Management 
orientation 
logistics 
management 
project 
management 
strategic 
management 
coalescing and 
energising self-
managing 
networks  
Development 
education 
starving 
children 
community self-
help 
constraining 
policies and 
institutions 
spaceship earth 
According to Korten, the need therefore exists also to “mobilize a people’s 
movement around a people-centred development vision” (1990:128). Whereas 
this would highlight the issue of development as such, a closer analysis of 
Korten’s argument suggests that development is not to be viewed in isolation 
from the existing new social movements. The challenge here is to build 
“alliances with other people’s movements that deal with related elements of the 
global crisis” (ibid., italics added). Development is to be seen as a matter 
integrated with the other pressing issues/values/concerns that drive the 
contemporary social movements.7 While not losing its specific identity as a 
                                                          
7 Such an integrated meaning is suggested by Korten’s repeated reference to the new social movements 
(environment, human rights, women, peace, population, consumer affairs) in his exposition of the concept 
of fourth generation development (see 1990:124-128), while his more detailed discussion of the movements 
mentioned in the previous footnote is clearly applied to the concept of (people-centred) development (see 
1990:124-125). This reading of Korten is also clearly confirmed in the introduction of Getting to the 21st 
Century?, where he states that: “…a people-centred development vision ... seeks a synthesis of the change 
objectives of the environmental, human rights, consumer protection, women’s and peace movements. It 
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development movement, the considerable overlapping with the other new social 
movements must be recognised. These movements constitute the most 
important allies of a fourth generation people-centred development movement. 
The various issues around which they are mobilised comprise aspects of people-
centred development and secure its sustainability. In this sense people-centred 
development can be taken as the overall and integrating term for the separated 
issues that define the various movements. There is a common denominator 
shared by all the new social movements, including an anticipated people-centred 
development movement: they all represent value- and idea-centred processes 
directed towards the well-being of people and the environment; they represent 
processes in which people are the actual subjects (owners) of change.  
With the latter description we touched on what might be taken as the 
outstanding feature of social movements, namely their voluntary character. To 
recall a point made in a quotation from Korten’s discussion in the introduction 
of this study, social movements reveal a special quality. They constitute the 
domain of ordinary, committed people who are driven by ideas and shared 
visions of a better world, and not by budgets or organisational structures. They 
move on social energy able to mobilise independent action by countless 
individuals and organisations across national boundaries (1990:124). 
Paramount in the fourth generation orientation is that the “reinforcing synergy” 
generated in the sphere of the new social movements also has to be tapped by 
the field of development. Korten defined the benign character of this sphere as 
constituting the “dynamic network of dedicated volunteers” that offer “mutual 
inspiration, political support, and exchange of experience and technology” 
(1990:125). It constitutes a sphere of ‘free space’ through which development 
actors may participate, find numerous allies for their cause and achieve people-
centred development on a global scale (ibid.).8 
                                                                                                                                              
seeks a new human consciousness in which the more nurturing, enabling and conserving dimensions of 
female consciousness gain ascendance over the more aggressive, exploitative and competitive dimensions 
of male consciousness that have so long dominated the social and economic life of human societies.” 
(1990:5) Finally, this is the same affirmation of the integrated meaning of people-centred development and 
the value-centred and issue-specific discourses generated by the new social movements that we also 
encounter in the latter parts of Korten’s discussion. For example, Korten at a particular point confirmed 
the centrality of the “most critical [development] issues to be addressed in the 1990s” also “to the agendas 
of environmental, women’s, peace, and human and civil rights groups” (1990:200). 
8 Here Korten upheld the historical example of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) 
movement referred to in footnote 6 of this chapter. According to him, this movement achieved “one of 
human history’s most extraordinary public policy reversals, as family planning was moved from a 
forbidden topic to a global public policy priority” (1990:125 - italics added). 
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5.3 Fundamental components 
5.3.1 Central actors  
5.3.1.1 Voluntary organisations 
Korten’s discussion of fourth generation development strategies did not mean 
the end of the NGO development debate, as the absence of reference to this 
institutional sector in the previous section (5.2) might suggest.9 Yet, in the 
discussion of this mode of strategic development action, reference to the NGO 
sector would undergo greater refinement (in accordance with the voluntary 
principle spelled out in 5.2). 
According to Korten, the term ‘non-governmental organisation’ embraces such a 
wide variety of disparate organisations that it is impossible to identify a 
distinctive developmental role for an ‘NGO’. Consequently, a framework is 
needed “that would have more meaning in defining the distinctive nature and 
development roles of the organizations commonly referred to as NGOs” (Korten 
1995:183). To define such a framework, the following basic classification of the 
institutional division in society needs to be made: 
× Government: This sector “has the distinctive ability to demand resources 
through use of threat, power or coercion”. In the idealised view of this sector, 
these special powers are exercised “to defend the law and to maintain social 
justice through the transfer of wealth from the rich to those in particular 
need” (ibid.). In reality, however, this sector has shown itself to be most 
responsive to the perceived needs of the political and economically powerful, 
thus often acting as a vanguard for escalating injustice, exploitation and 
corruption (Korten 1995a:183; 1990:99). 
× Business: This sector specialises in the use of economic power and obtains its 
resources through the sale or exchange of products and services. Its 
distinctive role is to create new wealth through value-added activities, which 
should be regarded as an essential function in any society. Yet, because of its 
orientation to market forces, this sector tends to be most responsive to the 
needs of those who have money and, as a result, gain control over the 
exchange processes (Korten 1995a:183; 1990:99). 
× Voluntary sector: This sector specialises in the use of “integrative power” or 
“power of consensus” and succeeds in mobilising human and financial 
resources on the basis of the shared value commitments of its participants 
(staff, citizen volunteers). This value orientation gives the actors or 
organisations in this sector their particular strength and makes them an 
important innovative counter-force to the political and economic power 
                                                          
9 See, in contrast to this absence, the frequent references to this sector in the exposition of first, second and 
third generation strategies in 4.2. 
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agendas of government and the business sectors (Korten 1995a:183, 185; 
1990:97-98). Korten had spelled this out earlier: 
They serve as forums for the definition, testing and propagation of 
ideas and values in ways that are difficult or impossible for the 
other two sectors. Their commitment to integrative values, over 
political or economic values, gives them a natural orientation to the 
perceived needs of politically and economically disenfranchised 
elements of the population that are not met through the normal 
political processes of government or the economic processes of the 
market. (Korten 1990:98)  
On the basis of such a threefold distinction the nature of development-oriented 
NGOs may be defined more closely. According to Korten, not all NGOs belong 
to the voluntary sector. A more correct view is to allocate to each of the above 
sectors its own distinctive type of NGO (1995a:185). Here the following 
distinctions can be made: 
× GONGOs: Known by the anomalous term ‘governmental non-governmental 
organisations’, this is a type of NGO that should rather be seen as a creation 
of government to serve as instruments of government policy (Korten 
1995a:185; 1990:2, 104-105). They are the creations of more sophisticated 
governments that respond to official donors’ desire to channel funding to 
NGOs (1995a:185). In practice “(t)heir existence depends on state 
sponsorship and resources, their leaders are subject to government 
appointment or approval, and ultimately they are accountable to the state 
rather than to their members or an independent board” (1990:104-105). 
× Public Service Contractors: While they are non-governmental and often non-
profit organisations, this type of NGO is driven by market considerations 
more than the values of the voluntary sector spelled out above (Korten 
1990:102). Their function is that of “market-oriented nonprofit businesses 
serving public purposes” (1990:2, italics added). Because they are highly 
adjusted to donor preferences and priorities, they are, on the basis of their 
greater technical and managerial specialisation, the NGO-type that is 
traditionally favoured by donors (Korten 1995a:185-186; 1990:103).  
× Voluntary organisations: This is the type of NGO that fits the profile of the 
voluntary sector set out above. They are organisations that “range from 
Mother Theresa-type charities to social activist organizations that are on the 
front lines of such causes as environmental protection, women’s rights, 
human rights protection, peace, and land reform”. They are organisations that 
“may or may not accept official donor funding, but when they do it is on 
their own terms and only to serve activities integral to their self-defined 
mission” (Korten 1995a:186). 
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It follows that all three the above sectors, and by implication NGO-types, ought 
to be regarded as indispensable to meaningful development. All three sectors 
and types are by nature ‘third-party’ organisations10 that “have distinctive 
competencies essential to a dynamic self-sustaining development process”. 
Excessive emphasis on any one to the exclusion of the others would, therefore, 
pose a serious threat to long-term, authentic development (Korten 1990:98).  
Yet, as suggested by the above profile of the voluntary sector, in the 
accomplishment of fourth generation development goals, NGOs more closely 
defined as voluntary organisations (VOs) have a special place. In contrast to the 
government and business sectors, which tend to define their strength in terms of 
the size and financial resources of their constituent organisations, the strength of 
VOs can be found in their diversity and capacity for independent action 
(delinked from the sectors of government and business). They are organisations 
that, based on their voluntary nature, can reach out and form alliances more 
easily than other organisations. Through this ability, combined with their value- 
and idea-centred focus, they are able “to achieve scale and leverage through 
joining in ever shifting coalitions - constantly defining, elaborating and redefining 
social issues, expanding political constituencies supporting their agendas of 
choice, promoting experimentation and advocating political action” (Korten 
1990:99). 
In essence, VOs orientated towards fourth generation strategies are service 
organisations to the people’s or social movements they support. This requires them 
to have managerial skills that go well beyond those normally associated with 
strategic management. Their job is to generate self-managing networks that will 
stimulate action beyond their own range of vision and control (Korten 1990:127). 
Related to such escalating dynamics, they serve as important mechanisms of 
democratisation through which people define and voice their interests, meet 
local needs and make demands on government. But they also fulfil important 
educational roles through which “they provide training grounds for democratic 
citizenship, develop the political skills of their members, recruit new political 
leaders, stimulate political participation, and educate the broader public on a 
wide variety of public interest issues” (Korten 1990:99).11  
5.3.1.2 People’s Organisations 
According to Korten, “(t)he people’s sector is the fourth and most important of 
all the institutional sectors for people-centred development” (1995a:187, italics 
added). Where the first three sectors identified so far constitute ‘third-party’ 
                                                          
10 According to Korten, ‘third party’ organisations are those that base their social legitimacy on the 
assumption that they exist to serve the needs of third parties, that is, persons who are not themselves 
members of the organisation (1990:95-96). 
11 Here Korten also referred to the “watchdog role” of fourth generation VOs. Along with the press they 
serve as checks on “the relentless tendency of the state to centralize its power and to evade civic 
accountability and control” (1990:99]. 
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organisations in which action and thought are initiated by actors from ‘outside’, 
POs, by contrast, represent the most basic principle of social movement theory. 
They are by nature ‘first-party’ organisations that embody people’s direct and 
radical participation in events. They are the potential and actual manifestation of 
fourth generation development. They “are membership organizations that exist 
to serve their members, have membership accountable leaders, and are largely 
self-reliant in their generation of resources” (ibid.; see also Korten 1990: 100). 
According to Korten, a unique characteristic of POs is their ability to combine 
all three types of power competence represented respectively by the sectors 
identified in 5.3.1.1: threat, economic and integrative. Identifying various types of 
POs, such as self-reliant cooperatives, landless associations, irrigator associations, 
burial associations, credit clubs, labour unions, trade associations and political 
interest groups (Korten 1990:100), for Korten a good example of a PO that 
embodies the mix of the different types of power competence is the cooperative 
business association. While the primary function of the cooperative is economic, 
it is much more than a business. In its governmental role the members of the 
cooperative “establish rules that they mutually agree to observe on threat of 
fines, expulsion or other sanctions” (ibid.). Yet, they are simultaneously “bound 
together by shared values that may lead them to direct their business to the 
cooperative even when they might find better prices elsewhere” (Korten 
1990:100-101, italics added). In this association the officers may “contribute 
substantial time to the organization without compensation. The cooperative 
itself may engage in community service activities purely for the community 
good, or it may assist the formation of other cooperatives as a public service, 
purely for the good of the cooperatives’ cause.” (Korten 1990:101; see also 
1995:187, italics added) 
POs, then, may be regarded as another special type of NGO (see Korten 1990:2) 
that integrates aspects of the above-mentioned three types of NGOs in its 
organisational structure. However, in Korten’s definition a certain tension is 
sustained between the concepts of ‘NGO’ and ‘VO’, on the one hand, and ‘PO’, 
on the other. Korten pointed out the aspect of organisational conversion that 
defines the commitment of NGOs/VOs in the ideal setting of fourth-generation 
development. According to this aspect, the central commitment of fourth 
generation NGOs/VOs is not only to create new POs and convert the first two 
sectors of government and business into POs,12 but to let the VOs themselves be 
transformed into POs (1990:101).13 This transition, in fact, spells out the 
                                                          
12 For Korten the transformation of local governments into POs occurs when they are made truly elected 
representatives of the people, their revenue base is built on locally levied tax revenues and strong direct 
citizen participation in their affairs is developed. Similarly business corporations become POs when 
employees of a publicly owned corporation buy their shares and become owners through an employee 
ownership stock plan (1990:101). 
13 According to Korten (1990:101), such a conversion happens when the staff of a VO is brought within the 
governance structure of a PO. It may then reconstitute itself as a paid secretariat of the PO that provides 
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necessary progression towards authentic people-centred development, that is, to 
truly transfer power into the hands of people:14  
One might well ask why a people-centred development vision 
should favor POs over third-party organizations, since by definition 
the latter are supposed to be serving external constituencies. The 
answer is that irrespective of whom an organization is supposed to 
serve, there is a considerable tendency for the people who actually 
exercise control over an organization to put its resources to their 
own service first. Thus the more that people can be placed in 
control of the organizations that presumably exist to serve them, 
the greater the probability that those organizations will fulfill their 
true function. (Ibid.) 
It can therefore be said that POs, more than any other organisation, constitute 
the building blocks of people-centred development, that is, of a just, sustainable 
and inclusive society (Korten 1995:187, 188). In terms of Korten’s conclusive 
profile of them, they are the authentic instruments for redistributing power in 
society by strengthening the economic and political power of the previously 
marginalised, the training grounds for democratic citizenship and institutional 
building blocks for democratisation, the expressions of grassroots concerns that 
provide the collective bargaining power to enable landless people, small farmers 
and urban squatters to negotiate on more equal terms with the politically and 
economically powerful (Korten 1990:101-102). 
5.3.1.3 Citizen volunteers 
In Korten’s scheme of fourth generation actors, the organisational level would 
not be emphasised at the cost of the individual or personal level. At the heart of 
fourth generation development action for him is the citizen volunteer, the 
personification of this mode of development.  
For Korten, in line with the free idea flow of social movement dynamics that 
accomplishes connections and associations across boundaries of place, space and 
identity, citizen volunteers come from all spheres of life: 
They are those countless individuals who bring the spirit and action 
of committed citizenship to their communities and to the 
                                                                                                                                              
specialised administrative and technical services to the PO, and, at the same time, is accountable to and 
financed by the members of the PO.  
14 For Korten this recognition holds serious implications for an intellectual enterprise that still predominantly 
focuses on the role of VOs/NGOs in development at the cost of POs. It in effect means “rather 
consistently building the power of voluntary organizations as the voices of the people - which they are not 
and cannot be - rather than building the capability of the people to speak with their own voice” 
(1995:188). 
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organizations in which they work - irrespective of the sector to 
which that organization belongs. (1990:106) 
Thus the citizen volunteer should not be perceived as belonging only to the 
group of persons that are directly involved with the two central organisations of 
fourth generation development identified above, namely VOs and POs. Whereas 
these organisations should be seen as providing the organisational support system 
for fourth generation development activity, the means for individual actors to 
obtain identity, legal recognition and aggregate resources for endeavours (Korten 
1990: 108), the span of citizen volunteers stretches far beyond their immediate 
activity. Korten observed that a (fourth generation) people-centred development 
agenda was “a human agenda that unites the interests of all people, irrespective of 
class, race, religion, nationality - or the institutional sector on which they depend 
for their daily bread”. In this all-encompassing sense, “(i)t is an agenda that must 
unite businessmen, religious leaders, newscasters, labourers, teachers, farmers, 
the unemployed, homemakers, politicians, bureaucrats, technicians, volunteer 
workers and countless others” (1995a:189, italics added).  
For Korten the achievement of fourth generation development and 
transformation hinges greatly on the commitment and ability of people to carry 
fourth generation values into the occupations in which they work (see 1990: 
107). In the respective occupations “the volunteer spirit is actualized when the 
individual acts as a responsible values-driven human being in ways that go 
beyond, or even conflict with, defined bureaucratic roles”. Characteristic of this 
behaviour is the fact that it is not motivated by any kind of reward,15 or 
sanctioned by the organisation that employs the person (1990:106). It is the 
behaviour of full persons, citizens who are open to the conflicts, processes and 
values that shape society, who apply a certain critical consciousness in carrying 
out their organisational duties and not simply bureaucratic procedures 
(1990:107). Ultimately, it is the behaviour of persons who, although filling 
occupations in the sectors of government and business, give precedence to the 
integrative values that are associated with the voluntary sector over the values of 
coercion and economic profit commonly associated with the first two 
(1990:108).  
According to Korten, different levels of citizenship can furthermore be 
identified: the community citizen, national citizen and global citizen. Yet, in 
achieving the transformation envisioned in fourth generation development, the 
global citizen has primary importance (ibid.). This is the person who commands 
a critical consciousness that allows him/her to transcend the institutional and 
cultural conditioning of the first two levels of citizenship for the greater good of 
                                                          
15 In his exposition of the nature of the voluntary sector, Korten particularly pointed to the aspect of 
financial reward. He emphasised that the surest way to kill a movement was “to smother it with money” 
(1990:124, 126). 
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society. As such this kind of person has “the ability to think independently, 
critically and constructively, to view problems within their long-term context, 
and to make judgments based on a commitment to longer-term societal interests 
that are distinct from, and, in fact may conflict with short-term interests” 
(1990:107).  
5.3.1.4 A global people’s movement 
In Korten’s identification of the central actors in fourth generation development, 
individual citizen volunteers and the organisations working towards fourth 
generation development (NGOs, VOs, POs) find their collective identity in the 
notion of a global people’s movement. For Korten, the realisation of such a 
movement poses the ultimate challenge in fourth generation development: 
The task is daunting. Since the forces that have captured the land 
and the sky are global in their scope, our vision must be global as 
well as local. Obviously this is beyond the capacity of any 
individual NGO. As individual people and organizations we must 
work to meld ourselves into a global force through the formation of 
coalitions and alliances that ultimately meld millions of people into 
a global movement for change. Those of us who have defined our 
roles in terms of projects and the internal management of individual 
organizations will need to expand our perspective and become 
adept at new modes of working. 
We must be willing to take risks, to reach out beyond the circle of 
like-minded organizations and individuals to build alliances with 
concerned citizens in business and government, to engage the mass-
based social movements, religious groups and institutions, and the 
mass media. (1995a:188) 
It follows that the objective of global change in the people-centred development 
agenda can only be achieved through the formation of alliances across people’s 
movements (Korten 1990:200). In this sense a global people’s movement 
represents the ultimate driving force to carry forward the dynamics of a social 
movement approach to development that is spelled out in 5.2 of this chapter. It 
embodies the ultimate integrating and synthesising force through which the 
various organisations and movements in fourth generation development can 
present their overlapping interests as a shared people-centred development 
agenda.  
Korten, in this regard, would refer to the reactive and proactive thrusts of the 
various social movements. In a contemporary social movement dynamics the 
reactive thrust seeks to block harmful actions, such as the “abuse of human 
rights, discrimination against women, regulation of dangerous products, increased 
arms expenditures and the cutting of forests”. The proactive thrust, again, seeks 
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“the creation of new and more positive social institutions: the strengthening of 
democratic institutions, introducing a stronger feminist perspective into public 
policy, promoting citizen diplomacy through sister city programs and developing 
markets for sustained yield forest products” (1990:200). Irrespective of the 
movement in question, the various proactive thrusts could, according to Korten, 
all be viewed as supporting elements of the transformation agenda consistent with 
the people-centred development vision.16 On the basis of this perception, it would 
therefore be natural for the respective movements to build interlinking alliances 
with one another around common interests in proactive transformation (1990:200-
201). 
It can be concluded that, on the strategic level, the impact and realisation of a 
global people’s movement can best be envisioned by the concept of global citizen 
networking. Korten commented that the power of civil society rested in its 
extraordinary capacity to “rapidly and flexibly network diverse and dispersed 
individuals and organizations that are motivated by voluntary commitments” 
(1995b:297). Here the role of modern communication technology to place 
members of civil society on an equal footing with the powerful global 
corporations of the world can be emphasised. The same electronic 
communications technologies - phone, fax and computer - that have been used 
by corporations to extend their global reach hold the same potential for civil 
society actors aspiring to the formation of a global people’s movement.17 The 
strategic implementation of these technologies would also allow these actors “to 
move quickly and flexibly in joint actions at local, national, and global levels” 
(ibid.; see also Korten and Quizon 1995:160). 
5.3.2 Key elements 
Korten observed that in fourth generation development the priority becomes 
“the transformation of our values, technology and institutions - in both North 
and South”. Yet, this must not be seen “as a prelude to setting a new pattern for 
the restoration of growth consistent with justice, sustainability and 
inclusiveness”. On the contrary, in fourth generation development it is 
transformation and not growth that defines the essential global development 
priority and represents the only path to resolving the contemporary global 
crisis18 (1990:133). 
                                                          
16 Cf. here the first two paragraphs of 5.2. 
17 While placing the role of modern communication technology and a communication strategy at the centre 
of fourth generation development (see the first quote in 5.2), this theme is nowhere in the writings of 
Korten presented as a broader and more fully worked out theory of communication and development. On 
this basis the discussion of ‘an alternative communication dynamics’ in 6.4 can be taken as an important 
complementary framework to Korten’s basic framework of a fourth generation development strategy. 
18 In this regard we may recall Korten’s identification of a contemporary “threefold crisis” of world poverty, 
environmental destruction and communal violence/social disintegration that was indicated in the previous 
chapter (see 4.3.1). 
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Against this background Korten prioritised the following seven key elements (or 
areas) as central to a fourth generation global transformation agenda for the 
1990s: 
× Reconciliation and demilitarisation; 
× Lifestyles and technologies; 
× Spiritual development; 
× The family; 
× Political democratisation; 
× Economic democratisation; 
× Trade and investment relations (1990:163-179). 
It is possible to say that the various elements or areas identified by Korten could 
clearly be taken as belonging to the realm of the idea- and value-centred domain 
emphasised in the fourth generation development orientation. Indeed, here we 
are presented with areas of transformation that are first and foremost defined by 
the various new social movements (peace, ecological, environmental, consumer, 
women’s, human rights, democratic, economic) in which the participation of the 
latter three actors identified in the previous section (POs, citizen volunteers and 
a global people’s movement) becomes determinant and the role of an 
overlapping and explicit idea- and value-centred actor such as religion19 can be 
emphasised, while third-party actors such as VOs/NGOs (that is, the first actors 
identified in the previous section) rather fulfil a supporting and catalysing role.20 
Here the participation/role of these actors can be highlighted in areas of 
transformation that are clearly global in scope, spell out the fundamental 
foundations for long-term, sustainable people-centred development and, for its 
positive outcome, hinge on large-scale idea, value and relational changes in 
society. 
Reconciliation and demilitarisation: It can be said that this element captures the 
fundamental basis of people-centred development. According to Korten, there is 
“no greater contributor to human suffering and no more significant barrier to 
effective development action than the violent conflicts that are tearing apart 
communities and societies throughout the world” (1990:163). For the forces of 
reconciliation and forgiveness to excel demands particularly a movement 
towards global demilitarisation. This means “the reallocation of military 
resources to alleviate poverty and to convert the global economy to sustainable 
modes of production”. It means that military assistance has to be limited to 
helping Southern countries to establish small and disciplined military forces that 
are committed to the principles of democratic civilian rule (1990:164). 
                                                          
19 Religion is an actor that by nature overlaps with all four categories of actors identified in the previous 
section. The reference to religion can here be made on the basis of Korten’s explicit identification of 
religion as an important fourth generation actor in the third key area that he identifies (see the discussion 
below). 
20 With regard to this supporting and catalysing role see also the discussion in 5.4. 
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Lifestyles and technologies: As radically directed to the human will and 
consciousness as the first area, this area calls for a strategic impact that would 
appeal to the over-consumers of the world and lead them towards ecologically 
more sustainable lifestyles21 (see 1990:164-167). This must lead humanity, and in 
particular the rich, to redefine “the good life, with less emphasis on the material 
and greater emphasis on the social, intellectual and spiritual quality of life” 
(1990:165). It must lead humanity to revisit current manifestations of economic 
growth (1990:164-165), direct its energy towards the devising and application of 
environmentally sound technologies (as the basis for future improvements in the 
well-being of particularly the under-consumers of the world) (1990:165-166) 
and, finally, bring under control as rapidly as possible the continued explosive 
growth of the world’s population (1990:166). 
Spiritual development: Particularly relevant to our thesis in this study of the 
strategic role of the churches in development, this element constitutes, 
according to Korten, one of the most basic dimensions of fourth generation 
development and relates to questions of “the uses of power, values, love, 
brotherhood, peace and the ability of people to live in harmony with one another” 
(1990:168, italics added). Moreover, in relation to these aspects an actor or actors 
such as religion and the churches22 (at their best) can truly excel and become 
central to the achievement of fourth generation development. On the basis of a 
theoretical concept of change that holds structural change to be dependent on 
the emergence of an alternative human consciousness,23 here religion and the 
churches can truly make a contribution on the structural level:  
Unjust structures are the creation of people and are products of the 
greed and egotism that are deeply imbedded in human nature. The 
human spirit must be strengthened to the point that greed and 
egotism play a less dominant role. This is perhaps the most central 
of religious missions, and a far worthier challenge for religiously 
oriented voluntary development organizations than the distribution 
of charity to the victims of the failure of spiritual teaching. (Ibid.) 
                                                          
21 Korten (1990:165) would put this statement in context by applying statistics of the International Institute 
for Environment and Development and World Resources Institute. Based on the years 1984-1985, “four 
countries - the United States, Soviet Union, Japan and West Germany - with 14 percent of the world’s 
population, accounted for 53 percent of the world’s consumption of commercial energy and a comparable 
share of important metals”. Applied to the rest of the world’s population, this meant that total world 
energy production and resource extraction had to increase by more than 250 percent if they were to equal 
the per capita consumption standards of the above-mentioned four countries. 
22 It is significant that Korten refers here not only to the more general denominator of religion, but that he 
specifically also highlighted the role of the churches as a specific institution of religion. 
23 Significant here is Korten’s reliance on the perspective of Charles Elliot (see 1990:168) on ‘conscientisation’ 
that was discussed in 3.3.2 of this study and that confirms a direct line between the perspective highlighted 
in that particular point of the discussion and our discussion in the present chapter of fourth generation 
development. 
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For Korten, however, in contrast to narrower, conservative views of the 
spiritual, such a ‘spiritual’ engagement takes on a distinct ethico-political 
dimension. It makes the aspect of power24 the heart of its concern and 
particularly sees its role as the conscientising of the power holders of the world 
with regard to their “stewardship responsibility” (ibid.). From a different angle, it 
leads ‘enlightened’ religion to challenge the “dominance of traditional masculine 
consciousness” that is institutionalised by growth-centred development and 
impresses the ideals of competition, empire and conquest. As positive 
counterpoint, it seeks to instil into the human consciousness more feminine 
values “of a nurturing family and community, place, continuity, conserving, 
reconciliation,25 caring and reverence for nature and the continuous regeneration 
of life”26 (1990:169). 
The family: For Korten this element constitutes “the most basic unit of human 
society ... essential to the construction and maintenance of strong integrative 
social structures” and the individual’s most important source “of economic and 
psychological security” (1990:169-170, italics added). This insight requires a new 
approach in tending to the deprivations and exploitation of women and children. 
Contrary to the traditional separation of these groups from the family in social 
development programmes,27 the social agenda has to be the restoring and 
strengthening of the family “in ways that increase equality, love, mutual respect 
and responsibility”28 (ibid.). 
Political democratisation: According to a statistic presented by Korten, more 
than 50 percent of the South still lived under non-elected governments at the 
beginning of the 1990s. This situation has suppressed the creative social energy 
of civil society, the matrix of people-centred development (see 1990:171). As 
this ongoing suppression ought to make the issue of human rights and 
democracy central to the global prospects of people-centred development, new 
guiding principles in the area of international development assistance to promote 
human rights and democracy are called for. Firstly, assistance is to be provided to 
non-elected governments only in instances where they clearly and directly 
contribute towards democratisation. Secondly, non-governmental organisations 
are to be made the primary channels of other aid intended to benefit people 
                                                          
24 Korten’s emphasis here on the notion of ‘power’ constitutes a further direct reliance on the perspective of 
Charles Elliot. See in this regard 3.3.2. 
25 Cf. in this regard also the discussion of the notion of reconciliation in 5.4. 
26 What is referred to here by Korten as ‘feminine values’ will be further elaborated on in 7.4.4 of this study 
under the heading of ‘soft culture’. 
27 For Korten (1990:170-171) this kind of separation is, for example, well illustrated in programmes for street 
children. It means treating the symptom of the problem rather than its cause. 
28 Such a positive pronouncement does not mean that Korten merely romanticises the family. He recognises 
that the family belongs to the list of contemporary human institutions that should be the subject of 
transformation, as it often serves as a mechanism of suppression and subordination, particularly for women 
and children. However, this does not deny the fact that the family remains one of the most basic units of 
society and, potentially and actually, a primary source to nurture the values mentioned by Korten (see 
1990:169-171).  
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who live under authoritarian governments (1990:172). To enforce such measures, 
this arrangement anticipates the preparation of a universal bill of rights for 
voluntary and people’s organisations. Such a bill would be based on existing 
international legal documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and would “set forth universal standards by which governmental 
compliance might be assessed by monitoring bodies” (1990:172-173). 
Economic democratisation: For Korten this is an element that “goes hand in hand 
with political democratization as the foundation of an equity-led sustainable 
growth strategy” (1990:173). As much a political as an economic strategy and 
fitting into the realm of political economy, many measures of a political nature 
could be identified that support democratisation: land reform, agrarian reform, 
the formation of member-owned and controlled cooperatives, the 
implementation of stock ownership plans that give employees a strong voice in 
management and a share in profits, policies that favour a strong small business 
sector, and guarantees of the right to unionise (ibid.). Economic democratisation 
thus emphasises the participation of particular groups and organisations in society 
(in accordance with our earlier observation) and the achievement of policy 
change; but it is also an area to be challenged, especially on the ideological level. 
This ideological challenge calls for a critical reconsideration of the commitment 
of the two grand economic ideologies, capitalism and socialism, to the ideal of 
broad economic participation and ownership by people: 
Socialism and capitalism, in practice, have both failed seriously in 
this regard. Socialism has concentrated productive asset in the 
hands of those who control state power, though these people are 
neither owners nor workers in any meaningful sense. In a parallel 
fashion, capitalism has concentrated control in the hands of 
financial managers, and particularly investment bankers, who 
leverage large sums of other people’s money to gain control over 
corporate assets for their personal benefit. As in the practice of 
socialism, these people are neither owners of the capital they 
control nor are they workers who depend on this capital to 
produce useful outputs. (1990:173-174) 
However, in his call for innovation, which clearly begins at the idea level, Korten 
does not propose a new grand economic ideology. While global in scope, 
Korten’s framework for innovation rather corresponds to the people-centred 
development theoretical framework spelled out under the discussion of the 
third generation development strategy in the previous chapter.29 By way of a 
final observation, Korten commented that the question of who should control 
the productive assets remained “central to current policy debates, but not as the 
                                                          
29 See 4.3.1. 
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question has been defined by traditional socialists and capitalists”. The challenge 
here is “to achieve true economic democracy based on meaningful participation 
in the ownership and control of productive assets for reasons of equity, 
productivity and environmental responsibility” (1990:174, italics added). 
Trade and investment relations: As in the case of economic democratisation, it 
can be said that this element closely overlaps with the theoretical framework 
and principles spelled out under the understanding of third generation 
development. To recall a central concept in this understanding, current 
international trade and investment relations could be seen as the major force 
sustaining the principle of functionalism.30 Korten comments that contemporary 
development wisdom focuses attention on foreign financial resources. However, 
to meet the repayments of loans and foreign investments of international 
development assistance required a country in turn to generate foreign exchange 
through exports. This means “diverting resources away from meeting the needs of 
its own citizens to meet the needs of foreign consumers”. It means serving “the 
interests of the international bankers and corporations who advocate such 
policies” (1990:174-175, italics added).  
Existing trade and investment practices could also be regarded as unjust and 
unsustainable in the light of the reigning terms of trade by which “the export 
earnings of Southern countries are heavily dependent on exporting 
environmental resources ... [and] are then used to pay for imports from Northern 
countries that derive their value from non-depleting information inputs” 
(1990:176). Korten spelled out the bottom line of this arrangement, saying that 
to speak of the ‘development’ of a non-renewable resource is a contradiction in 
terms. A non-renewable resource can be exploited or expropriated. But it 
cannot be ‘developed’. “Development must, at least by a people-centred 
definition, be sustainable.” (1990:177) 
Recalling a second central concept in third generation development, this 
understanding of transformation in the area of international trade and investment 
relations could be best conceptualised by the principle of territoriality.31 
Determined by the core people-centred development values of justice, 
sustainability and inclusiveness,32 the underlying vision here is the featuring of 
local communities as diversified local economies that are relatively self-reliant in 
meeting basic needs, controlling their productive resources and technologies, and 
absorbing their own wastes. The intent, here, however, is not to terminate 
international trade and investment,33 “but rather to moderate and restructure it 
                                                          
30 See 4.3.1. 
31 See 4.3.1. 
32 See 4.3.1 where these three principles are highlighted as decisive in people-centred development. 
33 See also the identification of ‘export promotion’ as a final, sixth stage in the equity-led sustainable growth 
strategic framework set out on in 4.3.1. 
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in ways that reverse the tendencies toward absentee ownership, concentration of 
economic control and the export of environmental costs” (1990:179). 
5.4 Third and fourth generation action: an overlapping and 
complementary unit 
We have reached a point in the discussion where fourth generation development 
can be identified as a value- and idea-centred approach to development and 
transformation that clearly goes beyond the third generation development 
strategic orientation that was discussed in the previous chapter. By prioritising 
particular normative actors and key elements of transformation, it can be said 
that development is now equated with a higher level of conscientisation and 
ethico-political discourse that cannot be pinned down by the more formal 
policy-making, organisational and learning processes in third generation 
development action. By contrast, development ultimately coincides here with 
the ‘value’, ‘idea’ and ‘democratic politics’ of the new social movements, a 
dynamics that penetrates through and links up beyond set places and spaces. As 
such, more radically than in the third generation orientation, development actors 
in the fourth generation orientation share the radical democratic and 
participatory principles of social movement theory. Ranging from third-party 
NGOs/VOs (as in third generation development) to first-party POs, citizen 
volunteers and actual movement formations whose identities are all shaped by – 
and who are themselves expressions (collectively and separately) of – the new 
social movement dynamics, it can be said that their participation and ownership 
of the development process (that is, particularly the latter three categories of 
actors) capture the condition for the actual realisation of development.  
However, such an identification of fourth generation development again calls for 
a requalification. As the numerous cross-references to Chapter Four of this study 
in the footnotes in the previous section (5.3) of this chapter suggest, fourth 
generation development in many instances overlaps with and refers back to 
meanings in the third generation orientation. It fully adopts the principles of 
people-centred development that determine third generation development 
action and shares the latter’s value orientation and vision of transformed 
societies. Stated differently, fourth generation development does not undervalue 
the policy and organisational processes that define the decentralised and local 
level, and is itself biased towards the local.34 
                                                          
34 We may, for instance, note how this becomes the ultimate reference point for Korten in his book, When 
Corporations Rule the World. Under the final heading in this book, “Localizing the Global System”, Korten 
states the purpose of global action as being to create a multilevel system of institutions through which 
unnecessary interdependence can be reduced and the remaining interdependence can be managed in ways 
that maintain a persistent bias in favour of the following processes: (i) The empowerment of the local to 
control and manage local resources to local benefits; (ii) The elimination of production or consumption 
costs beyond the borders of given localities; (iii) The encouragement of cooperation among localities in the 
search for solutions to shared problems (1995a:320). 
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Viewed from the third generation perspective set out in the previous chapter,35 
we may also observe how this orientation impinges on the domain of fourth 
generation development. Although not to the same radical extent as we 
stipulated in the first paragraph of this section, it may be observed how the 
fourth sector of people’s organisations are already prioritised as primary actors in 
development vis-à-vis secondary actors such as NGOs and government. In this 
regard, we may point to the perspective, albeit adopted by a minority of authors, 
which criticises the lack of concentration in the third generation orientation on 
the fourth sector.36 We may observe how, on the strategic level, the third 
generation orientation already extends to a perspective on movement building 
and how concepts such as ‘networking’ and ‘coalition-building’ (especially 
between civil society actors) enter the framework. In close adherence to such 
concepts, we may observe how the third generation perspective, albeit in a less 
elaborate manner, also begins to adopt a global or transnational strategic 
orientation. The need for the mobilisation of what is recognised as the vital 
actors of people-centred development (NGOs, social movements and POs) 
beyond confined local and national borders and the formal policy processes 
seems to be recognised, if not already adopted as a crucial strategy. 
In view of the foregoing observations we may turn our attention to the final 
chapter in Getting to the 21st Century. Following on the chapter in which Korten 
sets out the seven key elements listed in 5.3.2 (that is, a clear fourth generation 
agenda), we may notice how, in his last chapter, he highlights and discusses the 
following four critical roles for voluntary action: 
× Catalysing the transformation of institutions, policies and values; 
× Monitoring and protesting abuses of power; 
× Facilitating reconciliation; 
× Providing essential community services (1990:185). 
We can assume, in the larger context of Korten’s discussion, that these four 
critical roles spell out for him the fundamental modes of action by the various 
central actors identified in 5.3.1 to achieve the transformation of the key 
elements described in 5.3.2. Yet, and this is the main purpose of the discussion in 
the remaining part of this section, we may, in addition to acknowledging the 
contents of these roles, apply Korten’s discussion of them to illustrate our 
argument of the overlapping and complementary relationship between the third 
and fourth generation modes of action. 
Fourth generation development, Korten’s discussion of the first critical role of 
catalysing systems change suggests, requires the specialised catalytic and advocacy 
skills of professional VOs. A mode of action in which the emphasis falls on “pro-
action to create positive change more than re-action to police negative 
                                                          
35 See here in particular the final two perspectives set out in 4.3.2. 
36 See 4.3.2. 
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behaviour” (1990:186, original italics), it closely overlaps with the organisational 
and policy skills emphasised in the third generation development strategic 
orientation described in Chapter Four of this study.37 It calls for specialised 
third-party voluntary agents to help people to “define, internalize and actualize a 
people-centred development vision” (1990:186). In sum, it calls for specialised 
and skilled third-party voluntary agents to activate, stimulate, inform and change 
the consciousness of the first-party agents identified in fourth generation 
development, whose advancement and orientation towards the fourth generation 
development vision cannot be assumed out of hand. 
It thus follows that fourth generation development in the above proactive sense 
does not imply bypassing the skills emphasised in the third generation 
development orientation, but builds on them. Korten stressed that the VO 
seeking to catalyse systems change needed “a change theory that provides a basis 
for focusing its interventions”. It needs “skills in social and policy analysis, 
political strategy, and public education, and it must be able to define and 
articulate policy issues clearly to lay audiences” (1990:192, italics added). As on 
the level of third generation development involvement, it calls on VOs/NGOs 
to develop new competencies. It requires them to scale-up to a level of policy 
education and advocacy that goes beyond mere lobbying to protect or increase 
levels of foreign development assistance (1990:193).  
However, and this brings us back to the difference between the two 
orientations, here, more than in third generation development action, policy 
education and advocacy take on a global orientation. It becomes a question of 
involvement in what Korten calls “the larger policy issues” that have traditionally 
been left (by the VO/NGO sector) to global role players such as the World 
Bank, IMF and bilateral donors (1990:193). It becomes a question of education 
for global citizenship38 whereby people of both North and South are brought to 
an understanding of the actions required to eliminate the causes of human 
suffering, particularly in the South, and whereby they are prepared “for active 
participation in a global transformation” (1990:187). In this latter sense, fourth 
generation strategic development orientation to a far greater extent makes an 
appeal to the conscience and value orientation of people. It follows that policy 
and institutional change are not so much achieved as a result of the interventions 
of professional agents that act in isolation from ordinary people, but by a mass of 
critical, conscientised people. Here, more than ever, the focus falls on the free 
space of what Korten calls people-to-people linkages that, through processes of 
(global) networking and alliance-building, lead to mobilised vision, action and 
ultimate change. Korten puts the concept at stake here in a nutshell in the 
following statement, which describes the role of the third-party VO/NGO as 
the catalyst and not the achiever of change: 
                                                          
37 See the whole of 4.3.3, as well as footnote 43 of Chapter Four for the references to this aspect.  
38 See in addition the definition of the ‘global citizen’ in the last paragraph of 5.3.1.3. 
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The challenge is to reach out through human networks, study 
groups and forums where people can engage and dialogue on 
critical development issues. There is a need to seek more 
opportunities for true people-to-people linkages, bringing together 
community level environmental activists, cooperative leaders, 
women’s rights activists and organizers of farm laborers from North 
and South for mutual exchange to build a shared vision and put 
their efforts in global perspective. It is appropriate that VOs of 
both North and South give more attention to strengthening and 
engaging their natural citizen constituencies in ways appropriate to 
their nature. These would all be positive steps toward transforming 
private international assistance into a people’s international 
development cooperation movement. 
In the effort to develop engaged constituencies, lessons might be 
found in the experience of the international issues network 
campaigns that have been organized over the past few years, the 
best known of which was the campaign against the promotion of 
infant formula as a substitute for breast milk. There have been 
others in seeds, pesticides and pharmaceutical drugs that have 
brought together global education and citizen action in the fullest 
sense. (1990:204) 
We may observe that it is also appropriate to understand Korten’s second critical 
role of monitoring and protesting abuses of power as not lying outside the domain 
of third generation development action. Korten pointed out that the latter role 
was an essential dimension of the transformation agenda (1990:187). By 
implication, it constitutes an essential complementary action to the first role of 
catalysing policy, institutional and value change, which is a defining aspect of the 
third generation orientation, as we have indicated. Thus, it is a role that can be 
well perceived within the wider networking, coalition-building and relational 
dynamics of the third generation orientation pointed out earlier in this section. 
While it is less to be understood as a people-to-people interaction, and more a 
people/NGO-to-government interaction (cf. 1990:146-147), in the third 
generation mode of involvement information vital to the role of monitoring and 
protest (as pointed out by Korten) can be gathered (see 1990:195). Moreover, 
and given the focus of its interaction, in the third generation mode capabilities 
and experience not so readily available in fourth generation orientations - such as 
hard core dealings and confrontations with government and the state - can be 
tapped to fulfil the role of monitoring and protest.39 
                                                          
39 As argued by Korten, the second role of monitoring and protest does not to a lesser extent assume the 
need for VOs/NGOs to develop new competencies. In this role, as in the case of the first, it is equally 
essential that the organisation has “the capacity to use the gathered information in ways that lead to 
specific political, judicial or administrative action”. It requires “capabilities in political lobbying, litigation 
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We may view Korten’s fourth critical role of implementing large-scale service 
programmes to similarly overlap with third generation development action. 
Defined by Korten as a kind of service very different from the temporary nature 
of short-term delivery of relief services (first generation) and the 
implementation of conventional development projects (second generation) 
(1990:196), Korten furthermore highlighted the systemic, sustainable and 
widespread nature of this mode of service delivery. In this manner Korten’s 
definition spells out a level of involvement that has much to gain from and 
overlaps with the third generation social learning experiences in organisational 
and institutional change referred to in the previous chapter. It is a mode of 
involvement that concentrates on such aspects as sustained self-financing, 
effective resource management, local ownership and control of resources, and 
the development of new types of technical, strategic and social skills.40 
For Korten the delivery of large-scale service programmes constitutes an 
indispensable part of a sustainable equity-led growth strategy of development. 
The aspect of immediate material, social and economic needs is thus not 
neglected in fourth generation development and is integrated with the larger 
issues of institutional and value transformation. He stressed that it was a service 
mode able to function on a national scale.41 It goes beyond what governments 
can achieve and brings new and more innovative approaches to such vital areas as 
family planning services, reforestation, basic education, small-scale credit and 
farmer’s union and cooperative organisations. While best carried out on a 
decentralised basis (as also upheld in third generation action), “more focused and 
coordinated action than characterizes the episodic, scattered and ad hoc service 
delivery activities of many NGOs” is required (1990:191, italics added). 
Ultimately, in this service mode the NGO positions itself for a long-term 
implementation role and seeks to institutionalise itself and its functions. This 
kind of strategic involvement, again, fundamentally assumes the question of 
sustained financing and how the permanent service-delivery NGO should 
                                                                                                                                              
and mobilization of public protests through the media, demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns” (1990:195, 
italics added). 
40 See 4.3.3. 
41 For Korten (1990:191) significant examples of large-scale programme implementation by NGOs that have 
managed to spread their services across wide areas and to large groups of the population on a sustainable 
basis, even on a national scale, are: CARE in Bangladesh, which through its food for work programme 
supports the construction of nearly 10 000 miles of road a year; Bangladesh Rural Advance Committee 
(BRAC), which has given training to approximately 90 percent of the households in the country in oral 
rehydration; the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which has established itself as a permanent banking 
institution and extends credit to some 589 734 members, mostly women; the Sarvodaya Shrama 
Movement in Sri Lanka, whose programmes reach over 5000 villages in Sri Lanka; PROFAMILIA in 
Columbia, whose comprehensive national-scale programmes of family planning service delivery includes 
supplies and services rendered to nearly every family in the country. 
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organise its own governance structures in order to be held accountable for 
performance by the people who depend on its services42 (1990:196). 
Thus Korten identified four critical roles for voluntary action in a fourth 
generation development context. In our closer reflection on three of the four 
roles so far, we indicated that no clear distinction can be made between the 
fourth and third generation modes. In fact, our discussion should have made it 
clear that in many instances the distinction between third and fourth generation 
action becomes blurred, that the two modes are overlapping and complementary 
units, that fourth generation development action rather builds on the perspectives, 
competencies, arrangements and processes in the third generation.  
However, this statement should not be seen as a contradiction of the initial 
statement in the first paragraph of this section about the distinctive nature of 
fourth generation development activity and its progression to a higher level of 
conscientisation and reorientation of human will and behaviour. This would be 
the meaning especially of Korten’s third critical role of facilitating reconciliation. 
A mode of action is conceptualised here that lies absolutely on the idea and value 
level of the fourth generation orientation. It represents a perspective on 
transformation and mode of interaction that cannot be captured by the third 
generation meaning. Although it constitutes only one conceptualisation of a 
value- and idea-specific role that falls completely in the fourth generation mould 
(in our assessment the seven key elements of transformation prioritised by 
Korten should make it possible to formulate further roles of this kind), it should 
be viewed as a role that is indispensable to the achievement of people-centred 
development. By implication, it is a role that becomes conditional to the 
successful execution of third generation action.  
As suggested by Korten’s discussion, such an explicit fourth generation role 
brings into consideration other actors of development - actors who are rather 
marginalised and neglected in third generation development. In this regard, and 
in close relation to Korten’s third key element of spiritual development set out 
in 5.3.2, Korten once again highlights the role of religion in achieving the goal of 
reconciliation: 
The need for reconciliation is one of the most fundamental 
development needs in our contemporary world. Religion, which 
commonly presumes to be society’s arbiter of the values that 
govern human behaviour and relationships, must surely play a 
central role. While religion is all too often invoked as the rallying 
cry of the intolerant and hateful in the cause of violence, the basic 
                                                          
42 One can assume that this will, as aspired to in both the third and fourth generation development 
orientations, imply an increasing movement towards the organisational conversion of NGOs/VOs into 
POs, whereby the people that are served truly become the primary actors of the development process. See 
4.3.2 and especially the discussion in 5.3.1.2. 
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message of all of the world’s great religious teachers has been one of 
love, brotherhood and tolerance. Those who follow in the tradition 
of these great teachers are among the most important development 
workers of our day because they are attacking a root cause of 
human suffering. (1990:189) 
We may note how Korten in his further discussion significantly gives a still 
sharper edge to his perspective on religion by juxtaposing such a reconciliatory 
role with the traditional inclination of a religious institution such as the church 
to seek its development involvement in relief and project work. This point 
recalls the charity-development juxtaposition that frames this study, as well as 
the mutual affiliation that has been described in Chapter Four between the 
churches and the NGO sector, which presents the possibility – particularly for 
the churches – of innovation in the realm of development; Korten makes the 
point as follows: 
The reconciliation agenda presents a particular challenge to 
religiously affiliated VOs. These organizations have often developed 
agendas that are indistinguishable from those of their secular 
counterparts, even while attempting to work through local 
churches as the instruments of implementation. Seldom have they 
asked whether local churches are the most appropriate organizations to 
implement well digging, food storage and road building projects. Nor 
have they asked what might be a distinctive role of the church in 
addressing the realities of underdevelopment. 
If the church as an institution is not being effective in this role, then 
a priority concern of religiously oriented development VOs should 
be to help it rediscover its mission. If the institutional church is 
incapable of this role, then the religiously oriented development VOs 
should themselves accept a responsibility to play the role of teacher in 
carrying forward the universal messages of love, brotherhood and 
reconciliation as central to their own missions. (1990:190-191, italics 
added) 
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Chapter Six 
A BROADER ARTICULATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE IDEAS1 
6.1 Introduction 
We will focus in this chapter on relating the concept of fourth generation 
strategic development action to a broader corpus of thinking that may 
complement, enrich and add to this concept; this will entail going beyond the 
work of Korten and the NGO development debate as stated in the 
introduction (5.1) of the previous chapter. The focus here will be on debates 
on development and transformation that highlight or prioritise central aspects 
in Korten’s debate, such as the new social movements, ethics and values, 
communication and, significantly, religion. The debates on these themes in 
the interrelated circle of the World Order Models Project (WOMP) and the 
journal Alternatives2 will be taken as the point of departure. While they 
certainly do not exhaust the historical debate on ‘alternatives’ and ‘alternative 
development’,3 in the debates of this circle an interpretation can be found 
that, similarly to Korten’s, assimilates the concept of development, more 
specifically the concept of alternative development,4 into wider (alternative) 
discourses on social movements, values and ethics and a global transformative 
politics. The following appreciation of this intellectual circle in an earlier 
Alternatives article by the political scientist, Bob Stauffer, which, significantly, 
is entitled “After Socialism: Capitalism, Development, and the Search for 
Critical Alternatives”, puts our focus in this chapter in perspective:  
                                                          
1 This chapter draws selectively on perspectives which have been set out by the present writer in the 
article: “Toward a Normative Politics of Global Transformation: Synthesizing Alternative Perspectives”, in 
Transnational Associations 1/97: 2-20 (1997). 
2 It can be said that the aim and scope of WOMP and Alternatives basically overlap (that is the conceptual 
advancement of a just, alternative world order) and that the latter journal serves as a primary vehicle to 
promote the views of WOMP. 
3 A demarcation of the ‘alternative development’ discourse by Jan Nederveen Pieterse, for instance, views it 
as travelling under many aliases: ‘appropriate development’, ‘participatory development’, ‘people-centred 
development’, ‘human scale development’, ‘people’s self-development’, ‘autonomous development’ and 
‘holistic development’; as well as under specific headings such as participation, participatory action 
research, grassroots movements, NGOs, empowerment, conscientisation, liberation theology, 
democratization, citizenship, human rights, development ethics, ecofeminism and cultural diversity 
(1998:351-352). For historical overviews of the origins of ‘alternative development’ approaches, which also 
give an indication of this intellectual tradition in the thinking on development’s relations to a wider range 
of sources, see furthermore Friedmann (1995:1-13) and Hettne (1995:160-206). 
4 At the beginning of Chapter Five we noted Korten’s identification with what he calls an “alternative 
development paradigm” (see specifically the quotation at the start of the chapter) and his claim that his 
theoretical framework of a fourth generation development approach, which can otherwise be called a 
‘social movement approach’ to development (see 5.2), articulates this ‘paradigm’. 
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There have been ... some new alternatives advanced in the 1980s 
that fall outside either of the old polarities, do not represent the 
middle approach just discussed, and do in fact see themselves as 
filling the space seemingly vacated by the left. Emblematic of this 
new approach is the perspective articulated by the network around 
the journal Alternatives. The journal itself publishes a variety of 
points of view, and is committed to advancing a just world order. 
No other group (with the exception, possibly, of the International 
Foundation for Development Alternatives) standing in opposition 
to the mainstream model has such a global network of contributors 
and participants in alternative development activities. Within its 
wide network, which includes the United Nations University 
system, it has sought to contribute “to the development of an 
ideology and the praxis that local grass-roots activists and social 
movements might find useful in their struggle for social 
transformation, humane governance, and a just peace,” by linking 
those involved at that level with “groups working on global 
problems in a variety of settings throughout the world.” (1990:420) 
It should be emphasised here that what is extracted from Alternatives 
publications below - at its core the journal constitutes the perspectives of 
writers intimately associated with the WOMP itself5 - can at most be viewed as 
selective aspects of the debates by this intellectual circle. Taking these aspects as 
the starting-point for our exploration, the discussion will go on to draw on ever-
widening circles of debates that bring to the alternative and fourth generation 
framework further broadening perspectives, but also problematisations of 
central assumptions. Pointing here to the problematisation of social movement 
approaches in particular, but ultimately also civil society approaches to (global) 
development and transformation, the discussion will, finally, draw on new 
communication perspectives to (global) transformation. It will be proposed that 
these new communication perspectives should redefine the latter approaches 
and, for that matter, constitute the ultimate defining notion of the fourth 
generation and alternative strategic orientation (that is, more profoundly still 
than is the case with Korten’s presentation of a communication perspective, 
which does not represent a fully worked out theory of transformation6). 
                                                          
5 See footnote 2 of this chapter. See furthermore the essays and fragments of essays that make up the second 
issue of Alternatives 19 (1994). Written for a special WOMP workshop held in Kadoma, Zimbabwe from 
January 28 - February 1, 1993, these essays give an indication of the core group of writers and the 
interrelationship between Alternatives and WOMP.  
6 See footnote 17 of Chapter Five, as well as the first quote in 5.2 and the final paragraph of 5.3.1.4. 
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6.2. Aspects of the World Order Models Project /Alternatives debates 
6.2.1 Development: assimilated into a wider political and value dynamics 
The outstanding characteristic of WOMP/Alternatives debates on development 
is the assimilation of this concept into wider political and value discourses. It 
follows that we may, from this basic definition, extract two meanings of 
development that seem to stand at the centre of these debates. 
Similarly to the emphasis in Korten’s fourth generation development perspective 
on the fourth sector, on ordinary people and POs as the primary actors of 
development, so development discourse, in the first meaning, appears to be 
assimilated into wider political discourses of radical democratisation. This 
becomes clear in an article by D L Sheth, “Alternative Development as Political 
Practice”, which can be regarded as foundational to the concept of alternative 
development in the WOMP/Alternatives circle. Suggesting with the title that 
development takes on a distinct political meaning, we may note how Sheth in 
this article distinguishes between two approaches to alternative development: 
the alternative ‘structuralist’ approach and the alternative ‘normativist’ approach 
(see 1987:156-162). 
For Sheth, however, both these alternative approaches fall short of a political 
theory and praxis by which non-state social and cultural movements/groups, or 
as Sheth also calls them, the victimised populations and their own organisations 
(1987:158), become the centres of transformative action. It follows that both 
alternative approaches have failed to disengage themselves from the mainstream 
model of development. Whereas the alternative structuralist approach can be 
appreciated for pointing out the structural injustice of the post-war model of 
development, it remains focused on the state as the primary agent to achieve 
systemic reform and transformation. Consequently, in its analytic and political 
framework the “ruling élite of the Third World countries remain, for good or 
bad, the only relevant actors for any strategy of action” (1987:158). 
In a similar way, the alternative normativist approach can be appreciated for 
bringing normative issues into the framework, such as basic human needs, 
alternative life-styles, self-reliance and ecological appropriateness (1987:160). 
Once again it remains an elitist endeavour “confined to the narrow circles of the 
counter-élites in the North and their jet-setting counterparts in the developing 
countries” (ibid.). Having, as in the case of the first approach, also no political 
scope beyond changes that are to be made in state policies (1987:162), it 
ultimately represents an approach devoid of a theory of political action that can 
make its alternative values “a basis of new consensus in the various national 
societies of the North and the South and at the micro-level of the local 
communities” (1987:160). 
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It follows that, not unlike conventional development thinking (which is 
informed by positivistic social science), these alternative approaches present 
themselves as global models of alternative development that assume universality 
for the alternative value system. Like conventional development thinking, they 
“posit another centralizing universal principle” (1987:160, original italics) that 
“ignore the vital points of difference in the existential conditions of different 
societies” (1987:162, italics added). As further argued by Sheth: 
[I]nstead of viewing alternative development as a process through 
which a plurality of competing models can emerge and coexist, 
current thinking on the subject views it in terms of the emergence 
of one universal model of alternative development which would 
replace the conventional one. 
The implied shift turns out to be from one kind of linear 
universalising principle (embodied by modernity) to another such 
principle embodied in a vision of the ‘post-industrial’ or ‘post-
modern’ society. The quest for universality ignores the fact that the 
historical, cultural and civilizational continuities that characterize 
different societies throw up different universal models around 
which their respective development may be shaped; and that it is 
through the interactions based on these empirical experiences of 
development that a new perspective on alternative development 
has to emerge ... Yet, without reference to the empirical facts and 
processes that have a role in shaping norms, the whole exercise only 
reinforces the traditional norm-setting activity of the élites - 
however benevolent and radical they may be ... The fact of the 
matter is, the consumers of development cannot be kept out of the 
process of formulation of norms of alternative development - however 
convenient this might prove for the theorists’ own critical reason. 
(1987:162-163, italics added) 
The above concept of plurality, which is fundamentally focused on the 
grassroots level and rejects any claim to universality, can be taken as the basis for 
the understanding by Sheth and other writers from the WOMP/Alternatives 
circle of the meaning of alternative development. Going for the moment beyond 
Sheth’s formulation to the understandings of other writers in this circle, it 
becomes more appropriate to speak of the notion of alternative development as 
a misnomer itself.7 Instead of using any language of ‘development’, Gustavo 
                                                          
7 With these other writers we are in fact crossing the fine line between alternative development discourse 
and what is called ‘post-development’ discourse (see e.g. Nederveen Pieterse 1998:360-364). Whereas they, 
unlike Sheth, have been arguing for the abandonment of the whole idea of ‘development’ and, thus, should 
more correctly be placed under the banner of ‘post-development’ thinkers, we nevertheless draw here on 
what can be taken as the common element between them and Sheth: the emphasis on radical democracy, 
popular participation, alternative community values and grassroots/people’s movement actors. Cf. here e.g. 
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Esteva, for instance, claimed that it becomes preferable to speak of a regeneration 
of people’s space, whereby they “carry out their projects, which are nothing else 
than to lead their own lives” (1987:147, italics added). Instead of continuing to 
theorise about development as a Third World problem, Bob Stauffer ended his 
article on the search for critical alternatives by stating that it would be much 
more viable to shift to a global theorising “that attacks the basic premises upon 
which modernisation rests, and raises a series of objections to capitalist 
development on the basis of justice, treatment of women, minorities, indigenous 
people, etc.” (1990:125-426).  
In the same vein as the former two writers, and bringing us explicitly to the 
defining concept of democracy that we pointed out at the beginning of this 
section, is Douglas Lummis’s contribution to the WOMP/Alternatives debate. 
This author argued in his article, “Development against Democracy”, that 
economic development is by nature an anti-democratic force that generates 
inequality. As a working principle, instead, ‘democracy’ promises much more in 
achieving justice, equality and diversity in the domains of economic and social 
life. Contrary to development’s homogenising impressions, it generates new 
meanings of prosperity, beyond the merely economic and one’s determined by 
different communities (see 1991:59-61).  
Coming back to Sheth, we may note how he would also apply the notion of 
democracy as a defining concept. While not as radical as the above-mentioned 
three writers in the sense of rejecting outright the concept of ‘development’,8 he 
observed that “(t)he crux of any politics for alternative development ... [lies] in 
integrating into its theory an empirical model of democracy which treats the 
legitimisation of values and institutions as an open process” (1987:164). In 
contrast to the alternative approaches referred to earlier, in which the dominant 
or counter-elites act as the legitimisers of the institutional and normative 
structures in a society, this democratic model always presumes a society that 
allows the interplay of various legitimisation processes - “through critical analyses 
as well as through real-life conflicts, struggles and integrative movements of 
ideas and action” (ibid.). 
For Sheth the grassroots movements, as the representation of the concrete 
struggles of the people, are the locus from where a theory of action for 
alternative development will emerge. A basic condition for this to happen is for 
the activists of the movements to “become their own theorists and the theorists 
to find authentication of their thinking through their own role located within 
the movements” (1987:165). Sheth distinguishes between two broad types of 
grassroots movements, namely non-political developmental and non-party 
                                                                                                                                              
Nederveen Pieterse’s (1998:363) observation of the “inconsistencies” in post-development discourse and his 
analysis of one particular ‘post-development’ writer (Arturo Escobar), where he concluded that the latter 
ultimately gave “no clear delineation between anti-development and alternative development”. 
8 See the previous footnote. 
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political formations, and, according to him, it is in the activities of organisations 
of the latter kind that the seeds of an alternative development politics are 
visible. However, while they invest their energies in issues that affect the poor, 
that is, issues that are usually not taken up by political parties, for Sheth the 
crucial question remains whether such actions can move beyond the 
conventional political arena “of pressure groups, away from the power of the 
state and towards the creation of people’s own power and organizations” (1987:166-
167, italics added). Drawing on the experiments of grassroots movements in 
Latin America and Asia he continues by stating that:  
Creative action for alternatives is most unlikely to come either 
from experts or expertise-oriented developmental groups or from 
any kind of political mobilization active within the state system. In 
my view, it can come only from non-state actors operating at the 
interface of the state and the society, the interface between politics 
and culture. Some experiments in this direction are being 
undertaken by various groups in Latin America and Asia. They 
focus primarily on generating new social knowledge for alternative 
development, and on activating networks of people’s organizations 
for working out their own solutions for the problems they face. 
The method employed is of dialogues, interactions and participative 
action research (PAR). (1987:167) 
In a concluding note Sheth observed that the existing grassroots movements for 
alternative development, such as those in Latin America and Asia, were 
consequently shifting their battleground to a larger arena of society and culture. 
Their political agenda, beyond mainstream politics, “is of further 
democratization not only of the political institutions but of the family, the 
community, the workplace and society at large”. Their political thinking does 
not stop at transforming the structures. It goes beyond this aspiration to achieve 
integrity of values and action at a personal level; the practice of life-styles 
appropriate to their idea of alternative development.9 A ‘life politics’ that can 
best be described as societics, it constitutes the political activity of individuals 
and organisations directed to the transformation of consciousness and 
organisations, especially of the non-state organisations in society (1987:168). 
For Sheth, however, the proliferation of such actual movements for alternative 
development does not constitute the only remaining challenge. Striking a note 
that runs as a core through the WOMP/Alternatives debates, and that links the 
                                                          
9 Cf. here Gustavo Esteva’s identification of “hospitality” as the normative concept that ultimately defines 
his alternative community of peasants, urban marginals and de-professionalised intellectuals (see 1987:137-
140). Consequently, this similar emphasis on alternative community values also suggests the thin line 
distinguishing alternative development and post-development discourses in the context of 
WOMP/Alternatives debates. 
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first meaning of development in these debates with the second meaning set out 
below, he finally pointed out the need for a far more coordinated coalition 
politics between the grassroots movements for alternative development. The 
reason for this was that the grassroots movements for alternative development 
were still very embryonic and dispersed in character. For these movements the 
challenge remained to work their new politics from the bottom up in order to let 
their impact be felt at the national and global levels. In other words, a macro 
theory of transformative political action was required, “based on the values and 
practice of democracy and which has the synthesising potentials for integrating 
the perspective and actions of various issue-based movements in a larger 
framework of transformation” (1987:168-169).  
* * * * * 
The second meaning of development in WOMP/Alternatives debates again 
shows a close similarity with Korten’s understanding of fourth generation 
development in the sense of integrating development discourse into global social 
movement and value discourse, but also goes beyond Korten to focus more on 
the question of world order. Here, almost to the same extent as in the first 
meaning, development discourse appears to be assimilated into wider political 
discourses of global governance and global institutional and structural 
transformation.  
We can begin by observing that it is a meaning that is well formulated in the 
editorial statement by Rajni Kothari in the first issue of Alternatives. In this 
statement, which set out the scope of the new journal and WOMP, Kothari 
made it clear that the concept of ‘alternatives’ goes beyond development 
discourse when he stated that: 
Alternatives is a conception not just in the theory of development. It 
entails a model of and a perspective for world order and the 
transformation entailed for such a world order. It is an exercise in 
values and their realization at various levels of reality, always taking 
account of cultural diversities but also of the unities that inform 
these diversities. It is not just a different kind of model for China or 
India or Tanzania (or Brazil) that one is seeking out though no 
doubt these and other models provide a very large scope for 
learning and criticism and action. One is also concerned about the 
making of a different kind of world conceived as a set of 
interrelationships. Without seeking to alter these interrelationships 
the effort to alter individual societies is not likely to go very far. 
This is the great change that has taken place in human affairs, the 
global setting in which they have to be conducted. (1975:5, italics 
added) 
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Following from Kothari’s initial formulation, in WOMP/Alternatives debates the 
question of global structural and institutional transformation would thus take 
precedence over the issue of development. In this sense, it could be taken as a 
response to D L Sheth’s above-mentioned recognition of the need for a macro 
theory to address the need for change at the global level. In close resemblance to 
the principle of radical democracy spelled out in the first meaning above, it 
ought to be an approach to world order transformation – as was spelled out 
some twenty years later by one of the prominent spokespersons of WOMP – 
that acknowledges and celebrates difference and resists “totalizing modes of 
thought, organization, and technological capability, whether these are rooted in 
secularisms of the West or in the fundamentalisms that hide out in the traditions 
of the great world traditions” (Falk 1994:146). In other words, in terms of Sheth 
and the other writers of the first meaning’s concern with the issue of 
transformation, it is an approach that aims to achieve institutional and structural 
change at a global level, precisely to complement, protect and sustain the 
multiple of different spaces at the local level.  
It would, however, be stated in WOMP/Alternatives debates that the emphasis 
on difference does not mean the discontinuation of all descriptive and predictive 
discourse. World order discourse (in the alternative sense) indeed implies some 
descriptive and predictive element pertaining to the social totality and aggregate 
common good of humanity as a whole (political, economic, social and cultural) 
(Falk 1994:146). To reflect on a political project to constitute a global polity 
could very well be regarded as “necessary to the construction of a radical 
imaginary” (Ruiz 1994:254). 
It can be said that in WOMP/Alternatives debates the descriptive and predictive 
element is, ultimately, rather to be found in these debates’ drawing of the 
contours of the alternative world order that they envision, based on the guiding 
principle of plurality. As evident from an article by Lester Ruiz, in WOMP 
discourse the affirmation of plurality has a two-fold significance. Ruiz pointed 
out that the principle of plurality, on the one hand, presupposes the recognition 
of different centres of power10 challenging the centralising logics in many of 
modernity’s projects. These different centres of power function as dislocatory 
practices that put in question the institutional logics that are hegemonic, and 
they underscore the historical and contingent character of these logics and 
practices. On the other hand, plurality also points to different constructions of 
community and identity, alternative forms of knowledge and being, and different 
political strategies (1994:254).  
                                                          
10 From a constructive/proactive point of view, David Held, another writer from the WOMP/Alternatives 
circle, emphasised the need for a “politics of empowerment” (1994:221). He subsequently identified “seven 
clusters of rights” that “are necessary to enable people to participate on free and equal terms in the 
regulation of their own associations: health, social, cultural, civil, economic, pacific, and political rights” 
(1994:228). 
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But, and this can be taken to be the ultimate drift of Ruiz’s analysis, drawing the 
contours does not mean spelling out the contents of an alternative world order. 
Whereas (as suggested by the above description) the functioning and nature of 
the existing order clearly points to what an alternative world order should not 
be, the principle of plurality spells out the limits to any attempt to determine 
the contents of an alternative order. As Ruiz pointed out, this principle 
underscores “not only the impossibility of a fixed positivity but of genuinely 
other spaces for the construction of transformative cultural practices”. For here, 
similar to the principle of radical democracy in the first meaning above, all fixed 
imaginaries can only be defined by the yet undefined specificities of the 
multiplicity of subjects (in a world of difference) and their dislocatory practices: 
Precisely because of this multiplicity of subjects and subject 
positions, which function as dislocatory practices, we understand 
that our frameworks and perspectives - indeed, our preferred 
worlds and transition strategies - are radically contingent, 
precarious, historical. We are brought face to face with our end, 
with our limits ... the fact of our limits puts us in proximity with 
what might be called the constitutive outside of the limit itself, 
which is an absence. But, this absence is not a lack. In fact, it is the 
dimension of mystery - of the nonconceptualizable, of the 
unimaginable - that is the condition for articulating transformative 
cultural practices that are fundamentally new and better.  
(1994:254-255) 
From a different angle Richard Falk, in particular, came to define the contours of 
an alternative world order in WOMP/Alternatives debates in terms of a 
discourse on values. In contrast to what he referred to as the hegemonic and 
totalising nature of post-Cold War geopolitics, which is also referred to as the 
‘new world order’, Falk emphasised the different category of world order 
thinking to which WOMP belongs (1994:145-146). Whereas the WOMP cannot 
escape a certain descriptive and prescriptive element, as indicated earlier, it 
according to Falk remains in essence a normative project and not a hegemonic 
one (in the totalising sense). It is normative in the sense that it has in view a 
“(n)ew world order ... to be created by a combination of social forces acting 
effectively and on behalf of such world order values as non-violence, economic and 
social justice, human rights and democracy, and environmental quality”. It is also 
normative in the sense that it is informed and inspired by a moral “desire to 
improve the human condition by direct political action, deploying means that 
reject violence, respect truth, and rest their confidence upon democracy as both 
process and outcome” (1994:146).  
It thus follows from Falk’s definition that in WOMP/Alternatives debates the 
contours of an alternative world order is most pertinently defined by a particular 
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set of global values. As these values are global or universal in nature, the 
multiple actors for an alternative world order must overcome their ‘politics of 
difference’ through these values and find a common political purpose, but 
without forsaking their different identities and localities again.  
Consequently, in the context of such a global values discourse ‘development’ (in 
accordance with Rajni Kothari’s initial statement) would still be taken as a 
defining concept in WOMP/Alternatives debates, albeit as only one element of a 
broader, integrated package. We may note how this is, for instance, clearly 
illustrated in an article by Roger Coate, Chadwick Alger and Ronnie Lipschutz, 
which presents a rather favourable picture of an ongoing process towards a new 
global values construct. According to these authors, new nations, states and 
movements, in the context of UN fora and elsewhere, had increasingly gained 
access to an ongoing dialogue on global values in global governance, thereby 
shaping definitions of values that have acquired growing global relevance and 
legitimacy. According to Coate et al., it is now possible to summarise this 
dialogue in terms of four widely accepted global values: peace (non-violence), 
development (economic well-being) human rights and ecological balance 
(1996:102-103).  
They point out that in recent years the latter four values had in fact been 
integrated into what is, by now, largely a single dialogue. They argued that peace 
movements increasingly accepted that the full meaning of peace does not only 
pertain to the notion of non-violence, but also to development, human rights 
and ecological balance. At the same time, it was increasingly accepted that 
human rights must include not only civil or political rights, but also economic, 
social and cultural rights, and environmental justice. But significantly, the notion 
of development had also gone through a continual process of redefinition, from 
Western economic growth models to self-reliance of Third World states, to 
fulfilling the basic needs of people, to people deciding for themselves what their 
basic needs are (that is, local self-reliance). And to this a fourth significant 
development towards a single values construct could be added, namely the 
integration of ecological balance into a single dialogue. Coate et al. argued that, 
as a consequence of ongoing dialogue about its meaning, ecological balance had 
subsumed the dimensions of development, human rights and peace. But also, as 
significant as the latter ecological determination had been, the tendency by many 
involved in the present effort to define global values is to use a broadly defined 
notion of peace as a paramount global value that is inclusive of all the above-
mentioned four value dimensions (ibid.).  
Thus, in WOMP/Alternatives debates development has come to be referred to as a 
global value, shaped by but also shaping other global values. This observation, as 
in the case of Korten’s depiction of fourth generation development, brings us 
finally back to an integration of development discourse into social movement 
discourse. Viewing ‘development’ as an explicit value would at first glance 
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appear to contradict the assimilation of this concept into democratic discourse in 
the first meaning set out above. At the same time, this tension between the two 
meanings would seem to be dissolved, at least partly, by the direct link that is 
made in WOMP/Alternatives debates between values and the new social 
movements. 
The case in point is well made in an article by Richard Falk on “The Global 
Promise of Social Movements”, in which he identifies the following “mutually 
reinforcing set of predominant features” to shape a transformed world: security, 
development, environment, governance and worldview (or ethos). Thus, as in the 
case of Coate et al., ‘development’ would be identified by Falk as one aspect of a 
broader ‘value package’ that is to define the contours of an alternative world 
order. In addition Falk relied on the new social movements to actualise the 
different aspects or values, including development. For him these movements 
presently embody “our best hopes for challenging established and oppressive 
political, economic, and cultural arrangements at levels of social complexity, 
from the interpersonal to the international” (1987:173). Moreover, and 
particularly hopeful for the actualisation of the above-mentioned aspects or 
values, according to Falk, a process (very similar to the identification by Coate et 
al. of a single, integrated dialogue on values above) has evolved by which “the 
new social movements are losing some of their particularity by expressing a 
certain overall commitment to the future that draws on common elements” 
(1987:189). 
In WOMP/Alternatives debates, following Falk’s perspective, it can therefore 
firstly be said that the new social movements have been valued as the primary 
actors or carriers of the core values framing their world order perspective. 
Secondly, and derived from the first point, it can be said that a core ‘alternative’ 
value such as development has come to be reinterpreted in terms of the new 
social movements politics. For Falk, it is by means of such a reinterpretation that 
there is no longer any need “to conceive of development in an austere form that 
reduces the world to a common subsistence standard, an ordeal of grayness” 
(1987:191). He further explained: 
Development can be shaped in many satisfying, acceptable 
directions, but the constructive use of resources for positive human 
needs is a unifying theme. 
This ideal contrasts with current actualities: wasteful resources, and 
environmentally-destructive patterns of production; dedication of 
resources to military and paramilitary purposes, and to luxuries 
despite large sectors of acute poverty within existing states and in 
certain regions. The prevailing forms of social accounting and 
market mechanisms allocate resources in a manner that frustrates 
efforts to use resources for human betterment in an ecological-
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sustainable manner ... It seems possible to conceive of the 
emergence of developmental pluralism that is constrained by a 
shared cultural notion of human need and dignity. Without 
sentimentalizing the distant past, indigenous peoples seemed to 
achieve such developmental balance in a variety of societal and 
tribal forms, in settings informed by reverence for nature and by an 
underlying ethos of stewardship and conservation. Whether post-
modern society, and societies at various stages of industrialization, 
can reconstitute such a cultural grounding for positive development 
is uncertain. At the very least, social movements seem alive to this 
crucial reorientation based on values, not on lifting encumbrances 
from the operations of the market or assuring that production 
processes are nominally controlled by the working class. (Ibid., 
italics added)  
It follows that, in Falk’s interpretation, the notion of development does not 
completely dissolve in democratic and other socio-political discourse as in the 
first meaning set out above. It is sustained as an economically and politically 
specific concept that, in terms of Falk’s definition, indicates the constructive use 
of economic resources for positive human ends. Thus, in this sense, development 
acquires universal meaning and is applied to human society as a whole. At the 
centre (for Falk) of this redefinition of development, which is both potential and 
dormant, are the new social movements. They are the agents of a new ‘value 
politics’ that, through their converging and mobilising dynamics, are also 
reorientating the meaning of development (such as informing it with the value 
of ecological sustainability). At the same time, however, they do not contradict 
the pluralistic principle that determines the first meaning set out above. They 
represent, in their transnational and global manifestations, a continuation of the 
non- or anti-statist politics in the first meaning (see Falk 1987:175). They 
represent a ‘globalisation from below’ and depend on the democratising struggles 
in local spaces for their fuller articulation (ibid.). They incorporate into their 
ideological and political struggles the pluralistic cultural, social and ecological 
meanings in local spaces and make them the basis of their global articulations. 
Moreover, in their converging dynamics they shape (or are envisioned as 
shaping) the meaning of development. 
6.2.2 New religious appraisal 
In what can be nothing more here than a brief overview of such expressions, we 
may note how a positive reappraisal of religion as a force of transformation also 
constitutes a significant feature of WOMP/Alternatives debates.11 As in the case 
of Korten’s perspective on fourth generation strategic development, writers of 
                                                          
11 The bulk of articles from this circle that focus on religion are found in the second issue of Alternatives XIII 
(1988). 
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these debates have likewise been confronted with the question of the actors that 
will promote and establish the new global values construct that they envision. 
They, as in the case of Korten, have appreciated the role that religious traditions 
and institutions at their best12 can play as allies and expressions of the new social 
movements, the primary agents of the values that are appreciated. 
At the WOMP workshop mentioned earlier,13 Robert Johansen, for instance, 
expressed the positive inclination towards religion in WOMP/Alternatives 
circles well. In a fourth of six suggestions for strengthening the implementation 
aspects of the Project’s past focus on preferred worlds, he focused on the role of 
religion. In Johansen’s evaluation the participants in WOMP needed “to give 
more attention to the role of religious traditions in resisting and in promoting the 
implementation of preferred values” (1994:158). Johansen argued that religious 
traditions had enormous assets at their disposal - material, organisational, 
educational and spiritual - that can be employed for good or ill in shaping a new 
world order. Many affinities also existed between religious groups and the 
Project that had not been utilised. He explained: 
Religious traditions are value based, as is WOMP. Religious 
traditions at their best extol the value of human life and justice, 
despite the tendency of political and religious leaders to use their 
own traditions to deny the implementation of those values for 
others. The major religious traditions preach against viewing the 
state as the highest authority, as does the Project. At their best they 
stand above or against national parochialism; in this posture they 
parallel the transnational emphasis of the Project. Religious leaders 
are often experienced in calling for major attitudinal change, which 
the Project also seeks. Both attempt to develop support for doing 
what is “good,” even when the political effectiveness of such actions 
is not immediately evident. (1994:159) 
In an earlier Alternatives article Richard Falk, in a similar positive way, drew the 
link between the new social movements and contemporary progressive religion. 
According to Falk, the efforts by social movements to reshape the cultural 
ground of politics not only offered new challenges and opportunities for 
churches to join in the process of resistance and renewal, but churches and 
clergy themselves had, throughout the 1980s, provided resources, facilities and 
crucial encouragement to the social movements. For Falk, furthermore, a 
religious element could also be seen as “congenial with the anti-materialist, anti-
secular character of the new movements, as well as with their universalistic 
                                                          
12 As the discussion has indicated to a limited extent in this subsection (6.2.2), such positive appraisal of the 
role of religion by no means implies that the writers concerned are underplaying the countervailing effects 
of religion as a powerful source of fundamentalist thought, conflict and violence. 
13 See footnote 5 of this chapter. 
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sense of human identity” (1987:185). Pointing in a later article to the role of the 
churches in democratic and political struggles in, amongst other countries, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, South Africa, South Korea and the Philippines, Falk 
concluded that a Christian presence had in fact emerged “at the centre of radical 
opposition politics” in many contexts of the Third World. Yet, it was not only in 
the Third World that a constructive pattern of religion and political 
interpenetration had occurred. Falk subsequently pointed to the case of the 
Solidarity Movement in Poland, but also to a less focused, “yet ... definite 
reassertion of religious presence on many political battlefields” in Western 
Europe and the United States (1988:383-385). 
For Falk, then, the present-day “extraordinary recovery of religious ways of 
understanding human experience” could be understood as a dimension of a new 
postmodern societal condition or awareness (1988:379-380). Although he himself 
distinguished between varieties of postmodern expressions,14 postmodernism 
could, according to Falk, also be understood as an emerging new sensitivity and 
political dynamics that are reacting against “the destructiveness and spiritual 
dryness of modernism” (1988:381) and, consequently, are seeking “to recreate a 
human future by introducing considerations of ecology and spirituality” 
(1988:380). In terms of a broad categorisation, postmodern religion could be 
viewed as existing in two forms. Firstly, it had manifested itself within the main 
religious tradition through new interpretations of the ‘spiritual’ that emphasises 
the liberation of individuals and groups from oppressive conditions (such as in 
liberation theology,15 of which the above-mentioned participation of churches in 
political and democratic struggles in Third and First World contexts can be 
taken as expressions). Secondly, it had also asserted itself outside of formal 
religious traditions through a new overall interpretation of the meaning of life, 
one that goes beyond rationalist inquiry and derives significance from its close 
connection with nature (as expressed in ‘deep ecology’, for instance) 
(1988:381).16 
We may conclude this brief overview with a more pertinent statement by 
writers of the WOMP/Alternatives circle of what the nature or profile of the 
religious formation they recognised as an important partner in a ‘project’ of 
global transformation (following Johansen’s statement above, but also Falk’s 
                                                          
14 Another type or variety of postmodernism, which underlines our comment in footnote 12 of this chapter, 
is, according to Falk, one that reasserts the centrality of literal readings of religious interpretations of 
human experience. A primary example of this kind of postmodernism was the theocratic regime in 
Khomeini’s Iran (1988:380). 
15 See in this regard Pablo Richard’s reflection (that is, in an Alternatives article in the same issue mentioned 
in footnote 11 of this chapter) on the significance of the Ecclesial Base Communities (CEBs) in Latin 
America, which is discussed in more detail in 7.3.1. 
16 Elsewhere in this article Falk also defined this second form of religious postmodernism as predominantly 
anti-ecclesiastical and nontheistic in its expression and belief, but which nonetheless “tap[s] into religious 
feeling in the sense of confirming the sacred and viewing human destiny in nonmaterialist spiritual 
respects”. He furthermore referred to the Green Movement as a good example of this kind of religious 
postmodernism (1988:380). 
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positive appraisal) should be and should not be. Adamant that the dark side and 
countervailing effects of religion should be clearly spelled out,17 Falk, for 
instance, emphasised that fundamentalisms were obviously excluded, that is 
“those religiously-oriented initiatives that rely on violence, seek to transform the 
state into a theocracy, and fail to incorporate the whole of humanity into their 
professed imagery of salvation” (1987:185). Adhering to such an all-inclusive 
incorporation, the religious ideal thus pertains to an anti-imperialist and non-
expansionist religious attitude and practice that, in the words of Ashis Nandy, 
involves “the recovery of religious tolerance” that sustains “diversities and co-
existence in the matter of faith”. Accordingly, it points to a rediscovering of the 
non-Western meaning of “secularism” of “equal respect for all religions”, 
implying a “space for a continuous dialogue among religious traditions and 
between the religious and the secular - that, in the ultimate analysis, each major 
faith ... includes within it an in-house version of the other faiths both as an 
internal criticism and as a reminder of the diversity of the theory of 
transcendence” (1988:180-181). 
We may finally point to Lester Ruiz’s notion of theology as a critical theory and 
practice of transformation for an understanding of religion in the positive sense 
(that is, in the context of the WOMP/Alternatives understanding). Making a 
fundamental distinction between religion per se and theology (the latter denoting 
critical reflection on the religious and human totality), Ruiz’s positive conception 
relating to religion pertains to a critical theological discourse that “is at once 
public, critical and transformative”. It rejects the uncritical identification of 
theological and political discourse, while at the same time “celebrat[ing] their 
inextricable relatedness”. In this sense, it expresses itself as a ‘politics of 
transformation’ that, ultimately, is directed towards the “creation and nurtur[ing] 
of “fundamentally new and better relationships””, that is, relationships between 
human beings, between humanity and nature, and between the human and the 
sacred (1988:156-157). 
6.3 The ‘beyond a social movements approach’18 
The special place allocated by David Korten and the writers from the circle of 
WOMP/Alternatives to the role of the new social movements in global 
transformation - into which the question of (local and global) alternative and 
people-centred development has largely been assimilated - has clearly been 
spelled out up to this point in the chapter. Yet this cannot be a complete 
analysis of the perspectives coming particularly from the latter circle, as we may 
also find amongst its writers a broader perspective that emphasises what writers 
                                                          
17 See footnote 12 of this chapter. 
18 This subsection to a great extent represents a continuing discussion of WOMP/Alternatives perspectives. 
However, the reliance on publications outside the journal Alternatives and perspectives by writers who are 
not necessarily directly associated with the intellectual circle of WOMP/Alternatives (see next footnote), 
make it necessary to separate the discussion here from the discussion of the aspects in 6.2.  
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outside this circle have come to formulate as the need to move “beyond a social 
movements approach” (Shaw 1994:647-667; see also Finger 1994:48-65; Walker 
1994:669-700).  
Martin Shaw, who is one such writer outside the direct circle of 
WOMP/Alternatives, contends that, while the study of social movements is 
indeed important, a ‘social movements approach’ that privileges social 
movements as uniquely important social phenomena for transformation, “has 
serious limitations for the study of global and interstate politics”. As a corrective 
it is argued, instead, “that a broader and more complex ‘civil society’ approach is 
likely to be more theoretically adequate and empirically sustainable” (1994:665, 
italics added; see also 651-653).  
With reference to the intellectual circle of WOMP/Alternatives, it can be said 
that Shaw’s and other writers’ concept of a civil society approach, or rather a 
global civil society approach to transformation, has come to problematise the 
prospects of a new and alternative world order and values construct envisioned 
and worked for by this circle (cf. e.g. Walker 1994:669-700; Lipschutz 1992:389-
42019). Without totally neglecting the claims that such a process (of realising a 
new and alternative world order and values construct) has in fact developed a 
momentum of its own, particularly through the dynamics of the new social 
movements, a civil society approach otherwise emphasises the fundamental need 
for a more effective and deliberate coalition of progressive, alternative actors or 
forces to push forward the true global reach of the alternative agenda. 
In accordance with our observation in the first paragraph of this section, at this 
point it should more pertinently be pointed out how writers from the circle of 
WOMP/Alternatives in fact articulate the need for a coalition politics that 
encompasses more than the sum total of social movements. They conclude that 
global transformative action “will have to come from global civil society - from 
all its levels” including the United Nations system (Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 
1996:118), and propose a “global political party” of issue-specific oppositional 
institutions and organisations20 (Kreml and Kegley 1996:123-133). 
A more explicit problematisation of the new social movements by Rajni 
Kothari, a central figure in WOMP/Alternatives debates, furthermore illustrates 
the point. Kothari concluded that “the biggest failure of what are known as new 
social movements … [lies] in their inability to become part of a united political 
movement” (1993:134, italics added). Instead, the new social movements have 
been incapable of defying the basic establishment and have been coopted by the 
mainstream system (1993:131-133). Elsewhere in this writing, Kothari reiterated 
                                                          
19 Of the three writers referred to here, the latter two have also published in Alternatives and Walker, in 
particular, can be associated with the closer circle of WOMP. However, in this case they constitute a 
distinguishable group together with Shaw, as the references here represent publications in the journal 
Millennium rather than Alternatives. 
20 See in this regard also footnote 24 of this chapter. 
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his point that there is a need for a more effective global counter-politics, adding 
that for him: 
 ...the real answer to the present turbulence is the only civilized 
alternative to both the globalizing and ethnicizing trends, namely a 
worldwide federal democratic movement, both political and social, 
which alone is capable of responding to the demands for the self-
determination of regions and ethnic groups as well as the struggles 
for equity and justice. Only such a movement can respond to the 
genuine need of transcending national boundaries and 
experimenting with various supranational formations that can deal 
with new socioeconomic needs, new ideas of organizing human 
collectivities, and the growth of new identities. (1993:128) 
Against this background we can return to the concept of global civil society as 
an expression of the ultimate relational and strategic formation in the ‘alternative 
project’ for transformation. Taking firstly as our guiding framework perspectives 
from publications outside the journal Alternatives, but secondly also from 
Alternatives publications, we propose that the perspective on a global civil 
society approach can be summarised in the following points: 
(i) It appears in this approach that an emphasis on social movements – at 
grassroots, national and transnational levels – remains vital. It is argued that the 
contemporary social movements do not only represent a transformative ‘politics 
of difference’. In terms of R B J Walker’s identification, these movements also 
represent a “politics of connections” and a “politics of movement” that are to be 
regarded as absolutely crucial to a transformative, normative global politics. As 
Walker pointed out, while a “politics of connections” does not necessarily 
indicate a “politics of a united front or a counterhegemonic strategy”, social 
movements do indeed connect, converse, learn from each other, and sometimes 
develop partial solidarities. Moreover, these movements are the embodiment of 
a “politics of movement” that cannot be fully captured by territorial form and 
transcends the spatiotemporal relations and identities of modernity (1994:699). 
As such, these movements represent a politics that may be located in a 
particular space and place, but which, at the same time, are also in a process of 
constant dislocation, always on the move, always expanding, always linking 
somewhere, while also dislocating and moving elsewhere/somewhere/ 
everywhere. In Walker’s words: 
A politics of movement cannot be grasped through categories of 
containment. A politics of connections cannot be grasped through a 
metaphysics of inclusions and exclusion, whether of insides and 
outsides or aboves and belows ... An empirical analysis of social 
movements, and an interpretation of their significance for what a 
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world politics might become, does not have to be bound by the 
prejudices of modernity. On the contrary, these prejudices can only 
ensure that the fine lines separating us from them can never be 
transgressed. An empirical reading of social movements might show 
that these fine lines are being transgressed all the time. (1994:700) 
It can thus be suggested that Walker’s notion of a “politics of movement” and a 
“politics of connections” may well be extended to our defining concept in this 
study of a ‘politics of ideas’,21 whereby social movements in their local, national 
and transnational manifestations are in fact spreading and establishing a new 
construct of common values and ideas throughout the world, which is to be seen 
as the ultimate determining factor for positive structural change.22 Moreover, 
notwithstanding the absence of apparent links among social movements, such a 
‘politics of ideas’ can be said to constitute a ‘politics of connections’ in the 
strongest sense of the word, as it slowly brings into existence a new global values 
construct (together with other actors from civil society!), the ultimate binding 
factor of a decisive global transformative politics. 
(ii) It appears in a global civil society approach that the actual transformative role 
of social movements must also be problematised. In this sense a ‘global civil society 
approach’ directly challenges the overestimation of social movements in what 
has been identified above as a social movement approach. More specifically, the 
former approach challenges and problematises the notion of a grand political 
strategy of transformation with which social movements might be associated. It 
appeals to Walker’s rectification of what a ‘politics of connections’ and a ‘politics 
of movement’ are not:  
It makes intuitive sense to countenance the spatial extension of a 
movement here to a movement there, to envisage a convergence of 
progressive forces acting across those merely artificial boundaries 
that offend planetary integrity and species identity. Similarities and 
connections are all too readily translated into grand philosophies of 
history that point upwards to the projected vision of a global civil 
society, a global governance, and a properly world politics. 
(1994:699) 
Following from this qualification by Walker, it can therefore be said that a 
global civil society approach raises some doubts about the actual impact of social 
movements in a world politics. In reaction to those points of views favouring or 
emphasising the significance of social movements, a global civil society approach 
                                                          
21 See the introduction of this study. 
22 We are here again referring to our point of departure in this study that values and ideas are to be seen as 
the determining factor in achieving structural change. 
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asks whether social movements are in fact challenging “the constitutive practices 
of modern politics” (Walker 1994:672). To quote Walker again: 
Judged from the real heights of statecraft, social movements are but 
mosquitos on the evening breeze, irritants to those who claim 
maturity and legitimacy at the centres of political life. Some 
mosquitos, of course, can have deadly effects. Some movements, it 
can be claimed, have had tremendous impact on states, societies, 
economies and cultures. But even large movements are difficult to 
take seriously once compared to the might and reach of a properly 
world politics. (1994:669) 
As a series of further negations of an absolutised social movement approach, a 
global civil society approach similarly comes to ask: (i) whether many of the 
movements (such as the green movement, Green Peace) have not been coopted 
by the system (Kothari 1993:133-138); (ii) whether social movements are in fact 
political actors at all (Shaw 1994:652; Kothari 1993:134; Sheth 1987:166-167); (iii) 
whether social movements are in fact instruments of mass mobilisation (Shaw 
1994:653) and in any way representatives of a focused and central politics of 
transformation, that is given the “specificity of locations and traditions” 
characterising them (Walker 1994:690), their episodic, and in many cases, 
narrow ‘political objectives’, and their tendency towards a middle-class bias 
particularly in the North (Shaw 1994:653-654); and (iv) crucially, whether they 
(social movements) are not dependent on the other actors of civil society as well 
as formal political parties for their impact, for bringing about the world of 
transformed relations, policies and structures that they are envisioning. It is in 
view of such a problematisation that we can find important guidance in the 
following concluding statement by Martin Shaw of social movement’s 
dependence on a wider range of actors and institutions for their meaningful 
political articulation: 
Social movements depend closely on the other institutions of civil 
society. On the one hand, although they are widely seen as 
bypassing traditional institutions such as parties, churches and trade 
unions, they also exist in relation to these. They are often 
dependent on political parties, in particular, in order to translate 
social movement demands into political agenda items which have a 
serious chance of turning into state policy. Social movements also 
depend on a wider ideological discourse, which develops through 
university intellectuals but also through interchange with Green 
and traditional left-wing parties, through the mass media, and 
through other networks in civil society. In this way, as in others, 
social movements cannot be seen as completely distinctive social 
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phenomena, but are embedded in the larger complex of 
relationships in civil society. They overlap and share many 
characteristics with other civil society institutions. (1994:666) 
(iii) It follows from the second point above that a global civil society approach 
thus recognises the dependence of social movements on a wider range of civil society 
and political actors for meaningful political articulation. Stated differently, it 
follows that this approach is characterised by the basic principle of 
interdependence, whereby it is acknowledged that all actors or institutions of civil 
society, including states and political parties that are seriously addressing the 
question of a new sustainable and just world, are dependent on each other to obtain 
their common goal. 
In stipulating this interdependence, however, we are reminded by Martin Shaw 
that the existence of global civil society is still more potential than actual and 
that it is (regrettably) only following relatively slowly on economic globalisation, 
which has gathered momentum very rapidly (1994:655). Nevertheless, at the 
same time Shaw also identified at least three major types of institutions that 
comprise an emergent (albeit not yet fully developed) global civil society. Being 
expressions of already transnational (global) linkages, networks and collective 
organisations, they are: (a) formal organisations linking national institutions 
(organisations of parties, churches, unions, professions, educational bodies, 
media, etc.); (b) linkages of informal networks and movements (e.g. women’s 
and peace groups/movements); and (c) globalist organisations that are 
established with a specific global orientation, global membership and activity of 
global scope (e.g. Amnesty, Greenpeace, Medicines sans Frontières) (1994:650). 
In a global civil society approach, however, the quest for greater political action 
remains. As evident from Shaw’s perspective, this approach does not disregard 
the fact that a mobilising process towards a global civil society - a collectivity of 
interlinking groups of actors in globalised political, economic and social 
processes - may have come into motion already. But it otherwise poses the 
remaining challenge for movements and institutions of civil society to 
purposefully and strategically work for more effective and binding relationships, 
networks and coalitions that may ultimately capacitate them to influence 
meaningfully and in a decisive way (as a collective force) and change interstate 
relationships and the process of global governance. Coate, Alger and Lipschutz 
make the the point as follows: 
What remains a major challenge is how such bodies [from civil 
society aspiring/pursuing a sustainable development approach], as 
well as other even more amorphous collectivities such as scientists 
and opinion communities, can be integrated effectively into global 
governance processes and the work of IGOs. In addition, global 
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norms as they relate to people-centred development need to bloom 
from the roots up, not from the top down. For this actually to 
happen, the numerous and varied social groupings with which 
people most closely identify in the context of any particular issue 
setting - whether they be transnational social movements, religious 
orders, economic groupings, legal/political units, or whatever - 
need to be viewed and treated as acceptable partners for 
transnational cooperation and collaboration. (1996:111-112) 
6.4 An alternative communications dynamics 
The key point is that electronic media (including not only 
television and radio, but all forms of communication, such as 
newspapers and the Internet) have become the privileged space of 
politics. Not that all politics can be reduced to images, sounds, or 
symbolic manipulation. But, without it, there is no chance of 
winning or exercising power. Thus, everybody ends up playing the 
same game, although not in the same way or with the same 
purpose. Manuel Castells (1997:311) 
This chapter cannot be complete without returning to the issue of 
communication, an aspect that we have seen stands at the centre of David 
Korten’s perspective on fourth generation strategic development but which he 
does not present as a broader and more fully worked out theory of 
communication and development.23  
We have focused so far largely on perspectives from the intellectual circle of 
WOMP/Alternatives, but the intention here is to focus more specifically on the 
aspect of communication, which is absent from WOMP/Alternatives debates. In 
fact, instead of bringing this aspect into its debates, it appears that attempts at 
further innovative conceptualisation of the question of coherent political activity 
(such as expressed in the global civil society approach) have in this circle rather 
gone in the opposite direction.24 In contrast to Korten’s emphasis on the aspect 
                                                          
23 See footnote 6 of this chapter. 
24 This is, for instance, well illustrated by an Alternatives article in which William Kreml and Charles Kegley 
address what we pointed out in the previous subsection to be at the centre of a ‘global civil society 
approach’, namely the remaining problem of coherent political activity by ‘alternative’ actors in the quest 
for global transformation. Their proposal is the constitution of a “global political party” that will consist of 
“issue-specific oppositional groups” (such as Greenpeace, Sierra Club International, SANE, the Rainforest 
Action Network, Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, Survival 
International, Save the Children, Habitat for Humanity, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and similar 
organisations) along with nation-states and regional political organisations that are prepared to participate 
in creating a more democratic world (1996:133). With reference to their project of constituting a “global 
political party” as the “next step” (they entitle their article “A Global Political Party: The Next Step”) in 
achieving the coherent political opposition that has been envisioned in WOMP/Alternatives debates (see 
1996:124-133), Kreml and Kegley’s article presents a good example of the continued efforts toward 
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of communication - which refers to the means of interaction, to strategy as well 
as to the new technologies of communication – there is a complete lack of this 
perspective in the WOMP/Alternatives debates.  
With a view to expose and address this lack of perspective, but also to 
complement and further work out Korten’s emphasis on the aspect of 
communication, the discussion in this chapter draws finally on new 
communication perspectives in the social sciences. Constituting a theoretical 
strand or grouping that clearly stands separate from the circle of 
WOMP/Alternatives, these writers are not less ‘alternative’, in the sense of being 
in opposition or critical towards the mainstream, of favouring the new social 
movements as central actors of (alternative) transformation, and of being 
interested in the construction of a global civil society similar to what has been 
expressed in 6.3. Yet their angle or approach to these components of the 
alternative debate is different. They present a social-theoretical understanding that 
can be taken as most appropriate (authentic) in terms of the dynamics that 
determine contemporary global society, and a strategic (fourth generation) 
mobilisation around the new social movements and a global civil society in embryo. 
Their vital contribution to the alternative debate can be highlighted by means of 
the following points:  
Firstly, in the new communication perspectives writers emphasise to the broader 
‘alternative’ intellectual circle the need to reorientate itself in terms of the new 
social structure or dynamics that characterise contemporary society. This is a 
new understanding of society, both in view of its actual nature and in view of 
effective strategic mobilisation by alternative actors in this society, which 
Manuel Castells, in his recent profound social analysis, labels The Network 
Society.25 The vital point of Castells’s analysis is that traditional statist and 
modernist readings have become obsolete in any attempt to understand 
contemporary society sufficiently. Modern society has undergone a far-reaching 
paradigm change from being an industrial society to becoming an informational 
society: 
This new social structure is associated with the emergence of a new 
mode of development, informationalism, historically shaped by the 
                                                                                                                                              
innovative conceptualisation in this intellectual circle that appears rather ignorant of the social-theoretical 
analysis and perspectives on strategic mobilisation that are provided by writers from the alternative field of 
communication. This is an omission from many attempts at strategic conceptualisation and 
WOMP/Alternatives debates in general, but it seems all the more peculiar in view of the emphasis on 
values, ethics and ideas in this intellectual circle.  
25 We are referring here to Castells’s three-volume series, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, 
which was published in the second half of the 1990s. In this series of publications the notion of ‘The 
Network Society’ is taken by Castells as the basic concept of his analysis, as also evident from the title of 
Volume I in the series, The Rise of the Network Society. In this section we will use this first volume and the 
second volume, The Power of Identity, as sources.  
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restructuring of the capitalist mode of production towards the end 
of the twentieth century. (1996:14) 
It follows that the new informational society sustains a close relationship with 
capitalism26 and, in essence, represents the consolidation of the capitalist mode of 
production in reconstructed form (Castells 1996:18-20; see also Dawson and 
Bellamy Foster 1996:42-54; McChesney 1996:2-7). As a result of its merging with 
the new information technology, it now becomes possible for the capitalist 
mode of production, for the first time in history, to shape “social relationships 
over the entire planet” (Castells 1996:471). It is a brand of capitalism that is 
profoundly different from its historical predecessors in two ways: it is global and 
structured largely around a network of financial flows (ibid.). In this global 
network capital operates within a cycle of investment and profit extraction, 
which, in turn, is reverted back to the meta-network of financial flows, “where 
all capital is equalized in the commodified democracy of profit-making” (Castells 
1996:472). Characterised, furthermore, by its utterly arbitrary character, in the 
sense of the constant change of winners and losers in the economic cycle, this 
mode of capitalism greatly relies on knowledge and information generated and 
enhanced by information technology (ibid.). In turn, as communication becomes 
the heart of global capitalism (McChesney 1996:5), there is what Michael 
Dawson and John Bellamy Foster call the “scramble for control of the new 
communications system” (1996:51). In the words of Cees Hamelink, the 
communication industry takes on “economic significance” (1994a:58) and 
consolidates itself through mega-merging in the global capitalist market 
(1994a:80-92; see also Dawson and Bellamy Foster 1996:44; McChesney 1996:2-
7). A relationship of interdependence and mutual reinforcement between capital 
and the new high-technology exists, which Castells points out:  
 ...is the concrete meaning of the articulation between the capitalist 
mode of production and the informational mode of development ... 
It is in the interaction between investment in profitable firms and 
using accumulated profits to make them fructify in the global 
financial networks that the process of accumulation lies. So it 
depends on productivity, on competitiveness, and on adequate 
information on investment and long-term planning in every sector. 
High-technology firms depend on financial resources to go on with 
their endless drive toward innovation, productivity, and 
competitiveness. Financial capital, acting directly through financial 
institutions or indirectly through the dynamics of stock exchange 
markets, conditions the fate of high-technology industries. On the 
                                                          
26 Given the primary role which the process of capitalist restructuring has played historically in accelerating, 
channelling and shaping the information technological paradigm, this paradigm can, according to Castells 
(1996:18), be adequately characterised as information capitalism. 
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other hand, technology and information are decisive tools in 
generating profits and in appropriating market shares. Thus, 
financial capital and high-technology, industrial capital are 
increasingly interdependent, even if their modes of operation are 
specific to each industry. (1996:472-473, italics added) 
Secondly, in this world of information capitalism27 politics and its actors have to 
find themselves anew. Consequently, this does not mean the end of politics, but 
the restructuring of politics in accordance with the dynamics of the information 
capitalist system (see Castells 1997:310-312). This is a mode of regulation in 
which politics and people are, at first sight, subservient to the interests of the 
capitalist system. While not unimportant actors in this new dispensation, nation-
states, for one, are compelled to ally themselves closely with global economic 
interests (Castells 1997:307-308; 1996:88-90) and “accommodate the claims of 
the large corporate users of world communication” (Hamelink 1994a:109). In the 
process their relation to their own communities and citizens remains ambivalent, 
as they find themselves in a catch-22 situation: 
(T)he more states emphasize communalism, the less effective they 
become as co-agents of a global system of shared power. The more 
they triumph in the planetary scene, in close partnership with the 
agents of globalization, the less they represent their national 
constituencies. (Castells 1997:308). 
Castells concluded that in the new informational society power still rules 
society; it still shapes and dominates people. Yet, and this is the important point, 
it is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), organisations (capitalist 
firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches). “It is diffused in 
global networks of wealth, power, information, and images, which circulate and 
transmute in a system of variable geometry and dematerialized geography.” 
(1997:359, italics added) 
It is exactly this diffused network character of the new global society that 
captures its infinitely complex nature. As Castells pointed out, networks are open 
structures, able to expand infinitely through shared communication codes (e.g. 
values or performance goals). As the new structural formation of society, they 
capture “a highly dynamic open system, susceptible to innovating without 
threatening its balance” (1996:470). Consequently, they are appropriate 
instruments not only for a capitalist economy based on innovation, globalisation 
and decentralised concentration, but also constitute the “new material basis for 
the performance of activities throughout the social structure” (1996:470-471).  
                                                          
27 See the previous footnote. 
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Continuing with Castells’ analysis, this open, dynamic and infinite nature of the 
global ‘Network Society’ leads us to recognise that processes of social 
transformation in this society “go beyond the sphere of social and technical 
relationships of production: they deeply affect culture and power as well” 
(1996:476, italics added). The world is undoubtedly, first of all, one of global 
capital and the actors buying into it (states, a global elite, etc.). It is a world that 
at first sight is “exclusively made of markets, networks, individuals, and strategic 
organizations, apparently governed by patterns of ‘rational expectations’ (the 
new, influential economic theory)”. It is, in fact, a world without identity, of 
individual power politics and gain beyond any borders:  
No need for identities in this new world: basic instincts, power 
drives, self-centred strategic calculations, and, at the macro-social 
level, “the clear features of a barbarian nomadic dynamic, of a 
Dionysian element threatening to inundate all borders and 
rendering international political-legal and civilization norms 
problematic.”28 (1997:355) 
Yet, and this is an integral aspect of Castells’ analysis,29 the new ‘Network 
Society’ is a world that also “triggers its own challenges”, in the form of what 
Castells calls communal resistance identities and project identities (1997:359; see 
also 6-12). While the “(n)ew information technologies are integrating the world 
in global networks of instrumentality” (1996:22), the reverse side of this is a new 
‘identity politics’ by different collectivities that challenge the contemporary 
movement towards globalisation and cosmopolitanism, as well as the democratic 
principle upheld by the modern nation-state, on behalf of cultural self-expression 
and people’s control over their lives and environment (cf. 1997:2). Being multiple, 
highly diversified in nature as they follow the specificities of each culture, and of 
historical sources of formation of each identity, these collectivities include, in 
Castells identification, especially two categories. They are, firstly, the new 
proactive movements (that is, ‘project identities’) such as feminism and 
environmentalism, whose aim is the transformation of human relationships at 
their most fundamental level. But they, secondly, also include a whole range of 
reactive movements (that is, ‘resistance identities’), that under the combined 
assault of techno-economic forces and transformative social movements,30 build 
                                                          
28 Castells is here quoting Alexander S. Panarin. 
29 Volume II (The Power of Identity) of Castells’s three-volume series deals with the aspect of new identity 
formation in the ‘Network Society’. 
30 Whereas Castells views the relation between ‘resistance identities’ and ‘project identities’ in a positive 
light, in the sense that he sees the former as a primary source from which the latter does and will emerge 
(see 1997:11-12, 357-358), he also identifies ‘project identities’, in the form of the proactive social 
movements, as a possible cause for the resistance politics of reactive movements/communities. Thus, the 
outgoing dynamics of proactive movements, as they seek to transform human relationships and social 
structures, and ultimately construct new identities, can also be seen as an important cause, in addition to 
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communities of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family and locality 
(ibid.).  
It is important, then, to point out the ambivalent relation of these ‘identity 
projects’ to the new information technology. They are, and this is particularly 
the case with ‘resistance identities’, expressions of what Castells calls “the 
exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” (1997:9, original italics). Thus they 
compensate by building defensive identities in the terms of the dominant 
institutions and ideologies, whereby they reverse the value judgement forced on 
them and at the same time reinforce the boundaries of separation (ibid.). Castells 
put this eloquently in communication terms: 
There seems to be a logic of excluding the excluders, of redefining 
the criteria for value and meaning in a world where there is 
shrinking room for the computer illiterate, for consumptionless 
groups, and for under-communicated territories. When the Net 
switches off the Self, the Self, individual or collective, constructs its 
meaning without global, instrumental reference: the process of 
disconnection becomes reciprocal, after the refusal by the excluded 
of the one-sided logic of structural domination and social exclusion. 
(1996:25)  
But as Castells also concluded, more often than not, new powerful technological 
media, such as worldwide, interactive communication networks, are used by 
‘resistance’ and ‘project identities’ to sharpen their struggle and vision of a 
transformed society. He, in this case, pointed to international environmentalists, 
but also ‘resistance identities’ such as the Mexican Zapatistas, as the foremost 
examples of ‘alternative’ actors who have come to use the Internet to challenge 
the dominant system on their own terms (1997:2). In the case of the Zapatistas, 
they might be called “the first information guerrilla movement” (1997:79, original 
italics). They did not merely resist, but used the media and modern 
communication technology to communicate with the outside world, and by 
doing so, captured “the imagination of people and of intellectuals ... [and] 
propelled a local, weak insurgent group to the forefront of world politics” (ibid.): 
Essential in this strategy was the Zapatistas’ use of 
telecommunications, videos, and of computer-mediated 
communication, both to diffuse their messages from Chiapas to the 
world ... and to organize a worldwide network of solidarity groups 
that literally encircled the repressive intentions of the Mexican 
government ... Extensive use of the Internet allowed the Zapatistas 
                                                                                                                                              
the forces of economic globalisation, for the retreat of individuals and communities (cultural, religious, 
ethnic, etc.) into ‘resistance identities’.  
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to diffuse information and their call throughout the world instantly, 
and to create a network of support groups which helped to 
produce an international public opinion movement that made it 
literally impossible for the Mexican government to use repression 
on a large scale. Images and information from and around the 
Zapatistas acted powerfully on the Mexican economy and politics. 
(1997:80)31 
A similar case in point for Castells is the environmental movement’s use of the 
modern communication system to further their aims. Viewed by him as one of 
the most successful ‘alternative’ movements of our time (1997:110), much of the 
success of this movement had come, according to Castells, from the fact that it 
has been able to, more than any other social force in recent history, “best adapt 
to the conditions of communication and mobilization in the new technological 
paradigm” (1997:128). They have been especially successful in using the media32 
to “reach a much broader audience than their direct constituency”, which has 
also “lent them a legitimacy higher than that of any other cause”. This, however, 
is not only evident in the cases of global environmental activism (such as the 
public activism of an organisation like Greenpeace), but is also central to 
environmental struggles at the local level in which TV news, radio and 
newspapers have been utilised “to the point that corporations and politicians 
often complain that it is the media rather than ecologists who are responsible for 
environmental mobilization” (ibid.).  
According to Castells, environmentalists have indeed been “at the cutting edge 
of new communication technologies as organizing and mobilizing tools, 
particularly in the use of the Internet”. They have, in a sophisticated way, come 
to utilise the Internet to coordinate actions and information across boundaries 
and groups. Yet, while belonging to the category of proactive ‘identity projects’, 
Castells points out how environmentalists’ relation to science and technology is 
                                                          
31 For Castells another example of a successful populist utilisation of the modern communication system, 
which has shown that “media politics does not have to be the monopoly of influential interest groups, or 
of established political parties” (1997:331-332), is the case of the political movement, Condepa, in Bolivia 
since the late 1980s. Built around the leading figure of Carlos Palenque and his experience of and relative 
position of power in the field of modern communication, the success of this movement represents, to 
Castells, a primary example of the way in which the modern media system has been used to establish a 
significant popular base (see 1997:328-333). As Castells made the point in short: “ ...Condepa’s influence is 
not just a media manipulation: its themes refer to the actual suffering of people in La Paz, and its language 
directly communicates to the cultural and local identity of popular strata in La Paz and El Alto ... 
However, without the power of the media, and without a perceptive communication strategy mixing 
entertainment radio and television with a space for public complaints, and with the building of 
charismatic trust between the leaders and the audience, Condepa would have been reduced to a minor 
role, as happened to other populist movements in Bolivia ... Indeed, in 1996, Bolivians trust the media 
more than they trust their political representatives.” (1997:331) 
32 Castells speaks of the symbiotic relationship between the media and environmentalism, whereby the 
environmental movement has not only been dependent on the media for its cause, but the issues raised by 
environmentalists have also “provided a good terrain for the media to assume the role of the voice of the 
people, thus increasing their own legitimacy, and making journalists feel good about it” (1997:128-129). 
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not less contradictory than in the case of ‘resistance identities’. In the case of 
‘resistance identities’, first of all, we saw how they, besides being marginalised in 
instances to the extent where they are totally excluded from the economic and 
power networks associated with the new communication technology, have in 
other instances also vindicated themselves in the new informational society. In 
Castells’s words, “(t)hey use informational technology for people’s horizontal 
communication, and communal prayer, while rejecting the new idolatry of 
technology, and preserving transcendent values against the deconstructing logic 
of self-regulating computer networks” (1997:358). 
In the same but still more intensive way, a proactive group (collectively and 
generally speaking) such as the environmental movement displays what Castells 
calls “an ambiguous, deep connection with science and technology” (1997:123, 
original italics). Its ascendancy coincided “with the information technology 
revolution, and with the extraordinary development of biological knowledge 
through computer modeling, that took place in the aftermath” (ibid.). Science 
and technology, thus, play a fundamental albeit contradictory role in this 
movement. While criticising the domination of life by science, ecologists also 
“use science to oppose science on behalf of life” (ibid., italics added). As a 
movement, environmentalists rely largely “on gathering, analyzing, interpreting, 
and diffusing scientific information about the interaction between man-made 
artifacts and the environment, sometimes with a high degree of sophistication” 
(ibid.). They respond to the imperative set by Castells for ‘alternative’ actors, 
namely to act on the culture of real virtuality that frames communication in the 
‘Network Society’, and to subvert this culture on behalf of alternative values by 
introducing codes that emerge from their autonomous projects (1997:361). In a 
nutshell: 
The advocated principle is not the negation of knowledge, but 
superior knowledge: the wisdom of a holistic vision, able to reach 
beyond piecemeal approaches and short-sighted strategies geared 
towards the satisfaction of basic instincts. In this sense, 
environmentalism aims at retaking social control over the products 
of the human mind before science and technology take on a life of 
their own, with machines finally imposing their will on us, and on 
nature... (1997:123) 
Thirdly, the reality of the new global informational society brings writers from 
the intellectual group that is discussed in this section to emphasise the necessity 
of not merely conceptualising a civil society/global civil society approach to 
transformation, but a civil society/global civil society approach in terms of the new 
information and communication dynamics that shape contemporary society. 
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It is an emphasis that is, for some, based on the perception that current trends in 
world communication are in fact forcefully converging “towards the 
disempowerment of people” and are contributing “to the establishment of a new 
world order that is inegalitarian, exclusive and elite-oriented” (Hamelink 
1994a:121). They therefore call upon all social movements and other ‘alternative’ 
actors to make the issue of media and communication an integral aspect of their 
agenda, notwithstanding what their first issue of concern may be (McChesney 
1996:16; see also Hamelink 1994a:147; Waterman 1996a:25). They call upon all 
these actors to mobilise themselves into a global civil initiative that not only 
reactively challenges the world of global information capitalism, but proactively 
(see Hamelink 1994a:147) generates and compels new democratic and 
independent spaces through which people may assert themselves socially, 
culturally and politically on the basis of their access to the resources of modern 
communication (see Cassani 1995:217-218, 220--221; Hamelink 1994a:145-149; 
McChesney 1996:16-20; cf. also Stangelaar 1985:13-20).33 
However, the emphasis on civil society/global civil society mobilisation in terms 
of the new information and communications dynamics takes on a still deeper 
meaning here. As other discussions suggest, it is an emphasis that is not merely 
born out of necessity and the disempowering nature of world communication. 
On the basis of what has been pointed out in the previous point, the 
emancipatory potential of the new information technology for ‘alternative’ actors 
is indeed recognised, whatever the nature of their struggle may be. It is 
recognised that the new communication technology potentially constitutes a 
medium of great opportunity for strategic mobilisation within civil society. In 
the words of Raymond Williams, this technology and the new system as a whole 
“offer opportunities for new cultural relationships, which the older systems 
could not”. These new technologies could make “a significant improvement in 
the practicability of every kind of voluntary association: the fibers of civil society 
as distinct from both the market and the state” (Williams quoted in Dawson and 
Bellamy Foster 1996:55, italics added). 
From a somewhat different angle Peter Waterman has pointed out that the new 
informational society can be seen as the sphere most appropriate to the 
distinctive nature and dynamics of the new social movements. These 
movements are in large part “communication internationalisms” and (as we have 
also seen in the second point above) are making increasing use of “computer-
mediated communications” (1996:51, italics added). Waterman makes his point in 
a way that should also be taken as very valid with respect to the value and idea 
                                                          
33 Two concrete projects that are either proposed or under way in this regard are the “People’s 
Communication Charter”, which is discussed in the writings of Cees Hamelink, and an independent global 
“Civil Society Development Fund” (see Cassani 1995:215-221) that could meet the information and 
communications needs of civil society actors. In 7.4.2 these two projects will be considered more closely as 
projects through which the churches could make a meaningful contribution to the emerging new 
communication solidarities. 
THE CHURCHES AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
 184
emphasis in the WOMP/Alternatives intellectual circle discussed earlier, and this 
circle’s search for further innovative strategic mobilisation: 
There is considerable agreement on “the central importance of 
knowledge and information” ... in the current transformation of 
capitalism globally, even if the question of what the transition is to 
remains unclear or disputed. The growing centrality to social 
processes of the “mode of information ... - of data, ideas, values, 
images, theories, and cultures - makes it possible and necessary for 
life-asserting or emancipatory movements to operate on these terrains. 
Here they can reveal, as Amnesty International does, what is globally 
concealed, or suggest, as Friends of the Earth might, new meanings for 
what is globally revealed ... A global information capitalism would 
seem to provide far more favorable terrains for emancipatory 
movements than those of an internationalized industrial capitalism 
(industry, polity, nation, battlefield). It has proven extremely 
difficult to radically democratize these old terrains. (1996a:50, 
italics added) 
For Waterman, thus, information capitalism constitutes “an eminently disputable 
terrain” (2000:137). “That this sphere is created and dominated by the logic of 
capital” can, according to him, not “conceal its contradictory nature: capital, 
capitalists, capitalisms, cannot simply control this sphere in the way they did the 
factory, the family, the state, the school and the gun” (Waterman 2000:142). It is 
“a non-territorial sphere, meaning one increasingly capable of that expanding 
growth, flexibility and democratisation that the capitalism of industry and the 
nation-state has promised/denied” (ibid.). In this sphere it becomes possible to 
generate a space for the co-existence of what Waterman describes as “our 
networks” over against “their networks” (2000:144). Moreover, in this sphere the 
position of local actors and communities is redefined. Through the 
communication networks generated by this sphere, grassroots groups around the 
world are now suddenly enabled “to act globally, at the level where main 
problems are created” (Castells 1997:129, italics added). As a response, thus, also 
to what is recognised in WOMP/Alternatives debates as the remaining need for 
grassroots movements to mobilise into a more coordinated and effective political 
coalition at the meso and global levels34 - in the sense that the network model of 
the informational society might make such a coalition possible and effective - 
reference can be made here to Waterman’s notion of “multiple positions” to 
express the strategic position of activated ‘alternative’ actors in the ‘Network 
Society’: 
                                                          
34 See 6.2.1. 
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Any ‘alternative’ social movement, or related non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), can thus find itself in multiple positions, in 
local-to-global space, or at particular times. It is, for example, 
possible for a feminist movement, organisation or tendency (local-
to-global) to be simultaneously self-isolated (within civil society, 
from other feminists or women, from men) and incorporated (into 
reform strategies or intermediating roles promoted by capital or 
state). A complex, interdependent, yet uneven and unbalanced 
global order, requires complex, interdependent global alternatives, 
which the alternative movements are beginning to offer. In so far as 
it is globalised, moreover, contemporary capitalism promotes 
communication and culture to increasing pre-eminence, this 
providing an eminently disputable terrain for such new 
emancipatory movements. Cultural globalisation makes an 
alternative global solidarity culture both necessary and possible. 
The form of the new global solidarity movements is, thus, 
increasingly that of ‘information internationalisms’. (Waterman 
2000:137) 
In this chapter we have basically identified and discussed two intellectual 
debates that enrich David Korten’s notion of fourth generation development. 
We have seen how these two debates converge on a number of issues: (i) their 
emphasis on the new grassroots and social movements as the determinants of 
development and a new identity politics; (ii) their emphasis on the need for such 
a social movement and identity politics to assimilate into a broader solidarity 
initiative that we may call the construction of a civil society/global civil society; 
(iii) their emphasis on an approach to transformation that, by implication, relies 
on the free flow of particular sets of ideas, values and information to achieve the 
desired results; and (iv) their similar critical disposition to the mainstream, 
which can also well be taken as their similar, shared vision of an ‘alternative’ 
society. 
However, we have also seen how these two debates separate on the basis that 
the second debate has come to locate the ‘alternative’ debate in the socio-
analytic context of the informational society and the actual resistance and 
strategic politics of ‘alternative’ actors in terms of the dynamics of this society. 
Hence our conclusion that it is this difference within the broader ‘alternative’ 
debate that should be taken very seriously in further theoretical and strategic 
considerations on alternative development, fourth generation development, the 
new social movement politics and civil society/global civil society. If this is not 
done, the danger may indeed be an ongoing intellectual effort that is 
inappropriate not only in terms of the changed social context and the new 
opportunities, but also in terms of the forms of injustice generated in this new 
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context, and the value- and idea-centred approach to transformation highlighted 
in fourth generation/alternative development perspectives. 
In this regard we may well return to Manuel Castells’s analysis, specifically his 
distinction between two notions of civil society. In disregarding the new terms 
in which society is understood today (as set out in this subsection), it would 
seem that the ‘alternative’ debate rather adheres to a concept of civil society that 
is defined by Castells as outmoded in terms of the new social dynamics. Albeit 
that this may be a progressive meaning of civil society - in the Gramscian sense - 
which understands civil society to be formed by a series of “apparatuses (such as 
the churches, unions, parties, cooperatives, civic associations, etc.) constantly 
negotiating the position of people/citizens vis-à-vis the state”, it remains true in 
this particular understanding that the institutions of civil society cannot be set 
apart from the state that it seeks to conquer on behalf of the people (1997:8-9). 
“The conquest of the state by the forces of change ... present in the civil society, 
is made possible exactly because of the continuity between civil society’s 
institutions and the power apparatuses of the state, organized around a similar 
identity.” (1997:9) Castells puts it still better elsewhere in his discussion, where 
he points out the lost legitimacy of the state and its civil society counterparts in 
the new informational society: 
At the dawn of the Information Age, a crisis of legitimacy is voiding 
of meaning and function the institutions of the industrial era. 
Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power, and information, 
the modern nation-state has lost much of its sovereignty ... As a 
result of these convergent processes, the sources of what I call ... 
legitimizing identities are drained away. The institutions and 
organizations of civil society that were constructed around the 
democratic state, and around the social contract between capital 
and labor, have become, by and large, empty shells, decreasingly 
able to relate to people’s lives and values in most societies. It is 
indeed a tragic irony that when most countries in the world finally 
fought their way to access the institutions of liberal democracy ... 
these institutions are so distant from the structure and processes 
that really matter that they appear to most people as a sarcastic 
grimace in the new face of history. In this end of millennium, the 
king and the queen, the state and the civil society, are both naked, 
and their children-citizens are wandering around a variety of foster 
homes. (1997:354, 355)  
In the emergence of the new ‘project identities’ referred to earlier in this 
discussion, Castells sees the potential to reconstruct a new civil society and 
eventually a new state (1997:356, 362). However, the constitution of these new 
subjects “takes a different route to the one we knew during modernity, and late 
A Broader Articulation of Alternative Ideas 
 187
modernity” (1997:11). They do not seem to emerge from identities of the 
industrial era’s civil society, which is in a process of disintegration, but from a 
development of the ‘resistance identities’ also discussed earlier (1997:11, 357). 
Beyond this, however, they are the new proactive movements in society that are 
managing to move “out from the trenches of resistance” to build new identities 
that redefine their position in society “and, by so doing, seek the transformation 
of overall social structure” (1997:8). They are integral actors of the new 
‘Network Society’ that, in their networking, decentred form of organisation and 
intervention, are “mirroring, and counteracting, the networking logic of 
domination in the informational society”. In this sense, they “do more than 
organizing activity and sharing information. They are the actual producers, and 
distributors, of cultural codes. Not only over the Net, but in their multiple forms 
of exchange and interaction.” (1997:362, original italics) Their ultimate meaning 
is well expressed in the following quotation:  
They are the collective social actor through which individuals reach 
holistic meaning in their experience. In this case, the building of 
identity is a project of a different life, perhaps on the basis of an 
oppressed identity, but expanding toward the transformation of society 
as the prolongation of this project of identity, as in the above-
mentioned example of a post-patriarchal society, liberating women, 
men, and children, through the realization of women’s identity. Or, 
in a very different perspective, the final reconciliation of all human 
beings as believers, brothers and sisters, under the guidance of 
God’s law, be it Allah or Jesus, as a result of the religious 
conversion of godless, anti-family, materialist societies, otherwise 
unable to fulfill human needs and God’s design. (1997:10, italics 
added) 
Indeed, it would be possible to say that Castells’s identification of ‘project 
identities’ – that is, the new proactive social movements whose presence and 
participation in the new ‘Network Society’ are pointing to the possibility of a 
new (global) civil society in the making – closely resembles not only David 
Korten’s notion of fourth generation development strategies, but also much of 
the debate on alternative development and alternatives in the intellectual circle 
of WOMP/Alternatives. It would seem that we are encountering in all cases here 
a prioritisation of the same actors, whether they are referring to the grassroots 
and resistance movements highlighted in Castells’ discussion and WOMP/ 
Alternatives debates, or the proactive new social movements highlighted in 
common.  
Whereas Castells and the other writers who have been discussed in this section 
are, in a fundamental way, pointing out the new socio-analytic context in which 
the fourth generation/alternative development/‘alternative’ debate is to be cast 
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(which is still missing in this debate), it would also be possible to say that 
Castells’s identification of a different civil society shaped by the new ‘project 
identities’ of the ‘Network Society’ does not have to be viewed in opposition to 
the ‘solidarity’ vision of the global civil society approach that has been set out in 
the previous section (6.3), in so far as the latter approach may represent civil 
society actors that belong rather to Castells’s category of disintegrating 
‘legitimising identities’ of the industrial age. Let it be stated emphatically that the 
reality of the new ‘Network Society’, the actual participation of ‘alternative’ 
actors and movements in this society today, the vision of a new and global civil 
society, and ultimately a new people-centred world more than ever assume the 
necessity and possibility of larger solidarity projects: on the local, meso and 
global levels of society. In these solidarity projects aimed at the construction of a 
new civil society the actors of Castells’ old civil society could still play a vital 
role. What is required from them, however, is to be transformed inwardly by the 
values and worldview that are determining the alternative dynamics in the new 
‘Network Society’, not so much in the sense of Castells’s ‘resistance identities’, but 
in the sense of the new ‘project identities’ that he has identified. We will more 
pertinently consider the potential contribution of one such actor, namely the 
churches, in the last chapter of this study. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE CHURCHES’ PARTICIPATION IN  
FOURTH GENERATION DEVELOPMENT:  
PERSPECTIVES AND POSSIBILITIES1 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous three chapters of this study we explored the landscape of the 
meaning of new strategic development. In this exploration we highlighted the 
meaning of fourth generation strategic development action but we also focused 
on the concept of a third generation development strategy. Thus, a meaning of 
fourth generation development action has unfolded in our discussion that, within 
an overall perspective, assumes the people-centred development theoretical and 
strategic underpinnings that guide the third generation orientation. Put 
differently, in this overall perspective a fourth generation development 
orientation fully shares the alternative societal vision of the third generation, and 
the emphasis on managerial, policy and other skills to realise that vision. 
Consequently, this orientation does not neglect the fact that in the real world of 
today, which is a world still ruled by governments and state-centred actors2 in 
addition to the new/other dominant actors of global capitalism, another level of 
engagement is required that will complement the fourth generation mode. 
Albeit cast in terms of alternative values and theoretical understanding, this is 
the level of reigning sophisticated policy, managerial and organisational 
application to which actors of a people-centred and alternative development 
must also adapt and on which they are to make an impact as well.  
                                                          
1 This chapter draws in part on ideas that have been developed in the present writer’s MA Research Paper, 
Towards a New Solidarity Praxis: Critical Reflections on the Churches’ Participation in World 
Transformation, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1997. 
2 This statement does not contradict what was said in 6.4. Having pointed out, in terms of Manuel Castells’s 
analysis, how power has shifted away from state institutions in the new dispensation of global information 
capitalism and the ‘Network Society’, and how the reconstruction of a new civil society should be sought 
with those new ‘project identities’ that are today representing a discontinuity with the state and the 
‘legitimising identities’ that have constituted the ‘old’ civil society (given their loss of legitimacy), it would 
be wrong to understand by this that the institution of the state is to be disregarded as far as a 
contemporary ‘politics of power’ is concerned. Indeed, this is also not the meaning of Castells’s analysis, as 
our reading of him in 6.4 suggests. To elaborate here on his point of view, nation-states remain “strategic 
actors” of “considerable influence”, with the exception that today they are “playing their interests, and the 
interests they are supposed to represent, in a global system of interaction, in a condition of systemically 
shared sovereignty” (1997:307). In this sense of reconfirmed strategic importance, they thus also represent an 
actor that cannot be ignored by those ‘alternative’ actors that are interested in the construction of a ‘new’ civil 
society/global civil society. 
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Thus, it follows that a fourth generation strategic development orientation does 
not neglect the real world of policy and the managerial emphasis that the new 
world of global information capitalism seems to be emphasising more than ever. 
The new people-centred development world that this orientation envisions is 
also not a world without management and policy-making. Rather, it calls for 
counter-strategies also to be implemented on the operating level of the dominant 
actors and institutions of today, yet they must be counter-strategies that will in the 
process contribute to the new world for which the new social movements are exerting 
themselves. To state this emphatically: this is the same decentralised and 
sustainable world that is conceptualised in the third generation strategic orientation. 
Essentially, it is a new world that is at decentralised level also to be sustained and 
continuously shaped by the kind of theoretical and strategic input, institutional 
arrangements and policy processes that determine third generation strategic 
development action.  
As already stated, fourth generation development strategies require the analytic, 
catalytic, articulation, technical and other skills of third generation development 
strategies.3 Furthermore, they do not despise the use of modern technology, but 
recognise their emancipatory potential for achieving their goals of development 
and transformation.4 Whereas fourth generation strategic activity seeks greater 
global penetration, in contrast to third generation strategies, it otherwise requires 
and applies these skills and technology in the same formal way as in third 
generation strategic action when dealing with the global policy-makers of 
development. However, it does not to a lesser extent require these skills and 
technology in the people-to-people interaction and conscientisation by which it 
is ultimately characterised. Rather, it calls on the new social movements and the 
organisations that articulate and support them (e.g. NGOs) to be more 
effectively organised and to engage in more informed conscientisation through 
their application and utilisation of such skills and technology. 
Against the background of this summary of complementary third and fourth 
generation strategic development action (based on the discussion in the last 
three chapters), we can now shift our focus back to the churches. Having begun 
this study with the hypothesis that the churches (a distinct ‘idea’ and ‘value’ 
institution) could play a meaningful role and excel in the third generation and 
especially fourth generation modes of strategic development action, the question 
on the basis of our preceding exploration then remains: what should the concrete 
participation of the churches in third and fourth generation development 
involve? Furthermore, what is the nature of the discourse whereby the churches 
could meaningfully participate in these modes of development, given our 
conclusion in this study that the development praxis of the churches remains 
                                                          
3 See 5.4. 
4 See 6.4. 
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stuck in what David Korten identifies as first and second generation 
development strategies or approaches? 
Indeed, parts of our discussion in the previous two chapters may well have 
suggested that we are entering an emerging post-secular (post-modern?) era in 
which the role of religion (and by implication an institution such as the 
churches) in development and positive transformation is beginning to be 
reappraised. Whereas this reappraisal is not unconditional, David Korten and 
authors from the circle of WOMP/Alternatives (on the basis of the discussion 
especially in 6.2.2) may be taken as clear examples of such a reappraisal, that is, 
of what we have indicated in the introduction as a growing normative social 
scientific movement that is also showing a new appreciation of the role that 
religion and its institutions can play towards realising their visions of normative 
change.5 In the case of Korten and the authors from the WOMP/Alternatives 
circle, it can be noted that their appreciation is none other than one that falls in 
the realm of the fourth generation development thinking. Clearly, they are calling 
upon religion to play a role or roles that are of a fourth generation developmental 
nature.6  
Coming back to our question above about the concrete participation of a 
religious institution such as the churches, the perspectives that we found in the 
writings of Korten and the authors from the WOMP/Alternatives circle already 
enables us to become more specific. In the case of Korten, we have seen how he 
called upon religion and the churches (which he also specifically mentioned) to 
play a definite reconciliatory role7 (thus to excel as a distinct actor within the 
contemporary peace movement!). In another sense, we have seen how he also 
highlighted the aspect of spiritual development and the role which religion and 
the churches should play in changing and nurturing people’s inner spirit and 
consciousness towards caring relationships and a sense of structural justice.8 
                                                          
5 In addition to Korten and the writers from the WOMP/Alternatives circle that we have already identified, 
such a scholarly movement (which is characterised by its positive appraisal of religion and includes fields 
such as development studies, (humanistic) economics, future studies, environmental studies, political 
science, etc.) may, for instance, be identified also in the writings of Kenneth Boulding (see 1968:Part III), 
Simon Sui-cheong Chau and Fung Kam-Kong (see 1990:222-231), Bill Clark (see 1990:183-188), John Cobb 
and Herman Daly (see 1990:Chapter 20), Mawil Izzi Deen (see 1990:189-197), O. P. Dwivedi (see 
1990:201-211), Paul Ekins (see 1992:194-199), Ronald Engel (see 1990:12-14), Johan Galtung (see 1996:408-
413), Roger Garaudy (see 1983:47-60), Denis Goulet (see 1995:Chapter 16), Willis Harman (see 1984:10-
11), Leilah Landim (see 1987:31-33), David Lehmann (see 1990:Chapters 3, 4 and 5), Marilyn Little (see 
1995:131-134), Kate Manzo (see 1995:245-247; 1991:21-25), Robert Moore (see 1990:104-112), OECD (see 
1987:8-11), Martin Palmer (see 1990:50-61), Susanne Hoeber Rudolph (1996:314-318), William Ryan (see 
1995:Parts I and II), E. F. Schumacher (see 1993:Chapter 6), S. Sivaraska (see 1990:213-221), R. H. Tawney 
(see 1961:Chapter 11), Bart van Steenbergen (see 1983:140-141). 
6 This is, for instance, clearly indicated by Korten’s discussion of the churches in the quote at the end of 
Chapter Five. 
7 See 5.3.2. and 5.4. 
8 See the entry on ‘spiritual development’ in 5.3.2. 
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Thus, in the case of Korten, we may find an appreciation of the churches that 
fully takes into account their distinctive nature as ‘idea’ and ‘value institutions’, 
something which he contrasted sharply with their preoccupation with charity 
and so-called development projects.9 As such, it would be possible to say that 
all seven of the key elements that Korten has prioritised as central to fourth 
generation development (as set out in 5.3.2), could be taken as areas to which the 
churches might meaningfully contribute. Besides the elements of reconciliation 
and spiritual development that he has highlighted as especially applicable to 
religion and the churches, one can well see how the churches could make crucial 
contributions to Korten’s second and fourth element of lifestyles and the family, 
that is, elements or areas that have in fact always been a strength of the churches 
in one way or another.10 But also, it is possible to conceive how socially 
informed, ideologically critical and politically conscious churches could make 
meaningful contributions to Korten’s remaining elements of political 
democratisation, economic democratisation, and trade and investment relations 
on an idea, ethical and value level.11  
Indeed, an institution such as the churches fits Korten’s categories of central 
actors in fourth generation development very well.12 Thus we can say that the 
churches are in essence, and at their best, voluntary organisations (VOs) that 
operate and exist on the basis of the faith and moral commitment of their 
members. But they can also well be conceived as people’s organisations (POs) 
that are collectively run and owned by their members on the basis of a shared 
faith and values. Moreover, in the churches the concept of citizen volunteers also 
figures fundamentally: integral to their mission is preparing and sending out their 
members to live out their faith and values in the world. And last but not least, 
the churches are also no strangers to the aspect of movement formation: they have 
as ‘idea’ and ‘value institutions’ mobilised into different kinds of global people’s 
movements throughout their long history (such as the ecumenical and 
evangelical movements in contemporary history). It can be concluded that all 
these ‘fourth generation’ attributes of the churches could under certain 
conditions be utilised to the advantage of a fourth generation people-centred 
development and social movement agenda. 
In the case of the writers of the WOMP/Alternatives circle, their more concrete 
appraisal of religion13 follows a direction similar to Korten’s. It is the voluntary 
and value-centred dynamics of religious traditions and the churches that these 
                                                          
9 See the quote under ‘spiritual development’ in 5.3.2 and the quotes at the end of 5.4. 
10 With regard to the element of lifestyles, we may recall how the conscientisation (‘pedagogy’) of the rich 
had come to be emphasised in the pragmatic debate on development in the ecumenical movement, 
especially in the radical account through the writings of Charles Elliot in particular. See 3.3.2. 
11 These, in fact, seem to have been elements that the ecumenical development debate had aimed to address 
through their emphasis on the concepts of economic growth, social justice and self-reliance. See the 
discussion in 2.3.2. 
12 See 5.3.1. 
13 See 6.2.2. 
The Churches’ Participation in Fourth Generation Development 
 193
writers view as potentially of great advantage to their own agenda of alternative 
values and a new world order, and in strengthening a social movements politics 
in various ways - material, organisational, educational and spiritual. For them, as 
for Korten, there is a pertinent ‘spiritual’ role for religious traditions and the 
churches to play, but then one that takes concrete effect in terms of the new 
social movement values and activities.  
In addition to describing such first steps towards more concrete application, an 
attempt will be made in this chapter to work out a more concrete framework 
for the churches’ participation in the realm of fourth generation development. 
As the discussion above might suggest, it is possible to conceptualise various 
modes, elements or areas of fourth generation development action, also as far as 
the churches are concerned. On this basis our attempt towards formulating the 
moves towards concretisation and specification should not be taken as a 
recommendation of a complete or absolute package. It rather represents a 
conscious effort to conceptualise, on the basis of our exploration in this study, 
what we are calling beacons of fourth generation strategic development action - 
beacons that, in the broad sense in which they are formulated, reflect the 
concrete fourth generation meanings that we have been deriving from the 
formulations of Korten and the other alternative debates discussed in the 
previous chapter; yet beacons that also give an account of the complementary 
meanings of third and fourth generation development that we set out at the 
beginning of this chapter. In terms of the churches, whereas these beacons 
constitute guidelines predominantly towards outright or explicit fourth 
generation development activity, in the case of the third proposed beacon of 
alternative policy-making, the possibility of the churches’ meaningful 
participation as a third generation actor is also advocated (that is, a competency 
level that assumes skills and knowledge that are indispensable to meaningful 
fourth generation development action14). 
Having sustained the argument in this study that the participation of the 
churches in meaningful development is not self-evident, as they remain 
ideologically and conceptually limited to charitable and project-centred modes 
of action, it crucially follows that third and fourth generation action can only be 
undertaken meaningfully by a different kind of church and theological 
underpinning. Clearly, third and fourth generation development action presents the 
churches with the challenge of new social scientific insight and skills, and of 
participating in a new solidarity praxis. This challenge calls on the churches to 
adopt a new reflexive, collective, cooperative, dependent, relative and political 
outlook. Having already spelled out the theoretical and strategic contents of 
third and fourth generation development actions, as well as the actors that are 
central to an understanding of them, we will here, in so far as the churches are 
concerned, once again take the ecumenical development debate as our point of 
                                                          
14 See especially the discussion in 5.4. 
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departure. By way of a recapitulation of our appreciation in the introduction and 
first three chapters of this study, we will reflect on the ecumenical development 
debate as a remaining incentive to theological-ecclesiastical participation in third 
and fourth generation strategic development action. 
From this point we will then move on to a consideration of the beacons of 
fourth (and third) generation development action. For this section of the 
discussion we need to recall the ideals of interdisciplinarity and integration that 
were set out as aims in the conclusion to the introduction. As we are interested 
here in an extended formulation of the meaning of third and fourth generation 
strategic development - an extended meaning that is, however, aimed at the 
churches in particular - it is inevitable that we should not only rely on a wider 
corpus of complementary social scientific perspectives to serve this purpose,15 
but also on perspectives from the best of the discipline of theology itself. It will 
become clear in the course of the discussion below how theological 
perspectives/discourses geared towards this purpose do exist, outside of, and 
complementary to, the foundational basis that we are finding in the ecumenical 
debate on development.16 
7.2 The ecumenical development debate: remaining incentive 
This study should have made it clear that taking on third and fourth generation 
identities and roles (as opposed to first and second generation ones) is by no 
means self-evident. This fundamentally requires that actors aspiring to 
participate in such modes of action should be changed and capacitated by, and in 
relation to, particular external dynamics (that is, new skills/knowledge/ 
values/ideas, other actors/collectivities). In addition to such external dynamics, 
the impact of progressive forces or elements within these actors’ own ranks to 
start a process of redefinition of existing (traditional) practices, thinking and self-
identity is also required. 
In terms of the latter internal requirements, we conclude that the ecumenical 
development debate, on which we focused in the first three chapters, remains a 
most important incentive to the churches’ participation in third and fourth 
generation development. Having concluded in 3.4 that this debate presents us 
with both an impasse and renewal as far as the issue of the churches’ 
participation in development is concerned, we are firstly to remind ourselves of 
                                                          
15 Given the rich meaning of third and in particularly fourth generation strategic development action (as also 
evident from the beacons that we are identifying), it was envisaged in the introduction that this wider 
corpus will comprise additional perspectives (beyond the exploration up to Chapter Six) that are not only 
development specific, but also politically, sociologically, communication and culture specific.  
16 Ulrich Duchrow’s perspectives on alternatives to global capitalism from a social theological point of view, 
the World Parliament of Religion’s ‘Declaration toward a Global Ethic’, perspectives from the WCC 
debate on civil society, debates on public theology/religion, feminist theological perspectives and Jürgen 
Moltmann’s perspective on a theological expression of joy have been mentioned as cases in point in the 
introduction of this study. 
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how this debate has come to indicate to us the still present dichotomy between 
‘progressive’ discourse and ‘conservative’ praxis (thus pointing to a 
discourse/debate with relatively little practical impact), but also the ultimate 
erosion and fatigue of this debate itself. 
However, these critical observations should not deny the positive contribution 
of this debate, as reflected in our earlier evaluations. Our analysis in Chapter 
One made it clear that the ecumenical development debate had posed a definite 
conceptual and ideological challenge to the prevailing charity-oriented mentality 
(first generation development strategies) in the churches. Those writings on a 
theology of development that were discussed in 2.2 also remain as important as 
ever. Although they are more often than not neglected in theological and 
ecclesiastical debates on development, the proclaimed “commitment to the 
unqualified solidarity of Christianity with the life problems of the modern 
world” (Rendtorff 1971:86, italics added) in those writings - their perspectives of 
cooperation, integration, limited competence and dependence17 - must be 
regarded as absolutely foundational to meeting the above-mentioned 
requirements for participation in third and fourth generation development 
strategies.  
We have concluded on the basis of the exposition in 2.3 that a development 
discourse of a truly social theoretical nature has been constructed in the 
ecumenical development debate.18 Thus, not only does this discourse meet the 
criteria set in those foundational writings mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
but it has done so in a critical, uncompromising and normative manner that 
makes it an authentic exponent of an alternative development corpus.19 In this 
regard, it could be said that an ecumenical development discourse had come to 
challenge mainstream development theory and practice in a way that well 
matches the level of third generation theorisation described in 4.3.1. By way of 
further comparison, the thrust of the argument in the description of the three 
interrelated ecumenical concepts of economic growth, social justice and self-
reliance in 2.3.2 has a people-centred development emphasis similar to that in 
third generation development theorisation. Richard Dickinson, in his review 
article in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement,20 confirms this observation: 
“the notion of people-centred development” soon became “the distinctive 
                                                          
17 The far-reaching nature of such a foundation for involvement in meaningful development is particularly 
well illustrated when contrasted with the approach (or paradigm) of those evangelical theologians and 
churches identified in footnote 3 in the introduction. Whereas the ecumenical development discourse, 
which is described in Chapter Two, takes on a proper social theoretical identity, one that is of a normative 
kind but devoid of explicit theological language (see the further discussion below), the latter evangelical 
grouping appears, in turn, to vigorously defend the theological and Christian foundation of development. 
Thus, it can be said that their aim has been to reverse the whole process again and convert the concept of 
development from its secular, Western origins to a meaning that is truly biblical and Christian (see e.g. 
Sine 1987:2; The Wheaton ’83 Statement in Samuel and Sudgen 1987:255-258).  
18 See in this regard our concluding observations at the beginning of 2.3.1 and in 2.4. 
19 See 2.4. 
20 See footnote 2 of Chapter Two.  
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feature of the ecumenical understanding of development”. In this understanding 
“real social transformation was to be measured by what happens to people in the 
social change process, while the traditional notions of development tended to 
emphasize more abstract economic or political objectives” (1991:270).  
Indeed, a fourth generation meaning could be recognised in the ecumenical 
development debate’s people-centred emphasis. We saw in 2.3 how this debate 
increasingly posed a critical ideological challenge to the meaning of mainstream 
development, on behalf of the poor, marginalised and oppressed. It had gone to 
that extreme where its emphasis on “the people” (see Dickinson 1991:271-272), 
what we have come to describe as ‘a discourse from below’,21 would take on clear 
liberatory overtones (that is, converging with the message of the theology of 
liberation). Thus, development would in this sense be understood in very much 
the same terms as the first meaning of development in the WOMP/Alternatives 
debates spelled out in 6.2.1, a meaning that can also be seen as akin to Manuel 
Castells’s notion of ‘resistance identities’. It would similarly be understood that 
development, or the liberatory politics that takes its place, is a process 
determined by the people, in which they truly take control. Moreover, here the 
place/role of the churches is seen, similarly to that of voluntary 
organisations/NGOs in fourth generation strategic development action, as 
essentially supporting/serving the people’s emancipatory struggles.22  
Finally, in the ecumenical debate the foundation has been laid for a fourth 
generation approach to development by the churches, also in the fuller sense 
that we found in David Korten’s exposition, the second meaning of development 
in WOMP/Alternatives debates23 and Manuel Castells’s notion of ‘project 
identities’. Having pointed out how the critical ecumenical development 
discourse that was set out in Chapter Two can in itself be seen as an ‘idea 
movement’24 (a set of ideas that in a meaningful way renders specificity to the 
different value discourses in fourth generation development thinking), at this 
point the pragmatic debate that was discussed in Chapter Three is especially 
worth mentioning. A subsection or dimension of the wider ecumenical 
development debate, we have seen how an idea- and value-centred role for the 
churches in development was highlighted in the pragmatic debate, to the extent 
where the churches’ authentic role in development could be seen as lying 
explicitly on the level of conscientisation, of challenging reigning power and 
ideological formations. This role would first of all have in view the poor, 
marginalised and oppressed, and the transformation of their situation to the 
extent where they are the true beneficiaries and subjects of development; yet 
we also saw how the pragmatic debate, especially its radical manifestation, 
                                                          
21 See 2.4. 
22 See the second quote in 2.3.2.2, which clearly states this principle. 
23 See 6.2.1. 
24 See the final paragraph of Chapter Two. 
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directs such a role to a conscientisation of the rich and powerful themselves.25 
Here development has become a question of transformed lifestyles, structures 
and institutions, beginning with the rich and their societies. In so far as the 
churches are concerned, their role would be seen as similar to that highlighted 
by Korten and in the WOMP/Alternatives circle, namely to devote themselves 
to the spiritual renewal and deepening on which such a comprehensive 
transformation depends. In addition, this would be a call for spiritual renewal 
and deepening that, as in the case of Korten and the WOMP/Alternatives circle, 
is far removed from the traditional notion of spirituality (within the churches). 
It would take (or ought to take) concrete, outward effect through the way in 
which people, especially the rich and powerful, review their relation to the 
poor, adopt alternative lifestyles and develop a new sensitivity to the need to 
transform unjust structures and institutions. It may be argued that such a 
perspective on spirituality and conscientisation should have found its logical 
continuation in the wider fourth generation strategic and value discourses that 
we have explored in this study (that is, contrary to the state of erosion/impasse 
that we concluded the ecumenical development debate had reached in the mid-
1980s26). 
7.3 New beacons 
7.3.1 The new social movements 
[F]irst of all we must realise that all over the world, many people 
have actually got together in new social, environmental and 
democratic movements: women’s movements, homeless 
movements, farmer’s movements, indigenous movements, 
environmental movements, peace movements, and so on. Some 
have already formed international networks. They often work in 
close cooperation with the old social movements - workers’ 
movements and trade union movements ... Working in cooperation 
with social movements - as was the case with the prophets and the 
(peasant) farmer’s movements [in the biblical tradition] - churches 
and communities must convince their members of the need for this 
political struggle on the basis of their faith. If they expressed 
dissent, symbolic difference and a clear identification with the 
social movements, churches and congregations would gain 
credibility, and so enjoy untold opportunities to prophetically 
challenge the power structures ... Only when the churches 
participate in a double strategy, and go about it seriously, by saying 
“no” where necessary and offering alternatives, thus participating in 
                                                          
25 See the discussion in 3.3.2. 
26 See 3.4. 
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the creation of social counterforces, can their “dialogues” take on a 
limited meaning within the strategy as a whole. Ulrich Duchrow 
(1995:281, 282-283) 
Constituting perhaps the only explicit theological reference to the new social 
movements (in the sense that they are appreciated as actors of great significance 
that stand in an autonomous relation to the churches), the basic argument of this 
study is well summarised in the above extract from Ulrich Duchrow’s book, 
Alternatives to Global Capitalism: Drawn from Biblical History, Designed for 
Political Action. Thus we may propose, similar to Duchrow, that within the 
political, value and idea dynamics represented by the new social movements 
today (a value and idea dynamics that David Korten associates with fourth 
generation development strategies), the Christian churches could find new 
impetus in terms of their own quest for meaningful participation in the broad 
terrain of development. It is indeed here that the churches and an ecumenical 
development debate (whose ongoing relevance we have appreciated in 7.2) 
could find a new open-ended, normative and change-oriented concept of 
development, one not so much determined by set definitions or meanings of 
development (cf. Hettne 1995:11-1627), but by radical people-centred principles 
and global value discourses that one would assume the churches at their best, as 
progressive ‘idea’ and ‘value’ institutions, fully adhere to. 
On the basis of such an identification of the new social movements as the basic 
point of departure for the churches in development, it is proposed here that 
Manuel Castells’ notions of ‘resistance identities’ and ‘project identities’, which 
were highlighted in section 6.4 of the previous chapter (which also correspond 
with Duchrow’s notion of “a double strategy” in the above quote), can be taken 
as working concepts to give clearer structure to the churches’ participation in 
fourth generation development strategies. To begin with, it may rightly be said 
that it is on the level of resistance identities that the churches (or a particular 
segment of the churches) have always been stronger and have partly excelled as 
fourth generation actors.28 This statement is supported by our positive evaluation 
of the ecumenical development debate above, as well as a number of social 
scientific appraisals of the contribution of liberation theology to the concept of 
‘alternative’ development (see Lehmann 1990:88-147, 190-192; Little 1995:133-
134; Manzo 1995:245-247; 1991:21-25). Someone like Richard Falk (whose 
appraisal of religion is reflected in 6.2.2) would significantly add to this 
appreciation his suggestion of three pertinent terrains on which religion and the 
churches in particular have been allies of the new social movements. According 
to Falk, religious institutions/the churches have firstly served as enclaves by 
                                                          
27 An understanding of the concept of development and development studies by Björn Hettne (ibid.) is here 
adopted and applied. 
28 This is a mode of social movement politics that resembles the first meaning of development in the 
WOMP/Alternatives debate identified in 6.2.1. 
The Churches’ Participation in Fourth Generation Development 
 199
lending their “symbols and facilities in support of democratizing social 
movements of a generally nonviolent character” in various contexts29 (1987:185-
186). Secondly, through their active support to such democratising struggles, 
they have also contributed to a new kind (or revival of an old kind) of 
sacramental politics by which the values of peace and justice would become the 
trademarks of such struggles (1987:186-187). Thirdly, they have given expression 
to a new form of feminist religion that has become an important expression of 
the feminist movement, that is, particularly with regard to “(a) new language of 
the spirit [that] is needed, and being sought, as well as practices that accentuate 
nurturing and mothering, and that specify the sacred as a reflection of the 
feminine also” (1987:187).  
Returning to the contribution of liberation theology to development discourse, an 
appreciation of this mode of theology in an article by Marilyn Little, “The 
Liberation of Development”, is especially worth mentioning. A scholar from the 
field of geography(!), Little proposed the notion of “One World Development” 
as a working concept in her article. She pointed out that it was a concept or 
actual movement that articulates “a response to marginalization”. Moreover, it is 
a concept or movement that, through the two major motivators of religion and 
politics, has made a distinct impact in challenging the traditional economic 
growth model of development. This movement or concept has broken through 
the latter hegemonic concept of development and its consequent selective 
application to ‘Third World’ societies by promoting/establishing the recognition 
“that there are no automatic leader/follower positions in the development 
process”. It contends that “(t)he lack of human and social development in the 
‘First World’”, “matches if not surpasses the lack of economic development in 
the ‘Third World’” (1995:131-132). For Little, then, the combined intellectual 
effort of liberation theology and multiculturalism constitute, together with the 
movement of voluntary simplicity and the establishment of alternative trading 
organisations, a third manifestation of such a ‘One World Development’ concept 
or movement. Proclaiming that it is through this third manifestation that the 
‘One World Development’ movement is making/has made a universal impact, as 
“the attempt is to change the collective body of knowledge so that it includes all 
                                                          
29 This reality – of the churches acting as enclaves for democratising movements – is also well recorded by 
Leilah Landim in the context of Latin America. In her already mentioned article on “Non-govermental 
Organizations in Latin America” (see footnote 4 of Chapter Four), she wrote that in some cases of political 
opposition: “ ...the Church became the main arena for the popular sectors, deprived of any political 
channels for expressing themselves and participating in society, for speaking out and articulating their 
needs. The consolidation in certain regions, during the 1970s, of the current that has been called “the 
Popular Church,” is of particular importance. Religious sectors - both clergy and laity - who embrace a 
common discourse (sociological, political, theological: the Theology of Liberation) and a series of practices 
with specific characteristics, left a profound mark on the social movements they supported, and alongside 
which they worked, through “capillary action,” attending to the everyday needs of the popular sectors. At 
a time of closed political space, the NGOs in many countries took shape with this fundamental 
relationship with the Church’s work: they operated under the auspices of the Church, carrying out their 
activities primarily alongside the pastoral work.” (1987:32) 
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of the world’s people” (1995:133, italics added), Little concluded with the 
following appreciation of liberation theology:  
In liberation theology, the two driving forces of One World 
Development have met and inspired millions to act upon a dream 
eloquently expressed by two Brazilian theologians.  
…Those committed to integral liberation will keep in their hearts 
the little utopia of at least one meal for everyone everyday, the 
great utopia of a society free from exploitation and organized 
around the participation of all and the absolute utopia of 
communion with God in a totally redeemed creation…30 (original 
italics) 
Multiculturalism and liberation theology shared an intellectual 
philosophy. They have influenced each other and are influencing 
international discourse on development. Their major impact has 
been to challenge the concept of the ignorant and pliable aid 
recipient. This concept is the center of the authoritative persuasive 
approach in development planning. When it was combined with 
the basic needs approach the result was the transformation of homo 
economicus to “homo systematicus” … People became “cases” whose 
needs are “systemic requirements” which must be professionally 
evaluated ... Multiculturalism/liberation theology sees both history 
and current events as evidence that people are capable of analyzing 
their lives, determining choices and implementing solutions consistent 
with individual/group ethics. (1995:134, italics added) 
Certainly, the message of the theology of liberation and the practices that it 
inspires should remain a basic point of departure of the churches when faced 
with the issue of development, particularly the notion of fourth generation 
development. In fact, it should be said that, based on a distinctive theological self-
understanding, there can be no other point of departure but the theology of 
liberation: an unconditional option for the poor, marginalised and oppressed, for the 
popular and grassroots movements which they represent.  
Yet there is at this point also a need for further progression and innovation, as 
suggested by the consistent problem of reconstruction with which the churches 
(and other actors) are faced in contexts where liberation and a political platform 
for democracy have been achieved, but also by the striving to give shape to and 
promote those kinds of ‘resistance identities’ that Castells has come to view as 
sources of the new ‘project identity’ constructions (see 1997:356-362).31 In the 
words of the South African theologian, Charles Villa-Vicencio, who 
appropriately captured the challenge facing the churches here:  
                                                          
30 Quoted from: Boff, L and Boff, C 1987. Introducing Liberation Theology. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. 
31 See the final quote in Chapter Six (6.4). 
The Churches’ Participation in Fourth Generation Development 
 201
Winds of change are blowing across large sections of the globe, with 
the political crises in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and South 
Africa presenting a new challenge for theology. Hitherto the task of 
liberation theologians has essentially been to say ‘No’ to all forms of 
oppression. The prophetic ‘No’ must, of course, continue to be part 
of a liberating theology. As the enduring struggle for democracy in 
some parts of the world begins to manifest itself in differing degrees 
of success, however, so the prophetic task of the church must 
include a thoughtful and creative ‘Yes’ to options for political and 
social renewal. (1992:1) 
Thus, the quest is here for ‘resistance identities’ that anticipate, if not display, to 
a greater extent the qualities of Castells’s ‘project identities’. In view of this 
recognition, we may well remain within the sphere of liberation theology and 
propose as point of departure what has come to be known in Latin American 
liberation theology in particular as las Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs), 
the Ecclesial Base Communities. Based on the description in an Alternatives 
article by Pablo Richard (which adds to the religious appraisal set out in 6.2.2), 
through this ecclesiastical structure one may see the churches giving authentic 
expression to David Korten’s notion of people’s organisations (POs) described in 
5.3.1.2. Consequently, through the CEB model the churches become an extended 
community, built on what Richard pointed out as “a base, a neighborhood, 
hamlet, school, ethnic community, social movement” (1988:359).  
An expression of the “Popular Church”, or “Church of the Poor” (ibid.), Richard 
furthermore pointed out that “(a) key concept to understanding the CEB … 
[was] that of ‘participation’” (1988:368). In the CEB the traditionally marginalised 
and oppressed, “the poor, the campesinos, the laborers, the indigenous people, 
the blacks, the women”, are given opportunity to participate. It is the place 
where they can begin to think, speak and organise their actions. In the CEB 
creative participation that accommodates the social totality of the people 
becomes possible: they “participate by creating a new language, a new 
symbology, a new thought, within the CEB”, which “is done from their own 
social, political, and above all, cultural situation” (ibid.).  
(T)he Church, especially through the grassroots communities, 
presents itself as a place of creativity and life and popular 
participation. The CEB in this sense becomes a formative school for 
men and women who are creative subjects, who are creative leaders, 
and responsible citizens, who are in solidarity with the majority of 
the oppressed people. (1988:369, original italics)  
Richard concluded that in Latin America the CEB was “thus part of what has 
been called the “irruption of the poor” ...: a profound popular movement, an 
THE CHURCHES AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
 202
“awakening of the masses”, an awakening of the peoples and cultures which have 
been secularly oppressed, an increasingly significant participation of the women 
in society” (ibid.). As such, the CEB embodies “a new and authentic democractic 
movement” in this society, not only in the sense that it is the result of this 
movement, but also to a large extent the cause of it (1988:369-370, original 
italics). “It is the power of the people which manifests itself in the economic, 
social, political, cultural and also religious life.” (1988:369, italics added)  
Yet, it is in our opinion in Ulrich Duchrow’s above-mentioned book 
(Alternatives to Global Capitalism) that the CEB model, as an expression of the 
‘project’ element in ‘resistance identities’, is taken to a still further level. In the 
penultimate chapter of this book Duchrow challenged the churches to move 
beyond political rhetoric and actively participate in the creation of a new life-
sustaining economy. Based on the principles of the cooperative, people’s 
participation, creativity and ownership, and ecological sustainability, and given 
clearer direction by existing examples, the vision of a future life-sustaining 
economy, according to Duchrow, calls for experiments and enterprises in the 
following alternative micro-economic areas: (i) alternative companies and company 
networks;32 (ii) alternative technologies; (iii) alternative land use; (iv) alternative 
micro-financial systems;33 (v) alternative trade (see 1995:235-268). To this he 
would add the personal and communal commitment to an alternative 
consumption pattern and a fairer distribution of income (see 1995:268-274), that is, 
underlying value practices of the new economic system and the above-
mentioned enterprises. 
Thus, in Duchrow’s case, the emphasis has clearly shifted to the socio-economic 
level. As far as the churches are concerned, while they were still some way from 
making a large-scale contribution to the above-mentioned alternative practices,34 
he otherwise pointed to “a broad diversity” of church base communities all over 
the world and in various parts of Europe35 fitting the latter alternative category. 
From a more pertinently European point of departure, he pointed out that 
                                                          
32 Here Duchrow (1995:254) pointed to, amongst other things, the example of the Mondragon network of 
cooperatives in Spain, an initiative that was started by a priest(!). 
33 With regard to this area the famous Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is upheld as example by Duchrow 
(1995:261-262). 
34 However, examples of ecclesiastical participation could, according to Duchrow, be found in some of the 
identified alternative practices, such as the Development Commission of the WCC’s (CCPD’s) 
experimental study in the area of alternative technologies in the 1970s and 1980s (1995:255), churches in 
Germany’s participation in alternative trade through the political movement “Aktion Dritte Welt Handel” 
(1995:267), and churches in Germany’s attempts towards fairer income distribution through the Berlin-
Brandenburg initiative “PfarrerInnengehalt - Ökumenisches Teilen” and the Baden initiative “Soldarischer 
Lohn - Ökumenisches Teilen” (1995:272). 
35 Duchrow’s list of specific European examples includes the Sisters of Grandchamp in Switzerland, the 
Brothers of Taizé in France and various examples in Germany: the Christian communities in 
Wulfshagenerhütten, Wethen, Imshausen, the Mennonite community in Bammental, the traditional 
Hutterer brotherhood in the Eifel. He furthermore referred to the European Collective of Christian Base 
Communities, which has its small head office in Holland (1995:248).  
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examples of church-based communities acting as “germ cells” (see 1995:252) of 
the new life-sustaining economy envisioned did indeed exist. 
As prototype Duchrow upheld the example of “La Poudrière”, a community or 
collection of five interrelated communities of over 100 people living in and 
around contemporary Brussels. Starting off as a group of homeless and 
unemployed people who got together to work on all kinds of waste produced by 
the ‘affluent society’, they are a group of people (community) that has grown in 
sophistication and self-sufficiency on the basis of their initial recycling efforts: 
selling repaired goods to other poor people; running a removal firm; renovating 
an old brewery and factory for their recycling activities, doing vehicle repairs and 
all kinds of manual jobs; renovating parts of the works premises for 
accommodation; and producing most of their food on their own farm (1995:246).  
For Duchrow, then, this group of five communities, living in the city and the 
country, could be seen as “an autonomous cell of poor people for the poor in a 
totalitarian global economic system”. They have come to live “a life in 
community which is impressive in its wholeness, and marked by joy and 
healing”, a new beginning for many (1995:247). They express a new aesthetics of 
art, play and togetherness, and live according to clear communal goals. 
Importantly, they also have a clear religious base, but one that rather enhances 
the communal aspect and the value of equality.36 Their religiousness is rather a 
contributing factor in softening their ‘resistance identity’, as it emphasises 
voluntariness and an openness to outsiders. As captured in the following 
description by Duchrow of this community:  
In front of the large kitchen there is a big terrace on the garage roof, 
so that children can play there in sight of their parents. Meals take 
place around one or two large tables, made from timber from the 
farm. In the house of the first community there are five artistic 
stained glass windows over the tables in the dining room. They 
depict the five goals of the community: presence, friendship, 
justice, utopia and hope, and self-discipline ... Besides its stated 
goals, the community tried to define the means by which these 
goals could be achieved: work; a shared life and communal use of 
goods; a simple lifestyle; trust in others and in the goals ... simple 
resources, available to everyone ... no-one is excluded, be it for 
reasons of their past, class background, religion, situation or job 
training. 
                                                          
36 Elsewhere in the discussion Duchrow pointed out how the religiously open character of the “La Poudrière” 
community goes to the extent where “(a)ll its members, whether they are Christians, Muslims, Buddhists 
or atheists, are independent and equal and participate in the fully democratic process of shaping their 
economy for life” (1995:277). 
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In such cases, there is no ethnic exclusiveness, no masters and no 
slaves, and no dominance of men over women. Everyone is 
involved in the decision-making process, everyone receives the 
same financial allowance, and everyone is free to go on the main 
annual holiday excursion and to participate in cultural events. A 
small group celebrate Mass every morning, a larger group every 
Sunday and everybody joins in the periodic celebrations. The 
houses are always open to guests - the modern-day equivalent of 
the Pauline messianic communities, as are monasteries. (1995:247-
248) 
In the last section of the chapter under discussion Duchrow further highlighted 
the ‘project’ element by emphasising the necessity of networking. He emphasised 
that, due to the enormous pressure applied by the current mainstream system, 
individual or isolated alternative groups had “practically no chance of survival” 
(1995:274). Again, the simplest form, and hardest for the system to get hold of, 
are what he called “reciprocal visits” or networking, as expressed by the 
following recent initiatives, including an initiative by the WCC: 
Base groups working towards an alternative economy and 
democratic self-organisation visit one another, exchange 
information, support each other, strengthen each other through 
positive stimuli, and form loosely - or more tightly - organised 
networks: ecumenical networks, solidarity networks of all types, 
and research networks. This is happening at all levels: first locally 
and then at a national and European level, with countries always 
split into clear defined regions. During the UNCED in Rio in 1992, 
a large meeting of NGOs took place. In June 1993, the World 
Council of Churches hosted an international meeting of those 
networks which had carried out programmes of action marking 
“500 years of oppression and resistance”. The theme of the meeting 
was that of the Asian networks (People’s Plan 21): Alliances of 
Hope. There are innumerable examples, in many diverse forms, of 
such alliances. What unites them is a concept of a just, peaceful and 
environmentally friendly co-existence. (1995:275)  
However, Duchrow also cautioned against complacency. According to him, 
existing alliances are not to be idealised, as they are often weak and fragile in the 
light of financial constraints, rivalries and personality clashes that develop, as 
well as the absence of better organisational facilities that leaves too much in the 
hands of too few people. Consequently, it remained easier for single-issue groups 
to network with each other than with groups dealing with different (but 
interrelated) issues (ibid.). 
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Despite such difficulties to construct larger networking relationships, it also 
remains true that economic transformation (in the alternative, people-centred 
sense) cannot be achieved “by an ‘economic policy from below’ alone” 
(1995:277). This is stipulated as a basic assumption by Duchrow: grassroots 
initiatives are indeed to be seen as the “seeds of a new economic policy at the 
micro-level”; yet, they can change general economic conditions only if they evoke 
change at the macro level. On the basis of this basic condition the networking of 
initiatives among small-scale alternatives themselves, and between themselves 
and institutions that in principle might be independent of capital forces (e.g. 
trade unions and churches), was viewed by him as “(t)he bridge between rejecting 
unjust global mechanisms and setting up small-scale alternatives, on the one hand, 
and the necessary political strategies [on the macro level], on the other” (ibid., italics 
added). In short, without such a bridge, the small-scale alternatives on the 
ground would lose their meaning in terms of the larger whole.  
* * * * * 
On the level of praxis, it can be said that the discussion up to this point in the 
present subsection (7.3.1) pertains mostly to the local church’s participation in 
fourth generation development. Again, as Duchrow has pointed out to us, this 
does and should not neglect the factor of networking and cooperation at local 
and even wider levels among single churches or congregations, between such 
churches/congregations and broader communities/people’s movements/other 
actors. In line with the concept of ‘resistance identities’ that has been proposed, 
which consistently aims to move closer to the meaning of ‘project identities’, we 
can say that the discussion has come to challenge local churches/congregations 
and the larger networks in which they might be involved, to be more than 
voluntary organisations (to draw here on an earlier fourth generation concept37) 
that act as enclaves and voices for the democratic and resistance struggles of the 
poor and oppressed (although, one should add the qualification that such a role 
remains fully valid, necessary and meaningful in particular contexts). Inspired by 
the churches’ own message of liberation theology (which as a message has 
universal significance38) and the base model (CEB) that has become the practical 
expression of this message, the discussion has challenged the 
churches/congregations and their networks to become people’s organisations (to 
again draw on an earlier fourth generation concept39) that act as the base of 
people’s striving for political, social, cultural and, we should emphasise, economic 
emancipation, especially of the marginalised, the poor and the oppressed. It sees 
the local church/congregation as an extended community, as the springboard or 
base of people’s renewal, in the context of authentic participatory and 
                                                          
37 See 5.3.1.1. 
38 See the quote from Marilyn Little’s article earlier in this subsection (7.3.1). 
39 We have already applied this concept in the discussion of Pablo Richard’s perspective on the CEB model 
in 7.3.1. See also 5.3.1.2. 
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democratic values. It depicts the local church/congregation as a new community 
engaging in various new initiatives: spiritual, social, cultural, political and 
economic (the latter thus also denoting to the churches a new area of 
specialisation to be taken up by them). In contrast to first and second generation 
development strategies, it is not the church/congregation that goes out to render 
some project service for the people. Instead, it is a case of the 
church/congregation constituting the constant base from where people engage in 
a process of comprehensive and concrete renewal, which, in line with third and 
fourth generation development principles, ought to have sustainable, systemic, 
escalating and permanent effect within the local and regional community at 
large.40 
However, this can only partially be the social movement perspective that 
challenges the churches towards a meaningful participation in fourth generation 
development activity. This mode of development activity, as the exploration in 
this study has made clear, implies networking and communication, a ‘politics of 
ideas’, in the widest sense possible. Beginning with Korten’s perspective that was 
set out in Chapter Five, this mode of activity aspires to a people-to-people 
interaction going beyond local and regional initiatives. It is interested in a global 
people’s movement that will be the synthesising force of the various 
contemporary transnational social movements. It seeks value, structural and 
policy transformation in areas that have universal application. It is interested in 
the global citizen, in persons whose immediate acting and thinking relate to the 
larger reality of global values, survival, responsibility and transformation. In the 
extended meaning that we found in the WOMP/Alternatives and other 
complementary debates in Chapter Six, fourth generation development activity 
goes beyond local democratic discourses and practices to focus on wider political 
discourses of global governance and structural transformation, on the question of 
a new world order defined by the new transnational social movement values. In 
the light of this project (that is, the creation of a new world order), it goes 
beyond a social movements approach and emphasises a broader and more 
complex (global) civil society approach that draws on a diverse range of actors. 
                                                          
40 (1) In terms of the complementary meanings of the third and fourth generation that is sustained in this 
study (see especially the discussion in 5.4 and 7.1), the principles and policy framework of the people-
centred development agenda spelled out in Chapter Four (see especially 4.3.1) and the concept of essential 
or large-scale community services spelled out in 5.4 are assumed here. 
 (2) The concept of Mondragon in Spain’s Basque Country furthermore serves as a concrete illustration 
here. Being an initiative that was initiated by a priest, it has had the multiple effects that we are speaking 
of. As Duchrow described the widening dynamics of this initiative: “In 1941 the priest Don José Maria 
Arizmendiarrieta, with the help of a population still recovering from the effects of the civil war, began 
building a technical college. The first self-managed cooperatives soon followed in the Leniz valley. A credit 
cooperative was set up to fund the venture. By 1986, the system of cooperatives in the region consisted of: 
103 industrial cooperatives (with high quality research centres), 8 agricultural cooperatives, 4 service 
cooperatives (including medical care), 1 consumer cooperative, 17 housing cooperatives, and 46 education 
cooperatives with, in total, around 20 000 working members. All these workers and their families see 
themselves not only as owners but also as co-responsible creators of this continuously expanding 
enterprise, in which economic (wealth creating) and social components are integrated.” (1995:254) 
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Its orientation is ultimately the new informational or ‘Network Society’ and the 
system of world communication to realise its project of a new and global civil 
society solidarity. The working concept here is Manuel Castells’ notion of ‘project 
identities’, which takes as its point of departure the new transnational (proactive) 
social movements, that is those actors that should determine the identity of the 
new civil society solidarity. 
Against the background of such a formulation of an extended fourth generation 
strategic development action, the document, Declaration toward a Global Ethic, 
becomes a meaningful case study to assess – amongst the different religions – the 
churches’ progression towards the kind of fourth generation activity indicated 
here. Characterised by a strong Christian influence,41 this document, which was 
endorsed at the 1993 meeting of the Parliament of the World’s Religions by 6500 
representatives (Küng and Kuschel 1993:8), was a noticeable commitment to and 
recognition of the need for a global ethic, a binding values construct, by a 
substantial and widely representative group from the world’s religions.42  
It can be noted how the declaration departs from the basic presupposition that a 
new global order cannot be achieved without a global ethic, without “a minimal 
fundamental consensus concerning binding values, irrevocable standards, and 
fundamental moral attitudes” (Parliament 1993:18, original emphasis in bold). 
While this does not imply forsaking religious plurality (Parliament 1993:21), the 
declaration identifies the need for a new recognition of fundamental 
interdependence, “practising a culture of solidarity and relatedness” (Parliament 
1993:15). Again, it becomes clear in the document that such openness cannot be 
confined merely to the different religions. It implies a wider openness on the basis 
of a sense of humility that the world’s religions are not capable of solving the 
wide-scale and complex problems facing the world. At the same time, religion’s 
contribution is to be regarded as indispensable, in a concrete, spiritual sense. The 
document states:  
We know that religions cannot solve the environmental, economic, 
political, and social problems of Earth. However, they can provide 
what obviously cannot be attained by economic plans, political 
programmes or legal regulations alone: a change in the inner 
                                                          
41 The project leader and initial draftsperson of the declaration has been the distinguished Christian 
theologian, Hans Küng (on the historical origins of the declaration, see Küng (1993:43-73)). One may 
furthermore point to the substantial group of Christian religious leaders that signed the declaration (see 
Parliament 1993:37-38), as well as the continuing scholarly interest among Christian theologians in the 
project (as, for instance, evident in the 1996 publication edited by Küng, Yes to a Global Ethic. New York: 
Continuum).  
42 The declaration was signed by such significant people as the Dalai Lama, the Cardinal of Chicago, the 
Vatican representative, the representative of the World Council of Churches, the General Secretary of the 
World Conference of Religions for Peace, the General Administrator of the International Baha’i 
Community, the spiritual head of the Sikhs in Amritsar, a president of the Lutheran World Alliance, the 
patriarch of Cambodian Buddhism, a leading rabbi and an Arab sheikh (Küng 1993:72).  
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orientation, the whole mentality, the ‘hearts’ of people, and a 
conversion from a false path to a new orientation for life. 
Humankind urgently needs social and ecological reforms, but it 
needs spiritual renewal just as urgently. As religious or spiritual 
persons we commit ourselves to this task. The spiritual powers of 
the religions can offer a fundamental sense of trust, a ground of 
meaning, ultimate standards, and a spiritual home. (Parliament 
1993:22, original emphasis in bold). 
Closer scrutiny of the document makes it clear that ‘spiritual’ is nowhere 
understood in a mystical or abstract sense. It is a kind of spirituality that is 
fundamentally relational, which orientates the human consciousness to a new 
way of relating to other beings. It wants to inscribe in the human consciousness a 
profound respect for all life, human and non-human beings and entities. On the 
human side it means bringing about a new cast of mind that recognises the 
“inalienable and untouchable dignity” of every human being, “without distinction 
of age, sex, race, skin colour, physical or mental ability, language, religion, 
political view, or national or social origin” (Parliament 1993:23). Moreover, it is a 
kind of spirituality that also requires the creation of a new sensibility for caring, 
protecting and preserving animal and plant life, a new sense of planetary care, 
“especially with a view to future generations - for Earth and the cosmos, for the 
air, water, and soil” (Parliament 1993:26).  
Such a function of striving towards inner orientation or transformation is 
summarised at a number of places in the declaration, which also anticipates our 
fourth beacon of ‘soft culture’ below in which religion’s contribution to softer 
and gentler approaches to life is emphasised. The declaration concludes that the 
world religions are faced with the following challenges to give expression to a 
new ethos, the beginning and foundation of an alternative society: 
× to develop a concerning and helpful spirit towards others and a spirit of 
tolerance and respect for every other person or group - racial, ethnic or 
religious (Parliament 1993:26); 
× to develop a spirit of compassion with those who suffer, with special care for 
children, the aged, the poor, the disabled, refugees and the lonely; 
× to cultivate mutual respect and consideration, in order to obtain a reasonable 
balance of interests, instead of thinking only of unlimited power and 
unavoidable competitive struggles; 
× to value a sense of moderation and modesty instead of an unquenchable greed 
for money, prestige and consumption (Parliament 1993:29); 
× to cultivate a spirit of truthfulness in all relationships, instead of dishonesty, 
dissembling and opportunism (Parliament 1993:32); 
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× to create a sensibility for mutual respect, partnership and understanding in 
personal (sexual) and familial relationships, instead of patriarchal domination 
and degradation; 
× to create a spirit of mutual concern, tolerance, readiness for reconciliation, and 
love, instead of any form of possessive lust or sexual misuse (Parliament 
1993:34). 
In the Declaration toward a Global Ethic, furthermore, the perspective and 
orientation on religion’s contribution to a global ethic are ultimately to be found 
in the so-called ‘Golden Rule’, that particular principle shared by many religious 
and ethical traditions and positively expressed in the words: What you wish done 
to yourself, do to others. The declaration determines that this rule or principle has 
to become “the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families 
and communities, for races, nations and religions” (Parliament 1993:24). It is 
further spelled out and concretised by four broad, ancient imperatives for human 
behaviour that are found in most of the religions of the world, and which are to 
constitute the irrevocable directives of a new global ethos, a new society at large 
(ibid.). Hans Küng, in a later essay, indicated how these ancient imperatives had 
been contextualised in the declaration to constitute the basic framework for 
thinking and action: 
(i) On the basis of the commandment or directive, ‘You shall not kill’: the 
commitment to a culture of non-violence and reverence for all life; 
(ii) on the basis of the commandment or directive, ‘You shall not steal’: the 
commitment to a culture of solidarity and to a just economic order; 
(iii) on the basis of the commandment or directive, ‘You shall not lie’: the 
commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness; 
(iv) on the basis of the commandment or directive, ‘You shall not engage in 
fornication’: the commitment to a culture of equality and to the partnership 
of man and woman (1996:278; see Parliament 1993:Part III). 
Hence we may begin to ask on the basis of this review: is it not in this 
declaration that we are finding much of what is asked from religion in the fourth 
generation realm? Is it not in this declaration that we are encountering the kind 
of spiritual contribution that David Korten, for instance, is asking of religion and 
the churches?43 Is it not in this declaration that we are finding religion’s clear 
commitment to playing the reconciliatory role that Korten is asking from them, 
which, in the first place, begins with a reconciliation between the different 
religions themselves and making the message of love, brotherhood and 
reconciliation a common project (based on their own reconciliation)?44 Is it not 
in this declaration that we encounter the kind of spiritual sensitivity and renewal 
that authors from the WOMP/Alternatives circle are speaking of, a spirituality 
                                                          
43 See the entry on ‘spiritual development’ in 5.3.2. 
44 See the end of Chapter Five. 
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that serves as the fertile soil for a new social movement consciousness and 
activity and that allows for the recovery of religious tolerance that one of the 
writers of that circle has particularly emphasised?45 Do we not have here a clear 
example of transformed identity, of Manuel Castells’s notion of ‘project identities’ 
that he himself substantiates with the example of religious reconciliation and a 
new sense of religiousness?46  
As a positive confirmation of the above questions, we should conclude with 
others that the “declaration toward a ‘global ethos’ ... can serve as a pointer 
toward the new consciousness of human values that will be required” to achieve 
a more sustainable and humane world (Raiser 1996:4). It signifies a new 
“ecumenical understanding between world religions” (Küng 1996a:277, italics 
added), a “sign of hope for the future of religions and the peace of the world” 
(Küng 1993:73), “a sign of hope that a global change of consciousness is possible” 
(Küng 1996b:3). Küng furthermore pointed out the direct relation between 
religion, a global ethic and world peace: 
With this “global ethic”, the representatives of all the great world 
religions did not intend to establish a new world ideology or any 
unified world religion beyond all existing religions, and they 
certainly did not intend to establish the predominance of any one 
religion over the others. Instead, with this “global ethic” they 
wanted to bring to expression an already existing general consensus 
regarding binding values, fixed standards, and basic personal 
attitudes. For they were borne by the conviction that there will be 
no new world order without a global ethic. And without a global 
ethic, there will be no world peace. (1996a:277) 
With regard to the churches in particular, we may conclude that by making the 
declaration their serious concern, by adopting it as a project of their own, they 
could come closer to fulfilling a fourth generation development role than 
through all their charity and so-called community development projects 
combined. Here they may excel on the basis of their true expertise. Here they may 
come a step closer to the world of new ideas, values and relationships that the 
new transnational social movements at their best are also exerting themselves 
for. Here it becomes possible for local churches to fully participate in a global 
project, to conscientise the kind of global citizen asked for in fourth generation 
strategic development action. 
Yet, it must at the same time be concluded that the declaration by no means 
represent a fully-fledged fourth generation strategic development agenda. As a 
point of reservation it must be stated that the declaration could easily remain 
                                                          
45 See 6.2.2. 
46 See the final quote in Chapter Six (6.4). 
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within a vacuum, devoid of a clear social and political meaning or strategy. 
Directly related to this point, fourth generation development action challenges 
the churches to go beyond the interreligious solidarity that the declaration 
essentially represents. It challenges the churches’ (and the other religions’) ethical 
agenda to take ground in the more specific discourses and strategic activities of 
the new social movements, to be integrated into a wider social movement and 
civil society politics for the cross-fertilisation of that agenda and the political and 
social praxis of the new social movements. In line with the declaration’s 
admission that it cannot solve the world’s problems, it asks of the churches (and 
other religions) to manifest this concretely by engaging in wider solidarities. 
What we are trying to argue here is well reflected in Richard Falk’s Alternatives 
article on religion and politics in the contexts of the new social movements, 
when he stated that it was “not sensible to place our trust in any appeal that does 
not concretely and courageously respond to the actuality of suffering (past, present 
and future) in our world” (1988:390, italics added). For a new postmodern 
religious unfolding to succeed, Falk stated as the basic premise of his argument 
that it would “both have to clear a political path (to deal adequately with 
resources, relations among societies, group identity, human and nonhuman needs 
and aspirations) and facilitate an appropriate religious awakening (the release of 
spiritual energy associated with this readjustment of role and mission)” 
(1988:393). But significantly, elsewhere in his article he also seems to have 
reversed the order when he claims that the new, emerging religious reorientation 
of our time (which is grounded in the earth and is richly relational) was leading 
naturally to a political reorientation (1988:388). This is a case where the religious 
dimension dissolves in the new social movement politics:  
The new religious sensibility endows all of nature with a sacred, 
privileged status. The political implications are acknowledged, and 
lead to new forms of struggle in which modernist centralism and 
violence is under assault from a variety of postmodernist sources. It 
becomes worth dying for the sake of dolphins, whales, perhaps 
even on behalf of rivers, mountains, and forests. (1988:389)  
This point on political action is also clearly made by Ulrich Duchrow in the last 
chapter of his book. Duchrow points out that he favours a double strategy, which 
goes beyond the construction of small-scale alternatives (as pointed out earlier) 
to include “political intervention” (1995:279). For Duchrow, as captured in the 
quotation that heads this subsection (7.3.1), political intervention relates here 
specifically to the new social movements and to his statement that the churches’ 
own “dialogues” can only take on a limited meaning within the larger strategic 
dynamics represented by the new social movements (1995:283). As a clear 
transnational or global meaning is implied here, the churches are, according to 
Duchrow, challenged to engage actively in the international networks and 
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alliances that are made up, first of all, by the new (transnational) social 
movements, but also by like-minded actors such as the old social movements 
(workers’ movements and trade unions) and political parties (e.g. the Greens, 
democratic socialists) (1995:281).  
Thus, Duchrow’s challenge to the churches is a clear outward-going involvement, 
which very much resembles the transnational or global civil society solidarity of 
the fourth generation strategic development framework. It is to participate with 
the other actors of this solidarity in the grand ‘identity project’ of working for a 
new economic and political dispensation, what he calls a socio-ecological 
economic democratic alternative to capitalism.47 In terms of concrete strategic 
action, it is to work with the other actors of this solidarity for alternatives “to the 
current world economic and financial (dis)order” (1995:288). From the point of 
view of the churches, they are challenged here to face a new terrain of knowledge 
and creative thinking, the world of those international economic and political 
institutions that directly influence the outcome of development policy on a 
global scale. For Duchrow taking up this challenge furthermore meant that the 
churches should exert themselves for practical action in the following four areas: 
(i) Transformation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions 
(IMF, World Bank, GATT) to that point where the BW institutions will be 
integrated into the UN system on the basis of more democratic, pluralistic 
and universal principles (see 1995:288-294); 
(ii) Ending the debt that Southern nations owe to the North, which will, 
amongst other things, lead to the implementation of structural adjustment 
“on a fundamentally different development model, that is, an approach 
based on people and the environment, not on financial and economic 
growth alone” (see 1995:294-297); 
(iii) Combating capital and tax flight and all economic crime, which will lead to 
“new international regulatory and control systems, with the governments of 
the richest industrial nations taking the lead” (see 1995:298-300); 
(iv) Bringing the behaviour of transnational corporations (TNCs) under control, 
monitoring their activities on a constant regulatory basis, and binding them 
to new social, environmental and economic principles (see 1995:300-301). 
As clearly implied in the last part of Duchrow’s discussion, however, 
participating in solidarity strategies for global change is not to be seen as 
restricted to churches in their larger formations (such as regional and national 
                                                          
47 As indicated by Duchrow (1995:283, 288), in this respect he follows an intellectual stream represented by 
new/humanistic economic thinkers such as W Kessler (Germany), W Hoogendijk (Holland), P Ekins and 
J Robertson (Britain), H Daly and J Cobb jr. (USA), as well as by a number of reports and studies on the 
topic of a global restructuring of the political economy, such as: the UNDP Human Development Report, 
the ‘treaties’ emanating from the conference of NGOs at the time of the UNCED Rio Summit in 1992; the 
study commissioned by the EC Commissions’ Fast Programme, Towards a New Bretton Woods (ed. S 
Holland), the study by the Transnational Institute/Amsterdam, Beyond Bretton Woods. Alternatives to the 
Global Order (ed. J. Cavanagh). 
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councils of churches, the WCC). Thus it can be said that in his perspective the 
double slogan, ‘Think globally, act locally; think locally, act globally’ (see 
Waterman 2000:148), is equally applicable. For Duchrow, it is vital that the 
churches engage in larger coalition and networking strategies with larger civil 
society at national, continental and global levels (see 1995:304-311). Yet he 
pointed out that action for global change could just as much be seen as the 
terrain of the churches at the local level (see 1995:302-304), as the relevant 
“place to link small-scale alternatives and political strategies” (1995:304). At the 
local level large-scale processes of pauperisation, exclusion and destruction are 
most noticeable (1995:301). This is where the new civil society solidarity and 
alliance with the new social movements ought to begin for the churches, ought 
to be a manifestation or duplication of the global solidarity dynamics, and ought 
to ripple outward in ever-broadening linkages and networking initiatives (see 
1995:303). 
Finally, among the more recent reflections on civil society within the ecumenical 
movement/WCC48 already mentioned, a further meaningful articulation of our 
present argument may be found - particularly in an article by Israel Batista. 
Concluding his article by identifying four challenges that a civil society 
“paradigm” poses to the ecumenical churches, Batista in the process offered a 
perspective on remaining challenges that well supplements our own argument 
on the limitation of a project such as the one on a ‘global ethic’, but also on the 
challenges that generally face the churches in their endeavour towards a fourth 
generation development involvement (in the sense of Castells’ ‘project 
identities’); he concludes that: 
(i) Civil society (we could add fourth generation development strategies), while 
opening a new world of opportunity for the churches, challenges them with 
someone else’s agenda. Civil society was not invented within the churches, 
but was born in the midst of people’s struggles and has been worked on by 
many and in different contexts. It has, therefore, become vital for the 
churches to work with others’ agendas and to avoid hegemonising processes 
and programmes. In all, the churches are challenged here to another kind of 
involvement, one that is not to be seen as less important than former modes 
of involvement: acting as facilitator, enabler and catalyst of others’ 
experiences, which, in turn, would have a far-reaching influence on the 
nature, function and contents of the churches’ programmes (1994:19).  
(ii) Civil society (we could add fourth generation development strategies), 
challenges the churches to fully engage in local and global realities. Based on 
the realisation that small-scale schemes and micro-projects “cannot ignore 
the imposed character of global systems”, the churches are challenged to 
resolve “the tensions between local and global realities”, to engage in an 
                                                          
48 See points (2) and (3) in footnote 1 of Chapter Four. 
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agenda of a global civil society working to transform the global systems of 
power:  
The neo-liberal proposal of decentralizing state and civil society 
risks reducing global policies to the care of vulnerable groups with 
no political impact for transformation. Similarly, no new alternative 
or experience can dispense with the need for changes and 
transformation in the dominant global system. “The world needs a 
new vision of global cooperation for the next century,” the United 
Nations Development Programme has said.49 (Ibid.) 
(iii) Civil society (we could add fourth generation development strategies), 
challenges the churches to engage with the whole phenomenon of NGOs and 
social movements. Being central actors of contemporary civil society working 
for development and transformation, the churches (as co-actors of civil 
society) are challenged to facilitate critical consultation on their nature and 
activities (that is, of NGOs and social movements). Particularly with regard 
to the nature and work of NGOs, consultation (to which the churches 
could contribute) is necessary on the following matters: on questions such 
as labelling all organisations NGOs, including churches and ecumenical 
movements; on the attempts to replace people’s movements by NGOs; on 
NGOs as subsidiaries of the state and implementers of readjustment 
policies; on the role of NGOs as facilitators of “ideological readjustment” 
(ibid.). 
(iv) Civil society (we could add fourth generation development strategies) 
challenges the churches to exert themselves for a new international order. On 
the basis of what should be their profound dissatisfaction with the 
transnationalisation and gross concentration of power under contemporary 
capitalism, the churches are challenged to critically self-examine their own 
position in the international system (within an organisation such as the 
WCC, for instance). They should seriously reflect on what it means to be 
an international organisation, in relation to systematically structured ones 
(such as the World Bank and IMF) as well as international voluntary 
organisations (such as Red Cross and Amnesty International). They are to 
reflect on the ways through which they can contribute to the promotion of 
international civil society organisations (1994:19-20). 
                                                          
49 UN Human Development Report 1992, p. 10 (Batista 1994:20, n. 10). 
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7.3.2 The new communication solidarities 
Regardless of what a progressive group’s first issue of importance is, 
its second issue should be media and communication. This applies 
to all social movements. Robert McChesney (1996:16) 
(T)he power of the new movements, locally, nationally, and 
internationally, lies rather in their new ideas, values, and 
organizational principles - the latter revealing at least an implicit 
understanding of the potential of the latest communication 
technologies. Peter Waterman (1996:50-51) 
On the basis of the analysis in this study fourth generation development 
strategies necessarily challenge an actor such as the churches to become actively 
involved in the formal terrain of communication. As promoters of the new social 
movement politics, they are challenged in the following way: 
They are challenged to engage in strategies that will strengthen the new social 
movement and civil society activities and discourses specifically through the use of 
the media and new communication technologies. This implies that they engage 
with other civil society actors in strategies that will counter the consolidating and 
disempowering effects in world communication, will democratise world 
communication and thereby open up spaces and resources for the discourses and 
activities of the new social movements. In a more general sense, it implies that 
they act as facilitators, enablers and catalysts of a new civil society dynamics by 
generating resources and contributing to a communication infrastructure through 
which the new social movements and a larger civil society solidarity may flourish.  
However, let we immediately qualify such a challenge to the churches by stating 
that a meaningful contribution by the churches is here by no means self-evident. 
In one of only a few meaningful contributions to the theme of communication 
in the field of Christian theology, Neville Jayaweera suggested that such a 
statement was not only applicable to the mainline churches or the churches in 
the evangelical movement. Jayaweera also specifically discussed the role of the 
WCC and commented on the WCC’s (incomprehensible) lack of contribution 
to the concept of a New International Information Order (NIIO). He stated 
amongst other things that: 
The WCC, more than any other Church organisation, had the 
resources and the moral authority to speak out on this issue as it 
had indeed spoken on such issues as racism, disarmament, human 
rights, etc. It represents and speaks for more than ninety percent of 
the Churches outside the Roman Catholic and Fundamentalist 
Churches. Its voice is recognised and respected by the United 
Nations, and individual sovereign countries. Ideologically, at least 
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during the past decade, it has fearlessly witnessed to issues involving 
the rights and claims of poor and oppressed societies, often and not 
surprisingly, at great cost to itself. Why then has the WCC been 
muted on the issue of the NIIO? (1980:19) 
In this article Jayaweera also gave two reasons “why the Churches should have 
been in the vanguard” of the struggle for an NIIO. The NIIO concept was, firstly, 
“fundamentally a concern for values” that one might assume the churches would 
fully embrace: truth, justice, fair play, respect for the human individual, the 
defence of the weak and the oppressed, human rights, including the right to 
communicate and to be informed and educated, cultural equality, etc. (1980:18; 
italics added). 
Secondly, amongst the global institutions, the churches’ engagement in 
communication could be regarded as unprecedented. They had invested 
hundreds of million of dollars annually to communicate their message and for 
making the Christian position on various issues known. They were, in fact, 
communicating all the time, reaching out to all corners of the globe: through the 
operation of radio and TV stations, the publication of books, periodicals, 
magazines, newspapers, tracts and comics, the production of films, songs, drama 
and dance, grassroots parish networks, cellular groups and workshops, Bible 
study classes and house prayer groups (ibid.).50  
In his explanation of what he called the paralysis, the inability and unwillingness 
of the churches to involve themselves in the communication debate, we may 
note how Jayaweera’s criticism of the churches is very much in line with a basic 
assumption in our own study. For him, such a paralysis could be ascribed to the 
fact that “(t)he churches lack a social sciences approach and remain addicted to 
looking at empirical phenomena in theological terms” (1980:20, italics added). It 
can be said that they “have never felt a need for a valid ‘theory’ of 
communication”, as they basically remain interested “in one-way flow mass 
media” for evangelising purposes. Lacking any critical theoretical competence, 
they were also incapable of drawing the link between the interrelated question 
of an NIIO and a New International Economic Order (NIEO), or to recognise 
that the debate on communication is simultaneously a debate on economic 
justice, and that the call for an NIIO is merely an extension of the demand for a 
new economic order into the communication sector (ibid.). The following quote 
well summarises Jayaweera’s argument, but also what could, from a fourth 
                                                          
50 Giving some direct statistics of the churches’ involvement in communication, Jayaweera (1980:18) pointed 
out that in the 1980s in the United States alone Christian groups and churches owned and operated 998 
radio stations and 27 TV stations exclusively for communicating the Gospel. In addition, Christian groups 
in the USA were spending over $500 million a year on buying airtime on the national networks and 
private local stations. Scattered around the world, there were in all over 71 transcontinental and global 
broadcasting stations transmitting the Christian message on SW radio daily. 
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generation development approach, be stipulated as the basic problem of 
theological and ecclesiastical debates on development in general:  
It is nearly five hundred years since theology was dethroned from 
its self-appointed position as queen of the sciences. But most 
Churches and Church organisations generally behave as if Francis 
Bacon and John Stuart Mill had never lived. An empirical 
hypothesis, by definition, is more flexible and better able to 
respond to a changing reality than theological formulation. And 
communication, both as structure and as process, is primarily an 
empirical phenomenon. Unless communication is first analysed and 
understood in empirical terms, no amount of theological 
cerebration will give us the tools with which to manage it 
effectively. But Churches prefer to address themselves to the 
communication problematic in theological terms. They talk 
constantly of the ‘Theology of Communication’. In a sense one can 
even formulate a ‘theology of bridge building’ but no one would 
want to risk crossing a bridge constructed on theological principles. 
This is no less true of communication. (Ibid.)51 
We may conclude that a critical perspective, such as the one above by 
Jayaweera, cannot be neglected if we are to envisage a fourth generation 
development contribution by the churches, specifically in the area of 
communication. They are required to make the field of ‘communication for 
development’ an area of proper specialisation. This will mean that social theories 
of the new informational or ‘Network Society’, as set out in 6.4 of this study, 
will become the framework for all contextual understanding, analysis and action 
by the churches. 
In line with our first working concept of ‘resistance identities’, for the churches 
this will mean specialising in that area in which the formal practical and 
theoretical field of communication correlates with the field of alternative 
development or ‘another’ development and which can be termed alternative 
communication (AC) (see Hamelink 1994a:137-138; Lewis 1993:12; Melkote 
1991:Chapter 7; Stangelaar 1985:11-20; Waterman 1996b:25). Here, of course, one 
                                                          
51 In an earlier study on the participation of the churches in public communication, Cees Hamelink raised a 
similar critique. He concluded that the nature of the churches’ involvement in communication was 
inherently anti-dialectical by nature, that they operated without any proper theory of society by which 
they could critically analyse the socio-political and ideological context of their own communication praxis, 
which isolates public communication from the total social context (and thus from the problem of power 
and ideology). As a reversal of this, Hamelink proposed an approach/perspective for the churches 
according to which theological reflection and communication praxis are dialectically related, whereby 
theological reflection proceeds from a critical social theory that reveals the churches’ own position 
(ideological and political) and enables them to develop an alternative communication praxis. In 
ecumenical terms, it would imply a reversal from the “church and society” debate to a “society and church” 
debate (see 1975:48-50, 127-130). 
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is first of all thinking of local ‘resistance’ initiatives to the dominant information 
capitalist system (see Stangelaar 1985:11, 13-16; Waterman 1996b:25), which, on 
the practical level, may emanate in concrete initiatives such as “local stations, 
small community newspapers, minority media, counter-information magazines, 
theatre groups, pirate radio/TV stations, and alternative contents in mainstream 
media” (Hamelink 1994a:137-138). Guided by our determination in 7.3.1 in terms 
of which the concept of ‘resistance identities’ constantly anticipates and moves 
towards the actualisation of ‘project identities’, one is here thinking of the 
conceptualisation and actualisation of initiatives that confirm ordinary people as 
“the active participants in the communication process” and the active designers 
of “their own meaning systems instead of passively consuming the meaning 
system of the prevailing social order” (Hamelink 1994a:142). On a concrete, 
practical level, for the churches this would mean actively supporting a people’s 
media (see Hamelink 1994a:142-144), and moving still closer to the notion of 
project identities, supporting the construction of people’s networks that (most 
clearly in the movement from ‘resistance’ to ‘project identities’) exploit the 
potential of the new communication technologies and link local peoples to 
larger regional and global communication networks in ‘cyber space’ (see 
Hamelink 1994a:142-145).52 
In line with our second working concept of ‘project identities’, this will, for the 
churches, mean specialising in the field of world communication. It will mean 
that their ethical and value critiques become concrete in terms of addressing the 
disempowering effects (economically, politically, socially and culturally) of 
global information capitalism on ordinary people (see Hamelink 1994a:132-132); 
that their criticism is practically rooted in their active support for a global civil 
society initiative aiming “to shape world communication politics in accordance 
with people’s interests” (Hamelink 1994b:315; see also Hamelink 1994a:145-149). 
Pertaining to the ideal of “an active self-organizing global civil society” 
(Hamelink 1994a:147) that, in accordance with the analytic framework presented 
in 6.4 of this study, “is particularly active and effective on the terrain of 
                                                          
52 (1) Concrete examples of these kinds of ‘resistance identities’ would be those by Castells noted in 6.4, 
namely the Mexican Zapatistas and the Condepa movement in Bolivia (see footnote 31 of Chapter Six). 
 (2) Our concept of ‘alternative communication’ (AC) comes close here to the one identified by Peter 
Waterman. Having first of all listed a number of fundamental and interdependent characteristics of AC 
that comprise a strong element of the meaning of ‘resistance’, Waterman has otherwise been interested in 
an AC project that, while retaining its peculiar cultural/social identity, is outwardly orientated, overlaps 
with and relates to both the dominant system of communication and the new (transnational) social 
movements and civil society. As he explains: “I would like to suggest that alternative communication and 
culture are the project, or projects, of democratically-minded, theoretically-critical and socially-committed 
intellectuals (academics, professionals, artists, organisers), oriented towards the new social movements and 
civil society (both nationally and globally). ‘Alternative’ is thus placed, in both class and cultural terms, in 
tension with the ‘dominant’ and the ‘popular’. The three could be thought of as overlapping, 
interpenetrating and mutually-determining cultural spheres, physical spaces/geographical places, or even 
particular cultural products ... It allows for, and even requires, ‘alternative’ media or cultural actors to 
operate in relation to, and within, both other spheres as well as their own. It recognises ‘alternative’ 
cultural projects, spaces and places as marginal in power terms but maximal in terms of cultural freedom 
and innovation.” (1996a:25) 
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communication, media ... [and] culture” (Waterman 2000:142), for the churches 
this will mean joining the new social movements in what Hamelink identified as 
“a process of learning, of identifying issues as communication issues, of 
recognizing the micro/macro connection” (1994b:315; see also 1994a:147). 
According to Hamelink, this ought to lead to the following kind of dynamic, in 
which the churches should participate but a dynamic which they also need to 
help create by contributing to the necessary resources and infrastructure:  
The defence of local self-determination needs global action. Local 
spaces have to link transnationally to discover how people’s right to 
communicate is curbed by current political practice. Linking can 
take place through telecommunication, and computer networks are 
more easily accessible than before. Computer conferences on the 
main concerns in world communication are a feasible project. Joint 
actions can be planned for intervention in the global arena in an 
autonomous manner. People across the globe can conclude private 
agreements and alternative treaties in the various issue areas of 
world communication. (Hamelink 1994b:315) 
On a more general practical level, which goes beyond the specific aim to 
democratise world communication through the actual use of modern 
communication technology, a recent proposal by Robert Cassani to establish a 
global ‘Civil Society Development Fund’, may well guide the churches in their 
quest for concrete modes of action in the sphere of development and 
communication. Cassani argued that such a fund had become necessary to secure 
civil society’s independence from the dominant political and economic powers, 
and in meeting the infrastructure requirements of civil society so that it can seek 
its own solutions to global problems (see 1995:215-217). He furthermore 
emphasised that the information and communications ‘infrastructures’ of civil 
society in the broadest sense had to be the principle beneficiaries of the Fund 
(1995:220, italics added). These could be regarded as the needs that have become 
indispensable to a civil society to forge a global identity and engage in “(g)lobal 
lobbying, the coordination of campaigns and the exchange of information and 
real-time media relations” (1995:217). A number of communication-specific 
needs can be identified that such a fund ought to support and sustain: 
× the need to subsidise access fees to electronic communications systems; 
× the information and communication needs of those who facilitate or engage 
in fair trade; 
× the need for an independent global non-commercial, non-governmental 
television network to carry news and information from a plurality of 
perspectives, without the pressure of purely advertising-driven programming; 
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× the need for capacity building in the use and maintenance of modern 
communication technology and access to digital communications on a utility 
or use basis, especially for communities in low-income countries; 
× the need to support the travel and communication expenses tied to civil 
society participation in humanitarian or disaster relief operations (1995:220-
221). 
We may propagate that the churches could play an important facilitating, 
enabling and catalysing role by making a sustained financial and organisational 
contribution to the above kind of enterprise. Also, this kind of enterprise could 
guide the churches in reapplying their existing communication resources on local 
and regional levels and in those areas in which they (as actors that are often 
skilled in the new communication technologies) might play a capacity-building 
and training role. As the Fund would operate on a fully decentralised basis and 
be comprised of “a web of regional and local affiliates” (1995:215) that seek to 
enhance the capacities of poor people to participate in informational society 
(1995:220), this is also the kind of enterprise that churches at local and regional 
levels might feel close to. At the very least, it denotes the kind of enterprise that 
ought to be imitated by churches at local and regional levels that are serious 
about strengthening civil society and about playing fourth generation 
development roles. 
Communication, a fourth generation development perspective confirms, is basic 
to an authentic people-centred development process. Put in the negative, 
without sufficient access to the various mediums of communication, there can 
be no mobilisation of a civil society, no authentic participation by people, 
control of their immediate environment and active design of their own meaning 
systems (social and cultural), no proper conscientisation and education on 
people-centred development issues and values, no flourishing of the new social 
movements. As Hamelink pointed out, communication is basic to people’s 
empowerment: 
The term empowerment literally means that people are given 
power. It refers to a process in which people achieve the capacity 
to control decisions affecting their lives. Empowerment enables 
people to define themselves and to construct their own identities. 
Empowerment can be the outcome of an international strategy 
which is either initiated externally by empowering agents or 
solicited by disempowered people ... Much like communication is 
an important tool of disempowerment, it plays a significant role in 
empowerment. People’s power requires knowledge about the 
decisions that affect their lives and information about what they 
can do about these decisions. People’s power also needs expression, 
dialogue and the sharing of experiences. (1994a:132-133) 
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Yet, as Hamelink has emphasised, empowerment through communication in the 
context of contemporary world communication cannot be taken for granted. He 
concluded that in order for this to happen, “to create world communication 
politics ‘as if people matter’… new civil initiatives … [were] needed”. He 
postulates this as a basic condition: “If people’s interests are to be 
accommodated, people will have to claim the right to communicate.” (1994b:314-
315, italics added). This would require the new social movements to mobilise 
around the issue of communication as vigorously as they have around other 
issues: 
So far, social movements have expressed their concern about the 
world in such fields as human rights, security, environment and 
development, but not in connection with world communication. 
Yet people’s daily lives are affected by world communication in 
essential ways. We need therefore, much like the green movement 
and the peace movement, a communication movement. (1994b:315) 
In view of such a quest for new civil initiatives in the field of communication, 
Hamelink indicated that a first step in this regard “could be the worldwide 
adoption by individuals and movements of a People’s Communication Charter” 
(1994a:148, italics added). Launched as an ongoing initiative53 by a number of 
organisations,54 this Charter “could provide the common framework for all those 
who share the belief that people should be active and critical participants in 
their social reality and capable of governing themselves” (ibid.). It can be noted 
in brief that it is a document that aims to inspire political action around an 
integrated communication and human rights perspective.55 As stated in the 
introduction to the Charter, its aim is “to bring to cultural policy-making a set of 
standards that represent rights and responsibilities to be observed in all 
democratic countries and in international law”. Based on the recognition that 
“communication is basic to the life of all individuals”, it contains 18 standards 
that aim to protect people’s rights and dignity in the area of communication and 
to democratise world communication on behalf of ordinary people. They are the 
rights to: (i) respect (in accordance with the basic human rights and standards of 
dignity, integrity, identity and non-discrimination); (ii) freedom (of expression); 
(iii) access (to local and global resources for communication); (iv) independence 
(in the area of communication); (v) literacy; (vi) protection of journalists; (vii) the 
right of reply and redress; (viii) diversity of languages; (ix) (protection of) cultural 
                                                          
53 An updated version of the charter has been obtained from Cees Hamelink at the Centre of 
Communication and Human Rights by e-mail: hamelink@antenna.nl. Date: 18 July 1996. 
54 Centre for Communication and Human Rights (The Netherlands), Third World Network (Malaysia), 
AMARC-World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (Peru/Canada), Cultural Environment 
Movement (USA). 
55 As indicated at the end of the Charter, it has been informed by, and benefited from, various agreements 
and declarations in the field of international law and human rights. 
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identity; (x) participation in policy-making (in the areas of communication and 
culture); (xi) children’s rights; (xii) cyberspace access; (xiii) privacy; (xiv) 
(protection from) harm (that is, physical, psychological and social violation of 
individuals and groups by the media); (xv) (juridical) justice; (xvi) consumption 
(that is, physically and psychologically healthy consumption); (xvii) 
accountability (to the general public); (xviii) implementation (of the Charter). 
In addition to the idea of a Global Civil Society Fund (which is especially 
directed to civil society’s needs in the field of communication), we may 
conclude that The People’s Communication Charter constitutes a most 
meaningful (already existing) initiative that can give concrete direction to the 
churches’ (both local and global) participation in fourth generation development 
strategies. The Charter is an initiative that integrates the issues of 
communication, human rights, culture and development into a single 
framework, and which seeks to continuously broaden its support base, so its 
adoption may present a very worthwhile challenge to the churches. Spelled out 
in question form: could the churches at local, national and global levels become 
the meaningful supporters of the Charter? Could they subscribe to it through 
their various bodies and make it part of their theological, development and 
educational framework? Could they become part of a larger solidarity 
movement that places the agenda of the Charter at the centre of their activities 
for transformation and justice? 
Also overlapping with what we have recognised as the churches’ contribution to 
a global Civil Society Development Fund, could the churches become the real 
supporters of those groups already involved in the areas of communication and 
human rights stated in the Charter (cf. Hamelink 1975:129)? Could they make 
their own communication structures available to such groups by engaging in 
those diverse areas or issues themselves? Could they provide moral, political, 
ideological, financial and infrastructural support for the various groups and 
victimised involved? Could the churches, through its various national and 
international bodies, become an important voice to expose and criticise the 
present international economic order, by bringing a fundamental communication 
perspective into such critique on the basis of the Charter? 
As Hamelink asked in an earlier study, could the churches make a significant 
contribution to the creation of the conditions under which people will become 
competent to deal with communication (1975:130)? At a very concrete grassroots 
level, similarly to what we identified under the idea of a global Civil Society 
Development Fund, could the churches engage in initiatives of education, 
training and conscientisation that will enable ordinary and poor people to 
acquire what The People’s Communication Charter stipulates in its 5th article as 
the “skills necessary to participate fully in public communication”: literacy in 
reading, writing, story-telling, critical media awareness, computer skills and 
education about the role of communication in society? 
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7.3.3 Alternative development policy 
Given the complexity of contemporary social, political, and ethical 
issues, the church can no longer be content to focus its public 
ministry primarily on the issuance of social statements and public 
proclamations ... We have enough prophets who fire their moral 
broadsides against the evils of our society; we have enough policy-
makers who determine our future through efficiency studies and 
cost-effective analyses. What we lack are those who combine 
prophetic vision with careful analysis; and until we cultivate and 
nurture such persons, our public life will remain diffuse and 
spiritless. Ronald Thiemann (1991:41-42) 
In this study the hypothesis has been sustained that the churches best fit the 
unlimited space of the fourth generation development realm in which the 
emphasis falls on a ‘politics of ideas’, on values, ideas, ethics, and on civil society 
networking. Yet, this emphasis does not mean that the fourth generation 
strategic mode constitutes a ‘soft option’ for the churches, whereby they may 
bypass the more formal and rigorous processes of social theoretical analysis and 
policy-making. Whereas it can be said that this is already clearly implied in our 
discussion of the first two beacons above, which challenge the churches to new 
levels of social theoretical specialisation and public (political) action in various 
areas (economics, communication, etc.), the challenge to become meaningful 
actors on the level of formal/official development policy-making in general 
should be stated as a third beacon for the churches in fourth generation 
development. Consequently, the churches are – no less than other actors in civil 
society – challenged to move towards greater specificity and engage in the policy-
making processes that ultimately determine the direction that development 
takes. Their marginalisation in the public sphere (as we observed in the 
introduction of this study) does not exempt them from countering this position 
and seeking a higher public profile. This constitutes a challenge that the 
churches cannot shy away from, one that will ultimately determine their 
credibility and the quality of their involvement in development. They are 
challenged to make a constructive contribution to the conceptualisation and 
implementation of policies that ought to change institutions, structures and 
organisation in general on the decentralised and global levels of society. They are 
challenged to infiltrate the corridors of power and speak and operate on the 
same concrete public level as the rulers and decision-makers of society. 
From a different angle, our emphasis on the complementary relation between 
third and fourth generation development strategies cannot but lead the churches 
to develop skills and seek opportunities in the formal policy-making arena. 
While the mode of fourth generation development action ultimately goes 
beyond this formal arena, as we concluded in 5.4, the other side of our 
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perspective nevertheless remains. As we concluded (in 5.4 but especially also at 
the beginning of this chapter), fourth generation development strategies cannot 
do without the managerial, organisational and policy-making skills developed in 
the third generation mould of action. This mode of involvement needs those 
skills in order for its actors to become concrete, constructive and effective in terms 
of the global transformation that they want to achieve. Moreover, third and 
fourth generation strategic orientations can be seen as belonging to the same 
people-centred development vision. This recognition asks from actors of the fourth 
generation strategic development orientation to become operative also on the 
level and modes of involvement set out in the third generation development 
orientation. It asks from those actors to become involved in formal policy-
making activity on all levels of society, in a way that their involvement will 
manifest the reinforcing and complementary nature of third and fourth 
generation development strategies. It asks from them to influence the formal 
operational arenas of both third and fourth generation development strategic 
action in the direction of the new social movement values that are emphasised 
in the fourth generation orientation. 
Thus, the framework and contents that have been set out in Chapter Four of 
this study become just as important for the churches (in addition to the 
framework and contents that have been set out in Chapters Five and Six). 
Chapter Four points particularly to the innovative element in the third 
generation strategic development orientation, which lays the foundation for a 
serious involvement by the churches in development. There the churches will 
find the core of a proper social scientific theorising about development that 
ought to appeal to their own normative orientation.56 On the basis of such 
theorising, there the churches are also orientated towards a new kind of political 
involvement,57 which, as we have further seen, is closely linked to the notion of 
a new professionalism in which actors of a people-centred development should, 
inevitably, develop new capacities in the areas of policy-making, management, 
organisational development, and so on.58 There the churches and other people-
centred development actors can find the perspectives on theory, skills and strategy 
that, if adapted to, would give them the solid basis from where they can truly excel 
in the sphere of fourth generation development activity (in so far as this sphere also 
requires concrete policy, managerial and organisational alternatives). 
Yet the discussion in Chapter Four and our reliance on an interrelated NGO and 
people-centred development debate in this study in general for a deepening 
perspective on the strategic involvement of the churches in development (that 
is, from the starting-point of David Korten’s analysis) take on a further 
important meaning on the phenomenological level. Particularly with regard to our 
                                                          
56 See 4.3.1. 
57 See 4.3.2. 
58 See 4.3.3. 
The Churches’ Participation in Fourth Generation Development 
 225
comparative view of the ecumenical and NGO development debates at the start 
of Chapter Four,59 it should be stated that that view cannot be read as a 
complete identification of the churches with the NGO sector (as if the social 
identity of the churches can be summarised by the sum total of the 
contemporary NGO phenomenon). At the same time, the comparative view in 
Chapter Four suggests the substantial overlapping between the two sectors in 
the field of development, historically, strategically and organisationally.  
As allowed and demanded by the new worldly determination in the ecumenical 
development debate and the new civil society solidarity perspectives that 
ultimately determine fourth as well as third generation60 development strategies, 
it can be stated here as a basic premise that the phenomenological overlapping 
between the church and NGO sectors ought to receive far greater consideration in 
the theological-ecclesiastical debates on development. Based on their historical and 
sectoral overlapping, the churches’ path towards meaningful participation in the 
formal public arena (as required in both the third and fourth generation 
development perspectives) should go through the contemporary NGO sector. Being 
the less skilled, less informed and less experienced affiliate today, the churches 
are to seek renewed cooperation, affiliation and integration in the field of 
development with their NGO counterparts. Through, and only through, seeking 
alliances with and becoming part of an ever more sophisticated NGO network, 
which is increasingly challenging but also cooperating with the world’s major 
policy-makers (such as the World Bank, United Nations, governments) (see Coate, 
Alger and Lipschutz 1996:94; Uvin 1995a:509; Poverty and Social Policy 
Department, World Bank 1997:28-36),61 could the churches make a meaningful 
(people-centred) contribution in the arena of development policy.  
As the discussion in Chapter Four may suggest, the contemporary NGO sector, 
from the beginning of its initial historical overlapping with the churches, has 
embarked on a secular development path, which means that today it is 
acknowledged – to a far greater extent than is the case with the churches – as a 
meaningful role player by the main secular development actors. As such, the 
contemporary NGO sector, largely in its secular guise separated from the 
churches, has progressed towards levels of formal public development 
involvement far beyond the churches. Over against the domains of religious life 
in which the peculiar (unique) identity of the churches rightly ought to be 
sustained (such as cultic and personal worship, pastoral care), the churches are 
summoned to emulate to a greater extent this secular inclination of the NGO sector 
in the area of development. It can be claimed that this will be the only way for 
the churches to gain entry to and acceptance, on a systematic and specialised 
                                                          
59 See 4.1. 
60 See the second and third perspectives emanating from the discussion in 4.3.2. 
61 See also 4.3.2, where we noted how a similar claim on the progress by NGOs in the formal policy-making 
arena had been made by authors of the book, Government-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and 
Challenges for People-Centred Development. 
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basis, in the arena of formal development policy-making. Motivated by – and on 
the basis of – their faith and moral commitment, the churches are required, as 
one extension of their involvement in human life, to present themselves as 
development-oriented organisations that can in a capable way speak a 
predominantly secular social scientific discourse of development and that are fully 
integrated into the coalition activities of the NGO sector as a whole. This requires 
that they will, in a formal way, promote an NGO identity and activity that will 
simultaneously display the new professional, voluntary, participatory and 
democratic proficiencies that we outlined in Chapters Four and Five.  
Whereas it is true that the notion of “public church means different things to 
different writers”, as two participants in what has come to be known in recent 
decades as the debates on ‘public theology’ and the ‘public church’62 have observed 
(Hessel and Hudnut-Beumler 1993:297), our own perspective may find 
meaningful support in these debates. Beyond the theological-ecclesiastical and 
NGO development debates, we may note an emphasis in these debates on the 
need for the churches to progress to a policy involvement similar to that stressed 
above (though we focused more specifically on the issue of development, while 
the debates on public theology and the public church focus on the issue of 
public and policy involvement in general). 
As is evident from the quote with which we started this subsection, we 
encounter among the current debates on public theology and the public church 
the perspective, similar to our own, which states that the churches need to 
convert their moral discourses and statements into more specific policy 
discourses (see Lategan 1995:226; Hessel and Hudnut-Beumler 1993:299). In these 
debates the churches and Christian theology are summoned to make such a 
policy contribution not only for the sake of a new kind of normative policy 
determination, in which a value or ethical commitment would creatively 
combine with careful analysis (Thiemann 1991:41-42), but also for the sake of 
maintaining their own future and meaningful place in a rapidly changing society 
(Lategan 1995:220). Furthermore, they will be able to make such a contribution 
only on the basis of an engagement in “new forms of education” through which 
“genuine debate and dialogue about crucial public issues can take place” 
(Thiemann 1991:42). They are called upon to make such a contribution on the 
basis of a worldly, solidarity and interactive determination very much in 
accordance to our own determination in this study:  
The spirituality (or spirited mission) of a public church ... combines 
faith commitment with civil dialogue, prophetic passion with 
public sense ... it seeks the transformation of the social order that 
                                                          
62 In his reflection on the notion of public church, James Fowler (1991:153) noted that the term was first 
coined by the American theologian, Martin Marty, in a book with that title published in 1981 (Martin E 
Marty 1981. The Public Church. New York: Crossroad). 
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affects, and should be affected by people of faith. A church 
oriented to public ministry is open to the world, speaking and acting 
beyond its walls for the common good, so that others notice, interact, 
and respond. It is people embodying their faith in social concert and 
coalition. (Hessel and Hudnut-Beumler 1993:299-300; italics added) 
Against the background of the above generally stated intention of a public 
theology or church, we can at this point turn to the proposal for an interactive, 
constructive mode of theological discourse in the public arena that has been 
made by the South African scholar, Bernard Lategan. Making a contribution that 
can be regarded as representing a higher point of hermeneutical and conceptual 
sophistication in the general public theological debate, Lategan pointed out in 
his proposal the need for a different type of theological discourse in the post-
apartheid South African context, which can also be applied to our line of 
thinking in this subsection. 
Following the refined distinction made by David Tracy (a foremost exponent of 
the contemporary public theological debate) between three different publics of 
theology (the academy, the church and society at large), Lategan focused in 
particular on the meaning and implications of the third public for theological 
discourse (1995:219). In accordance with our recognition earlier in this 
subsection of the validity of a more distinctive church identity in certain 
instances or contexts, Lategan likewise emphasised his intention not to 
undermine the importance of more traditional theological and faith discourses 
that are conducted in the contexts of the first two publics, but only to add 
another kind of discourse:  
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be clearly stated 
that the intention of this proposal is neither the replacement of 
existing modes of discourse by a ‘superior’ form, nor the devaluation 
of alternative modes. The argument is, rather, one of ‘horses for 
courses’. The suitability and effectiveness of a particular discourse 
are in direct relation to the purpose for which it is employed. But 
more than that, the different modes of discourse play a supporting 
role in relation to each other. Intra-textual analysis, rediscovering of 
the tradition, reformulation and re-affirmation of dogma, describing 
the world of the text in its own terms, narrating the story of 
Biblical texts for their own sake, explaining and defending the truth 
claims of theology, prophetic resistance and confrontation, 
uncompromising witnessing, and apologetics of a more subtle or a 
more aggressive kind, all have their validity and function. The issue 
is to take into account which public one is dealing with, and to 
decide on which mode or modes would be suitable for that 
purpose. Furthermore, the more clarity that can be obtained in the 
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context of the second public regarding the nature and content of 
faith propositions, the more effectively the discourse with the third 
public can be conducted. The different modes are complementary 
to each other and should be valued for their supportive 
contribution. (1995:225)  
Beyond the preservation of theological and faith discourses in the first two 
publics, within this framework there ought to be, and could be, a legitimate and 
necessary place for a different type of theological discourse suiting the context of 
the third public (that is, larger society) - a type or style of discourse that would 
complement (and not oppose!) the modes of discourse conducted in the contexts 
of the first two publics. Lategan postulated that in the third public, theology and 
Christianity ought to respond to “the need to contribute to the establishment of 
a new public ethos in civil society” (1995:225). This could be seen as a crucial 
extension of their task (as a primary value or ethical actor), yet, one in which 
they must forsake their privileged position. In order to participate in, and 
contribute effectively to, this public, theology would be required “to move 
beyond its preoccupation with itself, beyond being concerned primarily with the 
validity of its own truth claims, beyond its defensive attitude, beyond its 
experience of marginalisation and its resignation of not being able to influence 
civil society” (1995:225-226). Theology would be required to adopt a new style of 
discourse (a new form of language) for the sake of a wider cause: 
The plea is, therefore, to move beyond what is conventionally 
understood as theological discourse and to explore the possibilities 
of a form of language that is not primarily interested in preserving 
the integrity of theology, but to serve a wider cause. The leading 
question for this purpose is not, How do we defend Christian truth 
claims? but, What contribution can theology make to the process 
of developing and establishing a new public ethos? 
What is proposed here, comes close to what Gustafson (1988:4563) 
calls ‘policy discourse’ - a discourse ‘which seeks to recommend or 
prescribe quite particular courses of action about quite specific 
issues’. As we have already seen, it is a discourse conducted in the 
public arena with the focus on concrete issues, within the 
constraints of the possible. It has the added dimension of taking 
responsibility for what is proposed in this discourse, and therefore 
demands accountability. Gustafson points out that it is a discourse 
not conducted ‘by external observers, but by the persons who have 
the responsibility to make choices and to carry out the actions that 
are required by the choices’. (1995:226-227)  
                                                          
63 Gustafson, J M 1988. Varieties of Moral Discourse: Prophetic, Narrative, Ethic and Policy. Grand Rapids: 
Calvin College. 
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We may end here by pointing out the seven characteristics that Lategan finally 
emphasised as indispensable for theology to succeed in such a policy-specific 
discourse. Reiterating, in fact, much of what we have attempted to say in this 
subsection, these characteristics can be presented as a structured set of proposals 
that should also determine the way forward for the churches, as development-
oriented NGOs, to become authentic actors on the formal terrain of 
development policy-making. 
Firstly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt a non-prescriptive mode of discourse in which their attitude 
“should rather be one of joint discovery, allowing parties in the public debate to 
participate on their own terms and articulate from their own experience and 
perspective - letting issues and formulations emerge before directing and 
confining the discourse” (1995:227). 
Secondly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt an inclusive style of discourse, by which they are open to the 
flow of ideas, to the fundamentally new and unexpected and to all possible 
contributions (ibid.). 
Thirdly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt an interactive, participatory style of discourse, which is no 
longer developed and conducted in the protected environment of the ‘own 
group’. “It implies the willingness, not to claim a privileged position for theology, 
but to become vulnerable, and to be challenged.” (ibid.) 
Fourthly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt a discourse that gives evidence of hermeneutical competence, 
“that is, familiarity with different discourses, but also the ability to move 
between these discourses and to mediate and interpret issues as they are 
expressed and experienced in different contexts” (ibid.). 
Fifthly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt a serving mode of discourse, by which they lose and transcend 
themselves “to become liberated in service to the other” (ibid.). 
Sixthly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt a new kind of constructive discourse, which goes beyond 
resistance and protest and display “a willingness to reach out, to build, to take 
responsibility, and to jointly map out a possible course of action” (ibid.). 
Seventhly, theology/the churches as development-oriented NGOs would be 
required to adopt a new mode of anonymous, secular or camouflaged discourse, 
which is no longer formulated in recognisable theological language and 
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effectively translates theological concepts in a public discourse accessible to 
participants from other discourses, in a form that is genuinely public64 (1995:228).  
7.3.4 ‘Soft culture’ 
Another way to state the need for a transformation in conscious-
ness might be in terms of a shift from the dominance of traditional 
masculine consciousness to the dominance, or preferably a melding 
into the dominant culture, of critical elements of traditional 
feminine consciousness. Growth-centred development institu-
tionalizes the masculine ideals of competition, empire and 
conquest. It is intrusive and individualistic. It seeks symbols of 
dominance and power over others and nature. People-centred 
development depends on a realization of traditionally more 
feminine ideals of a nurturing family, and community, place, 
continuity, conserving, reconciliation, caring and reverence for 
nature and the continuous regeneration of life. David Korten 
(1990:168-169) 
As an extension of the element of spiritual development that Korten has 
identified as a central dimension of fourth generation development, the notion of 
‘soft culture’ can be proposed as a fourth most important beacon for the 
churches. It appears that this notion summarises in an appropriate manner what 
Korten has defined as ‘spiritual development’,65 but also much of the 
appreciation of the authors from the WOMP/Alternatives of what religion and 
its institutions (including the churches) have to offer to their agenda of 
transformation.66 As such, this notion best highlights what the churches can 
offer as religious and idea institutions (contrary to the churches as development-
oriented NGOs, with reference to the previous subsection) that draw, 
                                                          
64 See here our statement in footnote 17 in the introduction, where we pointed to such a mode of 
anonymous or secular discourse as basically the mode of discourse to which this study as a whole adheres, 
but with the exception that we allow more explicit theological/religious discourse to contribute to the 
interdisciplinary perspective at particular moments or stages. This exception indicates the marginal 
difference between our own position and that of Lategan. Whereas our study also fully locates itself in the 
third public and aspires to the rules/conditions of participating in this public, it, in contrast to Lategan, 
also allows for a selective contribution that is formulated in the realm of theology/religion itself. In the 
case of Lategan such a contribution is restricted/referred back to the first two publics (the academy, the 
church), whereas in our case this demarcation rather becomes blurred. Adhering by and large to the 
rules/conditions of the third public, the relation between the three publics in our case becomes more than 
a complementary one, but one in which the three publics at times also overlap. 
65 This can be argued on the basis of the quote at the start of this subsection (7.3.4), which is extracted from 
Korten’s discussion on the element of spiritual development. See in this regard also the discussion in 5.3.2. 
66 See 6.2.2. 
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legitimately and meaningfully, on their own metaphors and spiritual language,67 
in addition to the normative language/discourses from the social sciences.68  
It can be said that the notion of ‘soft culture’ presents us with another way of 
looking at a social movement approach to development. It explicitly pertains to 
the characteristic of a ‘politics of unlimited space’ that we have emphasised in 
this study69 and fully draws on the ethico-political language of the new social 
movements, that is, predominantly in the sense of Manuel Castells’s notion of 
‘project identities’. Yet, as indicated by the concept of ‘soft culture’, the focus 
here is, beyond anything else, on the aspect of culture. This focus pertains to a 
description of society and human behaviour in which the cultural element merges 
with the aspect of spirituality, values and ethics. In this sense, ‘soft culture’ 
constitutes the counterpoint to a contemporary society characterised by hard, 
macho (male) culture, aggression and egoism – values which have been 
internalised in society’s structures and institutions and in human behaviour in 
general. In all, we can say that the idea of ‘soft culture’ is to serve as the ultimate 
expression of a totally different society (that is, different to the existing one), as a 
concept giving contents to new meaningful expressions of thinking, living, doing 
and relating in society as a whole. 
It must be stressed (in accordance with our adherence to the notion of ‘project 
identities’ here) that the expression of ‘soft culture’ does not merely relate to 
what many theorists of an ‘alternative development’ or ‘post-development’ 
notion understand as the recovering of traditional cultures (as the embodiment 
of ‘Gemeinschaft’ versus ‘Geselschaft’) (see Goulet 1995:137-152; Esteva 1993:20-
23; 1987; 125-152; Rahnema 1993a:127; 1993b:169-172; Verhelst 1992:Parts I-IV). 
Denoting a common project of transformation that relates to the whole of 
humanity, it indeed challenges a hegemonic70 and homogenising superstructure 
and cultural transformation that are suppressing local cultural traditions. At the 
same time, however, it also focuses on the suppressive elements inherent to 
                                                          
67 With reference to footnote 64 of this chapter, here we have the clearest case in point of the selective 
discursive contribution by the churches (and other religious institutions) to the third public that is 
formulated (partly!) within their own realm. 
68 It will become clear in the course of the discussion in this subsection that the social scientific perspective 
is not neglected and how we, in fact, to a greater extent draw on its contribution to formulate our 
perspective on the churches’ participation in ‘soft culture’. 
69 See the exposition of this characteristic in the introduction and 5.4.  
70 In his essay on “Critical Political Economy” Robert Cox has given a definition of ‘hegemonic culture’ that 
he linked in a direct way to the contemporary American way of life. He meaningfully stated: “The 
question of consumption models is closely linked to the question of hegemony. In the terms I have used, 
an indicator of hegemony would be a preponderant ontology that tends to absorb or subordinate all others. 
One intersubjective understanding of the world excludes all others and appears to be universal. It is often 
said that although United States economic power in the world has experienced a relative decline, the 
American way of life has never been a more powerful model. An American derived ‘business civilization’, 
to use Susan Strange’s term, characterizes the globalizing elites; and American pop culture has projected an 
image of the good life that is a universal object of emulation - a universalized model of consumption. This 
constitutes a serious obstacle to the rethinking of social practices so as to be more compatible with the 
biosphere.” (1995:43) 
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traditional cultures, such as hierarchy, patriarchy, autarchy, sexism and 
fundamentalism. As it is a project geared towards greater humanisation, a mere 
romanticisation of traditional cultures as representing the (re)generation of true 
humanity is resisted.  
In the above sense, of pertaining to the whole of humanity, of going beyond 
human diversity, the aspect of ‘soft culture’ can also be related to the aspect of a 
global ethic that was discussed earlier.71 It can be defined as the internalisation of 
a global ethic, of a spirit of compassion, of tolerance, of moderation, of solidarity 
in the overall behaviour, attitude and interaction of people in society. Closely 
related to a proposal by Johan Galtung for a social development project of 
‘restructuration’ and ‘reculturation’, we may here speak of what Galtung refers to 
as the need for “binding normative culture” and “binding ethical rules” or “norms” 
to become rooted in human beings - over against prevailing norms that are not 
binding, which is the meaning of “culturelessness” (“anomie”) (1996:394, 397-
398). 
To continue with Galtung’s perspective, he determined that the aspect of ‘soft 
culture’ also needs to find concrete expression in society’s structural and 
institutional formations. For him, the realisation of ‘soft culture’, in a project of 
social development, is inseparable from the rehumanisation of society’s 
structures and institutions. “What is needed is humanity.” (1996:410) This 
would, according to Galtung, first of all lie in the recreation, or strengthening, of 
what he calls “Beta structures”, those structural and institutional formations of a 
micro kind expressing intimate, horizontal relationships. They are structures that 
not only include close family and friends, but also colleagues and neighbours, 
workplaces and voluntary organisations (1996:386). 
While the emphasis is on Beta structures (because ‘small is beautiful’), it has to 
be recognised that some macro structural and institutional formations remain 
important, what Galtung calls “Alpha structures” (because ‘some big is 
necessary’). However, the goal would be to rehumanise Alpha, to “create Beta 
inside Alpha of any kind - bureaucratic, corporate, academic” (1996:408-409). It 
is a kind of Beta innovation well illustrated in number of contemporary 
examples: the colloquium at university, the Grameen Bank (introduced in 
Bangladesh) in banking; the so-called ‘Zehnergruppen’, groups of ten people 
working together in economic organisations in the former East Germany; the 
‘Wohngemeinschaft’ (WG), which signifies ‘communes’ of like-minded people 
living and consuming together, and sharing all the work of the household - an 
extended family except for the kinship factor (1996:410).72  
                                                          
71 See 7.3.1. 
72 One may draw a close parallel here between Galtung’s notion and examples of Beta formations and Ulrich 
Duchrow’s notion and examples of small-scale alternatives discussed in 7.3.1.  
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Importantly, in the context of this study, it can be pointed out how Galtung 
finally appreciates the potential contribution of religion to the realisation of ‘soft 
culture’. For him, religion’s special contribution is its unifying potential, that is, 
“(t)he notion of religion as linking, connecting, unifying” (1996:411). If we may 
interpret this further, it pertains to religion’s potential to create community and 
solidarity through a new spirit of compassion for others. Yet, it is a new spirit of 
compassion that should, first and foremost, start with religion itself, with an inner 
struggle to promote the softer (unifying) aspects of the various religions and to 
demote their harder aspects (that is, aspects that make religion as much one of 
the most destructive and divisive forces in society). In Galtung’s own words: 
Thus the most important struggle in the religio-scape ... is not the 
traditional struggle among religions as to which one is the most 
suited to carry humanity forward, but the inner struggle between 
the unifying and the divisive forces ... The important point is that 
the struggle is within rather than between and that each religion has 
this struggle on its agenda.73 Moreover, the harder aspects 
(Inquisition, witch-burning) have no doubt contributed to giving 
religion a bad name. Quakers and Sufis, Buddhists and Baha’is offer 
much softer approaches, but none of them would be entirely free 
from the harder aspects. For humanists this would imply a softening 
of the line they sometimes draw between themselves and the 
religionists, following the tradition of eighteenth century Europe. In 
short, there is a message to everybody in the world that is No. 1 in 
the vocabulary of the present Dalai Lama: compassion. (1996:411-
412) 
In accordance with the above framework we can speak more specifically about 
the Christian churches’ contribution to ‘soft culture’. Such a contribution 
requires from the churches, amidst the wave of fundamentalism currently 
overwhelming their ranks, to install a new spirit of tolerance and open-
mindedness amongst their membership towards others outside their direct circle, 
which should be extended to seeking new relations of partnership and solidarity 
with the latter in the field of fourth generation development. Furthermore, it 
asks of the churches to make the contents of a global ethic (in so far this has 
already been conceptualised) the basis of their message. At the heart of this 
should be a new message of compassion, as the highest marker of authentic 
religion to be rendered to all people, notwithstanding their descent – indeed, as 
                                                          
73 Such a starting-point for religion is also recognised in Declaration toward a Global Ethic of the Parliament 
of the World’s Religions that was discussed in 7.3.1. This document acknowledges that religion’s 
contribution to a global ethic can only occur after eliminating “those conflicts which spring from the 
religions themselves, dismantling mutual arrogance, mistrust, prejudice, and even hostile images, and thus 
demonstrate respect for the traditions, holy places, feasts, and rituals of people who believe differently” 
(Parliament 1993:22). 
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the highest marker giving sense and purpose to human life. Such a contribution 
should not, however, be conceptualised on the level of ideas alone, on bringing a 
particular message. In accordance with an integrated cultural/structural 
perspective, such a contribution anticipates that the churches themselves will 
become creative contributors of new Beta formations as envisioned by Galtung 
and as set out in 7.3.1.74 
In addition to the above, however, there would still be a consistent need to 
further fill in and enrich the notion of ‘soft culture’, over and above the already 
stated perspectives. It can be proposed that this is to be realised in particular 
through an engagement in feminist discourse, as a most important reactive and 
proactive discourse against male-infused hard culture. As Peta Bowden explains, 
in this discourse we are, for instance, presented with discourses of caring, with 
an “ethics of care” that is given further contents by a number of concepts 
denoting a variety of specific caring relationships and practices, namely 
mothering, friendship, nursing and citizenship (1997:2). Confronting the existing, 
dominant “morality of gender inequality itself” and expressing the multiple 
practices of a new “gender-sensitive ethics”, a particularly challenging aspect of 
such an “ethics of care”, in Bowden’s conceptualisation, is to overcome “the 
traditional split between public and private values” and to extend the concept of 
caring “beyond the familiar ground of close, personal relationships into a realm of 
more attenuated and formalized practices” – that is, into the public realm 
(1997:8-9, 17). For Bowden, this would require “social restructuring that enables 
both wider responsibility for nurture and participatory parity for women in 
public affairs” (1997:154). An “ethics of care” needs to go beyond and challenge 
existing ‘progressive’ social restructuring processes in the public sector, by 
demanding “a reconceived citizen ethics that reaches beyond the confines of 
distributive justice” (1997:155). This is because of the fact that the latter has not 
really challenged the “relations of dominance and dependency, as well as the 
distributive norms” that social and political institutions conventionally sustain 
(ibid.).  
Bowden maintained that women who had taken responsibility for caring 
practices have only been permitted “marginal status in public and citizenship 
practices”; and, within the activities of the public sphere itself, social relations 
have instead followed the same pattern, whereby female occupations are 
frequently subordinated to, and based on, servicing males’ work. Bowden 
elaborates on this point: 
Where responsibility for caring practices is acknowledged in the 
public sphere, the great majority of service workers are women 
whose ‘natural’ caring activities are frequently defined as unskilled 
labour and paid accordingly. Thus public policies that uphold and 
                                                          
74 See footnote 72 of this chapter. 
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exploit the ideology of family-based practices of care 
simultaneously play into social structures that sustain multi-layered 
relations of dominance and subordination, and support women’s 
dependency in citizenship. (1997:157) 
To end off our brief exploration of Bowden’s work, her perspective on the 
possibilities of reversing the ongoing relations of dominance and subordination 
suffered by women (and thus of reversing hard culture!) could be meaningfully 
explained by indicating how it well reflects Anthony Giddens’s notion of a ‘life 
politics’ that he propagated in one of his recent articles. For Giddens, in short, a 
new “politics of life decisions” and new life-style practices have emerged in a 
contemporary, detraditionalised society of manufactured risks and uncertainty, 
according to which people (in the industrialised and developing worlds) are 
beginning to reorientate their lives towards different values (1996:372-373). 
Giddens also refers to this as “life-style bargaining” in which various “life-political 
actions between different groups of people” have taken shape (1996:374). 
In this regard, specifically under the banner of what he has identified as 
“emotional life-style bargaining”, Giddens has ventured into Bowden’s terrain. 
For Giddens, too, a particularly important phenomenon of emotional life-style 
bargaining has come to be the changing relations between the sexes, whereby 
women across the world are today staking a claim to forms of autonomy 
previously denied or unavailable to them. While it very much points to a claim 
by women to achieve equal economic and political rights with men (thus to 
what Giddens identified elsewhere in his essay as traditional “emancipatory 
politics”), this claim, according to Giddens, also extends to the social and 
cultural level, into the realm of ‘life politics’ as “it raises issues to do with the 
very definition of what it is to be a woman, and therefore a man, in 
detraditionalizing societies and cultures” (1996:376). 
To return more specifically to Bowden, the above notion in Giddens, of a new 
‘life politics’ by individuals and groups/coalitions, overlaps with Bowden’s 
further perspective on the possibilities to overcome what she sees as the 
prevailing relations of domination and subordination of women in society (that 
is, the not yet realised “new social contract between men and women” 
envisioned by Giddens (ibid.)). Accordingly, Bowden also emphasised the role of 
(conscientised) public participants75 to carry forward “their personal experiences 
and aspirations of alternative practices” into the domain of citizenship. Through 
this kind of ‘life politics’ (Giddens), she anticipates a double process of conflict 
and change that would take place increasingly in the public realm, changing 
institutional and social structures, linking the private with the public domain, 
and influencing and changing the collective value system and public debate. 
                                                          
75 One assumes from the larger context of Bowden’s discussion that the reference is here to female and male 
participants. 
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Taking the example of Scandinavian countries as a particularly good case to 
illustrate her point, she explained: 
These possibilities for the transformation of allegedly personal 
interests into the broader concerns conventionally associated with 
citizenship are matched by opportunities to reconfigure the 
conventions of citizenship itself. While they are caught up within 
the dominant constructions of care-giving and citizenship, public 
participants also bring with them their personal experiences and 
aspirations of alternative practices. And it is with these 
understandings of the possibilities and choices, that different 
practices of care and different relations of citizenship allow, that 
they are able to ‘work within-against’ - to contest, reconceive, and 
change conventional relations of citizen care from within their 
conventional positions of involvement. 
These movements for change may not be swift: frequently, they 
entail humiliating compromise, tokenism and appropriation. But 
the sites of structural contradiction and conflict within the ‘system’ 
- the overlapping realms of both ‘social services’, and personal and 
informal caring - retain the potential for producing new norms, 
symbols and meanings for citizen care. Commentaries, on the 
Scandinavian experience at least, indicate that ‘conscious 
institutionalization’ of connections between public and private, 
community and personal aspects of life, has enabled women to 
become important partners in citizenship ... [T]he treatment of 
responsibility for nurture as a public issue is facilitating the 
rethinking of public values that connect the marginalization of 
women and their practices of care, the injustices of gendered labour 
arrangements and the irresponsibility of most men with regard to 
our intrinsic vulnerabilities and interdependencies. In this respect, 
Jane Lewis and Gertrude Astrom report that ‘attitude surveys show 
that all Swedish men between the ages of twenty-one and sixty at 
least feel that they should participate in unpaid [care] work.’ 
(1997:163-164)  
Thus, we can propose that the above notion of ‘life politics’, particularly as 
informed by feminist perspectives of caring, poses a further challenge to the 
churches’ understanding and contribution to ‘soft culture’. For the churches, it 
firstly implies that the discourse and practice of ‘soft culture’ is not something to 
be perceived as distinct from this world, as something ‘soft’ and exotic that is 
peculiar only to certain domains or spheres and to certain people. It can be said 
that the imperative to bear witness to their faith through word and deed has 
always been central, in one way or another, to the message and self-
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understanding of the churches. But this, generally speaking, has rather been 
understood as something a-political and separate from the question of structures 
and institutionalisation, political, economic and social. 
As opposed to this self-understanding, the notion of ‘life politics’ challenges the 
churches to a new understanding of their faith, a politicisation thereof according 
to different social movement values not conceptualised and practised merely 
from within their own circle, but outside their direct domain - amongst and 
with other actors, social movements, etc. It thus challenges the churches and 
their members to adopt new forms of struggle and solidarity, in this world and 
with others not necessarily belonging to their own circle. In close connection to 
the discussion in the previous subsection, it challenges the churches to go public, 
to speak a language and engage in practices that, in terms of their own language 
and practices, converge with the ‘worldly’ language and practices of a new ‘life 
politics’ and ‘soft culture’. Consequently, it is a language and practice in which 
both the churches and other actors of a life politics should find many common 
denominators: compassion, care, tolerance, respect (for others), modesty, 
solidarity, etc. 
Secondly, it is especially Bowden’s feminist perspective that further challenges 
the churches’ understanding of a ‘life politics’ and ‘soft culture’. Adopting a 
public identity, this perspective implies, is not enough as one of the most crucial 
inner transformations that still ought to take place in a largely male-biased and 
male-dominating church sector, has to do with the place of women in the churches 
and their contribution to transforming theology. Yet, having said this, perhaps 
one of the silent but most meaningful revolutions within the churches over 
recent decades has been a new confirmation of women and feminist theology in 
the churches.76 This confirmation constitutes an emerging revolution in the 
churches that can certainly be considered to have made, and continues to make, 
an important contribution to the feminist movement. And in this new 
theological and ecclesiastical voice (collectively speaking) the language of ‘soft 
culture’ may also be heard. 
In a book entitled, With Passion and Compassion: Third World Women Doing 
Theology, by women from Africa, Asia and Latin America, we may, for instance, 
note how Ana Maria Tepedino has written about “Feminist Theology as the 
Fruit of Passion and Compassion”. In this essay Tepedino writes about women’s 
struggle “against male-chauvinist ideology, which dehumanizes both men and 
women” (1989:166). Thus, she claims that the struggle ought to be a collective 
endeavour by women and men, and that women theologians should invite their 
male theological colleagues to join them in the struggle to give birth together to a 
new theology. Moreover, the starting-point for feminist theology ought to go 
“beyond the experience of oppression, the experience of God, and the struggle 
                                                          
76 Cf. here Richard Falk’s appreciation of feminist religion in section 7.3.1. 
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for justice” to the “practice of tenderness” (ibid., italics added). According to 
Tepedino, such dynamics needs to be all-embracing in terms of humanity as a 
whole, by seeking to create brotherly and sisterly relationships not simply 
between men and women, but also among the elderly, adolescents, and children. 
In a further, concrete sense, Tepedino stipulates that women in the ecclesial base 
communities have shown the way to the practice of such tenderness through the 
many life-giving initiatives in which they are involved and have taken the lead: 
the various movements for health, day-care centres, and schools; the community 
movements for land reform; the volunteer crews to construct housing; ecology 
projects; the movement to create an alternative to contemporary wasteful, 
consumerist, individualistic and hedonistic society (ibid.). 
In addition, the word passion emphasised in Tepedino’s above-mentioned essay 
title should attract our attention to this as a term that further informs the 
meaning of ‘soft culture’. Used as a twin concept with ‘compassion’, ‘passion’ 
here appears to denote the emotive aspect of women’s practice of tenderness 
mentioned above. For Tepedino, women do theology with passion, by 
passionately and wholeheartedly engaging with the subject themselves, by 
striving to fill their ideas with lived experience. As expressed in the following 
definition, they allow themselves to become totally possessed and unswerving in 
their struggle for new meaningful life. 
Passion, allowing oneself to be possessed, is the essence of the 
mystical experience and of the erotic experience as well, involving 
every fiber of one’s being at one peak moment, which explodes 
with energy and vitality for carrying on the struggle. (1989:168) 
While we could find in Tepedino’s perspective an important indicator for the 
churches’ contribution to ‘soft culture’, for transforming the churches and 
theology through a feminist input, there would still be scope for a further 
movement along the line of ‘resistance identities’ to ‘project identities’ that we 
are aspiring towards in this study.77 This is, for instance, illustrated by the above 
definition by Tepedino in which the notions of “passion” and “erotic experience” 
are related to the notion of “struggle”. Certainly, this cannot be the full story 
about human purpose and fulfilment. For the churches in particular, it means 
that neither a mere ‘struggle’ paradigm (even if this is filled with a more 
proactive contents), nor a world-denouncing Puritanism will do. It holds that a 
great challenge for the churches remains the development of a new ‘theology of 
joy’, as creative supplement to their worldly ‘theologies of struggle’.  
It must be concluded that ‘soft culture’ does not per se stand juxtaposed to the 
notions of pleasure, joy and passion (the latter term used here not in the above 
                                                          
77 This adherence to the notion of ‘project identities’ has been stated repeatedly in 7.3.1. See also the end of 
Chapter Six. 
The Churches’ Participation in Fourth Generation Development 
 239
sense of ‘struggle’ but in the sense of denoting sensuality), but affirms them 
rather. Here we may refer to Jürgen Moltmann, the distinguished German 
theologian, who once asked in an earlier work on ‘theology and joy’ whether it 
can be regarded as right to laugh, to play and to dance in a world of so much 
suffering; whether the cultural revival of play, festivities and enjoyment in the 
affluent West is not forced and downright unnatural as long as there are so many 
hells on earth. “How can we laugh and rejoice when there are still so many tears 
to be wiped away and when new tears are being added every day?”  
Moltmann gave a positive answer to these questions: creative play and enjoyment 
anticipates and constitutes the true liberation and freedom of humanity. But this 
does not mean a neglect of suffering and injustice in the present world, as 
Moltmann addressed himself to “those who are mourning and suffering with 
others, who are protesting and feeling oppressed by the excess of evil in their 
society”. What really matters is for humanity to learn “to distinguish between the 
alienated forms of merely apparent good fortune and the liberating forms of 
enjoyment” (1973:27-28).  
Thus, for Moltmann the art of creative play and enjoyment prepares for, and 
anticipates, the liberated, future society (see 1973:36-37). In his final chapter he 
proposes as a special challenge for Christians and Christian congregations to 
“experiment with the possibilities of creative freedom”, to become “testing 
grounds of the realm of freedom right in the realm of necessity” (1973:85). In the 
context of what Moltmann wrote earlier, a kind of freedom is implied that 
stands opposed to much of the Christian tradition’s unconditional 
denouncement of pleasure and the abolition of the “games of freedom”: the 
Puritans, the Neo-Puritans, the Reformation, the larger Protestant tradition 
(1973:34-35). 
But as Moltmann further commented, not only Christians have disregarded the 
culture of pleasure. This was just as much a characteristic of their secular 
counterparts, the socialist revolutions. As Moltmann observed ironically, “(i)n 
Prague the 1948 revolution closed down 2,000 coffeehouses, restaurants and beer 
gardens, the very ones in which the revolution itself had once been debated and 
plotted” (1973:35). 
Of course, it must be said some 25 years after Moltmann wrote these comments 
that the question today is rather about an alternative to the hard culture of 
contemporary global capitalism, which has almost completely denounced and 
replaced socialism and religious asceticism. It should be concluded, however, 
that on ethical, existential and religious grounds, the answer does not lie in a 
return to either of the latter. For Moltmann, in this regard, the answer would 
rather be to wrest control of the alienated games of society from the ruling 
interests and to change them into games of freedom (ibid.). In the same vein 
Peter Waterman, in his reflection on alternatives to global capitalism in view of 
an anticipated project of “Global Solidarity Culture”, has suggested that there 
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may be a thin line separating an alternative society and culture from capitalist 
society and culture. According to him, the answer would lie rather in processes 
of selective rejections and rearticulations by means of the many different voices 
participating in a common project of solidarity and transformation: 
The identification here of global problems rather than universal 
enemies requires us to formulate and develop viable, convincing, 
attractive, and “enjoyable” global solutions. The word enjoyable is 
crucial here. Insofar as we recognize how state-nationalism and 
globalized capital capitalize (literally and figuratively) on 
enjoyment, those seeking to surpass capitalism must shrug off their 
fear of hatred of pleasure, sensuality, lust and individual 
consumption ... The notion of a worldwide Maoist Cultural 
Revolution will attract few - especially among people who have 
been already subjected to such puritanical authoritarianism and its 
accompanying hypocrisies ... If we reject revolutionary historical 
schemas, then we can extend globally the notion Calderon (1987) 
has applied to Latin America, of living in “mixed times.” Such a 
notion undermines the binary oppositions of Traditional-Modern 
and Modern-Postmodern, reminding us that we live in a historical 
world, not just a sociological or linguistic universe. Realistic global 
utopias will then represent nor negations of either “premodernity” 
or “modernity”, but selective rejections and rearticulations - 
implying the necessary contribution also of those living under, 
rediscovering, or valuing precapitalistic civilizations and cultures. 
(1996a:49-50) 
7.4 Conclusion 
Development, education, communication and humanization are all 
part of the same process. Process means progression, creation, 
moving upwards and towards what is both desirable and ‘better’ 
(more human) ... The word ‘development’ should then be reserved 
for what it was coined for in the first place: to indicate growth, yes, 
but also and above all to invoke creation, culture, education, 
ownership and control, the satisfaction of fundamental human 
needs and everything involving autonomous human agency. Raff 
Carmen (1996:209) 
The above quotation from Raff Carmen’s book, Autonomous Development. 
Humanizing the Landscape: An Excursion into Radical Thinking and Practice, 
fittingly concludes our perspective on the churches and the contemporary 
development debate in this study. Indeed, we may note that the four beacons of 
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complementary third and fourth generation strategic development action 
identified in this chapter reflect Carmen’s conclusion of a broader and richer 
concept of development, one that also incorporates social scientific and ethical 
concepts and discourses that traditionally do not belong to the explicit and overt 
language of development. 
For the churches (and other religious institutions), perhaps more than any other 
actor of development, such a broader, richer and at times less traditional concept 
of development would seem to be far more appropriate to their nature as ‘idea’ 
and ‘value’ institutions and (presumed) orientation towards holistic human well-
being. In accordance with the perspective on complementary third and fourth 
generation strategic development action that has been explored in this study, the 
churches are challenged to invest to a far lesser degree in ‘development’ activities 
of a first and second generation nature - activities that are the less sophisticated 
expressions of development in the traditional sense of the word. As actors that 
(presumably) want to make a durable contribution, they are challenged to adapt 
and reorientate themselves to the third and fourth generation strategic 
development practices, which may first of all relate to innovative interventions 
in the traditional economic and political (or public) areas of development.  
Yet the concept of fourth generation development strategies - an understanding 
of strategic development action that we adhered to predominantly in this study - 
challenges the churches to focus especially on their (anticipated) contribution to 
the now emerging broader, richer and less traditional understandings/discourses 
of development in normative development and social sciences debates. These 
are new understandings/discourses of development that do not neglect the more 
traditional areas of development. However, they broaden the scope of 
development and move on to aspects that can be regarded as vital to greater 
social well-being, to transforming the lives of the poor and addressing oppression 
in its fullest sense, and to the creation of a society (globally speaking) that truly 
progresses on the path towards greater humanisation (following Carmen). In this 
sense, they are understandings/discourses that seek to transform the traditional 
areas of development as well as to go beyond those areas to emphasise other 
dimensions or aspects of human and social life. 
On the part of the churches, the new emerging fourth generation strategic 
development orientation - which is infinitely broader and richer on a conceptual, 
relational and ethical level in comparison with traditional development thinking 
and praxis - challenges them to a fundamental introspection. It challenges them 
to new levels of normative social-scientific discourse and specialisation. Above 
all, it challenges them to reconsider what their real strengths and purpose are in 
achieving development, or more preferably, in achieving a new just and human 
society. In that sense, it challenges them to excel as ‘idea’ and ‘value’ institutions 
in a renewed, more informed and concrete way - ‘idea’ and ‘value’ institutions 
that are not merely concerned with preserving or protecting their own peculiar 
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identity in the process, but engage in new relationships of solidarity and coalition 
with the contemporary movements of the poor and civil society with which 
they have (or ought to have) much in common. 
In conclusion, we have in this chapter (re)confirmed the prevailing relevance of 
the ecumenical development debate.78 This, certainly, is a debate or discourse 
representing an intellectual road that has not been travelled by the majority in 
the churches. It is a debate or discourse that must be sharply distinguished from 
the so-called evangelical development thinking, which is dominant in the 
churches today and which, on the basis of underlying ideological and structural 
constraints, cannot take the churches beyond the first and second generation 
orientations.79 At the same time, the ecumenical development debate or 
discourse and the churches’ adherence to that debate or discourse need to find 
new impetus in the modes of complementary third and fourth generation 
discourse and action that we have identified in this chapter. The ecumenical 
development debate and the churches’ adaptation to such modes will enable 
them to overcome the state of erosion and impasse in which they currently find 
themselves. Through their engagement in such modes they may become a 
significant actor contributing to true human development. 
                                                          
78 See 7.2. 
79 This can be argued on the basis of the exposition in Chapter One, which remains very much applicable to 
contemporary evangelical thinking on development. See also footnote 17 of this chapter. 
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